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




*James B. Fowler*  
THE

**BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.**


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THE  
  
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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JANUARY, 1842.

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ART. I. — *New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church.* By O. A. BROWNSON. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. ix. and 116.

It is not very customary for an author to be his own reviewer; and yet there is no good reason why it should not be. The reviewer might then always have the advantage, not slight, of reviewing a work which he has at least read, and a subject in which he most likely takes a warm personal interest. Our purpose, however, is not so much to review this little book which we published a few years since, as to bring its subject, with some additional developments, more distinctly before the public.

This little book, one of the earliest of our publications that we would not forget, is not without its faults, and some of them very grave; but we value it more than anything else that we have published. It is, upon the whole, the most genuine statement of our whole thought, of the principles which we believe must form the basis of the future Church, that we have made. It has been now some five or six years before the public, without having attracted much attention, although it has not failed to secure some warm friends. And yet its success has been all that could have been reasona-



bly anticipated. It is hardly fitted to be a popular work; not indeed because its style and language want clearness and precision, nor because its subject-matter is beyond the reach of ordinary comprehension; but because it is altogether too brief in its developments, and too abstract and general in its statements; and also because it is written from a point of view foreign to the great majority of our countrymen.

The general scope and design of the work have in most cases been misapprehended; not altogether through the fault of the author, but through the want of familiarity on the part of its readers with the order of thought, which it seeks on the one hand to develop and on the other to combat. The design of the work was to state simply, briefly, but distinctly, the general principles which must govern the religious and social future of the race; but so to state them as to refute the errors of a school, becoming somewhat powerful in the old world, and which might possibly ere long find its way to our own country. In a word, the work presupposes in almost every page the writings of the Saint-Simonians, and especially Henry Heine's *De l'Allemagne*. The author, writes with these works constantly before his eyes, and labors, on the one hand, to show the Church that it may accept the truths they contain, without involving itself in their errors; and, on the other hand, to show their authors that they can accept Christianity without becoming responsible for the unquestionable errors of the Church. But this, as it was done without any formal statement, could be apparent only to such as had read the writings in question; and as these were but few, comparatively speaking, the real purport of the book could not be generally conceived.

The Saint-Simonians, as a religious body have been dissolved; but their doctrines in a modified form, are perhaps the only doctrines that are at the present moment really making any progress in either France or Germany. They are no ordinary doctrines, and their influence on the future of mankind cannot be easily

calculated. They contain truths of the highest order, of the most comprehensive reach, — and truths, too, which must and will rise to dominion. But these truths, perfectly harmonious with the principles of the Gospel, nay, which are but the growth of the fundamental principles of the Gospel, are brought out in opposition to Christianity, and supposed by their authors to involve necessarily its destruction. With them Christianity was a very good thing in its day; and in the development of the race, in the institution and growth of a higher order of civilization, it has served a very useful purpose; but the race has now outgrown it, and demands not merely a new church, but a new religion. Against this view of Christianity this book of ours was written. We saw that the ground of attack upon religion was shifted, and that therefore it had become necessary to shift the ground of defence. The old sneers and cavils, the old attempts to impeach the purity of its morals, or the completeness of its chain of historical evidence, were to be abandoned; and Christianity was to be accepted, but not as a living religion, having the right and the power to command men's obedience; but as a religion of the past, divine and authoritative for yesterday, and therefore to be held in grateful recollection; but worthless for to-day. We wished to prepare for this new species of warfare, indeed to prevent it, by separating the truths of the Church from its errors, and the truths of this new school from its errors, and showing that the truths of both were coincident with the teachings of Jesus. This was our aim in the book, and time is fast showing that our precautionary movement was not uncalled for.

For the book itself we have the greater affection from the fact, that it did not turn out to be precisely such a book as we contemplated when we sat down to write. We had contemplated accomplishing our purpose, by attempting little more than to establish the general fact, that all religions are progressive, and that the elements of Christianity are comprehensive enough for a religion adequate to any conceivable stage of

human advancement. We had written some eight or nine chapters with this view, when one day, as we were writing, a sentence passed from the pen to the paper, which, as soon as it was written down and contemplated, seemed to be a key that unlocked the whole mystery of the historical development of the Church. Suddenly, man's whole history, from the indefinite past to the illimitable future, seemed to lie open in broad sunlight to the intense gaze of the writer. The whole book was given him in a glance, and in writing it, henceforth, he did little else than transfer to his pages what that glance revealed to him. The original plan was abandoned, and the chapters already written, condensed into the first four pages which serve as an introduction, and the book sent out as it is. This fact may be worth nothing to the public, but it is worth something to the author; and although he asks no respect to be paid to the book on the account of it, yet this fact gives it additional authority in his own mind, — the authority due to veritable inspiration.

The book was published, the vision which remained till it was written vanished, and man and his history became as dark an enigma to the writer as ever. He lost sight of the great leading principle of the book, and continued his philosophical and historical investigations as before, and as if nothing had occurred. The result has been, that after five years of intense application, he has come to the same conclusions by a different process. He, therefore, finds the book once again in his experience, and reaffirms it.

The views here given, perhaps, should not be called new, for taken separately, many of them may be found elsewhere; but the book, taken as a whole, in its leading principle, in its spirit and design, is truly original. It was at least original with the writer; and if others have taken similar views, we have not seen their statement of them. But the question of its newness, or of its originality, is of very little consequence. The only important questions concerning it are, What

are these views? Are they true? Are they comprehensive, and likely to be fruitful in important results? For an answer to these questions we refer to the book itself. In what follows we shall endeavor to set forth some of them again, and in a form less abstract and general. The book in fact is faulty in respect to the form in which it states the views of the writer. His desire to say all, and his unwillingness to make a large book, induced him to adopt a form of expression which is altogether too abstract. More is meant than appears, and more than most readers can find, till they have learned in part the author's views from some other source.

Man lives only by virtue of some theory of the universe, which solves for him the problem of his existence and destiny, and prescribes a life-plan which he must endeavor to realize. This theory, whatever it be, or however obtained, is what man names RELIGION. It is always his highest conception of God and of the law of his own being. Religion is then the Ideal, and man's effort to realize it. To be religious man must act with his whole nature, and strive with all his strength, intelligence, and love, to realize the Ideal in every department of life, in the individual, in the family, in the State, in the world, in industry, science, and art.

The CHURCH is the organization of mankind for the peaceable, orderly, and successful realization of the Christian Ideal, or the Ideal as beheld by the early followers of Jesus. The Ideal as thus beheld was below the infinite, below that of Jesus even, and therefore could be only for a time. It could not be the Ideal for the race through all the stages of its progress. The Church, in its origin, though never embracing the true Christian Ideal in its fulness, was nevertheless a genuine Church of the Ideal. It was far in advance of all preceding organizations of mankind, and must be redeeming and ameliorating in its influence, till it had brought the Christian nations up even with itself.

Up even with itself the Church has now brought the Christian world. The civilization it has created is even in some respects in advance of it. For a thousand years and more, it was the Church of the Ideal. It was the depository of the intelligence, the wisdom, the virtue, the aspirations of the race. It proposed a work for humanity, and directed individual and social activities in the path of progress. But it now looks no more to the future. It has realized its Ideal. It proposes no new labors for civilization, makes no new demands on the race in behalf of progress. It therefore loses sight of the end for which it was instituted, and must now turn its face once more to the future, embrace the Ideal, or give way for a New Church, which shall be an organization of mankind, not to retain the past, but to conquer the future. Humanity eternally aspires. It sees ever before it new heights to be scaled, new victories to be won, and is always eager to march. It cannot be stayed. Ever does the Ideal hover before its actual position, commanding it to advance, and forbidding it to halt, much less encamp. If the Church will not lead, humanity will displace it, choose a new leader, and go on without it in its career of battle and conquest.

The Church was originally based on the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Word, or the Divine Ideal, in the man Christ Jesus, and on that of the distinction of the two principles, Spirit and Matter, making spirit the principle of good, and matter the principle of evil.

The ancient philosophers, especially Pythagoras and Plato, conceived of the Logos or Word of God. But with them this word was a pure idea. It existed, but merely in the abstract. It might be an object of contemplation, and of a sort of metaphysical admiration, to the few choice spirits, able to rise to its conception; but it was hidden from the mass, without life, and without power to mould the character of the individual, or to direct the action of society to the common advancement of the race. Few only can rise to the abstract, and those few derive no life from it. The Word of

God, however prominent a place it may hold in systems of metaphysics, cannot be the wisdom of God, and the power of God unto salvation, until incarnated, clothed with flesh, and seen living and breathing, acting and loving, toiling and suffering, and dying and rising from the dead, for the redemption of man. God is for us only in his word, and his word is regenerating only as made flesh, and seen to "dwell among us full of grace and truth."

Men strive in their minds to form a conception of an infinite, all-perfect, abstract being, which they may call God; and in their hearts they strive to love and reverence him. Vain effort. There are no abstractions in absolute life. God is no abstraction, but an infinite concrete. He may be perceived, but only relatively, and the view which is taken of him must be always finite and inadequate. The finite, relative, inadequate conception we form of God is the Ideal, the only God there is for us, and to this Ideal we never attain by abstraction; to it we attain only so far as it is concreted, or revealed by the finite and relative beings falling under our observation.

The doctrine of the Incarnation of the Word, teaches us that there is for us no God, but "God manifest in the flesh." There is no God to love and reverence, but the God that lives and moves in, creates and sustains, what we actually see and know of the universe. God is to us *distinguishable*, but not *separable* from man and nature; as time is distinguishable from succession, but absolutely inconceivable without it; or space from extension, while without extension it were to us as if it were not. God, if we may so speak, is concreted in his works, a living God, instead of that cold, naked abstraction, which metaphysicians call God, satisfying the demands of a frigid logic it may be, but dead to the heart. Nevertheless, this living God, which we finite beings may know, love, and reverence, is not God in the infinite fulness of his being, but the Word of God, — God *uttered*, and uttered merely to our finite capacities. The absolute God is too vast for our feeble intel-

lects, too luminous for our obscure vision. No man hath seen his face at any time. Yet the living God, uttered in the living realities, we see and know, is in fact one with the Father. In knowing, loving, and reverencing the God thus made visible to us, we are in fact, knowing, loving, and reverencing the Absolute God, so far as our feeble faculties do or can attain to him.

The doctrine of the Incarnation also proclaims the dignity and worth of human nature, not of the human soul merely, but of man himself. The **WORD** is made flesh in a genuine Son of Man. Jesus is born of woman. Marriage and maternity are thus declared to be holy, and human nature itself to be kindred with the Divine. For what means this Mystery of the "**WORD** become flesh," if not that the highest and fullest manifestation of God, the most brilliant and adequate representation of God, of the Absolute God, is a genuine Son of Man, a true human being? Man was made in the image of God, is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person. He is the finite representative of the infinite God. He is then redeemed from the alleged degradation of his being, and declared to be worthy of love and reverence. The Incarnation, since it was in a man, a real man, a man born of woman, proclaims the dignity of man, and the divinity of his nature.

God is known, loved, revered, only in his visible manifestation. Man is this visible manifestation. To know, love, and reverence man, then, is to know, love, and reverence God, under the only possible form, and in the only acceptable manner. The love of God has no expression but in the love of man. Here is a basis, and a firm basis too, of a broad and genuine philanthropy, in view of which, the angels, all pure and loving spirits, hovering over the cradle of the infant Redeemer, might well shout, "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, and good will to men."

The effects of this doctrine of the Incarnation, are visible everywhere in modern civilization, in great part are it, and are seen in its more generous and humane

character over all the civilizations which preceded it ; in its tenderness of human life ; in the high rank it assigns to the virtues of meekness, gentleness, mercy, charity, modesty, chastity, and love ; in the high value it places on man as an individual ; in its emancipation of the slave, and general labors to promote liberty, and social well-being.

The Church, however, has but imperfectly comprehended this doctrine. It misapprehended it from the beginning ; but its misconceptions of it were of a nature to do no harm in the actual state of things for a long series of years ; but they now become mischievous and need to be corrected. The Church was right in what it asserted, wrong in what it denied. When it asserted the incarnation of the Ideal in Jesus, it asserted the truth ; when it asserted that it was and could be incarnated in only him, it erred ; and this latter error is the source of no small part of the present hostility it encounters.

The Church, by asserting the incarnation of the Ideal in the Son of Mary, has declared him to be a true Man, a genuine Son of God, and secured to him the love and reverence man owes to his God ; but, in restricting it to him, she has disinherited in some sort all the rest of the Sons of Men. She has secured to him no more love and reverence than was his due ; but had she properly interpreted the Mystery of God made flesh, she would have commanded that the same love and reverence be paid to every man, for every man is, in proportion to the quantity of his being, an incarnation, a visible manifestation of the Divinity. This truth the Church has overlooked in her intense admiration of Jesus ; and of all the Sons of Men she has found but one she could dignify with the name of the Son of God.

Jesus was all that the Church has alleged. He was verily the Son of God. He lived, toiled, suffered, and died, and rose again for the redemption of man. Of all the Sons of Men, in his epoch, he was eminently God's dear and well-beloved Son. He has been the father of a new age, the institutor of a new order of civilization,



the giver of a new life to the world, the real Mediator between God and men, and the literal Saviour of our souls. But viewed as the Son of Mary, the sympathizing brother of the poor and afflicted, he is not separated nor separable from the rest of the Sons of Men. He was a true brother Man. He was the Son of God. But we may say to-day, for to-day the truth can be apprehended, we are **ALL THE SONS OF GOD**, and therefore heirs of God, and joint heirs with Jesus. Not in Jesus alone does the Divine Ideal incarnate itself, but in every man, in all men, and therefore all men are brethren, and possessors of a divine nature.

This is the great truth which the Church must now accept and bring out, a truth which is nothing but the generalization of the particular truth, she has always contended for. The new Church, the Church of the Ideal, will be based on this generalization, and will therefore prescribe to its members the duty of loving and reverencing all men, as we have heretofore loved and revered Jesus. We love and reverence God, when we love and reverence man. Religious duty will be made henceforth to consist, not in abortive attempts to love and reverence a metaphysical abstraction, a mere logical entity, nor yet in loving and reverencing one only of the sons of men; but Humanity; nor yet Humanity in the abstract, man in general, but nobody in particular; but all the individual men and women who compose the race. This will not require us to love and reverence Jesus less, but his brethren more. All men will by this become sacred; each man will be a living shrine of the Godhead, a visible, speaking, loving symbol of the Father.

The actual Church is an organization for the worship of God, as revealed in one individual; the Church of the Future will be an organization for the worship of God as revealed in all men. The Ideal of the new Church will be the redemption and sanctification of the race, as the Ideal of the old Church was the redemption and sanctification of the individual; or the new will add to the old the redemption and sanctification

of the race. The new never lets go the old ; but retains it, and enlarges it, by making that general, which was before particular. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets ; I am not come to destroy, but to FULFIL." The effect of the new Church, or the new organization of mankind, for the express purpose of directing all activities, all intelligences, all sympathies, all industry, science, and art, to the realization of genuine love and reverence for all men, must baffle the most sanguine hope to calculate. The new Church will realize the vision of the angels, and enable all men from all the earth, with sweet and harmonious voices to echo their glad chorus. It will usher in the age of universal peace ; and all man's energies, which have so often been turned against his brother, and into instruments for making the earth a vast field of blood, will be employed in the useful or ornamental arts, and in promoting universal well-being. The groans of this nether world will cease. Man will stand erect, the image of his Maker, and look forth in joy upon a world made beautiful by his love. This SHALL be. The old Church will become the Church of the Ideal, or a new Church will be organized for its realization. The heart of universal Humanity cries out for it. Let him that hath ears hear.

II. The Oriental religions, which preceded the Church, all recognised the doctrine of two coeternal, coexisting, and mutually hostile principles, one the principle of Good, the other the principle of Evil. The Church has never formally embraced this doctrine ; it has condemned it even, in the Gnostic and especially the Manichæan heresies, and sought to reconcile the existence of Evil with the origin of all things in the principle of Good, by means of the dogmas of the revolt of angels and the fall of man. Nevertheless it has not wholly escaped it, but has reproduced it under the modified form of the original and inherent antagonism of spirit and matter, generating two classes of interests, mutually destructive one of the other, termed the one class celestial, or spiritual interests, and the other class

terrestrial, material, temporal, or carnal interests. The first class are regarded by the Church as supreme, permanent, eternal, holy ; the second class as low, variable, transitory, and essentially unholy. Hence, its constant effort has been to withdraw attention from the latter, and to fix it on the former ; to rescue men from the slavery of the flesh, and to make them free in the spirit.

This distinction of interests, and this labor of the Church, have not been without their good results. They have tended, in no slight degree, to purify the affections, to exalt the sentiments, and to promote the virtues of tenderness, meekness, gentleness, humility, chastity, and love. Men have been led to raise moral courage over physical, to prefer truth to riches, and poverty and obscurity to the pomp and majesty of the world. An army of true soldiers of the Cross has been reared and disciplined, eager to brave toil, suffering, danger, and death for the glory of God and the salvation of the soul. The history of missions and missionaries, from Paul to the Moravians, is a brilliant chapter in the history of humanity. The voluntary poverty of the mendicant orders, and of the great body of the Catholic clergy, reveals a faith that overcomes the world.

This separation of spiritual interests from material interests, involved necessarily a separation of Church and State. When Jesus came, the State was in the hands of the military society, and was organized for no higher Ideal than war and conquest ; or at best, the maintenance of civil order by military force, against foreign and domestic enemies. He said, therefore, "my kingdom is not of this age." I must wait till a more auspicious period, before mankind can be definitively organized for the peaceable and orderly pursuit of the Ideal. Therefore "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Civil society could not then be brought into accordance with Christian principles. In order to effect that, a higher order of civilization was needed. The Church therefore abandoned civil Society to Cæsar —

to rapine and violence, to ignorance and brutal passion ; while it labored exclusively in the spiritual sphere for the creation of a new order of civilization, which should ultimately redress the State, and bring it up to its own Ideal. In this sphere it labored with untiring zeal and perseverance from the first century to the fifteenth, and successfully laid the foundations of all that society now is. During the greater part of that period, by means of its superior intelligence and virtue, it ruled the State, modified its actions, and compelled its administrators to consult the rights of man, by protecting the poor, the feeble, and the defenceless. It is not easy to estimate the astonishing progress it effected for civilization, during that long period, called by narrow-minded and bigoted protestant historians the dark ages. Never before had such labors been performed for Humanity. Never before had there been such an immense body, as the Christian clergy, animated by a common spirit, and directed by a common will and intelligence to the cultivation and growth of the moral virtues and the arts of peace. Then was tamed the wild barbarian, and the savage heart made to yield to the humanizing influences of tenderness, gentleness, meekness, humility, and love ; then imperial crown, and royal sceptre paled before the crosier, and the representative of him, who had lived, and toiled, and preached, and suffered, and died in obscurity, in poverty and disgrace, was exalted, and made himself felt in the palace and in the cottage, in the court and the camp, striking terror into the rich and noble, and pouring the oil and wine of consolation into the bruised heart of the poor and friendless. Wrong, wrong have they been, who have complained that kings and emperors were subjected to the spiritual head of Christendom. It was well for man, that there was a power above the brutal tyrants called emperors, kings, and barons, who rode rough shod over the humble peasant and artisan, — well that there was a power even on earth, that could touch their cold and atheistical hearts, and make them tremble as the veriest slave. The heart of Humanity leaps with joy, when a mur-

derous Henry is scourged at the tomb of Thomas à Becket, or when another Henry waits barefoot, shivering with cold and hunger for days, at the door of the Vatican, or when a Pope grinds his foot into the neck of a Frederic Barbarossa. Aristocratic protestantism, which has never dared enforce its discipline on royalty or nobility, may weep over the exercise of such power, but it is to the existence and exercise of that power, that the PEOPLE owe their existence, and the doctrine of man's equality to man its progress.

All that the Church has really done for humanity was done during what are termed the dark ages. It then laid the foundations of modern civilization, breathed into it its humane and gentle spirit, and animated it for an uninterrupted career of peaceful conquest. It was then it established schools and universities, founded scholarships, and prepared for a system of universal education. It emancipated the slave, declared all men equal before God, raised the barefooted friar to the throne of Christendom, and made the rich sinner disgorge his misbegotten wealth to feed the poor he had robbed, and to serve the interests of humanity. Children, as we are, of what is called the Reformation, and which was nothing but a rebellion against the Church, and the establishment of an insurrectionary government, we are too prone to forget the benefits of the Church; and casting a veil over its struggles and its labors of love, we would fain make it appear, that there was no light in the world till protestantism was born, and nothing done for humanity till a German Monk dared burn the papal bull. But all that has been done since is but the necessary development of what was done before. He is an undutiful son who curses his own mother, and no good can come of him.

Up to the fifteenth century the Church was the true Church, as true to the Ideal as was possible in the circumstances in which it was placed. Up to that period it was the Church of progress, and continued itself to advance. But in consequence of the broad line it had drawn between spiritual interests and material interests,

it placed necessarily a term to its own progress. It could advance, or aid the advancement of the race, only till it had brought the civil organization in a spiritual point of view up even with itself. As soon as the State embodied in its organization, and in its enactments as much wisdom, intelligence, justice, and humanity, as it itself embodied in its own organization and canons, its mission in regard to civilization was ended. It could work on the State only through the individual conscience, and it could not, without abandoning its ground, make it a matter of conscience with individuals to organize the State for the indefinite progress of the race in relation to material interests. It became, then, a mere parallel organization with the State, having no longer in relation to society an ideal to realize. It had nothing to propose. It could no longer take the lead in civilization. From being the suzerain of the State, it was forced to become, as it has been for three hundred years, its vassal.

In point of fact, for three hundred years the State has been superior to the Church, and it, instead of the Church, has proposed and effected whatever social ameliorations have been proposed and effected. But so long as the old theory of a separation of interests remains, the supremacy of the State over the Church is a monstrous anomaly. It is in theory nothing less than making the low, the transitory, the unholy, superior to the high, the holy, and the eternal. It is making matter, declared to be the principle of Evil, superior to the spirit, declared to be the principle of Good; the body triumphant over the soul; and time over eternity. This is intolerable. It creates a disgust with some for the Church, which makes pretensions it does not justify, and with others it prompts efforts to restore the Church to its former position. But the restoration of the Church to power would relieve no embarrassment. The Church has realized its ideal. To give it supremacy would not be to make it again a Church of the Ideal, and therefore favorable to progress; but to arrest the progress of the race, and to place us back where we were in the fifteenth

century. There is but one method by which Churchmen can recover the dominion of the Church, and that is the reverse of the method they pursue. The Church was supreme, because it had a right to be. It had a loftier ideal than had the State. Now it is not so. The State, the creature of Christian civilization, is more Christian, in fact, than the Church; and whoso would labor for the progress of humanity through any existing organism, must take the State instead of the Church, and be a politician instead of a clergyman. In order that it should be otherwise, the Church must show that she has an ideal, some work for civilization to propose, big enough for men's hearts, equal to their aspirations. Men are now uneasy and confined within her enclosures. They see immense evils obtain in the world, which they would gladly redress. Rich feelings kindle up within them; great thoughts swell in their hearts; a mighty energy is working in their souls; and they would go forth and act, lay hold of the ages, and shape them to the glory of God, and the redemption of man. But they are bound, confined in a narrow dungeon. They rave, they foam, they pull at their chains, beat their heads against the dungeon walls, fall back wearied, exhausted, and die. There is a universal restlessness; men's great souls are seeking some mode of utterance, but find none. They burn to act, and yet are held back. Nothing is proposed equal to what they feel moving and working in themselves. There is no vent for the activity, which has long been accumulating in the soul. It but preys upon its possessor. Hence the deep pathos of our times, the wail of sorrow, heard on either hand, the melancholy, the morbid sentiment, the suicides. In this state of things it is madness, to attempt to revive the Church, on its old platform, and to carry us back three hundred years, to do over again what has already been done.

The remedy will not be found in going back, but in going forward. The Church can rise to power only by accepting the Ideal. It must abandon the distinction it has made between spiritual interests and material inter-

ests, a distinction which has no existence in the nature of things, and recognises the fact, that in actual life, spirit and matter are one. The flesh is no more sin than is the spirit, and the soul is no more holy than the body. Man is not tempted and drawn away into sin by his body, for without the soul, the body were dead, and incapable of performing a single function. The soul acts never without the body, nor the body without the soul. One is not the other, but one is never without the other. The action of the one is, so long as there is life, absolutely indistinguishable from that of the other. The action and reaction of each are so harmonious, and one becomes so blended with the other, that in real life, there is for the two but one agent. Man should never, then, be treated as a twofold being, made up of soul and body, but as one simple being, made to live in a body ; and through that in intimate relation with nature. He should then be taken as a whole, as one, and identical in all his phenomena, however multiform, various, or variable they may be.

Man and nature are made of the same stuff. Spirit and matter are the same at bottom. The basis of the composite existence, termed matter, is not dead atoms, but living substance, endowed with force and perception. This living substance, or these living substances, into which all material bodies may be resolved, are kindred with that substance termed in man soul or spirit. Body is nothing but a continuity of points, each point of which is a living being, acting from its own centre, from its own inherent force, and representing the entire universe from its point of view, and is in itself as immaterial and as indestructible as the human soul itself.\* No reason, then, can be assigned, why matter should be more sinful than spirit, or more the cause of sin. One God has created both, and both out of his own infinite fulness of being, and both for the communication of his own unbounded goodness.

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\* This is the doctrine of Leibnitz ; but we have advanced, and demonstrated it, in substance, in several of our previous essays.



Spirit and matter reconciled, declared to be one in the unity of actual life, all interests will become alike sacred and proper to be consulted. There will be no more lusting of the spirit against the flesh, nor of the flesh against the spirit. Spiritual interests and material interests will be held to be not only inseparable, but indistinguishable. There is no act that really promotes the welfare of the soul, that is not also for the welfare of the body; there is no act demanded by the well-being of the body, not also demanded for the well-being of the soul. What is for man's good in time, is for his good in eternity; and the only sure way of gaining a heaven hereafter, is to create a heaven on earth. What is for the good of man, is for the glory of God. All interests are the same, then, in their character, and all acts which are proper to be done at all are religious acts.

III. The Church of the Future will be based on two great principles; the first, the generalization of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the other, the unity in actual life of spirit and matter. This makes the service of God and man one and the same service, and the service of man, under the spiritual relation, identical with the service of man, under the material relation. God must be served by our labors for the good of all men; and the good of all men does not consist in a spiritual culture to the neglect of physical well-being, but in their redemption and sanctification under all the possible aspects of their being. The Church of the Future will then propose the amelioration of man under his material relations, no less than under his spiritual relations. Material sufferings will touch it not less than moral sufferings, and oppressions in the State will be as much offences against its laws, as the misdeeds of individuals. Its mission will not be merely that of fitting men to die, and to gain a happier world, but fitting them to live, and to make the earth itself an abode of plenty, peace, and love. It will not enjoin poverty, but justice, and so direct the industrial activity of the race, and establish such laws for the distribution

of the fruits of industry, that all will have a competence, and none any temptation to abuse his possessions, or to rob another.

By uniting all the interests of man, and subjecting them all to the same law, Church and State will ultimately become one, and a new classification of the race obtain. There will not then be a spiritual society, and a civil society, a religious society, and an irreligious society. All society, all association will be holy, for all association will be for the worship of God. The State will become a Church, and legislators and civil rulers ministers at the altar. For then God will not be worshipped by idle hymns, and idler ceremonies; but by those substantial acts of piety and love, which do really tend to the melioration of the condition of all men, especially of the poorest and most numerous class. Men will then be religious by visiting the fatherless and the widows in their afflictions, and by keeping themselves pure and blameless.

Man is a being who *acts*, *knows*, and *feels*. He is a simple being, but with a threefold power of manifestation. He manifests himself as activity, intelligence, sensibility. Hence there are three ways, in which he can serve and be served. Every man has these three faculties; but in some men one of them predominates; in others another. Those, in whom activity predominates, are what are termed men of action, practical men; those, in whom intelligence predominates, are men of science, whose tendency is to know, to investigate, to be acquainted with the universe, its principles, and phenomena; in fine, those, in whom sensibility predominates, are artists, — men, who are attached to the beautiful, who delight in the fine arts, and aspire to ornament and embellish life. Ultimately men will fall into three classes according to this three-fold division.

The men of action have heretofore been too often engaged in war and conquest, or in taking advantage of their more simple brethren. They will hereafter turn, as they are now turning, their activity into an industrial and peaceful direction. These will be the industrial

portion of mankind, cultivators of the earth, artizans, manufacturers, merchants, traders, active business men. The second will be engaged in scientific investigations, all of which will be turned to the advantage of industry and art. The third will be devoted to the cultivation of the fine arts, to adorning our habitations, purifying our affections, and exalting our sentiments.

In these three ways man may serve man, and therefore worship God. They, whose taste and capacity lead them to industrial pursuits, will worship God by tilling the earth, by manufacturing the raw materials, or distributing or exchanging the fruits of labor. They, whose tastes and capacities lead them in a scientific direction, will worship God, by penetrating the secrets of the universe, upturning the several strata of the earth, and learning how nature improves upon her own types, or as they track the divine wisdom through forests, see it unfolding in the violet under the hedge, living in the animal frame, soaring with the eagle, and blazing forth in glory in the sun and stars. All nature will be seen to be full of God, and at each step the man of true science will pause in transcendent admiration. The artist will worship him by communing with the visions of beauty that come to his soul, attempting to seize and transfer them to his marble or canvas, to embody them in column or dome, or give them voice in song or story.

Forms of worship there will be, and forms that have meaning, that speak to the heart, and waken great thoughts, and generous and holy feeling, — forms that inspire men's souls, and make them aspire with ever increasing energy to worship God in Humanity. All that industry can do, science can teach, or art inspire, will be done to bring man into harmony with the will of his Maker, and to redeem and sanctify all men. In this work art will take the lead. Man, by the fact that he is endowed with a sensible nature, can be inspired, and it is by *inspiration* that his progress is mainly effected. God by his providence raises up, at distant intervals, providential men, a Moses, a David, an Isaiah,

a Jesus, a Paul, who admitted by their love into a closer communion with himself, speak to men in those living tones, which make men's hearts beat, and would make them beat under the very "ribs of death," and waken them to a higher life, — inspire them to new, and better sustained efforts to realize the Ideal, and make earth reflect the beauty of heaven. Every genuine artist is a being, in whom love predominates; love carries him up to the very principle of things, and makes all things beautiful and lovely to his rapt soul; and speaking from the deep love up-welling from the bottom of his own heart, he can quicken love in the race, and inspire humanity to a more zealous and acceptable worship.

The Church of the Future will place the worship of God solely in the redemption and sanctification of the race, especially the poorest and most numerous class, in loving all men, as we now love Jesus, and doing all that it is possible to do, to raise up every man to his proper estate; in a word, to realize that equality between man and man in his material relations, that we now recognise in his spiritual relations. But it will not be merely utilitarian. It will not be cold and naked and barren. In accepting material interests, it will not become less, but even more spiritual. In making the worship of God consist in the service of man, it will recognise both the necessity and the utility of whatever tends to develop the soul, to awaken generous sentiment, to increase the love of man for man. It will still have its temple-service, which will be solemn, imposing, and inspiring; its instructors, who will disclose the laws of industry, science, and art, — instruct men in the proper direction of their activities, intelligences, and sympathies; its preachers, who will make the heart thrill, and kindle a deep and burning enthusiasm in the soul, to labor for the amelioration of the race. All the fine arts will be laid under contribution. Poetry, painting, sculpture, music, architecture, whatever speaks to sentiment, will be pressed into the temple-service, and made to administer to the worship of God, and the amelioration of man.

Protestantism, in its excessive rationalism, in its rejection of sentiment, of inspiration, has deprived the temple-service of nearly all its power. In its churches there are a few dry forms, and much barren logic ; very little that speaks to the soul and kindles love. Puritanism knows nothing of the power of love. It has not learned that the road to men's convictions lies through their hearts, and that we are raised to God effectually, only by the purification and exaltation of our sentiments. It places the affections under ban, and regards all emotion as the fruit of the flesh, and is even enthusiastic against enthusiasm, inspired against inspiration. The Church of the Future will follow the principle of the Church of the Past, and adopt a form of service, that shall speak to the sensibility, to man as a being capable of inspiration, of love. But it will purify the form heretofore adopted, and the better adapt it to the awakening of a genuine love for universal man.

The priests of the new Church will be those, who approach the nearest to God, those who best understand the works of the Creator, are best qualified to direct the activities of the race, and who have the most enthusiastic love for their brethren. They will be directors of the people, of all consciences, because they will prove themselves the most able, and the most worthy ; because they will be those, in whom the power to act, to know, or to love, manifests itself in the most striking degree. They will be listened to and obeyed, because their words will carry conviction and create love. This is the true conception of a Christian priesthood. Men will not enter the priesthood to gain a livelihood, but because they are burning to do a work for humanity, which they cannot do without entering it. They will be more powerful than ever were the priests of the old Church ; but their power will be in their inherent superiority, not in an artificial sanctity ascribed to their persons ; not in the laying on of the hands of the presbytery ; nor in any formal consecration. They will be God-ordained, God-commissioned, and they will speak as God gives them utterance ; and their words will be

with power, because they will be words of truth and love.

IV. Such will be the Church of the Future. It will not be a destruction of the old Church, but its fulfilment. It will be the Church of the past, enlarged, modified, and converted into the Church of the Future. It will be an organization for the more full and perfect realization of the Christian Ideal. Christ is to it all that he has ever been. Jesus is its founder, and its aim is still the realization in actual life of the principles of the Christian Revelation ; but these principles more generously interpreted, and seen in a broader generality. The Ideal will still be the Christian Ideal, and it will be a true Christian Church, as true for the future, as the old Church was for the past.

This Church recognising the unity of all interests, of spirit and matter, will place no term to its progress. Covering man's whole activity, its Ideal will ever hover before it. It will gradually absorb the State, and abolish the double organization of mankind ; it will supersede the necessity of a religious organization and a civil organization ; and as the service of God and the service of man become identical, Church and State will become one. There will then be no clashing of rival claims, no war of hostile powers. The government of God and the government of man will be identical.

By spreading over all interests, extending to all activities, intelligences, and sympathies, the Church will command the direction of them all ; and as its Ideal is the redemption and sanctification of the race, it will impose upon the consciences of individuals, and of legislators and rulers, the religious duty of directing them all to the production of that love and reverence for all men, which have heretofore been paid to but one man. Always then will it have a work for civilization to propose, and therefore always a work which will enlist the sympathies of the human heart. Therefore it will always be the Church of the Ideal. It will always aspire, and kindle the aspirations of the race. It

will then be forever a kingdom which the saints shall possess, and of which there shall be no end. It shall become a really Catholic Church, a Church truly universal, and finally gather the vast family of man into one universal association; when wars will cease; all tears be wiped away; hatred be no more; and man labor side by side with his brother, in peace and love, for the glory of God and the progress of humanity.

The time has come for the new Church to be formed. The old Church has done its work. It has no work for us; nothing to propose but a certain routine, which has no power to excite our sympathies, or to command our respect. It has ceased to aspire. It has no words of authority. Men laugh at its puerile duties, and its idle threats. It does not direct the action of society; nor does it presume to make it a religious duty for legislators and rulers to shape the laws and the administration of the government, so as to effect, in the most rapid manner possible, the moral, physical, and intellectual amelioration of the race, especially of the poorest and most numerous class. It declares all men equal before God, and yet tolerates, nay, upholds the grossest inequality before society; it declares poverty a virtue, and riches a sin, and yet gives the chief seats to the rich, and baptizes their means of gain. It declares that the poor are blessed because theirs is the kingdom of heaven, and frowns upon all measures likely to be effectual in securing them the possession of that kingdom on earth. It has no Ideal. It looks back and sighs merely for its lost dominion. It has no blessing to pronounce on the young prophets of God, who start up to gain a more glorious future for the race. They are, in its estimation, seditious fellows, disturbers of the peace, profane levellers, disorganizers, abhorred of God, and rejected of man. For them no word, no look of encouragement. It excommunicates progress, and pronounces a curse on whatever is advanced, whatever belongs to the Ideal. Humanity will not, cannot tolerate this, but will return neglect for cursing, and pass on, leaving the dead to bury their dead.

For three hundred years the Church has been on the side of the past, and the future has been with statesmen and philosophers. During these three hundred years of insurrection, revolution, experiment, and philosophizing, philosophers and statesmen have brought forth two grand conceptions, which are to serve as the basis of the whole future. These two conceptions are **EQUALITY** and **PROGRESS**, or the Incarnation of the Word in all men, making all thereby the sons of God, and therefore equal one to another; and the indefinite perfectibility of the race; giving therefore an Ideal to the Church, and making it its duty to labor for the realization of this perfectibility for all men, and in all the aspects of their being. These two conceptions were already in the mind of Jesus, but were only partially embraced by the Church. It admitted the divinity of human nature only in the case of one man, and progress, perfectibility, only in the spiritual order. Now all men are divine, and progress must be sought in the material order no less than in the spiritual. This progress is indefinite; no term can be placed to it. These are the grand conceptions, which have come forth from past labors and past struggles. They have cost much, but they are worth all that they have cost. These are the foundations of future society, **EQUALITY AND PROGRESS, LOVE TO ALL MEN, AS HERETOFORE THERE HAS BEEN LOVE TO JESUS**, efforts to set the race forward to more and more advanced stages of civilization. Here is the Ideal. Morality, piety, all that is praiseworthy and noble will consist in efforts to realize this Ideal. This Ideal is now affirmed, and not by one man only, but by millions of warm hearts, that thrill at the very words **EQUALITY** and **PROGRESS**. They are affirmed in the very soul of the age in which we live, and the Church must accept them, and become an organism for their realization, — direct all activities, intelligences, and sympathies to their realization. The existing Church may accept this Ideal. She is already an organism for that purpose, did she but know it. Her clergymen may become prophets, and from the heights of every pulpit in Christendom



proclaim, that all men are sons of God, and indefinitely progressive ; and that the love and worship of God consist in the love of all men, and in efforts to advance the race in civilization. But if she will not thus proclaim, if she will not make it matter of discipline, and regard the neglect to labor in the cause of equality and progress an offence, deserving the censure of the Church, then a new Church will organize itself, a new temple will rise at the magic words, as did the walls of Thebes as the prophet touched his lyre.

The time of denial has gone by. Protestantism is obsolete. The time has come to affirm, and to affirm with emphasis. The race is tired of mere analysis, criticism, dissecting, which gives not life, but takes it away. It demands a broad and generous synthesis, positive convictions, positive institutions, and a positive mission. It would act. Infidelity there may yet be ; men no doubt are still disputing, whether there be or be not a God, whether the Scriptures were or were not given by divine inspiration, whether there be or be not a life beyond this life. Vain disputings all. He who would have faith must go forth and act. He who will do the will of God shall know there is a God. He who will cultivate love to all men, by seeking to do good to all men, shall never doubt that there is a common Father of all ; and he in whose heart eternally wells up a living love for all that live, who perpetually aspires, shall want no arguments to convince him that he cannot die. He lives immortality. Let the Church once more aspire, let its face be turned to the future, and let it command the moral, physical, and intellectual advancement of the race, command it in the name of God, and bless him who is able and willing to live or die for it, and faith will be restored, and men will live again. Christ will then reappear, and the kingdom shall in very deed be given to the saints who will possess it forever and ever. Even now, they who have eyes may see the Son of MAN coming in the clouds of heaven, in all the glory of his Father, surrounded by all pure and loving spirits, to gather his

elect from the four corners of the earth, into a holy association, animated by a single spirit, and directed by a single will, for the brilliant conquest of the future. He comes. Lift up your heads, ye who have sighed under bondage, open your eyes, ye who have sat long in the region and shadow of death, exult, ye who have waited to see the salvation of God, for he cometh, and the day of redemption is at hand, and all the ends of the earth shall see the glory of God, and rejoice together.

EDITOR.

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## ART. II. — CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is not, as the author of *Common Sense* asserts, "at best a necessary evil." It has its origin and necessity in what is good, not merely in what is bad in human nature. It rests for its support on elements as pure, as elevated, and as indestructible as those on which rests religion itself. It will not, therefore, cease to operate, nor become less essential as an instrument of social progress and well being, in proportion as men advance in wisdom and virtue, as is contended by a portion of our modern philanthropists.

Man was made to live in society, in intimate relations with his race, and he can live nowhere else. It is only in society, and by its aid, that he can grow, and expand, and fulfil the end of his being.

Society is inconceivable without individuals, but it has an existence, a destiny distinguishable, if not separable from theirs. It acts ever in relation to individuals, and through individuals, but its action is not theirs, nor merely an aggregate of isolated activities. It is not itself an aggregate, a collection, but a unity, an individuality, living its own life, which extends from the indefinite past to the illimitable future.

Society becomes a unity, an individual, by organizing itself into the state or commonwealth. So organized, it

is government, and its action is governmental action. Or in other words, and a more limited sense, government is the result of this organization, and the agent through which it operates.

Society organized into the state or commonwealth, that is, as government, has for its mission the maintenance of every member of the community, in the free and full possession of all his natural liberty, and the performance, in harmony with this natural liberty, of those labors demanded by the common good of all, which necessarily surpass the reach of individual strength, skill, and enterprise.

The maintenance of each and every member of the community in the full possession of his natural liberty is the first duty of government. Till this be done, nothing is gained. But this is not all. No individual is sufficient for himself, and however free individuals may be, if left to act always as individuals, without concert, without union, association, they can accomplish little for themselves, or for the race. Savages are as free, individually, as can be wished; but the savage state is the lowest conceivable form of social life. In it there is no progress. The individual is poor and solitary, wandering the earth as an outcast, and doomed to subsist on wild berries, or the scanty products of fishing or the chase, always precarious, and at best but feebly sufficing for his subsistence. There are labors demanded for the growth and well-being of the individual, which no single individual can perform. These must be performed by association, that is, by government. Government, besides maintaining the natural liberty of the individual, must open the resources of the country, construct roads and bridges, railways and canals, open harbors, erect light-houses, protect commerce and navigation, build school-houses and churches, asylums and hospitals, and furnish the means of universal education, of the highest industrial, scientific, and artistic culture for all the children born into the community.

The end of government is then two-fold. Those

who regard its mission as merely negative, merely that of preventing or redressing the encroachments of one individual upon another, restrict quite too much the sphere of its activity ; and those who look only to the positive labors it may perform for social progress and well-being, and urge it on to their performance, regardless of the rights of individuals, defeat themselves ; for there is no good that can compensate the loss of liberty.

The **ENDS** of government are determined by the law of eternal and absolute Justice, and are everywhere and always the same. Always and everywhere is it obligatory on government to maintain justice between man and man, and to direct the activity of society to the common good of all its members. Of this no government may ever lose sight. No statesman may raise in regard to it a question of expediency, allege that it is difficult or inconsistent, and that it may, therefore, be sacrificed to something more easily attained.

But the **FORM** of the government is a mere question of means to an end. One form of government in itself is no more just and equitable than another, and no more obligatory upon a people. That form is the best for a people, which in its practical workings best realizes the true end of government. In some countries this may be the monarchical form, in others the aristocratic, in others still the democratic, or some modification of one or all of these.

Hitherto all governments have failed to realize, in any tolerable degree, the two-fold end of government designated. The American governments form no exception to this statement. They have merely demonstrated that the American people can maintain a strong and stable government without kings or nobles ; nothing more. It remains to be demonstrated, that they can establish and maintain wise and just governments, which fulfil their duty alike to society and the individual. Beyond the recognition of political rights, our governments do nothing more for individual liberty, or for social progress, than the governments of the more advanced European nations are doing. In the science

of legislation we are perhaps behind England, France, and even Germany; for we are struggling with great zeal and perseverance to fasten upon the country a policy which these nations are casting off.

Politically we have declared all men to be equal; the rights of one man to be the measure of those of another; but in all other respects we are nearly as unequal in our condition as are the people elsewhere. Property, instead of becoming more equally diffused, becomes relatively more and more concentrated in a few hands. Poverty keeps pace with wealth, and even outruns it. There is as gross ignorance, as filthy wretchedness with us, though confined within narrower limits, as can be found on the face of the globe. Laws are partial, and unequal in their operation. One section of the country, or one interest is favored at the expense of another; the administration of justice is affected by the relative condition of the parties concerned; he with the longer purse, or the most influential friends, is pretty sure to have the better cause, and a rich man, though acknowledged to be a murderer, is seldom hanged; swindlers and rogues on a large scale are high-minded and honorable men; and the many are taxed for the support, or the benefit of the few. Government maintains not individual liberty, nor does it confine itself to those labors which are for the common good of all. It is perpetually legislating for classes, for interests, and protecting one at the expense of another. Whence the cause of this failure? And what is the remedy?

One class of politicians attribute the failure to the general diffusion of democracy, to the almost universal extension of the right of suffrage; and the remedy they would propose, if they dared, is the restriction of this right to men of property and respectability, or at least to those who have a property stake in the community. The number properly qualified, in any community, for the exercise of political power, is unquestionably small. The voice of the multitude is rarely the voice of God. But the few, who are qualified, are as likely to be found among those, whom these politicians

would exclude from the elective franchise, as among those to whom they would extend it. The ignorant multitude are as likely to be on one side of the line as on the other; and vice is as prevalent among the rich as among the poor, and altogether more dangerous. Restrict the right of suffrage to the property holders, and none of those would be excluded who are now influential in giving to government its false direction. The men who cause all the mischief are not the poor, the men who live by daily wages, but the men of property, business men, bankers, traders, speculators, and designing politicians, who want government administered for their special benefit. The restriction of suffrage, so far as it would have any practical effect, would be to throw still more power into the hands of these, and enable them to turn government further and further from its true end.

The evils, which obtain, result from the attempt of government to build up certain property interests. Government never makes direct war on the natural liberty of individuals; but destroys it by legislating for classes, for special interests, instead of confining itself to those measures which are equal and for the common good of all. To place it entirely in the hands of any one class, or under the control of any special interest, is merely to aggravate the evil, not to cure it. For it is the invariable nature of every class, of every interest to wield, so far as it can, the whole force of the government, for its own protection and furtherance. Found your government on property, and its whole force will be wielded in favor of property. Man, except so far as his rights and interests are involved in the protection of property, will be disregarded, and even depressed. The evil complained of cannot then be redressed by restricting the elective franchise to the property holders. In point of fact, these have already too much power, and hence the evil.

Another class of politicians propose to remedy the evil, by enlarging the power of the democracy. The government, they say, is too aristocratic, and ought to

be made more democratic. This, if it were said in England or France, would be very intelligible, but in this country it has no meaning, or a meaning the reverse of that intended. Democracy here is triumphant ; that is, if we mean by democracy the people, or the government of the people. Here all are people, and all interests popular interests. The interests fostered by government are no more aristocratic interests than those it neglects or depresses. It is no more aristocratic to spin cotton than it is to till the soil, to fit out a ship for Canton than it is to saw wood or black boots. All are alike interests of the people, and therefore democratic interests. The people here are already sovereign. They frame the government and administer it. They make and execute the laws, determine and enact the public policy of the country. What more, then, in favor of democracy, can be asked ?

There are only two ways in which democracy can be politically extended in this country. The first is by removing the few remaining restrictions on the right of suffrage ; the second is to abolish the constitutional checks now imposed on the action of the government. The first cannot amount to much. No man, who watches elections, and comprehends the influences which decide them, can believe that making suffrage absolutely universal would vary at all their results. The second would be to increase the power of the government, and to enlarge the sphere of its activity. But the evil complained of does not arise from the weakness of the government, nor from the fact, that it is restricted to too few matters ; but the reverse ; — from its too great strength, and from its attempting to do, what government ought not to do. The proposed remedy would be merely rendering the people as a body politic an unlimited sovereign, and giving, in practice, to the majority unlimited freedom to pass any laws they please. This would lessen no evil.

On this subject of democracy our politicians fall into some mistakes. A portion of them have clear and systematic minds. They start with the doctrine, that the

people are sovereign, and proceed on the maxim, that the people can do no wrong. Once clear the field for a free and full expression of the will of the people, and government would always protect the liberty of every citizen, and be administered for the common good of all ; no monopolies, no partial or special legislation, no fostering of special interests, would be tolerated ; no laws bearing unequally on sections, interests, or individuals, would be enacted ; no iniquitous public policy would be pursued ; but government, imposing burdens upon none, would shed its blessings, like the dews of heaven, alike on all, whether rich or poor, learned or unlearned, powerful or without influence. But unhappily for this theory, it is already in practical operation. It is difficult to conceive, what now hinders the free and full expression of the will of the people. They are sovereign, and can do as they please. The government and laws, that we now have, are precisely what the sovereign people will. They vote as they please, elect such men to office as they choose to elect, and men who usually take good care to support such a policy as they believe will be most satisfactory to their constituents. How then can it be pretended, that the will of the people is not freely and fully expressed ? or that if there could be a freer and fuller expression, it would vary the result ?

There can be no question, that the government is not administered for the good of the great mass of the community ; no question, that the many are taxed directly or indirectly enormously for the exclusive benefit of the few ; but whose is the fault ? Bankers, capitalists, corporators, stockjobbers, speculators, and trafficking politicians control the government, and in nearly all cases shape its policy. By their arts and intrigues they unquestionably succeed in giving predominance to their will over the will of the rest of their fellow citizens. But they are a portion of the people, and therefore a portion of the democracy. They do not constitute a class apart from the democracy. The late President of the late United States Bank is as much one of the peo-



ple, as the hod-carrier who aided in the construction of his marble palace. In speaking of the people, the democracy, these must be included, and their will be counted the will of the people, as much as the will of any other portion of the community. In estimating the course likely to be taken by the people, we must take into the account the liability of the people to follow the advice or dictation of this portion of their number, and the interest this portion has in misleading them, and the means it possesses of misleading them. The whole people must be included in our estimate, and taken as they are, and for precisely what they are. Whatever the result of an election in this country, it must always be taken to be as free and as full an expression of the popular will, as democracy with us can collect. The fact, that this will is after all in reality but the will of a small minority, alters not the truth of this statement. It simply proves, that in a country like ours, under a purely democratic order, or under an unlimited democracy, the will of the people, that rules, will always be the will of the smaller number. It shows, then, not that we should render our institutions more democratic, but that it is not in absolute democracy, that we are to seek the remedy of the evil complained of. The will of the people, which it is possible to collect, can never be in advance of the people themselves. So long as the people are what they now are, made up of the same materials, with the same diversities of character, condition, and interest, no other will of the people can exist, certainly no other can be officially uttered, than that which now rules through the government.

The democratic theory, now under consideration, requires for its success a community, in which all the citizens have in all respects one and the same interest, and are all substantially equal in position, wealth, and influence. Whether such equality and such identity of interests be or be not attainable, be or be not desirable, [neither one nor the other is attained here. As men all are indeed equal, and so far forth as men, they all have the same interests; but as members of the community

their conditions are diverse, their callings are different, and their interests are often hostile one to another. Their interests, so far forth as men, are not, as democracy demands, the interests which predominate. These interests count for little or nothing with electors and legislators. In elections and legislation the interests which predominate are never those which belong alike to all men, but the special interests of classes, sections, or individuals. Men are governed at the polls, and in the legislative hall, by the same passions and interests which rule them in the ordinary business of life. No man, when he acts as an elector, or as a legislator, divests himself, or can divest himself, of these passions and interests. They are his life. The planter votes and legislates for the planting interest, the farmer for the policy that will enhance the price of wheat, the manufacturer for that which will pay him a bounty on his wares, and the stock-jobber, or speculator, for a paper currency as best adapted to his gambling propensities. Each demands a policy most favorable to that branch of business in which he is specially interested. The several special interests of the country go to the polls, each pitted against the other, and the stronger triumphs, possesses itself of the legislature, and wields the whole force of the government in its own favor. This is inevitable in a democracy, where there are diversities of interest. The stronger interest, by whatever means it is the stronger, whether by numbers, wealth, position, talent, learning, intrigue, fraud, deception, corruption, always possesses itself of the government, and taxes all the other interests of the community for its own especial benefit.

This fact is not duly considered by our democratic theorists. They tell us the voice of the people is the voice of God; that what the people will is for the good of the whole; but however this may be in some refined transcendental sense, in practice the will of the people is the will of that interest in the community, which is able to command a majority, and the voice of the people is the voice of that interest. Political theories must

be tested not by their abstract beauty and excellence, but by their practical operations, the people being taken just as they are. In Fourth of July orations, or in caucus speech, the noblest sentiments, the purest and loftiest enthusiasm for justice and humanity, are always received by the assembled mass with the heartiest rounds of applause. Appeals to patriotism and philanthropy will always make you most effective as an orator, or as a writer; but patriotism and philanthropy, when carried to the polls or into the legislative hall, are identified by each man with the special protection by government of his peculiar interest. Patriotism and philanthropy with the planter are in his cotton bags, with the farmer in his wheat field, with the manufacturer in his spindle and loom, with the banker in his notes, with the merchant in his ship or counting room. What most benefits *me*, is most patriotic and for humanity. No government will work well, that does not recognise this fact, and which is not shaped to meet it, and counteract its mischievous tendency.

There is altogether too much fulsome flattery of the people, too much nonsense uttered about independent voters. One fourth of your independent voters will not take the trouble to go to the polls, unless called out by more zealous partisans; and the party which can make the most noise, and has the most money to expend for electioneering purposes, will always be able to call out the larger portion of them, and usually enough to decide a closely contested election in its own favor. Nearly as many more make it a rule to vote always with the stronger party, and always do vote with that party, which they believe has the greatest likelihood of succeeding. Of the remainder, not one in ten has any clear conception of the questions at issue, or any tolerable judgment of what will be the practical operation of one policy or another.

With these facts staring us in the face, it seems idle to seek a remedy for the evils complained of in a further extension of the democratic principle. The form of our government is already as democratic as need be;

and were it made more so, it could only aggravate the disease, so long as there is in the community the present inequality of conditions, or the present diversity of interests. This remark will of course be offensive to our demagogues and trading politicians, whose stock in trade consists mainly in their ability to scream democracy, DEMOCRACY, in our ears from morning to night, and from year's end to year's end. It will deprive them of many of their present facilities, should it gain credit with the people, and render it somewhat doubtful whether this ability to scream democracy does in reality of itself qualify a man for any and every office, from path-master to President of the United States. But as this is a sacrifice demanded by the public good, perhaps these pure patriots will consent to make it.

In these remarks nothing is said against democracy, when interpreted to mean, as many of our friends interpret it, a government which is so constituted and administered, as to maintain the natural liberty of the individual, and to perform those social labors, surpassing the reach of the individual, demanded by the common good of all. But when democracy is so interpreted, the *end* of government is confounded with its *form*,—an error into which we ourselves, we are sorry to say, have on some occasions fallen. That what is thus declared to be democracy, is the end that government should aim to realize, that which it should be so constituted and administered as to realize, is unquestionably true. But the purely democratic form of government, that is, a form of government which recognises the absolute sovereignty of the people, and leaves the ruling majority the unlimited freedom to do whatever it pleases, will not secure this end, as is abundantly proved by the considerations already alleged. Democracy, when it is interpreted to mean the end to be gained, is worthy of all acceptation; it is defective only as a means. It cannot as a form of government secure the end proposed, because there are in the country a diversity of conflicting interests, and the government must always take the direction of the stronger interest; which with us has

been heretofore, if not now, what may with sufficient accuracy be termed the interest of business capital. The government, following the direction of this interest, can be for the common good only on condition that the interest of all classes, sections, and individuals is identical with the interests of the small minority engaged in business.

Nor is this all. The interest which triumphs, and obtains for itself the fostering care of the government, is not in reality promoted thereby. The specially protected interests, in the long run, suffer in consequence of the very protection they receive. This is now admitted by the more enlightened statesmen both at home and abroad. All interests prosper best under that government which proceeds on the maxim, "justice to all, favors to none." In political economy, as well as individual, a departure from the principles of common justice breeds confusion, hostility, and brings with it a day of terrible retribution. The laws of God, whether for individuals, or for societies, are equal and just, opposed to all favoritism, to all special privileges, and in neither case are they ever transgressed with impunity. But all interests are short-sighted. The dram of protection exhilarates to-day, and they think not that it will debilitate to-morrow, and finally, if persisted in, destroy the system.

The evils of government, all proceed from its attempts to protect or further special interests; that is, in not confining itself to those matters, or to such lines of policy as necessarily affect all interests and all individuals alike. The interests of a community are two-fold, those which are common to all its members, and those which are peculiar to classes, or to individuals. The first only are proper objects of government. True statemanship consists in so constituting the government, that it can never, in its practical operations, obtain any power to act on any matters but these. Government should be so constituted, as to operate for man, not for his accidents. It should legislate not for the merchant, the manufacturer, the farmer, the planter, the speculator,

the banker, the laborer, but for the man. The problem to be solved is, how to constitute and administer the government so as to recognise always, and in all its practical bearings, the supremacy of the man.

Aristocracy with us is not the solution of this problem, because the aristocracy, whatever its basis, birth, wealth, learning, or military service, will always administer the government for the exclusive benefit of the aristocratic class. Monarchy will not answer, because there everything must bend to the glory of the monarch. Democracy will not answer, because it concentrates all power in the hands of the ruling majority for the time, and that majority will always consist, as has been shown, of the stronger interest in the community, and therefore of the interest that should be checked rather than suffered to rule. The common vice of all of these systems, as of all conceivable absolute governments, is in their CENTRALISM. All power is centred in the government, and the interest, class, or individual oppressed, or neglected, has no effectual veto on its tyrannical acts.

The great and difficult problem for the statesman, but at the same time his first and indispensable duty, is to provide a veto on power. No government can operate well, where there is no power in the community to arrest it, peaceably and effectually, whenever it runs athwart the interests or the rights of the people at large, or of any portion of them. The prosperity of Rome dates from the establishment of the tribunitial power, which was a veto on the government; and it continued till both the government and veto power were absorbed in the emperor. Then centralism triumphed. All power was in the same hands, in one and the same body, and Rome declined and fell. The merits of the old feudal system, now so universally repudiated, consisted in the veto the great vassals had on the crown, and on each other. England is indebted, for the stability and beneficial influence of her government, to the imperfect veto her House of Com-

mons has, in granting or withholding supplies. In Poland the veto power was carried too far, and proved the ruin of the Republic. But always, in order to secure good government, must there be somewhere in the state the **POSITIVE** power called the government, and a **NEGATIVE** power, naturally and peaceably arresting the action of the government, whenever it attempts to play the tyrant.

These two powers must be lodged in different hands. For the veto power is nothing, if vested in the government itself. It would then be only the government vetoing its own acts. It must be separated from the positive power, and placed in other hands, as was the case at Rome. The patrician order governed, but the plebeians, through their tribunes, could veto its acts. The patricians, therefore, while they constituted the governing power of the state, could enact no laws, pursue no line of public policy, which would not be so far acceptable to the plebeians as to escape the tribunitial veto. But if this veto power had been lodged in some branch of the Senate itself, or in a portion of the ruling order, it would have been no veto at all; because the interest that must exercise it, if exercised at all, would have been the very interest against which it must be exercised.

It may be assumed then as an axiom in political science, that in order to secure a wise and just administration of government, there must be a division of powers into positive and negative, and the negative power must be placed in such hands, as will have a direct interest in interposing it against the encroachments of the positive, or governing power.

Till quite recently nearly all American statesmen have recognised the necessity of a veto power. They have not, however, always perceived the necessity of placing it in a distinct organization. They have sought to obtain it by various artificial divisions in the positive power itself, and have trusted to the ruling interest to veto its own acts,—at least to some considerable extent, and wholly where circumstances were not



against them. The necessity of a limitation on the exercise of power has been felt by all ; but, except in the case of the federal government, they do not appear to have had any clear conceptions of the nature of the limitation demanded, nor of the effectual means of constituting it. The methods, they have for the most part relied on, are frequency of elections, the division of the legislative branch into two houses, the executive veto, and written constitutions. Frequency of elections is well, as far as it goes ; but is by no means an effectual veto. For it rarely happens that the veto is needed, when it must not be exercised against the majority of the people themselves, as well as against a majority of their representatives in the legislature. The new elections will then almost always return men pledged to the obnoxious policy, and the acts of the new house will need vetoing as much as those of the old.

The division of the legislature into two houses answers a good purpose, when, as in England, they are differently constituted, and really represent different interests ; but in this country, for the most part, the two houses represent the same interest, and differ from each other only in the fact, that one is more numerous than the other, as is evinced by the fact, that the instances of disagreement between the Senate and House are few, and comparatively trifling. Both houses are usually of the same political complexion. Nevertheless, this division, when the members of one house are chosen for a longer term of service than those of the other, or when the local interests of the state are such, that by making the members of one house more numerous than those of the other, one may be made to represent different interests from those represented by the other, answers a good purpose, and to some extent secures the veto power demanded.

The executive veto is inefficient, from the fact, that it will be rarely exercised. The executive is in all cases chosen by the people at large, or by the legislative branch of the government. In most cases his term of office is the same, or very nearly the same, with that



of the members of the legislature, and he must, therefore, agree with the ruling majority in his politics; and will, for the most part, represent the same interests. In general, then, the chances are much greater, that he will approve an improper exercise of power on the part of the ruling majority, than that he will veto it. In a few instances, the presidential veto has been exercised against the wishes of the political friends of the President, but never when there was not good reason to believe that a majority of the people would sustain it.

Written constitutions are indispensable in this country; but mere written constitutions impose only a slight restriction on the power of the ruling majority. If there be not a veto power behind them, in the very constitution of the commonwealth, able and interested in sustaining them, they will be violated with impunity, whenever the ruling majority find them in their way. In the estimation of those who have the power, that is always constitutional, which they believe to be conducive to their own especial interest. The minority may protest, adduce the very letter of the constitution, but what avails it? Power cares not for a few slopes, curves, and angles, drawn on parchment. It cares not on what rights or interests it tramples. It goes straight to its object, from which nothing can avert it, but an antagonistic power, which effectually resists it. Experience abundantly proves this. Nothing is more evident than the unconstitutionality of a United States Bank, and yet there has been scarcely a congress from the origin of the federal government not ready to charter one; the constitution authorizes no tariff for protection, as the advocates of the protective policy admit by the fact, that they never dare bring in a bill for protection, that declares on its title its purpose; and yet the protective policy has been able to command large majorities in congress and among the people. No law can be more right in face and eyes of the constitution, than that of the extra-session of congress last summer, distributing the proceeds of the public lands among the States, and yet it found a majority in both houses of congress in

its favor, and received the executive sanction. These and numerous other instances show that written constitutions are as mere waste paper, when in the way of ruling majorities.

There is a mistake in regard to constitutions, somewhat prevalent, fraught with much mischief. It is supposed to be the easiest thing in the world to frame a constitution, and therefore to secure the wise and just administration of government. Let the people assemble by their delegates in Convention, debate for three or four months, and then draw up an instrument, which, when ratified by the people in their primary assemblies, shall be a constitution, the fundamental law of the land. All this is well enough. But what makes this instrument a constitution, a fundamental law? Does the convention merely draw up an instrument? or does it give a constitution to the body politic? The common opinion seems to be, that it merely draws up an instrument with a certain number of articles, and sections, and declares that that shall be the law, according to which the government shall be administered, or power exercised. But where is the guaranty, that power will be so exercised, that the sovereign authority will not transgress its provisions? The common reply will be, that the people, who make the constitution, will see that it be not violated. This is the mistake.

Constitutions are intended to be a restriction on power, and are needed because power has a perpetual tendency to exceed wholesome limits. But, with us, power is the people. The people here are the sovereign authority. Constitutions are needed then to be a check on the people, a limit to their power, in order to save us from the calamities of absolute government. To form a constitution and entrust its preservation to the people is, then, a manifest absurdity; for then the very power is relied on, to protect the constitution from violation, which the constitution is created to restrict, and from which alone the violation of the constitution is to be apprehended. It is like locking up the culprit in prison, and entrusting him with the keys. To say that the

people will voluntarily, of their own accord, sustain a constitution that restricts their sovereign power, is only saying that they will voluntarily, of their own accord, forbear to exercise that portion of their power so restricted. What, then, is the use of the constitution? It affords no additional security; but leaves us right where we should be, in case we had no constitution at all. We have with the constitution nothing but the discretion or pleasure of the sovereign on which to rely, and we should have that without the constitution. In this view of the case, constitutions are a great absurdity.

Let not these remarks be misinterpreted. Nothing is intended against constitutional governments, but the reverse. Constitutional governments are the only governments which really secure the freedom of the subject, or citizen. But, then, they must *be* constitutional governments. The constitution must be something more than the roll of parchment, with its slopes, angles, and curves. To make the constitution is not to draw up the written instrument, but to organize the body politic, to constitute its several powers; and if we really intend it to be a constitution, so to organize the State as to have always a negative power capable of arresting the positive power, whenever it is disposed to exceed the bounds prescribed to it. The constitution, then, must virtually consist in the manner in which the different interests, classes, sections, or natural divisions of the community, are organized in relation to the government. The great point, to be always kept steadily in view, is the constitution of the veto power. The positive power can always take care of itself. There is rarely any danger, that it will not be able to do all the good that the community requires. The danger is, that it will absorb too much into itself, and become tyrannical and oppressive. Almost the sole art, in constituting the government, consists in devising an effective veto, one that shall operate naturally, peaceably, when, and only when, it is required.

The constitution of the veto is, by no means, an easy

problem ; nor will it admit of an arbitrary solution. It must have its reason and origin, in the previous divisions, habits, conditions, or institutions, of the country. In some countries it is almost, if not quite, impossible to constitute a veto power ; in others it already exists, if statesmen but knew how to avail themselves of it. In one sense it is always the people that possesses and exercises the veto ; but not the people as a whole, constituting one simple body, but the people taken in parts. The whole people, through the majority, are the positive power, the governing power ; the negative power must be sought in the parts, and secured by so constituting or organizing the parts, that each part, when an oppressive measure is attempted, may have an effectual veto on the action of the majority, or positive power. But where these parts do not already exist, or where the population of a country, or its natural or geographical character, the productions of the soil, or the pursuits of the people, do not permit the organization of the community into distinct parts, the constitution of a veto power is nearly or quite impossible ; and such countries seem doomed to all the horrors of eternal despotism. Liberty is not for them, except as it comes from abroad, and through conquest. Conquest, by foreign powers, may introduce upon the soil a new race, which by virtue of its previous habits, institutions, divisions, coexisting with those of the conquered race, shall furnish them the necessary elements, and pave the way for the eventual establishment of an effectual veto power, and thus save them from despotism, and bring them into the family of the free. This is the process by which Western Europe was redeemed from the despotism, into which Imperial Rome had degenerated. Modern Europe owes its freedom, saving the moral influence of the Church, to the conquests of the Northern Barbarians. England owes hers to the Norman Conquest. The Barbarians, by their military divisions, and possession of the land, furnished the Feudal Lords ; the conquered population, by being forced into industrial pursuits, gradually emerged into Com-

munes, Commons, and Third-Estate. The superiority of the English commons over the corresponding class, in continental Europe, is owing to the fact, that their ranks were recruited by the old Saxon nobility and gentry, dispossessed of their former rank and estates by the followers of the Conqueror. In Western Europe, and in England, conquest supplied the elements out of which free governments could be ultimately constructed, by instituting such divisions as could be made available in time, for the constitution of a veto on the sovereign power.

In this country we have been favored by Providence. Here the constitution of the veto power is more natural and easy than anywhere else; and our statesmen have not entirely overlooked it, though they have not made as much of the opportunities afforded them, as they might, or should have done. Two parties existed at the origin of our government, both honest, no doubt, but each tending to push the other to extremes, and both conspiring to give the government a false direction. Both really desired to obtain a veto power, but neither understood precisely how it should be constituted; neither, in fact, took the right course to obtain it. The jealousy was rather of the power of classes than of the power of the sovereign. One party wished to place a veto on the power of what it called the mob; the other, on the power of what it termed the aristocracy. The first sought its end by laboring to lodge the sovereign power exclusively in the hands of the well-born, the gentlemen, and the holders of property. This would undoubtedly have been an effectual veto on the power of the poorer classes, but none on the power of the government. The positive power of the State would still have been unlimited, and in hands, too, even more liable to abuse it, than would have been the poorer classes it was proposed to exclude. The government, if unlimited, is safer in the hands of the simple-men, than in the hands of the gentlemen; and the democracy, to use the term in its old sense, may be more safely trusted than the aristocracy.

The other party sought to place a check upon the aristocracy, the gentlemen, and men of property, by rendering suffrage universal. They were right, as far as they went. But their system could not be effectual; for, in the first place, it imposed no check on the sovereign power itself, which was the main point; and none, in fact, on the aristocracy, because the gentlemen, the men of birth, education, manners, and property, could always be the most influential, and thus control the elections and the government. In point of fact, this second party has furthered the aims of the first; and the old party, which called "democracy an illuminated hell," finds now that it is through democracy it can most effectually secure the triumph of the aristocracy. Hence it claims to be *the* democratic party of the country.

The struggle between these two parties has engrossed almost wholly the attention of our statesmen, and prevented them from considering, so expressly as they should have done, the all-essential point of constituting the veto power, where it would amount to something. The government, whether lodged in the hands of the gentlemen, or the simple-men, will be tyrannical and oppressive, if the oppressed party have no effectual means of resistance, except that of rebellion; which would end, even if successful, as it does in the Asiatic nations, only in displacing one tyranny and substituting another equally bad. Nevertheless, the veto has not been altogether overlooked. In the constitution of the federal government we have it in as perfect a form as can be desired. Providence prepared the way for it, by so ordering it that the country should be settled by distinct colonies, independent one of another, which at the Revolution could become free and independent States. By the union of these States into a single body politic, for certain specific purposes, we obtain the two powers needed. The American people, acting through the federal government, as one people, constitute the positive or governing power; the States, each in its separate, independent capacity, constitute the negative

or veto power. The positive power is that of the majority. The majority of the American people govern through Congress. This is right. This is the only possible rule that can be adopted; and the maxim so common among our politicians, the majority must govern, is accepted. But the majority, according to the constitution, is not absolute. It has a right to govern only within certain limits. Whenever it transcends, in its acts, those limits, its acts are unconstitutional, and therefore null and void from the beginning. When it so transcends, there is, by means of State organization, a veto power to arrest it. By this the constitution of the Union is rendered a real constitution — a constitution of the people, and not a mere roll of parchment. There is a power behind the written constitution, different from the authorities created under it, capable of compelling its observance. A State is to the Union, what the Tribune was to the Roman Senate. When the Union enacts a law which transcends the constitution, and every law does transcend the constitution, that bears unequally on the different States, the State can interpose its veto, and arrest its action. The veto sought by means of universal suffrage, that is to say, the veto of the individual citizen, is too feeble to amount to anything; but the veto of a State will always be as effectual as was that of a Roman Tribune.

This veto power is no artificial creation, but is inherent in the constitution of American society. No objection can be brought against its exercise. It can never be exercised, except against an unjust and unconstitutional law. A State will interpose its veto only against such a law, as bears with peculiar hardship upon itself, which oppresses it for the benefit of some one or more of the other States. No State will complain of a law, from which it does not suffer, or refuse to submit to a law, from which it suffers no more than its sister States. A law affecting all the States alike, and so burdensome as to demand the interposition of the State veto, would be so odious to them all, that its repeal, without a resort to the veto power, could be easily effected. The



laws of human action forbid us to fear an interposition of the veto without just cause. The Roman Tribunes, it does not appear, ever interposed their veto, except when the Senate proposed a law, which threatened to be peculiarly oppressive to the plebeians; and the English House of Commons has never interposed its veto, that is, withheld the supplies, except in the last resort, as the only means left of forcing the government to a redress of grievances, or the abandonment of an oppressive policy. It may be assumed as an axiom, that a State will never interpose its veto, except when the acts of the general government are peculiarly oppressive to its citizens, ruining their interests for the promotion of those of other States. Now all such acts are, from their very nature, unconstitutional. The federal government has no right to impose, directly or indirectly, any heavier burdens on one State than on another. Its taxes must be laid equally upon all, according to a uniform census; and its measures, to be constitutional, must be for the common benefit of all the States. The measures then, which a State would veto, would be always unconstitutional measures, and therefore null and void from the beginning. The veto would then always be interposed to save the constitution, never to destroy it.

The State veto will always be effectual. One of three things must inevitably follow its interposition. The government must reduce the vetoing State by force; obtain a new grant of power; or yield to a compromise. The first is out of the question. There will always be one or more States to sympathize with the vetoing State, that will not consent to the employment of force against it; and individual volunteers from all the States, from various motives, will always rush to its support; so that no trifling force will be requisite to subdue it. The States in favor of the policy vetoed, strongly desirous as they may be of carrying it into effect, will pause, before resolving to do it at the expense of a protracted and bloody civil war, and will rather choose to abandon the policy, than sustain it at such cost. The second alternative will rarely, if



ever, occur. A glance at the geographical character of the country, will show us that a policy, bearing so hard upon any one State as to induce it to resort to its veto, will always be opposed by more than one fourth of the States; and power to carry the measure into effect can never be obtained, if one fourth of the States join the vetoing State. Nothing remains, then, but the last alternative. The government must yield to a compromise of the difficulty; and consent to abandon, as soon as may be, the obnoxious policy. The State veto will, then, always be an effectual, peaceable, and orderly remedy. The knowledge of its existence, and the certainty that it will be interposed, when occasion demands, will operate as a salutary check upon the government, and serve to keep it so uniformly within constitutional limits, that a resort to the veto will rarely, if ever, become necessary.

This veto power, which Providence, and not man, seems to have constituted for us, has in most cases been overlooked, or undervalued by our statesmen. This is bad. For, though it is almost impossible to constitute an effectual veto power, where it does not exist, it is an easy thing, through a false political theory, to abolish it, when provided. The veto power has not done us all the service it might, in consequence of the centralizing doctrines which have prevailed; and because the attention of our statesmen has been turned in other directions. Let the true theory of our constitution once be clearly brought out, and understood by the people of the several States, and the veto power will be saved, and be found capable, at all times, of saving the constitution. With this power, fairly recognised as an integral element in the constitution of American society, the American government must appear to all competent judges, as a miracle of wisdom, and adapted to any conceivable extent of territory, and fitted to endure forever. It combines all the excellencies of the Roman and English governments; nay, of all preceding governments, without any of their defects. It is the most wonderful creation of political science

the world has ever beheld ; the *résumé*, if one may so speak, of all the past political labors of the race, the latest and noblest birth of time. Nothing is wanting to it, but to be comprehended, accepted, and administered in its true spirit.

In regard to our State governments, we have been less successful in constituting the veto power ; and what is worst of all, we have made no progress in obtaining it. On the one hand, there has prevailed the centralism of the aristocracy ; that is, of such an aristocracy as the country has been able to produce or import, not very respectable, and hardly deserving to be called an aristocracy ; and, on the other hand, we have had the centralism of democracy. The tendency has been, however, steadily in favor of the democratic centralism, which is the better tendency of the two. Every new revision of our constitutions has tended to bring our governments nearer and nearer to the character of pure democracies. This has been effected by the gradual elevation of the laboring classes, but more especially from the disposition of demagogues and political aspirants to court the multitude ; and from the fact, already mentioned, that the party, formerly in favor of giving the government an aristocratic cast, have discovered that they can obtain all by means of democracy, they hoped from aristocracy, and without incurring the odium of being opposed to the democracy. This party, made up at present, for the most part, of the money-changers, who now, as of old, turn God's Temple into a den of thieves, are so pleased with democracy, and find that they can so easily secure the preponderating influence in elections and in the legislative hall, that they have no wish to return to the high-toned doctrines of the old federal party ; but would resist such a return with as much firmness as any portion of our countrymen. Both parties, under this point of view, have come on to the same ground ; and are vieing with each other, which shall be the most democratic. Both parties combine their influence to establish democratic centralism ; that is, to render the gov-

ernment an unlimited democracy ; one party, because it knows it can always use the democracy in furtherance of the views of the aristocracy ; and the other, because it hopes to secure thereby a preponderating influence to the poorer and more numerous classes. Between them both it will go hard, but **CENTRALISM**, which is but another name for **ABSOLUTISM**, shall triumph, and freedom and good government be indefinitely postponed. This is now the predominating tendency, and the dangerous tendency, which every statesman, every patriot, and every philanthropist must struggle to arrest, before it shall be too late.

But the constitution of the veto power, within the States themselves, even if these dangerous centralizing doctrines of our politicians were abandoned, and the attention of all turned towards it, would be exceedingly difficult, and all but impossible. In the Union it is, as has been seen, comparatively easy. The Union spreads over a vast extent of territory, with many varieties of climate, soil, and productions, which create distinct, sectional interests, embracing entire States, and therefore capable of being organized, each into a veto power on the other. This indicates the importance of an extended territory ; and shows us that our federal system must work the better in proportion as the field of its operations becomes extended and varied. Were it to extend over the whole continent of North America, as it one day must, if continued, it would be altogether more beneficial in its operations, and stronger and more likely to be permanent than now. These sectional interests, from the mutual hostility of which, so much evil is apprehended by narrow-minded and short-sighted politicians, are the very life and support of the system. If the Union were not extensive and varied enough to create them, the horizontal division of parties would universally obtain, by which the whole power of the government, with no effective veto, would be thrown into the hands of the upper classes, who would invariably make it an instrument for oppressing yet more the poorer and more numerous classes. Of all possible

divisions of parties, this horizontal division is the worst, the most dangerous, and the one against which we should labor the most strenuously to guard ; for, where it occurs, the lower strata must bear the whole weight of the upper. But with the great extent of territory, and diversity of interests, presented by the Union, parties will divide geographically, and consequently so that each party may have within its ranks a proportional share of the wealth of the community ; and will be so constituted, that the interest represented by one party can be organized into an effective veto on the preponderance of that represented by another. Where there are so many interests, each embodying the force of an entire State, the federal government must be held in check. No one interest will consent to be sacrificed to another. Each, then, will struggle to prevent the government from granting any special protection to another ; and the result must be, that the government will, as it should, abandon the policy of specially protecting any interest, and confine itself to the *common* good of all. When government is so confined it operates always wisely, justly, in favor of freedom and national prosperity.

But when we come within the bosom of the States themselves, the whole aspect is changed. In the Union, it suffices to give one sectional interest, by means of State organization, a veto on another ; but in the State itself it is not against the preponderating influence of one sectional or geographical interest over another, that it is necessary to guard. The territory is, in general, too small, and the interests of all parts of the State are too much the same, for these sectional interests to become of much importance. Parties in the bosom of the State rarely, if ever, divide geographically, but almost uniformly, especially in the non-slaveholding States, horizontally. Parties are classes, with merely individual exceptions. Take the two parties which now exist, and one will be found to embrace much the larger portion of the wealth of the community, nearly all the active business capital of the coun-

try, while the other is made up of small farmers, journeymen mechanics, and common laborers. At least, this is eminently so in the New England States ; and it is becoming more and more so in the middle and western States, in proportion as the effort is made to render government more just and equitable in its operations. This is a serious fact, and one from which the saddest consequences are to be apprehended. With this division of parties, as has already been said, power is all on one side. The poorer and more numerous classes are no match for the wealthy and more influential minority. Universal suffrage serves but to delude them. For wealth can command votes, if not always at the polls, at least, in the legislative hall. The United States Bank, when it represented the money power, though unable to prevent the re-election of General Jackson, never failed to have a majority in both Houses of Congress. The upper classes can always triumph, when they think it worth their while to make the effort. Let them once bring the weight of their personal characters, their influence as employers, and creditors to bear, as they always will when there is anything important enough at stake, and the poorer and more numerous classes, with justice, patriotism, and intelligence on their side, are before them but as the chaff of the summer threshing floor before the wind. They sweep over the country in one wild destructive tornado, as they did in 1840. There are no arts too base for them to adopt, no oppressions too gross for them to practise, no corruption and bribery, no fraud and misrepresentation too barefaced for them to countenance, in order to secure their triumph. Having the wealth of the country, they can easily command all that is base and profligate in the community ; and be sure of the services of every Iscariot that will betray the sacred cause of freedom and justice for "thirty pieces of silver." Even men, who have generally the reputation of being high-minded and honorable men, from whom better things might be expected, will consent to quaff "hard cider," or play the buffoon, in order

to cheat the simple and unsuspecting out of their rights. The election of 1840 reads to the statesman and patriot an instructive lesson. A reaction has indeed taken place for the moment, for there is at present no call for similar exertions; but it will go hard, but similar or worse scenes will be reënacted, whenever the upper classes feel again that power is slipping from their grasp, and that it is necessary to rally to prevent the government from being restricted to its constitutional duties.

The evil to be guarded against in the States, especially the non-slave-holding States, is this tendency to a horizontal division of parties. With this division, it may be taken for granted, that power will be always virtually, if not nominally, in the hands of the upper strata of society; and the poorer and more numerous classes must be governed for the benefit of the more wealthy and influential minority. The only possible remedy is in the constitution of some veto power, which shall arrest the government, whenever it attempts to act on matters not common to all classes, or to pass laws not for the common good of all. This is the kind of veto needed in the States; a veto operating naturally and effectually to prevent the wealthier and more influential classes from pursuing any line of policy bearing with peculiar hardship on the poorer and more numerous classes. The constitution of such a veto power is the problem; and, it need not be disguised, that it is a problem of most difficult solution.

It was partly in consequence of observing this tendency, in all small communities, to divide horizontally, and perceiving that in such a division power was, and must be, on the side of the upper stratum, that we were induced, some time since, to suggest the bold and energetic measure of changing the law, by which property now descends from one generation to another. We saw no way of preventing this horizontal division, but by rendering each member of the community an independent proprietor. The substantial equalization of property, could it be effected without violence, by the gradual and

natural operation of a just and uniform law, we felt would abolish the distinction of classes, and give to each man his proportional share of influence. All being proprietors, and virtually possessing in themselves the means of subsistence, without depending on wealthy capitalists, the interests of all, so far as government is concerned, would become so nearly the same, that no one would have an interest in obtaining, or be able to obtain, any law not bearing equally on all the members of the community. We still see no effectual measure of curing entirely the evil complained of, short of the one we proposed, — a measure which has been received with almost one universal shriek of horror. We still insist that the measure we suggested is deserving the serious consideration of our statesmen. Nevertheless, we have, as we had when we suggested it, no hope of its adoption. It therefore enters for nothing into our plan of organizing the State, or administering the government. The practical statesman, however he may theorize in his closet, never, when he goes forth to act, wastes his strength in vain efforts to effect what he knows, in the circumstances in which he is placed, to be an impracticability. When he cannot adopt the means he believes would be most effectual, he consents to adopt the best within his reach. However beneficial might be the proposed change in the statute of distributions, the class of society, that would oppose it, have now the power, and it would be impossible to dispossess them, without the aid of the change itself; and, perhaps, were we able to obtain for the poorer and more numerous classes power enough to effect the change, we could, without much harm, dispense with effecting it. That change, if it ever comes, and come one day it must, will be effected, not by the direct action of civil government in assuming the initiative, but through moral and religious influences, creating a higher order of civilization, and involving a new and different organization of the race; — an organization resting for its foundation, not on wealth, nor military force, nor the accident of birth, but on CAPACITY. The day for that

organization is far distant. The new Church perhaps will usher it in, or usher in something better. In the mean time government must be organized with such materials as we have at hand ; and do the best it can with the race as they are, and as they gradually become. With all we can do, the wail of sorrow, from the heart of the true man, over the sad doom of the poorer and more numerous classes, must yet longer be heard. Their friends are few, and without influence ; or if they have influence, they lose it, the moment they attempt to befriend them.

Nevertheless, that were a detestable philosophy that left us nothing but to wail over incurable evils. Shame on the statesman, or the philanthropist, that can do nothing but sigh and weep. Something can be done. He blasphemes God, who utterly despairs. The division into towns, or small communities, as in our New England States, though it in some measure favors the horizontal division, is not without its beneficial effects. It serves many valuable municipal purposes ; and by creating a large number of small offices, and bringing the people frequently together for town affairs, in which almost every citizen takes part, has a happy effect in cultivating the intelligence and independent spirit of the people. The division of the State into small districts, for the choice of one branch of the legislature, and into larger, for the choice of the other, and giving to the members of the separate branches a different term of service are not without use, and in some of the States answer an important purpose.

But, for the present, our main reliance must be on the federal government. The legislation, which operates the most to the disadvantage of the poorer and more numerous classes, is that which concerns currency and finance. The State legislation on currency and finance is determined almost solely by the general policy of the federal government. Abstract the laws relative to the banking and credit system, together with the protective policy, and not much legislation would be left, specially injurious to the poorer and more numer-



ous classes. The paper system, which has proved so ruinous to the country, will not long survive in the States its abandonment by the general government. The protective policy, which taxes the southern planter and northern laborer, for the especial benefit of the capital invested in manufactures, depends entirely on the federal government, which will not be permitted to continue it. With these two systems will fall most of the measures, bearing with oppressive weight on the poorer and more numerous classes. The laborer will be lightened of his burdens; he will retain in his own hands a larger proportion of the proceeds of his labor; and gradually emerge from his unfriendly condition to one in which he will have more independence, and consequently more weight in the affairs of his town, and more power to protect himself in the State. In the mean time improvements will continue to be made in the science of legislation. The State most favorably circumstanced will take the lead. Its example will influence other States; and gradually, by being on the alert, by availing ourselves of every favorable opportunity, we may hope the State governments will ultimately come to be constituted as wisely for their internal purposes, as the federal government now is for its sphere of action.

We have gone, thus elaborately, into this subject of constitutional government, because it is important in itself, and one almost generally neglected by our politicians; and, also, because we have wished to give our own views, which have, in some instances, been misapprehended by our political friends, more fully, and at greater length than we have heretofore done. From the fact, that we have objected to an unlimited democracy, we have been supposed to be unfriendly to democratic governments. But we contend earnestly for the popular form of government; we only object to an unlimited government, whatever its form. We are in favor of limiting the sovereign power, wherever that power be lodged; that is, we demand constri-

TUTIONAL GOVERNMENT; and constitutional government exists for us as a mere name, *unless there be in the organization of society a power, which can effectually preserve the constitution, whenever the government is disposed to violate it.* This power we call the negative or veto power of the State. The constitution of this power we hold to be the main problem in the organization of government; and we are unable to conceive of any safeguard for the liberty of minorities, or of individuals, without it. This is the extent of our anti-democracy. For this we have called aloud; for its importance seems to us hardly suspected by the mass of the people, and overlooked by the majority of leading politicians, — we were about to say of all parties. But we will not say so. The Republican party, the old States' Rights party of '98, are beginning to see its importance more clearly than heretofore; and promise, unless we greatly misread the signs of the times, to come into power and place, in 1844, on true constitutional ground. The trafficking politicians and "spoilsmen," of which that party, as well as all others, has its share, will of course reject the doctrines we have set forth, as they ever do all doctrines, which go to secure a wise and just administration of government. All this portion of the republican, or any other party, want, is the power to plunder the people, to reward themselves and partisans for their *patriotic* services. But we trust their counsels will not prevail, that the sound portion of the party will for once count for something, and succeed in placing the government on the constitutional track. If so, the doctrines we have humbly set forth will come into power, and with them the country will be safe; and the experiment of the American people to establish a wise and just government, operating always naturally, and without violence, in favor of individual liberty and the common good, will not prove a splendid failure. At any rate, if this very imperfect Essay tend to awaken the attention of the people, and to turn it to the paramount importance of CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, our purpose will have been accomplished.

EDITOR.

ART. III.—*The Well-instructed Scribe, or Reform and Conservatism; a Sermon preached at the Installation of Rev. George F. Simmons and Rev. Samuel Ripley, as Pastor and Associate Pastor of the Union Congregational Society, in Waltham, Mass., Oct. 27, 1841.* By JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1841. 8vo. pp. 19.

WE do not introduce this Sermon to our readers in consequence of its intrinsic merit, for it is but a commonplace performance; altogether beneath the talents and genius of its author,—a most estimable man, and a successful preacher;—but for the purpose of saying something on the very important and deeply interesting subject it broaches.

The man, who helps us to detect our errors, we always hold to be our friend; for he renders us an essential service,—the most essential that one man can render another. We, therefore, feel that we are not a little indebted to the author of this sermon; for we had no conception of the impotent doctrine we had all along been insisting upon, till we found him reproducing it. We cannot reflect on our advocacy of the doctrine, here drawn out at length, without taking shame to ourselves, confessing our sins, and promising an endeavor at amendment.

The leading doctrine of this sermon is, that the well instructed scribe is one who retains a firm hold on the past, while exerting himself to conquer the future; that reform is progress; and that the true reformer labors ever to fulfil the old, never to destroy it. This is a doctrine, which our readers know, that we have insisted on from the first; it is a doctrine which covers a great and vital truth; but as we have often brought it out, and as it is brought out in this sermon, its effect must be worse than that of falsehood itself. By its light Mr. Clarke proceeds to read a lecture of conservatism to reformers, and of radicalism to conservatives. To the first he says, virtually, though not consciously, “my

good friends, you are too hot ;" to the second, " you are too cold. Let me beseech you, therefore, reformers, to cool off a little, and you, conservatives, to warm up a little ; and then we may all come peaceably together, in a state of most perfect and blessed lukewarmness."

This is not Mr. Clarke's language, nor does it express the effect he aims to produce ; but the effect the doctrine in question, as set forth, must produce, so far as it produces any effect at all. But is it necessary to labor to produce lukewarmness ? Is it not more acceptable to the great Head of the Church, to be either too cold or too hot, than it is to be neither cold nor hot ? Nothing is, or can be, more nauseating than to be lukewarm. Give us, we say, open, energetic, uncompromising enemies, or firm, staunch friends, who will take their stand with the truth, for weal or for woe, to live with it, or die with it ; and not your half and half men, blowing hot out of one side of the mouth, and cold out of the other ; neutralizing always their own exertions, and producing only a state of absolute indifferency.

Mr. Clarke must pardon the strength of our expression. We are censuring ourselves more than we are him ; for we are an older sinner, and with less excuse for our sins. We, like him, have been for years blowing hot and cold with the same breath, though unwittingly and unintentionally ; and like him have mistaken an imbecile eclecticism, for a powerful and living synthesis. We are both wrong. Reformers unquestionably often mistake their means, and fail in their ends ; but they are never too hot, too much in earnest. The true man, he who feels the great heart of humanity beat under his left breast, is always terribly in earnest. He speaks out from a soul full of love, as if life and death hung on the issue, burning words, which fall like coals of fire on the naked heart of the sinner, and make him shriek out, in the agonies of hell, " What shall I do to be saved ? " He can make no compromise with sin and iniquity, whether in church or state, in the individual or in society ; but, armed with the word of

God, and the terrors of God's law, pursues them through all their windings, fearless of the hosts of enemies he may rouse up, the blows he must give or receive; resolved to save the soul or die in the attempt. There is his work, right before him; and he can eat not, slumber not, pause not, till he has done it. Wo to the anointed preacher, that calls out from the height of the Christian pulpit, "Stop, my good friend, you are running too fast, you are too hot; cool off a little, let me pray you." How the fiends must laugh to hear him!

Man was made for progress. The race, nay, the entire universe is in motion, flowing onward with all its waves of worlds and beings, as the current of a mighty river, and will flow on forever; for it flows out from the inexhaustible Infinite,—is the unremitted effort of the infinite God to realize out of himself his own Infinite Ideal. But progress is effected by growth, by accretion, assimilation, not by abstraction and waste. The race advances by assimilating, to its own life and being, the truths which God successively reveals to it; and that which its own generations, by constant striving, successively discover and promulgate. We, of to-day, are enlarged by all the past accumulations of the race. Into us flows all that has been; and which, swollen by our contributions, flows on through us, and will flow on, ever enlarging by new contributions, into the unknown ocean of eternity. Here is the significance of the doctrine we and others have been striving after. Here is wherefore the true reformer retains ever a hold on the past, while he labors for the future. He retains the past because it has flowed into him, been assimilated to his actual life; because he is the past, as well as the presentiment of the future, and can no more divest himself of it, than he can divest himself of himself.

There is no question that it is idle to war against the past. No man can be a reformer who has no tradition. Divest us of all tradition, of all that we have derived from the past, or which the race has assimilated of past labors,

as the body assimilates food, and we were mere naked savages, without industry, science, or art, wandering the earth forlorn, with no shelter but the caves or the inclement skies, and no means of subsistence but the scanty pittance doled out, with a grudging hand, by step-dame Nature. They who would so divest us, so cut us loose from all tradition, must ever be as impotent as they are mistaken. They are mere false meteoric lights, that rise and deceive for a moment, it may be, the simple; but instantly melting into nothing, leaving the glorious vault brilliant as ever; studded, as of old, with all its "sapphire flames," which shine on in their mysterious beauty, all unconscious of the mimic stars that collect and dissolve at infinite depths below. There is no need of exhorting the reformer to venerate the past. If he really be a reformer he carries all the past in his soul; and to tell him that he must retain it, is like telling the child that, if it do not retain from day to day the accessions it is constantly receiving, it will not grow!

The folly, we are guilty of on this subject, arises from our not having fixed in our minds, **WHAT PAST** it is that we should retain. We have supposed that it must needs be the past that subsists in monuments, doctrines recorded in books, or engraved on tablets, moral precepts, lessons of experience, forms of faith or practice existing out of the soul, and the essence of which has not as yet been assimilated to the life of the race. But these, so far as they are true, and unassimilated, forming as yet no integral part of the life of humanity, belong to the Ideal and not the Actual, and therefore to the future and not to the past. The past is only that which has been realized, and become an integral part of the life which the race is now living. This is the only real past. This is what we term tradition; and this we cannot throw off, if we would; for it is a part of the very being with which we who now live were born. It constitutes our past progress, the growth to which we have already attained; and is the point of departure for new progress, for further and nobler

growth. So much is gained, and can never be lost. We need, then, give ourselves no concern about retaining it; but turn our whole attention, and exert all our zeal and energy in behalf of new acquisitions.

The mistake of preachers, and even philosophers, is in overlooking the true principle of progress, and in supposing that it consists only in the accumulation of monuments. Moses and the prophets, it is thought, live for us only in the Old Testament; Jesus and the Apostles only in the New; Grecian art and philosophy and Roman jurisprudence, only in the few fragments which all-devouring Time has spared. Poets, prophets, philosophers, who sung, inspired, taught, lived, toiled, suffered, and died, of whom there are no external monuments remaining, are to us as if they had never been. But this is false. As the warm life-blood, that flowed in the veins of Adam in the garden, still circulates in ours, so lives in us the life of all who have gone before us. Not alone in Old Testament or New, not in the Fathers, nor in ecclesiastical historians, live Moses, and David, and Isaiah, and Jesus, and Paul, and James, and John, but in that new life they have given to the world, into which, through them, the race has been initiated; and which we should live, and could not but live, were all exterior monuments of them destroyed. In order to slay Jesus and the Apostles, you must annihilate the race. Their moral life circulates in the soul of him who attempts to revile them; and gives force to his attacks on their pretended representatives. Lycurgus, Solon, Socrates, Plato, speak in your pettiest village politician, and debate through your least significant disputant in your least significant lyceum.

We must remember that there is a progress of MAN, as well as of men; and that this progress consists, not merely nor chiefly in external monuments, whether industrial, scientific, or artistical, but in the enlargement, the actual growth of human nature itself. We say *growth*, by which we do not mean the creation of new faculties, or new elements of our being, but an enlargement of those with which man was originally consti-

tuted. These original elements are perpetually growing, and in their growth consists the progress of the race. Man to-day is a larger being, has more being, if one may so speak, than he had three thousand years ago. He can do unaided, to-day, what formerly surpassed the combined powers of the race. In the age of Moses no man, without a special revelation from God himself, could rise to the conception of one pure and spiritual Divinity. And no community could then take in the Idea, though God, through Moses, proclaimed it. Now we need no supernatural assistance to possess ourselves of the conception of one God. We read his being and unity in all nature, in our souls, in all the events of history. When Jesus came, no man was equal to the great conception of the universal brotherhood of the race. It required a positive revelation from God to place the doctrine in the world; and though so placed, the Apostles themselves very imperfectly comprehended it; none of our sectarians even now comprehend it; yet the more advanced portion of the race see it, as it were naturally, and embrace it as a truth self-evident. All that theologians to-day call natural religion, which they distinguish from revealed religion, and suppose man by nature may attain unto, surpassed the natural powers of the race in its infancy, and needed to be revealed specially from heaven. We find no such natural religion among the savages of antiquity, nor among the New Zealanders of to-day. Now it is natural religion with the more advanced Christian nations, because by the aid of Providence, always acting the part of an educator, their natural powers have become equal to it. Natural religion is always that amount of revealed religion, which the race has assimilated, and for which no positive divine authority is any longer needed.

The school-boy of to-day, it is often said, knows more than the wisest of the Greeks. He is in advance of the wisest of the Greeks, not because he can in a few months learn all that Plato could teach, or the great and wise of the race have since been able to teach; but



because there circulates within him a life, far above the highest life of which Plato dreamed. The child born of civilized parents, carried at the most tender age, and left in the cabin of the savage, other things being equal, will grow up with a nature superior to that of his savage associates. He will adopt but refine their manners. He will have thoughts surpassing their comprehension, dreams which visit not them. They will marvel at his words and deeds, and bow to him as their chief. Catch, on the other hand, young as you please, the savage infant, and bring him into the bosom of your civilized life, and surround him with all that is most advanced in your social state, he will, in spite of all your efforts grow up with an untamed soul; the wild Manitou will speak to his heart, and he will pine for his native forest, and the wandering life of his forefathers. Our missionaries repeat to us ever the exceeding difficulty they find in making the children of the heathen comprehend the most familiar conceptions of Christian civilization; not dreaming that ages of growth are needed to bring the heathen races up to the level of the advanced life of Christendom.

Proofs of this doctrine may be found in families. Nature has her aristocracy, and the more advanced races are always the ruling races. Family pride, nobility founded on birth, is not altogether without reason in fact and experience. It is not absurd to ask of one, Who was his father? What was his mother? Find a man really distinguished, and you may be sure he comes of an improved stock; that he has, as we say, good blood running in his veins. A man who has no ancestors is nobody. Patricians and plebeians intermarry, before they become equal in the state.

This comes not from the fact, that God did not make all men of one blood, but from the fact, that your patrician stock, your real nobility, have had, for ages, superior means of culture; and their children inherit the growth thus effected. It takes many generations to wash out the churl's blood. The *novus homo* betrays himself at a glance. The doctrine of hereditary de-

scent, plays a more important part in the affairs of the race, than we democrats admit. Nay, we all feel it; we all are proud of our ancestry, if they were at all distinguished. We inherit the features, the diseases, the moral and mental qualities of our parents. The child of truly noble parents, brought up in the family of the churl, will be no churl. How many tales and romances have been founded on this fact. They are not mere fictions; they must contain a vein of truth, or the race would not, could not, relish them as it does.

We repeat it, this comes not from the fact, that God made originally men of different bloods; for he made all of one and the same blood. But some families and nations, being more favorably situated for improvement than others, have obtained the lead; and retained it, unless corrupted and exhausted by vice and luxury. By continued, superior moral, intellectual, and physical culture, they have improved, if we may so say, the blood. They have become really superior; and their children are born with more enlarged capacities than the children of those whose ancestors, for countless ages, have had no advantages of education. When, by a fixed regimen of the state, you separate these families from the community at large, the fact becomes striking, and productive of the greatest evils. But in a society like ours, where wealth makes up for the want of birth, there is a general intermixture, which produces comparative equality, and the gradual elevation of all. There are, in consequence of the perpetual whirl of our society, of its ups and downs, few families with us that cannot boast as good blood, in some of its branches, as flows in the veins of our proudest aristocrats. Democracy, therefore, needs not shriek at our doctrine. Nay, it may accept it; for it shows strongly the necessity of laboring for the universal culture of the race, and keeps alive its hopes, by making it appear, that the progress effected in one generation, is so much capital in advance for the succeeding.

Unquestionably all men are born with the same nature, but with that nature in different stages of devel-

opment or growth. A Leibnitz has nothing of which the New Zealander has not the germs; but between the New Zealander and Leibnitz there intervene a hundred centuries of growth. Leibnitz thinks without effort, and assumes as self-evident axioms, what surpasses the utmost conception of the New Zealander; and would, were the New Zealander educated from his earliest infancy in the bosom of our own social state. Yet the New Zealander may one day be to a Leibnitz, what a Leibnitz now is to him.

With this view of progress, that it consists, not in the accumulation of exterior monuments only, but in the moral assimilation of truth, in the continued growth of our being, and enlargement of our actual life, there is no danger that the past will be unduly depressed, that it will be forgotten, or that men will cut themselves loose from tradition. The thing, we repeat over and over, again, is impossible; for we *are* the past, as well as the presentiment of the future. We *are* the synthesis of what has been, and of what is to come; and while the humanity that was, the humanity that is, and the humanity that is to be, all beat in our hearts, circulate in our veins, think in our thoughts, and love in our love, we should give ourselves no further concern with the monuments of the past, than is necessary to decipher its lessons, so far as they can instruct and warm us for new efforts to advance the race. What we want, then, is not, as we have heretofore carelessly contended, — though the doctrine we have now advanced has been for years our faith, — and as Mr. Clarke contends, a moulding of Conservatism and Reform into a sort of systematic eclecticism, compelling its disciples to keep perpetually turning from the past to the future, and from the future to the past, in endless gyration, and therefore making no progress; but a real **SYNTHESIS**. Mere eclecticism, taken strictly, is impotent. So far as it is at all influential, it is mischievous, by withdrawing our attention from the Ideal, damping the ardor of hope, quenching philanthropic zeal, and rendering us indifferent and imbecile. Alas, we have

felt this. We have labored long and hard ; no man more zealously, and with scarcely a perceptible effect. The world has felt that we contradicted in one breath what we had asserted in another. We felt that this was unjust, for we knew that we were consistent. We knew we were right, so far as concerned our own thought ; and marvelled, that with tolerable powers of expression, we could never make the public perceive the precise position we chose to occupy. The amalgamation of conservatism and reform, as existing in our own mind, was well enough ; but no form of expression we could devise would enable us, when we undertook to speak to others, to escape apparent contradiction. The moment that we had awakened them to efforts for progress, we struck them all aback, by telling them that they must not run away from the past. Our progress doctrines offended conservatives, and our conservative doctrines offended reformers ; and we received little except, as we deserved perhaps, the execrations of both. We trust that we have shown the cause of this failure. The fault was not in the public, but in ourselves ; in a certain confusion in our own mind. The public must judge whether that confusion is still there or not. We have felt that the past was venerable, and should be retained, and that there should still be efforts to conquer the future. But, in stating this, we so stated it that our readers, and especially those who listened to our public discourses, could not see how the past could be retained and venerated, while by our efforts to conquer the future, we were running away from it as fast as we could. This came from mistaking eclecticism for synthesis, a system composed of shreds for an entire new garment, woven without seam from top to bottom. Eclecticism wants life, power to quicken men's souls, to make their hearts beat, pulses throb, and prompt bold and energetic and continued efforts for humanity ; but a synthesis, which binds the past and the future into a living unity, obviates the difficulty, and gives us an effective system. By our doctrine we retain the past, because we live it ;

live what has been, as well as fore-feel what is to be. Here is a genuine synthesis. Not a speculative synthesis, existing only in a system, only in the abstract ; but in actual life, — in the actual life of the race, and in that of the individual. Every man, in his degree, is this living synthesis ; and, therefore, every man, in his own way, struggles for progress. There is, then, no real foundation for this distinction, harped upon so much, between conservatives and reformers. In our civilization, the question at issue is never, Shall there, or shall there not, be progress ? but, simply, What is, or what is not progress ? Every man has an Ideal, and admits that it is his duty to labor for the perfectibility of man and men, and only asks you to show that what you propose will tend to realize that perfectibility. They in whom the past is most living, and the future most present, are they who can best tell what is or what is not most favorable to progress.

There is no foundation for the distinction that is made between the movement party and the stationary party, when one looks a little below the surface. Men are not so radically different in their tendencies, as this distinction supposes. All men aspire, some with more energy than others, but all in a degree. They differ, not in their tendencies, but in their judgments, and their faith. One believes in more progress than another ; and one believes that that is progress, which another regards as a retrogression. At bottom all men are the same, else what means the great doctrine of fraternity ? These distinctions we make, convenient and true enough under a certain point of view, are after all mischievous, and sunder men instead of bringing them together, — make men feel to each other as strangers, not as brothers. The less we insist on them the better. Are we not all of one family ? Hath not one God made us ? Are we not bound up together in one common lot ?

Nor is there ever a class of men who really deserve the name of destructives. The human race goes forward by a series of transformations. All things change

their forms. Nothing is stable but truth itself, but God ; and of truth, of God, our views undergo, whether we will or not, a ceaseless metamorphosis. Old forms must be modified to new conceptions ; the garments of childhood must be thrown aside as we approach manhood, and others fitting our new size must be obtained. The modification of old forms of society, of faith and practice, is after all by no means a destruction, any more than the pruning of a fruit tree, to improve its beauty and advance its growth, is a destruction. Jesus and his Apostles were not destructives ; and yet they destroyed the old forms of the Jewish and Pagan religions. They were not destructives, for there came forth from their labors new dogmas, a new temple, a new worship, a new and a higher life for the world. In no country, in no age of the world, have the men called destructives deserved the name. These men, at all epochs, demand a reform, a progress of man, of men, or of institutions. They are men who have an Ideal they would realize. They are believers in perfectibility ; and, therefore, in some sense religious. The much decried French philosophers, of the last century, belong to the great brotherhood of believers. They were not irreligious, nor merely destructive in their aims, nor in their tendencies. They were not skeptics, as we sometimes foolishly imagine, but men of strong faith, full of zeal and enthusiasm ; and faith, however small the quantity, when once at work in a man's soul, redeems him from sin, and brings him into harmony with God. But these men, it is said, were atheists, they denied God and Christ, and reviled the Holy Scriptures. All a mistake. Just as if a man who has faith and love enough to do valiant battle for humanity, could possibly want faith in God, or be a denier of Christ, or a reviler of the Bible ! Voltaire, Condorcet, Helvetius, and Rousseau, are of the same fraternity with Luther, and Calvin, and Zuingli, and Knox. And they labored in the same cause with them, and, for all that appears, with motives as pure, and as Christian. No doubt they said many foolish things, many absurd

things, which no wise or good man will repeat ; but from their labors, and that of their age, the Christian Ideal has come forth enlarged. A grand, a Christian idea, eminently so, has been brought out, and placed in the common faith of mankind by these same philosophers, whom we and others have been foolish enough to call infidels, atheists, and destructives ; — the grand and brilliant idea of the **PERFECTIBILITY OF THE RACE**. This idea was in the mind of Christ, and may be found in the monuments we have remaining of him ; but it was not embraced by the Church. The Church had embraced only the Ideal or the perfectibility of individuals. The philosophers did not war against the Church because it labored to perfect men, but because it refused to labor to perfect man and society. The Church was right in what it asserted, but wrong in the point of view from which the philosophers attacked it. They were right in their attacks. They destroyed nothing. The Idea embraced by the Church is as firm as ever ; but they have added to it another Idea, even broader and more powerful, which the Church may embrace if she will ; and if she will not, she will find it exceedingly difficult to retain her hold on the race. The two Ideas are perfectly compatible ; and now we can see that the adherents of the one have no occasion to make war on the defenders of the other. Tell us not, then, that these men, who have enlarged our Ideal, given a positive dogma to the faith, a second table to the law of the race, were mere destructives. They did their work, as most men do, imperfectly, with a due mixture of human passion and weakness, but they did it, as time and circumstance permitted ; and it were more fitting for us to make sure of our own faith than to be questioning theirs. They have labored to advance the religion of the race, and why shall we undertake to separate them from the great brotherhood of religious men ? The professed believers in Christ must go and study yet longer the meaning of the Christian dogma of **EQUALITY**, if they find it difficult to embrace them as brothers.

What these French philosophers say of Jesus, of Paul, of the Bible, and the Fathers, is all very foolish, very absurd, and very saddening withal; and cannot fail to make us regret that men cannot be found to advocate truth without a mischievous admixture of error. But we can see the error of these philosophers, their folly and absurdity, and therefore need not to imitate them. We are under no necessity of denying what they denied, nor of reviling what they reviled. We can do, what they could not, separate their truth from their error. Both they and the Church, in their respective denials, were pitiable enough; but both were grand, kindling, and Christian, in their positive faith, in what they asserted and really sought to establish. Mole-eyed sectarianism will, no doubt, shriek with horror at these remarks; but her shrieks have no great power to touch a wise man's heart, who will rarely think her end untimely should she even shriek herself to death. She would no doubt take it very unkindly in our heavenly Father, should he suffer Voltaire, Condorcet, and Diderot, to escape being damned; but we have never been able to persuade ourselves that of all his numerous offspring, God loves none but a few Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists. What mighty thing have they done, or are they doing, for religion or morals, that they should rise up and arrogate a monopoly of heaven's favors? They are, doubtless, passable people enough, as the world goes, and we shall be happy to renew our acquaintance with them in a fairer and better world than this; where, we trust, we shall find their views somewhat enlarged, their tempers sweetened, and their charity *not* diminished. Equally happy shall we be to meet in company with Calvin and Edwards, and Gill, and Wesley, Voltaire, Turgot, d'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, and d'Holbach. Sure heaven is large enough to contain these as well as those; and God's love is broad enough to cover them, and rich enough to bless them. It is time to leave off this nonsense about infidels and destructives, and to remember that all men are brethren. No man is an infidel who



believes a greater good can be obtained for the human race, and who exerts himself according to the measure of his strength and of his light to obtain it. We heartily repent us of the charge of Infidelity, which we have so often thrown out in the pages of this Journal, against greater and better men than ourselves. God is no respecter of persons; but, in every nation, he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him, whether he embrace our creed or not. Thank God! we are not the wielders of his judgments, nor the distributors of his bounty. If we were so, alas, for our brethren!

Nevertheless, we are not among those who believe all opinions alike good; and that every man does all he can, or all he ought, for the progress of man and of men. We deny utterly all such radical difference among men in regard to religion and infidelity, or reform and conservatism, as is commonly contended for; but we recognise a wide difference among men in the justness or sagacity of their practical views, and in the energy and fidelity with which they labor for human perfectibility. Some mistake entirely the means of realizing a greater good for the race; and others neglect almost entirely to use the means they do not mistake. Men are fallible in their judgments, and they come short in their actions. They err and they sin; and hence the slow progress of individuals, and of the race. History records man's weakness not less than his grandeur; his crimes, sins, misdeeds, as well as his virtues. Over her scroll we must blush and weep, as well as tremble and hope. There is darkness no less than light in our past doings. And men now, in seeking to do what they believe to be right, often war against the best interests of the race. Ever does Satan delude them, by coming to them in the guise of an angel of light. And not this alone. Indolence, like an incubus, rests upon thousands to whom God has given intellect and means, and paralyzes their souls; selfishness and sensuality drive thousands and thousands of others in a direction, their better feelings and soberer judgments assure them is

false and wicked. We believe neither in the infallibility, nor the sinlessness of the race. We believe only in its capacity for progress, in its *perfectibility*; not in its perfection, nor power to become perfect, but merely to approach perfection.

Errors are peculiar to no one class of men. They who are called reformers and they who are called conservatives err, not because they advocate or oppose progress, but in their adoption and application of means to obtain the end common to them all. They are all brethren; their faces are really all the same way; but they all, in no small degree, mistake the most effectual means of setting humanity forward. Our transcendental theologians, saving so far as they are animated by an intenser zeal, than their opponents, are no more the party of the future, no more reformers than the others. They err by mistaking, in no small degree, both the end and the means. Their merit consists in their assertion of the inspiration of all men, and thereby declaring all men to stand in intimate relation with their Maker. This is a great and glorious truth; but it is not the whole truth. Their opponents, in rejecting this truth, are wrong, and mischievous in their influence. But these opponents contend for another truth equally great, and equally if not more essential, — the SPECIAL INSPIRATION OF INDIVIDUAL MESSENGERS, as the providential agents of the progress of the race.

The tendency of the transcendental theologians is to overlook the agency of these special messengers, these providential men; and to assert the sufficiency of the inspiration common to all men. Hence Bibles and Messiahs to them are but natural occurrences, and entitled to no special reverence or authority. Through the aid of Bibles and Messiahs they have grown so large, that they fancy Bibles and Messiahs are no longer necessary; nay, that they were never necessary. We have no sympathy with this tendency. Undoubtedly all men stand in intimate relation with their Maker; undoubtedly all men are inspired, for all men love; undoubtedly many of the great essential elements of relig-

ious faith have been so far assimilated to the life of humanity, as to be now natural religion ; and, therefore no longer needing, with the more advanced nations of the earth, a positive supernatural revelation either to assert them, or to confirm their authority ; but, after all, it is mainly through the agency of specially inspired, and extraordinarily endowed individuals, that the race is itself improved ; and through Bibles, prophets, Messiahs, revelators, that it has attained its present growth. God is nearer to us than transcendental theology teaches. He is near us, not merely in the fixed and uniform laws of nature, but with us in his providence, taking free and voluntary care of us, and tempering all events to our strength and condition. God is not a resistless fate, an iron necessity, inaccessible to human prayer, which no tears, no entreaties, no contrition can move ; but a kind and merciful Father, who hears when his children cry, and is ready, able, and willing, to supply all their wants. True, we see him not, know him not, save in his manifestations, save in the effects he produces, and so far as he enters, by his power and love, into his creatures. But this we know, that we have never sought help of him in vain ; and have never gone to him with a broken and contrite spirit without finding relief. We see a special as well as a general providence in the history of individuals, and of the race. All is not the result of natural tendencies. Moses, no doubt, embodies in himself all the tendencies of his people, but how much more ! These tendencies did not produce him and his legislation ; for ages on ages were requisite for his people to come up to his level, to reach the point where his legislation must cease to be an Ideal for humanity. The absurd-est of all theories is that, which would make Moses the natural production of his age and people ; and that people, utterly incapable of comprehending him ; so sunk in ignorance as, the moment his presence was withdrawn, to fall down and worship a calf of gold !

We have indeed no sympathy with Jewish exclusiveness, none with the doctrine that teaches God had

disinherited all nations, but the Jewish ; and we may add, just as little with the modern doctrine, that,

“ Out from the heart of Nature roll’d  
The burdens of the Bible old ;  
The Litanies of nations came,  
Like the volcano’s tongue of flame,  
Up from the burning core below, —  
The canticles of love and wo.”

This is to mistake the effect for the cause. These litanies came not from the “ burning core below ; ” but they came from God, and kindled that “ burning core.” They originated not in the human heart, sprung not from the effort of the soul to utter or to satisfy its own inherent wants ; but they came from abroad, to create in the soul a deep want for God, and to make the heart and flesh cry out for the living God. Tell us not that nature has produced the Bible. Man has not degenerated ; he lives in as close communion with nature as ever, — has the same senses, the same soul, the same “ burning core,” and yet out from his heart no Bible rolls its “ burdens.”

Christianity is no natural production. It had, no doubt, its reason in the age in which it was born ; it was, no doubt, that to which all preceding progress pointed, which all the previous tendencies of the race demanded as their fulfilment ; but if it was the mere natural and inevitable result of the natural development of the human race, why appeared it not first where that development was most manifest ? Why was not its first appearance in Athens, Rome, or Alexandria, and in the Temples, the Mysteries, or the Schools ; instead of a by-corner of the world, in an obscure hamlet, and in the person of an obscure peasant, followed by humble fishermen, and despised publicans ? Had the tendencies of the age reached furthest, become most manifest, the development of the race most advanced with the fishermen and boatmen on the Lake of Genesereth ? Undoubtedly Christianity was the last word of Oriental and Grecian philosophies ; a word for the utterance of which all previous providen-

ces had been preparing the way ; but a word none but God could utter ; and not till he had uttered it in thunder tones from his dwelling in the heavens, and his well-beloved Son had echoed it from the cross and the tomb, could the nations hear it, and leap at the sound.

For ourselves, we confess our utter inability to explain the past history of the race on the theory of natural development, or even on that of the supernatural inspiration, which we believe to be common to all men. That history is all bristling with prodigies, which are inexplicable to us, save on the hypothesis of the constant intervention, in *a special* manner, of our ever-watchful Father. It is through the agency of prophets, and messengers, and Messiahs, specially and supernaturally endowed by God's spirit, coming when they should come, that the race is initiated into higher and higher degrees of moral and social life. It is our profound belief in this agency, that sustains us in the darkest days, and enables us to hope in the midst of despair. It is because there is a God, a great and good God, who never deserts his child, humanity, but is always near and able to succor, that we look forward to a higher moral and social state ; and have the courage and the strength, though single-handed and alone, to demand progress, and to labor for it. We have thought differently in our day ; but let this confession, written while tears of contrition and joy are falling fast, plead our pardon.

Nor let it be supposed, that in clinging to the Bible and Jesus, men are mere conservatives, that they have no aspirations. Some of the truths of the Bible have been assimilated ; a portion, if we may so speak, of the Divine life of Jesus, has become the life of Christendom. Some portion of the Christian Ideal has been realized. But not all. There are depths in that old Hebrew Book, which no human plummet has sounded ; heights in the life of Jesus which no human imagination has scaled. In contending for the Christianity of the Bible, and of Jesus, we are not looking back but forward ; for we are contending for truths far, far in

advance of our age. Here is the truth of those who war against what is called transcendental theology. They see, as well they may, in the rich store-houses of the Gospel, of the Bible, of Christ, enough for the warmest heart, the profoundest intellect, the loftiest aspiration. Their error, if error they have, is in misinterpreting Christianity, in not being true to the law they acknowledge, in not laboring with sufficient faith and energy to realize the Ideal of Christ. They are hearers and not doers of the word. They are as the man who seeth his face in a glass, and then goeth away and forgetteth what manner of man he was. Let them really bring out the Christian Ideal, and labor with zeal and energy to form Christ, the hope of glory, in the individual and in the race, and they will be true and efficient reformers. Their works will live after them.

Nor, again, let it be supposed that they who cling to the authority of revelation, are necessarily inimical to the rights of the mind, or to progress in the knowledge of truth. The Christian Ideal, so far as realized, needs no foreign authority. The human mind is equal to it. But what is the authority for that Ideal, so far as yet unrealized? The individual reason? Alas! we have seen enough of mere individual reason. It is impotent when it has not, for its guide and support, the reason of God, speaking not only to the heart, but through revelations and the traditions of the race. The great doctrine we are laboring to establish, the reforms we would effect, we confess our inability to demonstrate by mere individual reason. We ask for them, both on our own account, and on account of others, a higher authority than mere individual reason. That reason may be sufficient for here and there one. But how can it suffice for the ignorant, the bigoted, the superstitious, the incredulous, the sensual, the wicked; the men in whom conscience slumbers, love sleeps, and only the world with its impurities, is awake? Alas! man's word is impotent to arouse them; man's authority too weak to command even their attention. They may speculate with us, or debate with us, but not act with us, not live

with us, for God or for man. You must go to them with a higher authority than your own ; speak to them in a Name, above all names, and which they dare not resist, or your preaching\* and efforts will be fruitless. Deprive the preacher of the authority of God, let him go in his own name, not as the messenger of God, and men will laugh at his truths, and mock at his most earnest expostulations. No. They are sorry reformers, who would reduce God to nature ; and the authority of his word to that of the individual reason, varying with every individual, and with every age.

Nor can we sympathize with the doctrine that makes "religion a matter wholly inward and spiritual." Does Mr. Clarke call this a new doctrine, or an old ? It is as old as the oldest records of the race, excepting the Bible ; and its legitimate results may be seen in the Indian Faqui, who sits all day with his eyes turned downward, contemplating the celestial light playing upon the end of his nose. It may be seen in the sublime indifferency and refined sensuality of the great Goethe, the modern transcendental saint ; who cared not how the world went, providing he succeeded in cultivating all sides of his "many sided" being. Whenever we make religion a matter wholly inward and spiritual, we either make sanctity consist in the calm, quiet, contemplation of the beauty and excellence of truth ; or we run into a vague, dreamy sentimentalism, which is never slow to lose itself in sensuality. In either case the result is to be deprecated.

Mr. Clarke tells us that, prior to the rise of transcendental theology, our community was divided into two classes, —

"Both of which sought to be justified by works rather than by faith ; the one by religious works, the other by moral works. According to both systems the free soul of man was bound beneath the yoke of opinions and outward practices. Christianity was not enough regarded as lying in the state of the soul, and in its inward union with God."

This account of our religious community does not state the precise evil which existed. Assuredly we

shall not here advocate a round of rites and ceremonies, but we utterly deny that those who sought to be justified by "religious works" were wrong in principle. The doctrine, which led our orthodox Christians to seek the favor of heaven by works of piety and love, which led them to maintain what they believed to be the truth, to build churches and assemble for worship, to form Bible, missionary, and tract societies, and to contribute liberally of their wealth for evangelizing the world, was no false doctrine. It led them out of themselves, to seek heaven by doing good; and in this it was right. Their error was not one of principle, but merely mistaking the most direct methods of doing the greatest amount of good for their brethren. Nor did our Unitarian community err in principle. We should like to know how a man is to be justified, if not by the performance of *moral* works. The "baptized atheism," with which we some time since charged Unitarianism, belonged to its neglect of tradition, to its excessive rationalism, and its want of a broad and comprehensive faith in the progress of man and society; in a word, to its coldness and want of power to inspire love, and prompt its believers to bold, earnest, and successful efforts for human salvation; and to its contending for a philosophy, the logical results of which could not fail to end in speculative atheism. We never thought of charging Unitarians, as such, with being atheists, or of censuring them for making religion too outward and formal. Either the orthodox principle or the Unitarian is altogether preferable to the anti-nomianism of the transcendentalist. So far as the transcendentalists have recognised in man the power to perceive truths which transcend the outward senses, so far they have been of service and have aided progress; but so far as they have represented these transcendental truths to exist *in* the soul, and taught us it is in ourselves that we see them, and led us to suppose them to be mere developments of the soul itself, they have falsified the truth, and retarded progress instead of aiding it. No, these transcendent truths are no more in the soul, no more the patrimony,



as somebody calls them, of the race, than are the objects of external nature. They are objects of the soul's intelligence; and therefore are out of it, exterior to it, and possessed by it, only when it beholds them. It is always out of us we are to look for the truth; never in us; for it is only as we are reflected from what we are not, as in a glass, that we learn what we are, or even that we are.

It is making religion consist in the frame of the soul, not in the intensity and direction of its activity, that leads the author of this sermon, when speaking of the duty of the Christian minister, to say, that he has a "work to do *on the hearts* of his hearers." This is the highest conception of the duty of the minister of Jesus that he can take with his mysticism and quietism. According to him the question is not what we *do*, but, what we *are*; just as if what we *are* is not the result of what we do; as if our *being* is not in our *doing*. We exist not for ourselves any further than we act; and all consciousness of our very existence ceases the moment we cease acting. The great end of life is not to be, but to do; and, in doing, being is developed and enlarged. This cant of the followers of our transcendentalists about being, and cultivating one's being, is quite nauseating. Assuredly we do not regard the frame of the mind and heart a matter of indifference; assuredly we do not object to self-culture, nor the cultivation of one's whole nature; but there is for us no sadder image than that of a man who sets out "with malice aforethought" to cultivate himself. Sad, sad is it to see a man engrossed wholly with himself; and thinking only of the effect this or that act may have in cultivating the barren soil of his own puny being. The great question the Apostles made their hearers ask was, What shall we *do*? and Jesus bids us *do* the works he commands, if we would know whether they be of God or not. The preacher must not aim at doing a work on the hearts of his hearers, — although, if true and faithful to his mission, a great and glorious work he will do, — but he must aim to make his hearers do

something, to point them to a work, out of themselves, which they must do in order to be saved; and inspire them by bold words, and warm love, with zeal and energy to do it. In doing this work, in being drawn away from themselves, forgetting their own salvation even, and laboring to realize a good for humanity, they will cultivate their souls, improve their hearts, and advance in the internal life of Christ. We do not cultivate love to God by trying to look into ourselves, by calm contemplation of his commands, nor by internal, isolated strivings to love him; but by active efforts to do his will, which is to love and serve our brethren; that is, by "moral works." Nor do we come to love mankind by efforts carried on by ourselves alone; but by going forth among them, into active life, and by striving to do them good. No man loves his race till he has served it. If we waited for faith and love, before acting, we should never act. Faith and love are born in the effort to do. The love to God, or to man, that comes in any other way is no true love; but a vague, dreamy sentimentalism, weak and effeminate, weeping and sighing at the recital of wrong and outrage, fainting at sight of human suffering; but unable to lift even a finger to lighten the load of misery that weighs man down in the dust.

No; your *Christian* minister is not one who contents himself with, or thinks of, the work he may do on the hearts of his hearers. He comes from God to man, and points to a work the sinner must do. On that work he fixes the attention of his hearers. He speaks with authority; and infuses a new and a higher life into the world, by awakening the world to the performance of nobler deeds. He carries every man's thoughts away from himself, and instead of concentrating them on his own self-culture, he fixes them on God, on duty, on humanity; and warms and kindles, enlightens and directs, every one to bold and vigorous efforts for truth and progress. Self-culture, the redemption and sanctification of the individual heart, will follow, as a natural and necessary result.

But it is time for us to close. We have extended our remarks beyond what we proposed, because the subject itself is one of vital importance; and because it is one, on some points of which, we are fully satisfied, that we have often spoken too hastily, without due deliberation, and on which we have been still more mistaken by others. We trust that we have now expressed ourselves so clearly, and so distinctly, that we shall not be again misapprehended on these points. It will be seen that, for the foundation of our faith, and our general tendencies, we take our stand with those who do not accept the transcendental theology. We go for progress; not in truth, for truth is immutable, but in the knowledge of the truth; and that truth is no innate property of our souls. We are not born in possession of it. We obtain a knowledge of it only by a sincere and earnest study of man and the universe, the Bible, and the life of Jesus. We have no wish to separate ourselves from common humanity. We go with our brethren. Their traditions are ours; their God is our God; their faith is our faith; and all we ask of them is, to permit us to labor in common with them for a more perfect understanding of the Gospel, and a more complete realization of its great truths, in both man and men, in the individual and society, in church and state, in industry, science, and art, — in the whole sphere of man's life and activity.

EDITOR.

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ART. IV.—*Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, on the Distribution Bill, in the Senate of the United States, August 24, 1841.*

Nothing can more forcibly demonstrate the utter recklessness of power, or the total disregard of constitutional restrictions, by a factious majority, having a favorite measure to carry, than the passage, at the late

extra session of Congress, of the Bill for distributing the proceeds of the public lands among the States. A bolder assumption of power, on the part of the general government, was never attempted; and a measure more directly in violation of the very letter and spirit of the constitution it is impossible to conceive. And yet distinguished statesmen advocated it, a majority of both Houses of Congress recorded their votes in its favor, a conscientious President, laying great stress upon the sanctity of his official oath, sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution, gave it his approbation; nay, recommended it, and it has become the law of the land! We hardly know what to say or think of so astounding a fact! It were sheer simplicity, to imagine for a moment, that the intelligent men, who voted for it, were not perfectly aware of its being altogether unauthorized by the constitution. There are some matters so plain that men can come to but one honest conclusion concerning them; on which an honest difference of opinion is impossible. The constitutionality of the distribution scheme is one of those matters. Men may perhaps honestly differ in their views of it, as a question of policy, but we cannot conceive it possible, that any one could for a single moment regard it in harmony with the constitution. How, then, account for the fact, that men, who hoped to be able to hold up their heads in decent society, and even to look their constituents in the face, could urge and vote its passage?

We can account for this fact only on the loose notions in regard to constitutional governments in general, and the constitution of the United States in particular, which have grown up and become prevalent in the community. We committed a serious error when we translated the word Republicanism by the word Democracy. It was a grave error. Names are things. From our habit of regarding our institutions as democratic institutions, and ourselves as democrats, has originated a doctrine, false in itself, and which, if not soon corrected, will prove the ruin of our government and of our liberties. We may define words as we will, but it is im-

possible to make an arbitrary definition of an old word practically prevail over its popular and legitimate sense. Those of us who, in these times, call ourselves democrats, and adhere to the democratic or present opposition party, mean, by a democracy, a government where the supreme power of the state is lodged in the people, and administered by the people, *in accordance with constitutional rules*, for the freedom and common good of all. So defined, democracy is worthy of all acceptance. But it is only in our closet speculations, that the word ever is so defined. This is not the old and legitimate sense of the word; nor that which obtains or will obtain in practical life. In practice, democracy will assume but one meaning, — a meaning which has passed into the axiom, “The majority *must* rule;” which again is always practically translated, “The majority have a *right* to rule.”

Carry this doctrine, this practical democratic formula, into the legislative hall, and it is easy to predict its consequences. The majority are in favor of a given measure, obviously unauthorized by the constitution. But what then? The constitution represents only the will of the majority that framed it. The will of the majority has the right to govern; and the majority at one time is equal to the majority at another. The majority of the legislature is as much the majority of the people, as the majority of the convention that framed the constitution. It is, then, as supreme, invested with as much authority; why, then, shall it yield to it? Why is the dead letter of the constitution of paramount authority to the living majority of the people speaking through the voice of the majority of the legislature? The constitution, moreover, was framed for the general welfare. The majority are the sole judges of what is for the general welfare. The majority decide that a given measure is for the general welfare; it is then virtually a constitutional measure, — one of those measures for which the framers of the constitution would have provided in just so many words, if they had but foreseen its importance. What, then, shall prevent the

sovereign authority, the majority, in whom vests the right to govern, from adopting it? The majority that framed the constitution is necessarily merged in the majority of the legislature to-day; the two, then, are one and the same sovereign power; and shall this sovereign power be hindered from pursuing the general good by a few barren technicalities, a mere lifeless form of words? Out upon your "abstractions." Just as if the constitution could be paramount to the people that make it!

To this fatal conclusion, the democratic theory of the country inevitably leads, when translated into practice. We say not that this is the conclusion to which the theories of the present opposition party inevitably lead, for we are perfectly aware that it is not; but it is the conclusion to which leads democracy, as practically understood by the country; and as it will be understood, in spite of all that can be said or done. This is the democratic doctrine of the majority; a doctrine boldly avowed by General Harrison, in his inaugural address; and acted on, with a consistency and vigor commanding our admiration, by the leader of the whig party in the Senate of the United States, during the late extra session of Congress. It is in vain to protest against this doctrine in the name of democracy, to declare that it is not democracy; and in vain that we offer definitions and resolutions. It is democracy, according to its legitimate meaning; it is democracy, in the only practical sense in which the word ever was or ever will be understood by a people at large. How long is it, since the official organ of the Jackson party, at Washington, declared that "the only intelligible democracy is the democracy of numbers?" The *Globe* was right. There is no other democracy intelligible to the great mass of politicians even. The greater part of the men elected to Congress are men, who know little of the science of government; men unaccustomed to nice distinctions, and incapable of appreciating them. They pique themselves on being *practical* men, who do not believe it necessary to be expert in splitting hairs in

order to be able to legislate for the common good. They eschew devoutly all abstractions; and so long as they adopt the maxim, the majority have the right to govern, all constitutional restrictions on the power of the majority will be to them mere "abstractions," beneath the notice of wise and practical statesmen, who legislate not for theories, but for the general welfare.

Wise and patriotic men may raise their warning voice; they may plead the constitution, as the authority under which they act; they may show the dangerous tendency of the "general welfare doctrine;" that it is an utter abandonment of constitutional government; that it removes all check on the sovereign power, and places all the rights and interests of the people, of minorities and individuals, at the mercy of the lawless will of an irresponsible majority, — inevitably leading to anarchy, oppression, and despotism; but all in vain. They will be answered, by the ruling majority for the time — "The people are the only legitimate source of power; they are the judges of what is, or is not, for the general welfare; we represent the majority of the people. Through us they demand these measures; and who are we to betray the trust confided to us, from regard to the selfish protests and declamations of a minority, whose foolish 'abstractions' the sovereign people have already condemned? If you do not like our measures go and talk to the people, convert them to your 'abstractions,' if you can. We are responsible to them, and not to you. We shall obey the instructions they have given us; do the will of our constituents, of the PEOPLE, who have sent us here to act, not to theorize; to adopt great and essential measures for the relief of the country, and the general good, not to split hairs on constitutional abstractions with a few impracticable political metaphysicians." So always will answer the ruling majority, when is adopted, as the creed of the country, the practical democratic formula, "The majority have the right to govern." This is wherefore we say the American people committed a serious mistake in translating republicanism into

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democracy, — a mistake which we fear it is too late to correct. It has silently worked a radical revolution in our system of government, — a revolution unsuspected by some, and encouraged by others in the hope that it would tend to the advantage of the poorer and more numerous classes; but which has tended to strengthen and confirm the power of the wealthier and more influential minority. The word democrat has so long been the rallying word of the Republican party, it has become so endeared by past struggles, successes, and defeats, that it is now perhaps impossible to lay it aside, and reassume our old and legitimate appellation of **REPUBLICAN**. The politician, who should propose to do such a thing, would hazard his popularity; and though his whole life had been devoted to the welfare of the poorer and more numerous classes, be thought to have grown cool in his love of liberty, and indifferent to the rights and interests of the people. But we much doubt whether we shall be able to restore the government to the true principles of the constitution, and effectually maintain constitutional order, till we rally again under our old appellation of republican, on true republican ground, — staunch and eager to rush to the battle under the old republican flag of '98, weather-beaten and torn as it may be, but still streaming in the wind, promising victory and freedom.

We know well enough how these remarks will be received. But we have never desired to be among those, who are incapable of profiting by the lessons of experience. The election of 1840 has taught us much; the conduct of the whigs at the extra session, and the documents they have put forth since the veto of the bank bill, have taught us more; and have, — we care not who knows it, — essentially modified our views, not of the *end* of government, but of the means by which that end is to be secured. We are satisfied what we and our friends are striving for is not to be obtained by the appeals, which were made during the last Presidential campaign. What we have heretofore hoped to gain, by calling upon the political party, with which we



act, to be more democratic, we are now satisfied can be gained only by first establishing a rigid constitutional order, by restoring the government to the true principles of the constitution, and administering it according to them. Then it will be administered for the common good of all. And this is precisely what, and all that the laboring classes, whose interests we have had, and trust we ever shall have, specially at heart, demand. But till we can confine the government within its constitutional limits, it will, in spite of all that can be done, be wielded for the special interest of the class, or section, that, for the time being, can command a majority; and this will not be the interest of the laboring classes. We have seen the use the whigs can make of the word *democracy*, and we see that they, and not our party, use that word in its popular acceptation; and, therefore, they, and not we, will control the government, when that is the common watch-word of both parties. Theirs is the simple, natural, easy meaning of the word, the first meaning it suggests; ours is more recondite, more philosophical, more abstract, and therefore less easily seized; and will be supposed, by the mass, to be practically the same. Hence, we refuse to shout democracy; we refuse to shout for enlarging the power of the masses; and substitute the call for constitutional restrictions on government; a negative on power, so that it cannot tyrannize; a republican government, confined within wholesome limits, constituted to manage the affairs of the public, and not of individuals, special classes or interests; and which will necessarily operate only for the freedom and common good of all. This is precisely the end the party with which we act are aiming at, and which they misname democracy; and it is because they are aiming at this end, that we act, and shall continue to act, with them. But to secure this end, we repeat, it is the CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, and not the DEMOCRATIC ORDER, as this last will be practically understood by the country, that we must labor to confirm.

But to return. It is to the general prevalence, prac-

tically, in all parties, but more especially in the whig party, of what we have termed the democratic formula, that is, "the general welfare" doctrine, which strikes at the foundation of all constitutional order, that we must attribute the astounding fact, that a majority of the two Houses of Congress could record their votes in favor of the Distribution Act. The majority had become habituated to a mode of considering and construing the powers of the government, which made the constitution of no practical significance; they believed that government was instituted for the "general welfare," and that the people had elected them to take charge of the "general welfare," and were they to suppose that they had not the power to adopt such measures as were obviously for its promotion? A constitution prohibiting them from adopting such measures would be null and void from the beginning, by defeating the very end for which government is instituted. Having, then, by some means or other, persuaded themselves that the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands would be for what they regarded as the "general welfare," they could entertain no question as to its constitutionality. They were not the men to sacrifice the interests of the country to the constitutional scruples. They were patriots, philanthropists, *practical* statesmen, of enlarged and liberal minds, adopting a broad and comprehensive policy; and quite too patriotic and conscientious to be deterred from doing their duty to the country by the dreams, or wire-drawn objections of a few "abstractionists." No more theorizing, no more refining on the constitution. Action, action, action, is all that we want. So place they their gag on debate, and almost without allowing the minority an opportunity to enter their protest, they, with indecent and ruinous haste, hurry through their revolutionary measures. Hence are they, after having wantonly violated the constitution, able to come home, and look even honest men in the face, and to wonder why they are not applauded for their proud superiority to mere technicalities, to "abstractions." All we say is, their

example should be instructive, and full of solemn warning to every man, who really loves his country, and desires for it the blessings of good government.

But we need not dwell on the dangerous tendency of the "general welfare" doctrine. We have drawn it out distinctly, that its destructive tendency may be seen. We cheerfully admit that there are probably few men in the country who would, in general thesis, maintain it as we have stated it. Nevertheless, we have only stated what is lurking confusedly, and half the time unsuspected, but always effectually, in the minds of a large portion of our countrymen, and producing the saddest results. It is, as we have stated it, the doctrine that almost exclusively shapes the policy of the government, and gives to it its false and mischievous direction. The whig party of to-day are its perfect representatives; and at the extra session they carried it out with admirable boldness, vigor, and consistency. All must see that it is at war with constitutional order, and therefore with freedom and good government. The real issue before the country, between the whigs and republicans is, then, no longer bank or no bank; but **CONSTITUTION**, or **NO CONSTITUTION**; the **FREEDOM** of law and order, or the **TYRANNY** of an irresponsible majority; the rule of the **PEOPLE** constituting the state, or the rule of a lawless mob. In the whig-democracy, we see only the foundation for the misrule of the mob, — not indeed the unwashed mob in the streets, of hard fists and coarse garments; but your well clad and even perfumed mob of brokers, stock-jobbers, bankers, speculators, and ambitious and intriguing politicians, — the only real mob there is in this country, or that is, or can be, formidable. The poorer and more numerous classes are, with us, the fast friends of law and order; and would endure almost any conceivable wrong, sooner than, as a body, violate them.

We have no intention of going again into the general merits of the distribution policy. In our Journal for April, and also for July last, we considered it at length,

both in its constitutional bearings, and as a question of expediency. Moreover, after the very full discussion the subject has received in both branches of Congress, and especially after the masterly speeches of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, nothing in fact remains for us to say, but to repeat what others have already said, and better said than we could say it. It is hard gleaning after Mr. Calhoun. We have no ambition to follow him in the discussion of any question relating either to the principles of government, or to its policy. He usually covers the whole ground; and however we may be disposed to question some of his propositions at first, we are, for the most part, obliged to surrender to him unconditionally at last. To this subject of distribution he has had his attention drawn for a long time; and no small portion of his efforts for the last twelve years have been directed to its defeat. It is but simple justice to him to say, that he was the first of our statesmen to see and expose its mischievous bearing; and he has exerted himself, often alone, amid reproach and obloquy, showered upon him from all quarters, for its defeat, with a foresight, a sagacity, a steadiness of principle, and a firmness of purpose, which have won for him a place in every truly American heart; and the reputation of being the first statesman, in the purest and loftiest sense of the term, that his age or country can boast. The American people have great reason to be proud of Mr. Calhoun, and to cherish a profound respect for his talents and worth, and a tender regard for his fame. With a personal character that has passed for years through all the bitter conflicts of party strife, unsullied by even a breath of suspicion; an intellect of the highest order, enlarged and invigorated by a long life of assiduous cultivation; an unwearied devotion, from his earliest manhood, of his best affections and powers to the public service, in high and responsible stations, to every one of which he has proved himself equal, and the duties of all of which he has discharged with a fidelity and success unparalleled in the history of any other public man in the country; a clear and vivid

perception of justice, and a martyr-like firmness of principle, that would lead him to rush in where "blows fall thickest and heaviest," to its support, and to brave power and even the axe of the executioner in its defence; always true to the great principles of law and order, and the fast friend of the broadest liberty, embracing in his policy the freedom and well-being of the humblest as well as the proudest citizen; unseduced by power, uncorrupted by success, undazzled by reputation, he is a man of whom his native country may well be permitted to boast, for such a man is only the slow growth of the ages; and in showing that she knows how to appreciate and honor him, his country inscribes her name high on the list of the more advanced nations of the earth, and proves that she has within herself the elements of national greatness and immortality.

We have been particularly interested in this last speech of Mr. Calhoun on the Distribution Bill, which we have placed at the head of this article; not only as being one of the ablest of his speeches, but as developing a liberal and patriotic policy, deserving the special attention of our own beloved New England. Mr. Calhoun proves in this speech that he is a southern man, with strong affections for his own section of the Union, and disposed to resist to the utmost any aggression on its rights or interests; but, also, that he studies and embraces in his policy the protection and furtherance of the common rights and interests of the whole country. We have no high opinion of that man who has no local attachments, no preference for his own natal soil; and into whom the peculiar circumstances, amid which he has been reared, have infused nothing. We wish to see in every man the marks of his age and country; and to read in his feelings, and to hear in the accents of his voice his birth place. Your men from whom all traces of their native land are obliterated, who have that enlarged philanthropy which overleaps all geographical distinctions, and grasps, with equal affection, all lands, races, and individuals, are quite too

refined and transcendental for daily use ; and the sooner they are translated to a world where time and space count for nothing, the sooner will they find themselves in a congenial element, and at home. The harmony of this world is maintained, and its real well-being promoted, by men who are not superior to tradition ; by assigning in fact to each individual a special sphere in which his affections shall centre, and the principal part of his labors be performed. We are too feeble beings to be able to grasp the universe in our affections, and to labor with equal zeal, energy, and wisdom for the whole. In aiming at so much, we lose the less we might accomplish. A southern man, born and reared under the influence of southern interests and institutions, habits, manners, and customs, who should yet have no traces of them, would be to us as undeserving our respect, as the travelled fop who had lost his mother tongue, and become unable to speak the language of any Christian people. And the New Englander whose heart does not swell at the sound of the surf breaking on her "rock-ribbed" coast, and at sight of her hills and vallies, her churches and school-houses, her factories and wharves, and thank God that she is his own, his native land, and prefer her to all other lands, like the man, who has no music in his soul,

"Is fit for treason, stratagem, and spoils."

Thank God, we have never yet been able to hear the word "Green Mountain Boy," at home or abroad, but our heart bounded as when a child ; and our own mountain-home came back to us in all its freedom and freshness, and the tears unbidden to our eyes. Long may it be so. For so long as it is so, we shall feel that the heart with which God made us is yet unestranged, and still retains somewhat of its early purity, simplicity, and warmth.

But whatever may be Mr. Calhoun's preferences and affections, as a southern man, he has nothing of that narrow, sectional feeling, that would lead him to promote the interest of one section of the country at the

expense of another. His proposition, which he made some time since, to dispose of the public lands to the States in which they lie, on condition that these States would assume the entire management of them, and pay over to the federal treasury sixty-five per cent. of their proceeds, showed that he comprehended and was willing to further the true interest of the West; and we regret that the late administration party did not adopt that proposition when they had the power. Had it been adopted, it would have settled our land policy on a footing equally advantageous to the West and to the whole Union; and the statute book would not have been stained by so unconstitutional and ruinous an Act as this for distribution. But, unhappily, some of those who should have supported him, preferred to misrepresent him; and to try to prejudice the country against him, by alleging that he proposed to give the lands away to the new States, as is supposed to be the case even now by the larger portion of the community; when, in fact, his proposition, if carried into effect, besides relieving the new States of their present dependence on the general government, and paying them liberally for their management of the public lands, would have secured to the federal government a larger net profit, than it can possibly receive by continuing the present system. It is exceedingly difficult to tell the truth about a man, who makes a proposition we do not wish to have succeed.

In this speech, again, he shows himself disposed to urge the general government to adopt a policy equally wise, just, and liberal to the north. He has here urged with great force and clearness the policy suggested, we believe by Dr. Linn, the worthy Senator from Missouri, the appropriation of the proceeds of the public lands, or of a sum equal in amount, to the defence of the country, and principally by means of enlarging our naval force. Mr. Calhoun, from his first entrance into public life, has shown himself the staunch friend of the navy; and his policy has always been to afford effectual encouragement to commerce and navigation. He

considers the encouragement and protection of commerce and navigation the principal external duty of the Union, and wishes that duty never to be lost sight of. In any plan of general defence the interests of these must hold a permanent place. We have little to fear, and can suffer comparatively little from any hostile invasion of our territory. A war with a foreign power would be principally destructive by its injury to our shipping interest, by sweeping our commerce from the ocean; and reducing to the greatest distress that large class of our citizens who depend upon it, not only for their wealth, but their means of subsistence. Consequently, a foreign war must always fall with peculiar weight on our section of the country; the section principally concerned in the interests of commerce and navigation. This fact was proved in the war of 1812 with Great Britain. It almost ruined our New England. Another war with Great Britain, with our present insufficient naval force, would be equally, if not even more, ruinous. We should feel its effects not only in our commercial and navigation interests, but even in our manufacturing interests. The kind of defence demanded by our interests is, unquestionably, that which protects us, not only on the land, but on the ocean, where so much of our property is afloat, and which is the home of so many of our free and hardy citizens. For this we must rely solely on our naval force. This is what our New England statesmen have always contended. Hence, the deep interest so many of them have taken in the navy.

The only power with which we are likely, at any time, to come into serious collision, is Great Britain. This country and Great Britain are commercial, and beginning to be manufacturing rivals. They are competing with each other for the markets of the world. Their territories join; and the ocean, instead of separating, brings them but the nearer together. They meet and rub against each other everywhere. We are the only power really formidable to Great Britain; and she is the only power really formidable to us. It is against



her, and her alone, that we are called upon to put ourselves in an attitude of defence. No defence against her will be adequate for the protection of our commerce and navigation, short of a naval force fully equal to that which she can, at any time, bring against us. This, Mr. Calhoun thinks, will require the increase of our naval force to about one third, or one half, of the actual naval force of Great Britain. By a wise and just policy we can always secure the friendship of Russia, Austria, and France, in case of any collision with England. This consideration, with the fact, that England has more points to defend than we have, shows that a far less effective force than hers will always be adequate to our defence. She can never liberate from other points, more than one third of her actual force to operate against us ; or, at most, not more than one half. Mr. Calhoun proposes, then, that we increase our naval force, and maintain it, to the equal of one third or one half of hers. In this he takes precisely the view that every New England merchant must approve.

Mr. Calhoun's policy is to unite firmly the north and the south Atlantic States, while he would be just, and even generous, to the west. He contends, with great justness, that the interests of the north and of the south Atlantic States, so far as they come under the cognizance of the general government, are virtually the same ; and he would bring chivalric South Carolina, and the glorious old Bay State, with her adventurous spirit, her love of order, her industry, and her "fierce democratie," together on the constitutional platform, to labor side by side, for the glory and prosperity of the common country, as they fought side by side, in the days of the Revolution, for the common liberty and independence. The land of Warren and Hancock and Adams, and that of Marion and Sumpter and Haynes, should be but friendly rivals in the cause of freedom, and patriotism, and honor, and glory. In order to make them so, he urges a policy of all others the most essential to our interests and prosperity, the only policy which can effectually protect our commerce and navigation, as

well as our manufactures themselves. Our manufactures have grown too large to be contented with the home market. Their protection is now involved in the protection of our commercial interests.

We will not revive, at this moment, the angry controversy concerning the expediency of the protective policy. The advocates of that policy, if we remember aright, never contended that it ought to be the permanent policy of the country. They asked its adoption only for a time, during the infancy of our manufactures, to give them a start, and enable them to acquire sufficient strength to sustain themselves; whether even this was needed, it is now useless to inquire. Our own New England came very reluctantly into their views; the enlightened merchants of our city resisted their policy, and never adopted it till forced into it by the great central States. It is worthy of note, that no protective tariff, laid by Congress, has ever received the votes of a majority of the members of Congress from either New England, or the south Atlantic States. But let this pass. The protective policy, however expedient it may have been, is now no longer necessary. Our manufactures, so far from being encouraged by the continuance of that policy, imperiously demand its abandonment. That policy is to encourage our manufactures, by securing to them the monopoly of the home market. But we can secure to them the monopoly of the home market, only by excluding ourselves from foreign markets. For, if we will not buy of foreigners, they cannot buy of us. But the home market is too contracted for the present growth of our manufactures. Confined to that market, they would diminish, at least not increase, or at best but to a very moderate extent. They now depend, in no small degree, for their prosperity on foreign markets; and their continued prosperity requires us to seek out for them as many and as valuable foreign markets as possible. Their real interest, then, instead of demanding the policy, which would confine them to the home market, demands a policy that leads us forth to compete with

other nations for the markets of the world. This last is the policy most worthy of our ingenious, bold, and enterprising countrymen ; and this policy with them, whatever it might be with a more sluggish race, would be successful. But this policy demands not restrictions on commerce ; it demands its freedom and effective protection.

This is unquestionably the true policy for New England, and, in fact, for our whole country ; for it would give us the widest field for our enterprise, and ultimately prove the only real protection to our manufacturing interests possible. Mr. Calhoun, among other reasons, therefore, objects to the distribution bill, its direct effect, by withdrawing from three to five millions annually from the revenues of the country, which must be supplied by increased duties on imports, to restrict commerce, by throwing upon it the whole weight of the government expenses ; which, if increased by the additional expenditure which will be demanded for enlarging and maintaining our naval force to the extent necessary for the defence of the country, and its navigation and commercial interests, will prove altogether too burdensome, if not overwhelming. The operation of the bill must be to increase the duties, while it diminishes the quantity of imports ; to cripple the commercial strength of the country, while it is required to carry increased weight. This objection is one that should not be lightly dismissed. It is worthy of serious consideration, whether commerce will prove able to sustain the whole weight of protecting itself, and of meeting all the expenses of the general government. It may, also, be a question whether there be justice or wisdom in making one interest of the country sustain the whole weight of its government. Commerce is a great and leading interest in the prosperity of a nation, and the prime agent in advancing the civilization of the world. Not for light and casual reasons should we consent to restrict, or overwhelm it with unnecessary and oppressive burdens. He who would cripple its energies or restrict the sphere of its operations, wars

against the best interests of his country and of his race. As soon should we recommend a war on the mechanics of large towns, who in all ages have been the most generous defenders of liberty, the first to demand and the first to sacrifice themselves to obtain it. Commerce is the real agent in building up manufactures; and it is only through her free, unrestricted operations, that the future prosperity of our manufactures can be promoted. What, in a word, would be the condition of England, with her immense manufacturing capital, were she confined to the home market? By her corn laws, her monopolies, her restrictive policy, designed to exclude, as far as possible, foreigners from her own market, she is even reduced to the necessity of attempting, contrary to all justice and international law, to open by means of her armies and fleets foreign markets for her manufactures, in order to save herself from the conflagrations of chartism, and her miserable operatives from starvation. Can anything more forcibly demonstrate the folly of attempting, by artificial means, to extend manufactures beyond the natural and regular demand created by commerce and home consumption?

But it was not our intention to discuss at length the protective policy. We may hereafter find it necessary to consider that policy somewhat at length; for we see very clearly, that a portion of our countrymen, unable to profit by experience, are resolved to revive it, and to fix it on the country as a permanent policy; and there can be no question, that one of the strongest motives the administration party had for urging the distribution bill through Congress, at the late extra session, was to prepare the way to create apparently a necessity for reviving this policy. We should hold ourselves utterly unworthy of attempting to discuss any political question, in the presence of our countrymen, could we for a single moment countenance a policy that we thought would be hostile to our manufacturing interests. Whatever schemes of a Utopian Republic, à la Plato, we may devise and speculate upon in our closets, or send out

for the speculations of others, we claim, when we enter into practical life, to be a practical man ; a New England man, with the feelings, and traditions of those among whom we were born, and wish to live and die, — taking a deep interest in, and cherishing a generous regard for, all the important branches of business in which they are engaged. Our manufactures have become a great and leading interest. A large portion of our New England capital is invested in them ; and hundreds and thousands of our population are dependent on them for wealth and worldly prosperity, and even for the very means of subsistence. We are not the man to recommend a policy that would impede their progress. But, we are confident, — and it is not now for the first time, nor lightly that we have considered the subject, — that the steady growth and permanent prosperity of our manufactures demand the policy recommended in the speech before us ; and we have gone into the question to the extent we have, for the purpose of drawing the attention of our New England community more expressly to it ; and of showing them that the objection Mr. Calhoun urges against the bill, on the ground of its tendency to operate unfavorably on commerce and the maritime defences of the country, is one that deserves our serious consideration ; not only because we are so deeply interested in commerce and navigation, but from its bearing on the protection and prosperity of our manufacturing interests.

On this ground alone, on the ground of the additional burdens it will throw on commerce, and the withdrawal in part of our means of providing for the adequate defence of the country, where most needing defence, — that is, on the ocean, — we are willing to rest our own opposition to the distribution policy. We grant our policy would be, to make this the first commercial nation of the world. Its position, its vast agricultural resources, its yet unsuspected mineral wealth, its facilities for extended and various manufactures, its vast extent of coast, and innumerable harbors, its mighty rivers and lakes, and increasing artificial facili-

ties of inland navigation, and internal communication ; the habits, spirit, genius, and freedom of its population, all mark it out as destined to be the first commercial nation on the globe ; and that will secure it preëminence in agriculture, manufactures, and the mechanic arts. Industry has become the ruling interest of the world ; and the grand promoter of that interest is commerce. Philosophy and science, literature and the fine arts, all that elevate the interior man, cultivate the taste, exalt the sentiments, and embellish exterior life, necessarily follow in its train. Such is the destiny marked out by Providence for our Republic ; such the destiny which we see for it in our patriotic dreams ; and the policy, that will enable it to attain this high destiny, we own, is the one we are ambitious to urge upon our statesmen and politicians.

But the anti-commercial bearing of the distribution scheme is not our only objection to it. The very fact of its unconstitutionality, which we established in our Journal for April last, is of itself a sufficient reason for rejecting it, were it even demonstrated to be of the highest public utility. We are not among those who can bend the constitution to their convictions of what is for the general welfare. The first and permanent good that can be obtained, or secured, to this country, is the maintenance of the constitution in its strict inviolability ; and in administering the government according to its express provisions, rigidly construed. For without this there is, according to our manner of viewing it, no good possible for us. Show us that your proposition is in itself never so wise, just, or useful, if it be unauthorized by the constitution, we cannot entertain it for a moment.

This act, interpret it any way you please, is an act for imposing an additional tax on the people, of from three to five millions, annually, for the purpose of raising that amount to distribute among the States. The simple, naked, undisguised fact is, that Congress, at its extra session, passed an act authorizing the collection of from three to five millions of dollars annually, beyond what

it needs for its own purposes, merely to give away. Is there a man in the country who believes this to be constitutional? Is there a man in the country, who dares lay his hand on his heart, and say that he believes Congress has the constitutional power to collect revenue for distribution? This is the simple, naked question, which no talk about land, proceeds of lands, and the like, can the least alter or affect. The public lands belong to the Union, — were in part ceded to it by States claiming them, — but whose claim was never admitted by Congress, — for the express purpose of furnishing a federal revenue; and in part were bought of France and Spain, and paid for out of the federal treasury. Their proceeds, then, are revenue, just as much revenue as the proceeds of the customs; nay, they are proceeds of the customs, for they have been bought by the customs in part; and the customs have paid more on account of them, including those ceded as well as those originally purchased, by several millions of dollars, than the government has as yet realized from their sales. There is no difference, can be no difference in principle, between distributing money derived from their sales, and distributing money derived from the customs. It is distributing revenue; and all revenue is a tax on the community. The simple question, then, is, Has Congress the constitutional power to tax the people for the purpose of raising a revenue for distribution? Of course not. Then who dares pretend that this measure is authorized by the constitution?

This measure is also objectionable, because it is an indirect assumption, by the general government, of the State debts. There is no one, who can believe for a moment, that a strong reason for urging the passage of the bill, at the extra session, was not the relief it would most likely afford the indebted States. The credit of the States, which had made heavy loans for facilitating or sustaining their banking operations, and carrying on their various plans of internal improvement, had to some extent been shaken, and in several instances very nearly ruined. Their bonds, holden by the principal

advocates of the distribution act, or their political associates, the Barings and Rothschilds abroad, and the bankers and stock-jobbers at home, were at a ruinous discount ; and to save a loss, or rather to secure a profit to their holders, some measure of "relief" was necessary, that should enhance their value in the market. The proposition was put forth, in the first instance, we believe, by a foreign banking house, that these State bonds should be assumed, or their payment guaranteed, by the federal government. But from this proposition, after feeling very delicately the public pulse, even our "general welfare" politicians shrunk. Their courage was unquestionable, but they had learned that discretion is sometimes the better part of valor. They, apparently, judged it neither safe nor prudent to attempt so open and bare-faced a violation of the constitution. Anxious as the people were for "relief," it was somewhat doubtful whether they would be willing to accept it on such terms. Assumption could, then, in prudence, be attempted only indirectly, and in disguise. An indirect and disguised assumption offered itself in the form of the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands. This measure had for years been sought for a double purpose ; by subtracting a portion of the revenue to create an excuse for raising the tariff on imports, in order to please the manufacturers ; and by distributing the amount among the States, as a basis of foreign loans, to conciliate the importers, and the stock brokers. It was a measure admirably adapted to the "relief" of the indebted States, or the holders of their bonds. For although indirect and partial, if acquiesced in by the people, it would soon prepare the way for open and entire assumption. That it would be acquiesced in, there could be little doubt ; for the indebted States could hardly be supposed to have the magnanimity to reject the "relief" proffered them ; and the unindebted States would be *bribed* into acquiescence, if not active support, by the portion of plunder that would fall to their share. Every captain of a ship, or commander of an army, knows the virtue of holding



out to his men the prospect of prize-money. Such was the view taken of this measure by its advocates; and such the end it was hoped to secure by means of its adoption. Its express design was, by a disguised and partial assumption of State debts, to enhance the value in the market of State securities. But is there a man in the country who will pretend that this disguised, indirect, partial assumption, is not as much a violation of the constitution as would be the adoption of the bolder and more manly proposition, put forth by the foreign bankers, of their direct assumption, or guaranty of their payment, by the federal government? But we beg pardon for the question; the advocates of the distribution policy, will only smile at our simplicity, in supposing that the unconstitutionality of a measure can have any weight with them; or in fancying that the "prize-money" they have offered may not secure them the support of a majority of the people, in spite of the obvious unconstitutionality of their acts.

The assumption of these State debts is objectionable, whether direct and entire, or only indirect and partial, on still other grounds. As a financial measure, it is either an absurdity, or a manifest injustice. The people of the States furnish the revenue of the Union; and are presumed by the constitution to furnish it according to the ratio of their federal representation. This is the constitutional basis of taxation. Now, if the same ratio be adopted as the basis of distribution, or assumption, the amount returned to each State will be precisely the amount it has previously contributed, — minus the cost of collection, re-distribution, and what sticks by the way. If the rule of taxation be just, or if each State has contributed its proportional share of the revenue, it is obvious, then, at a glance, that assumption or distribution of revenue, from the federal treasury, can add nothing to the ability of a State to pay its own debts. It is just as easy for the citizens of the State to pay the same amount of tax to the State government directly, as it is to do it through the medium of the federal government. In this view of the case, it

is a great absurdity to pretend to afford the indebted States relief, by means of assumption or distribution; because the same individuals must furnish the means of redeeming their bonds in the one case as in the other; and by introducing the agency of the federal government they necessarily incur the expense of two agencies, when one only is requisite.

But if taxes are unequally levied, — which is the fact, — then assumption, or distribution, can afford relief to the indebted States only by a manifest injustice to the unindebted States. They can obtain relief only by receiving from the federal revenues an excess over their respective contributions, and this excess must come from the other States. Is there any body to pretend that Congress has a right to levy taxes on one portion of the States to pay the debts of another portion? We go on the ground that distribution of the proceeds of the lands, is distribution of revenue. This we all know is the fact; for every dollar taken from the proceeds of the lands, must be supplied by an additional tax to that amount, direct or indirect, on the people. It makes no difference, then, whether the money distributed is said to be the proceeds of land, or proceeds of the customs. To the full extent, then, to which distribution of revenue adds to the ability of the indebted States to redeem their bonds, the unindebted States are taxed for their benefit. Where is the justice of this proceeding?

This measure is rank agrarianism. We have heard, within a few years, much of agrarianism. Even we ourselves have been accused, and falsely accused, of advocating agrarianism; and have been held up in all the strength and originality of the Peter Parley literature, in which whig leaders do so abound, to the execration of our countrymen. In 1840, if whig orators and newspapers may be taken as authority, the fact that we, the solitary conductor of a periodical, which then had only a few hundred subscribers, were supposed to entertain certain agrarian notions, was a good and sufficient reason why Mr. Van Buren should not be re-

elected. The charge against us was, in form and in substance, a sheer fabrication. We have been a sinner, we confess, and have said many foolish things first and last ; but, thank God, we never yet was left to entertain for one moment a scheme so wicked and withal so foolish as that of agrarianism. We have always been among those, who contend that man's right to property is not a grant from the legislature, but a divine right, which the legislature must respect and protect. Even the suggestion which we threw out for the modification of the law, by which that portion of property shall be reappropriated which escheats to the commonwealth through default of an owner, and which has not a single feature in common with agrarianism, in any possible form, we refused expressly to assume the responsibility of urging, save as a mere theoretic speculation. But we charge the representatives of the whig party with solemnly enacting, in open day, unblushingly, in this distribution act, the very principle which they falsely accused us of advocating ; and over which they shrieked in such loud and piercing tones of horror from Maine to Georgia, and from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains. The solemn enactment of this principle, we are exultingly told now, has covered the whig party with glory. Was their cry against us, then merely set up for the purpose of diverting pursuit from themselves, as archest rogues have been wont to do ? There is no getting by facts. There stands the distribution act on the statute book of the Union ; and placed there by a whig majority in Congress, and the official sanction of a whig President. There it is, — rank agrarianism, beyond the possibility of denial or cavil ; and agrarianism too under its worst possible form. Shriek, ay, shriek over agrarianism, whig orators and whig editors ; ye may yet shriek in good earnest. The sword is in our hands now, and it shall go hard but we profit by your lessons to use it with effect.

We say this measure is rank agrarianism. What is the real character of the distribution act ? It is simply an act for taxing the people, annually, from three to

five millions of dollars, for the purpose of distributing that amount among the States. It then declares the property of the citizens of the several States, so far as necessary to yield an annual income of this amount, common property, and provides for its distribution. If this is not agrarianism, in principle and in form, too, we know not what is. There is, and can be, no difference in principle, between the distribution of the proceeds of property, and the distribution of property itself; and none between distributing a portion of the proceeds and distributing the whole. To-day the government may be content with the distribution of only a part, and to-morrow it may choose to distribute the whole; and, next day, property itself. From distribution among States, there is but a step to distribution among individuals. And with the precedent before us, what security have we that this step will not be taken? We tell the whig leaders not to flatter themselves that distribution will stop where they now propose to stop. They enact agrarianism to-day for bankers, capitalists, and speculators; let them be assured that another sort of agrarianism may be demanded to-morrow. If agrarianism is to be the policy of the government, they will hear thundering in their ears the demand that it be for the benefit of the poor, instead of the rich; and when the poor are driven to make this demand, and authorized to make it by whig precedents, they will not be in a condition to resist it. Resistance will then lead to blows; and, in dealing blows, the fist of the wood-chopper, the black-smith, or cord-wainer, will count for as much as the fist of the lawyer, the banker, capitalist, or swindling politician. We have heard much of Marats, Robespierres, and French Revolutions; we tell the whig leaders, if they continue their agrarian policy, there will be no dearth of Marats, Robespierres, and French Revolutions. On their own native soil may be erected the guillotine; and they may be its first victims,—theirs the first blood to whet the appetite of the tiger. As yet the combustible materials in our Republic are scanty, but their accumulation will be

fearfully rapid under such a policy as this; and if it be persisted in even we, who are now on the stage, may live to see deeds done from which the stoutest hearts, — nay, hearts the most hardened among us, would now shrink appalled. We speak not in the tone of menace; we are too insignificant to threaten, even if we had the disposition. We are no advocates of a war of the poor upon the rich. But, if the poor find themselves perpetually defeated at the polls, and cheated of justice in the legislative hall; if they see the government continually administered for the benefit of the wealthy and influential minority; labor, and the necessities of life, taxed for the purpose of raising a revenue for distribution among stock speculators, and foreign bankers, or to feed the hungry maw of plundering politicians, and rapacious capitalists, no power on earth will be able to prevent them from appealing to the law of force. There is a might in the peasant's arm, when once waked from its slumber of ages, before which the enactors of iniquitous laws, will be but as so many dead men. Beware, how you rouse the sleeping lion. The seeds of a French revolution are sown broad-cast in every land; and the germs of a Marat, a Danton, a Saint-Just, a Robespierre, are in many a village clown. Would you guard against them, — practise **JUSTICE**. The government, or the party, that practises iniquity, must look out for a day of final reckoning, of terrible retribution. Delayed it may be for a time, but not forever; come it will, for there is a just God who reigns. We speak strongly, for we feel in common with all good citizens, the wish to leave this soil, purchased by the heroic deeds of our fathers, and the heroic sufferings of our mothers, free to our children, and blessed with wise and just government. These attacks on the rights of property, these agrarian doctrines, solemnly enacted in the legislative hall, and approved in the executive cabinet of the Union, we confess, fill us with alarm. They seem to us to speak in tones of loud and solemn warning to every republican, who loves freedom; to every patriot, who loves his native land; to every father, who looks

around with the just pride of a father's heart upon his children, and asks for them a country and a home. Not to-day will this iniquitous policy ripen. Not to-day will its poisonous fruits produce all their effects; but ripen it will, if not nipped in the bud, and its poisonous fruits be tasted. The flood-gate of iniquity once opened, corruption, sedition, tyranny, oppression national and individual degradation, crime, vice, and squalid wretchedness will rush in and deluge the land, — inundate every hope of the patriot, the philanthropist and the Christian. But that we know it would be in vain, we would entreat the advocates of this wicked distribution act, in the name of our common country, of our common ancestry, our common hopes, of all that is good, and sacred, and holy, to retrace their steps before it is too late. But, why seek to charm the deaf adder? Why appeal to the stony heart of mammon? The men who could urge forward such a measure, are past being touched by any appeals to what is noble, generous, true, or just in human nature.

But we object, also, to this policy on the ground of its bearing on the manufacturing interests of the country. We have already shown its bearing on the interests of our commerce and navigation. We call the attention of our New England manufacturers to the effect it must have, if persisted in, on their peculiar interests. They are demanding protection of the government. They have no doubt supported this measure, among other reasons, because it seemed likely in the present state of the treasury, to force upon the government the necessity of raising the tariff of duties on imports. Have they reflected, that they, by supporting this measure, are preparing the way to deprive themselves of all the benefits they hoped to derive from an increase of duties? If they will not listen to the voice of the constitution, of justice, of patriotism, of humanity, we ask them at least to listen to the voice of interest, and not consent to plunder themselves.

Free trade is unquestionably for the interest of our manufactures. The south and west are our principal

domestic customers ; and these States furnish the principal portion of our exports. The staple States of the south furnish about three fourths of the whole exports of the country. In these States the west finds its market for its peculiar productions ; and in them and the west we find the market for ours. Now it is obvious that the ability of the west to buy of us depends on its ability to sell to the exporting States ; and the ability of the exporting States, to buy of the west and of us, depends on their ability to sell to foreigners. A policy that tends to facilitate and increase the exports of the southern staple States is, then, unquestionably that which tends to increase the prosperity of our northern manufactures. And this policy, we all know, is free trade. But this is not the view we wish to insist upon at present.

The distribution policy is evidently designed to revive the credit abroad of the indebted States. It is with this view that it has been put forward, and in this view that it has been regarded as a measure of "relief." Now, our manufactures have nothing to dread equal to this reviving of the credit of the States abroad ; for nothing can be more destructive to our manufactures than these State loans. Foreign loans, in the shape of money, or bullion, imported into the country are, perhaps, not injurious ; because they bring with them the means of their own redemption ; and also because they furnish capital, which is essential to industry. They then render industry more effective ; and, of course, are advantageous in a country where there is but little capital and great natural industrial resources. But these State loans bring in no real capital, that can serve to stimulate the industry of the country. No money is borrowed ; merely a foreign credit is obtained and placed in the hands of a foreign banking house, or with wealthy bankers, on which bills of exchange are drawn and sold to our merchants. These bills are transmitted to Europe, and their proceeds returned in goods. From 1831 to 1839 inclusive, it has been stated that States and corporations obtained credit abroad to the enormous

amount of three hundred millions of dollars. We have no means at hand of verifying the accuracy of this statement. The aggregate of State indebtedness is generally admitted to have been at the latter date about two hundred millions of dollars; various corporations, cities and banks, had also, it is well known, borrowed largely; but we should hardly think to the amount of another hundred millions. To remove all ground for cavil, we will waive all the loans, except those of the States, which may be set down, as already stated, at two hundred millions of dollars. Now, the operation of these loans has been to swell the imports of the country to this amount, in nine years, above what could be sustained on the natural basis of credit; that is the exports of the country. The tables of imports and exports, during the years mentioned, after making liberal allowances for profits, and the interest annually accruing on foreign loans, show us an excess of imports over exports of very nearly the amount assumed. And if we look at the list of articles imported, we shall find a large proportion of them to consist of articles coming in direct competition with the products or manufactures of our own country; and which never could have been imported, if these foreign credits had not been obtained. Have our manufacturers reflected on the influence these heavy importations, made on the basis of State and corporation loans, have had on their interest? Are they not calling upon Congress day and night to grant them protection, by excluding foreign manufactures? But what tariff can withstand the operation of foreign credits, obtained by States and corporations, in addition to those warranted by our exports, to the amount of two or three hundred millions, in the short space of nine years, causing an augmentation of imports from twenty to thirty per cent.?

Now, the distribution policy, so far as it has the desired or contemplated effect, must revive the credit of the indebted States; and this will enable them to obtain new loans for completing or undertaking public works; and by furnishing the unindebted States large sums,



not needed to meet their current expenses, and pledging the public domain to raise and sustain their credit, already good, will tempt them also into vast expenditures for public works, demanding for their prosecution heavy foreign loans. These loans will be realized in the shape of goods. In both cases, then, the policy, if successful, will tend to swell our imports, as heretofore, some twenty or thirty per cent. beyond what the exports of the country can sustain. Can our manufactures survive such a policy? If so, what means this clamor for protection? If not, why do our manufacturers advocate it? Why do they tell us with one breath, that even the imports sustained by the exports of the country are more than they can compete with; and, in the next breath, sing the praises of a policy which has heretofore, and must again if revived, augment the imports beyond that amount to some one or two hundred millions, every six or seven years?

We much question, whether the mass of our business men are able to answer this question. Perhaps they will find the answer in the fact, that the some eight or ten prominent business men in this city, whom they regard as oracles, and follow as leaders, combine in themselves the several characters of manufacturers, merchants, bankers, and possibly speculators in State bonds. The policy of them is to sustain themselves as bankers. They, indeed, do not look to banking, as such, as a source of profit; but to their credit as bankers, to serve as the basis of their operations as corporators, manufacturers, importers, and speculators. What they want, then, is a government policy which shall sustain their credit as bankers; or, if you please, the credit of the banks. The credit of the banks requires a policy which tends to relieve them from the necessity of redeeming their paper. They require a favorable state of foreign exchange, which guards against all foreign demand for specie; and large government deposits, enabling them to extend their operations, and to meet their demands at home.

High duties and State loans effect both these objects.

The loans keep the exchanges favorable, so long as the States are contracting them ; and overcoming, as they do, the influence of high duties on the amount of imports, the two combined swell the government revenues, and increase the amount of government deposits. The banks, protected against all demands that may be made upon them, furnish immense resources to those who combine in themselves the several characters enumerated ; and enable them to realize immense profits, when the policy adopted all but ruins those who confine themselves strictly to manufacturing. These few individuals, by investing credit, where others must invest real capital, are always winning, while others are losing ; for one per cent. on their nominal capital yields them a higher actual profit, than the others are receiving, when they are making a profit of some ten or twelve per cent. These last derive no advantage from the policy which enriches the others. The only possible advantage, they can hope for, is in the increased amount of bank accommodations they may obtain. But this hope is fallacious. The bankers are also manufacturers, importers, stockholders in rail-road and other corporations, and general speculators. They need all the possible accommodations of the banks for themselves ; and it will not be denied, that the amount of discounts or accommodations to others than the officers, directors, and heavy stockholders of the banks, are, and for a long time have been, exceedingly small. This is the reason why there has been such a rage to multiply the number of banks. Moreover, by means of the favorable state of exchange, and the large government deposits, the banks are able to circulate their paper to an almost unlimited extent ; and this enhances prices, so that our market is all but monopolized by the foreign producer, or manufacturer. Under the operation of the policy, which it is now proposed to revive, we imported largely the very necessities of life, notwithstanding the protection of high duties, and our vast agricultural resources. The rise in prices then more than neutralizes any supposed bank facilities the manufacturer

would obtain. What interest, then, have they, who are engaged in manufacturing only, to call for a favorable state of the exchange, and for larger government deposits? Do they imagine, the Messrs. Lawrence, for instance, were they simply manufacturers, would demand distribution and encourage State loans? Or if they were simply merchants, that they would demand high duties? We think better of the business capacities and general sagacity of these gentlemen, than to suppose they would be guilty of such egregious folly. They would not, as some of their dupes are doing, labor day and night for their own ruin.

We cannot enlarge on this point. But we submit to the mass of our business men, if they have duly considered the great diversity there is between their interest, and that of the few individuals they follow. Have they considered, that the policy, which is most favorable to these few, must be the very policy most injurious to those who are manufacturers and nothing else, or merchants and nothing else? We beg them to pause, and consider even for their own sake. Why should they war against their own interest?

We have many more, and even weighty objections to this distribution act, but our limits compel us to draw our remarks to a close. In whatever light we view it, it is absurd or iniquitous. To give away five millions of dollars, annually, from the revenue, when we are obliged to resort to a public loan of twelve millions to meet our current expenses; to cut off one of the principal sources of revenue, at a time when our foreign relations are threatening, and increased expenditures are demanded to provide for the defences of the country; to increase the tariff of duties to protect home manufactures by diminishing imports, and pledging the whole public domain as a basis of foreign loans to be realized in the shape of increased imports; to revive credit, and render it stable and uniform by adopting a policy for swelling bank circulation to an almost unlimited extent; to keep the government pure by augmenting its fiscal transactions, and paving the way for a surplus revenue,

to serve as the basis of banking operations ; to promote the independence and dignity of the States by making them pensioners on the federal treasury ; to enhance the dignity and worth of the federal government by converting it into a mere tax-collector for the benefit of a few rapacious business men, and gamblers in State stocks ; to promote the morals and happiness of the people by facilitating the means of wild speculation and general extravagance ; and the purity, and freedom of elections, by appropriating some five millions of dollars annually, as a corruption fund, with which to bribe directly or indirectly electors, may be wise, liberal, and patriotic statesmanship, in the estimation of whig politicians, and worthy to cover their party with glory ; but if the immense majority of the American people do not treat it with the indignant scorn and contempt it so richly merits, the progress of corruption must have been fearfully rapid for a few years past, and altogether more so than we had supposed. If the American people permit the authors of such a barefaced, such an absurd, and such an iniquitous policy, to hold a place in what is regarded reputable society ; if they go further, and sustain them in this policy, they will deserve the scorn and derision of the whole world. In such a case, let them never again speak of their intelligence and virtue, their freedom and independence, their capacity for self-government ; but sink into the infamous slavery, for which their base hearts and craven spirits and stultified intellects fit them.

But we think we know the American people. We cannot praise them. They have suffered themselves to be most wofully deluded ; they have disappointed and grieved the hearts, and almost destroyed the faith of the friends of popular government ; but they are not clean gone in iniquity ; they have not quite lost their old spirit, their old devotion to justice and freedom. There is a spark of Seventy-Six in their hearts yet ; there is some of the old indomitable courage left, that will brave all but the fires of hell for freedom ; and, thank God, there is still ground for hope. The deep

indignation with which the Republican party to a man has received this measure, the terrible defeat which the whig party has experienced in nearly all the States, which have held elections since its passage, revive our hopes, and show us that the people will yet be true to themselves; that they will prove themselves worthy descendants of those who fought for independence on Bunker's Hill, at Saratoga, or Yorktown. Whiggism indeed came into power and place; but the extra session, it was so eager to call, disclosed its character, and already is it prostrate. Alas! poor whiggism! Thy day was short. It was written long ago, the wicked shall not live out half their days, and thou hast proved the truth of inspiration. Go to thy long home. A few may be found to bear the pall, and weep over thy ashes; but the heart of humanity bounds with joy at thy departure, and wisdom and virtue assume again their dominion in the affairs of the Republic.

We conclude, by calling, in the name of the constitution, upon the Republican party in all the States, where it has the majority in the legislature, to reject the bribe proffered, to refuse, with the stern integrity now demanded of them, to become, by accepting the portion offered to them, parties to the gross infraction of the constitution, which every man of the party believes has been practised. Now is a fair opportunity for republicans, democrats, the late administration party, to prove the virtue which they have always professed. They have been called "spoilsmen;" let them show by their conduct, the charge was a base slander. Let them show now, that reverence for the constitution, a sense of justice, of honor, and integrity, can outweigh in their bosoms the few thousand dollars offered them. The rejection of their respective shares by the republican States will defeat the measure. The whigs dare not persist in it against the protest, the stern indignant protest of a majority of the States in the Union. Nor is this all. The moral effect on the whole Union would be grand and salutary. A great party, standing on principle, and scorning the proffers of wealth to corrupt

them, would be a sublime spectacle, worthy of the true Republican party; and needed, in these days of degeneracy, to revive the hopes of good men in the purity and permanence of popular governments. The party owe this to the constitution; they owe it to their own consistency; they owe it to the integrity of their principles; they owe it as a stern and indignant rebuke to whig corruption and corruptionists; they owe it to their country; they owe it to the cause of popular government; they owe it to Christian morals, and to oppressed humanity, sighing everywhere for deliverance. Do we count too much on them, when we say they will do it? Do we trust them too far, when we say they will scorn to accept the bribe? Now is the crisis with them. Let them now take their stand boldly and firmly on principle, stake everything on principle; and their triumph is not only sure, but they will redeem their country, and bless the race. More we need not say. The democratic party, the true Republican party of the country, will not now be wanting in what is due to itself, and the just and glorious cause it represents.

EDITOR.

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#### ART. V.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

*Monaldi: A Tale.* Boston: Little and Brown. 1841. 12mo. pp. 253. — This is a Tale by Mr. Washington Allston, who stands unquestionably at the head of American artists, and is precisely what a student of his paintings would expect; neither more nor less. It indicates a mind highly cultivated, of considerable native richness, of great sensibility, but of no uncommon boldness or vigor of thought.

We are too ignorant of works of art to be able to speak of them with much confidence in our own judgment. We profess to have some sensibility to such works, but we do not know how to speak of them in the language of connoisseurs. We can judge nothing of the skill or machinery of the artist, any further than the effect his works produce upon us. Mr. Allston's pictures, while they affect us not

a little, do not produce upon us the full effect we look for from the masterpieces of art. They rarely satisfy us. In some instances they are unintelligible to us, and in others where they are not, they fall below our ideal of what they should be. Lorenzo and Jessica strikes us as the most perfect of his pictures; and in pictures of this class he seems to us to be a perfect artist. But when he attempts the higher and more daring walks of art, he appears to us not seldom to fail. The Scribe in Jeremiah is beautiful; but Jeremiah himself is a huge disproportioned giant, whose bulky frame but makes his intrinsic weakness the more apparent. You ask why his frame is so large, for the soul, that speaks out in his face and eyes, demands nothing more than the body of a dwarf. We cannot look on this picture without pitying the weakness of the man, when we would fain stand in awe of the prophet. Mr. Allston's conception of the Hebrew prophet approaches too near to that of the Pythoness, to satisfy us. We always think of the Hebrew prophet as exalted by the presence of God, which strengthens and sustains him, imparting to him somewhat of the calmness and repose of a divinity. Jeremiah is almost a maniac; his eye indicates that he is a prophet only through the influence of a spasm, and that the moment his fury abates, he will be no longer able to read the book of God's providence. Miriam, with the proud sweep of her arm stretched forth in mingled triumph and thanksgiving, strikes us very favorably. The Dead Man coming to life, on touching the bones of the prophet, is full of bone and muscle, raw flesh and blood, and though admirable for its coloring and grouping, is unintelligible to us. We cannot make out whether it is a man dying, or a man coming to life. The Head of St. Peter is in a more daring style than anything else we have seen of Mr. Allston's, and affects us powerfully. But there is more of conceit than grandeur in the thought of throwing in the light from the angel's wings. Mr. Allston's women are all very saintly; but though they may be angels to be worshipped, they are far from being women to be loved. The *woman* seems to be abstracted. They are no doubt pure, chaste, but they are cold, forbidding, as a Vermont snow bank, which sometimes has been known to withstand the influence of the sun in dog days. Mr. Allston's asceticism, or that of the religious portion of his countrymen, seems to have affected his art not for good.

But we will not proceed, for we are but betraying our own ignorance and want of taste. We studied Mr. Allston's pictures, when collected together a few years since in this city, with great attention, and with no little delight. We do not expect soon to find a similar pleasure. He has devoted himself through life to his art. He shows that he loves, that he all but worships it. He has true, noble, and lofty ideas of the province of art, and of the high and religious mission of the artist. Through all his productions there runs a chaste and religious spirit. All his works are fitted, so far as influential, to purify the sentiments, to inspire holy thoughts and virtuous emotions. So far we honor him, we reverence him. With more vigor, with more boldness, with more comprehensiveness, with a little more of the sublime genius of Michael Angelo his works would de-



serve the highest rank. But as they are, they are honorable to him and creditable to his country. Their grand defect to our taste is in their want of vigor. He paints sentiment, slightly hardened by thought; we would that he painted thought mellowed by sentiment, — love and devotion.

Monaldi is one of his pictures done in prose instead of being done on canvass. It is marked by all the delicacy, polish, and excellence in detail in which he is without a rival. It shows a nice observer of men and of nature, and is full of remarks on art and on life of great value. The story is one of intense interest. The characters are elaborated with great care, with nice attention to costume, with inimitable art; but not always with the truth of nature. Monaldi, the artist, is the best drawn character, and conducts through the whole as such a character should; but Maldura is a failure. So hardened a villain could never be engrafted on a nature originally as worthy as his is represented, and such a cool deliberate villain would never so suddenly repent, or so thoroughly reform. In the first part of his career he is too good to become the calm, calculating villain he proves himself; in the second part he is too base and hardened to become a pious and truly reverend monk. The disappointments he met were not sufficient to corrupt him; and with his immense acquisitions of literature and knowledge he could have attained the object of his ambition, had he possessed the deep feelings, he is in another part of his career represented as expressing. We confess again, that we have some doubts if envy of another's success can ever carry a man so far. But we have no room to enter into minute criticisms. We can only add in general terms, that we have read the book with pleasure, as evincing a high literary talent in its author. We do not like its horrors, and they might have been mitigated. A man has no business to torture us unnecessarily even in his books. If Mr. Allston had been a Frenchman, and had written a tale so full of horrors, he would not soon have heard the last of it. But as it is lawful for all but Frenchmen to write tales of horror, he will escape without any severe censure. We cannot close without saying, that the book is got up in a beautiful style, successfully competing with the best specimens we have seen of English printing. There is no necessity any longer of importing English editions for the sake of having finely printed books. We can print as well and send out books in as good a style in Boston, as they can in London.

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*The Mechanic.* By FRANCES HARRIET WHIPPLE. Providence: Barnett and King. Boston: Little and Brown. 1841. — This is the title of a little volume just issued, and dedicated to the mechanics of Rhode Island. Miss Whipple, to whom we are indebted for it, has heretofore been favorably known as the author of several short poems of much merit, but we do regret that in the volume before us, she has suffered her love of the good and the useful to supersede the love of the beautiful and the poetical, if in fact they are not inseparable, or if what is good and true be not therefore necessarily beau-



tiful. For ourselves, we much prefer to the poem or mere work of art that appeals solely to the love of beauty, the work which addresses itself to the whole higher nature, that deepens our reverence for God and man, removes us from that insignificant creature, *self*, around which we too often revolve, unites us to the great brotherhood of men, and attracts us to that sublime orbit whose centre is God.

Every age has had its poets, but the present age opens a new era in the history of the race; political and religious freedom have been born, and they require stronger nutriment than poetry; — they demand philanthropy. — A nation has arisen and as if by divine inspiration declared the fraternity and equality of man; and though the prophet has belied his utterance, that utterance has gone forth and cannot be recalled. Christianity, truth, justice, demand its fulfilment — not indeed as France demanded it with the sword and the guillotine, but by a power mightier than they, by the omnipotent spirit of love, of Christian love that sees in God a common Father, and in his image recognises a brother. Our country has been the first to declare these truths; she should be the first to put them in practice.

If it be true, as they have asserted who have scanned closely the annals of the race, that each nation as it rises from the bosom of the sea of time, and like a mighty billow rolls onward and breaks, has a mission to accomplish, an element of humanity to develop, as the Greek nation developed the love of beauty, the Roman the love of country, the idea our country is destined to realize must be the love of man. This mission she is slowly, imperceptibly it may be, but it seems to us surely accomplishing; and one proof of this is found in the fact, that such sentiments as this book abounds in are called for and find echoes in the depths of many hearts.

The *Mechanic* has not been written for the purpose of telling a story, though it is prettily told, but for the higher purpose of embodying a principle, of inculcating the doctrine of the dignity, the divine rights, not of kings, castes, or professions, but of the human soul; and we think no one will rise from the perusal of it without feeling his moral nature strengthened and his high purpose confirmed.

Imitative, as we are, and living and acting in a world that is too often governed by other notions than the highest regard for truth, justice, and love, the still small voice in which they speak to us is in danger of being drowned in the din and uproar around us; and whoever has a word to utter, and can command our hearing in their name, has done us, — nay the world, a service.

The idea this little book illustrates is that as the diamond can only be ground by its own dust, so the soul can only be degraded by itself; — that it is not the occupation but the spirit we bring to it, that is honorable or dishonorable. If this spirit be true, lofty, and self-relying, whatever it acts upon is elevated and refined — as the true philosopher's stone transmutes the base metal into gold.

This we are aware is no new theory, it is a commonplace truth that all must admit, yet one that very few act upon. — But the world can never be regenerated until man shall feel the dignity of his nature simply as man, and realize how that nature through long ages past has been perverted and debased.

Mechanic! laborer! apprentice boy! whoever thou art that hast shrunk under "the proud man's contumely," and before the pomps and vanities of the world felt a sense of thy littleness, knowest thou not that the germ of all greatness lies folded in thine own bosom, as the forest oak lies folded in the tiny acorn, waiting but for nutriment to expand and rear its branches to the very clouds? Give it sustenance then from the fountains of truth and knowledge that flow free to all; so shalt thou no more crouch servilely before thy kind, but erect and manlike shalt thou pass through this beautiful universe — no longer to thee a prison or a workshop — "but God-like and thy Father's."

In conclusion, we will merely add our thanks to Miss Whipple for her interesting little volume, and assure her that we shall always greet her with a hearty welcome, whenever she chooses again to appear for the purpose of doing good to the less favored classes among us.

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*Theory of Teaching, with a few Practical Illustrations.* By A TEACHER. Boston: E. P. Peabody. 1841. 12mo. pp. 128. — Books on education, on teaching, together with the great mass of modern school-books, especially of the Peter Parley class, have become a great nuisance, and would be forthwith presented as such, would our grand juries but do their duty. The evil is a great and growing one, and an independent fortune will soon be needed by a man who has half a dozen children to educate, to supply them even with class books. And what is worse, even when obtained and mastered, the child has learned nothing. The rage for simplifying and adapting everything to the child's capacity has diluted our school books, till a whole cartload of them have not substance enough to save an ordinary child from dying of inanition.

Modern theories of teaching strike us not a whit more favorably than Peter Parley Primers, Histories, and Geographies. Fellenberg's system is excellent in the hands of a Fellenberg, Pestalozzi's in the hands of Pestalozzi, but neither is worth anything in the hands of anybody else. No theory of teaching is worth anything, except in the hands of him who forms it. All we ask of a teacher is that he have a method, and that method be his own. If it is his own, he will teach well by it, because he has the peculiar talents of teaching that demand it. But God save him from borrowing a method, or from seeking to impose his method on others. We should be glad to see more education and less cant and speculation about education.

Nevertheless, we like this unpretending little volume, from a most estimable lady, whose heart and soul seem to be absorbed in the great work of rearing the young. As a theory of teaching we do not think much of it, but as a work containing much fine writing, many beautiful thoughts, much rich, fresh feeling, and right down good sense, we prize it very highly. It is a work, which all who are concerned in any way with children may read with pleasure and profit. The method of instruction is as wise and as good as any

method we have seen set forth, and in the hands of the lady herself we have no fears that it would not be successful. The book is quite creditable in a literary point of view. It indicates a mind of great richness assiduously cultivated, a warm and gushing heart, which must everywhere win confidence and love, and will certainly win the confidence and love of every child placed under her care. It proves that she is just such a lady as we should choose to entrust with our children. Her influence on them would be quickening and holy.

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*Man a Soul; or the Inward and the Experimental Evidences of Christianity.* By A. B. MUZZEY. Boston: Crosby & Co. 1842. 16mo. pp. 157. — The author of this little volume is a Unitarian clergyman of this neighborhood, of great respectability, a faithful and successful pastor. He has made himself favorably known to the public at large by several popular publications of great practical utility, among which *The Young Maiden* deserves honorable mention, as one of the very best books of its class within the range of our acquaintance. The work before us we have had time since it was put into our hands only to glance through, and therefore we are unable to speak in decided tones of its merits; but from our knowledge of the man, of his general ability, and his leading views, we feel warranted in commending it to the public as a valuable popular treatise on a great and interesting subject. Mr. Muzzey adopts a spiritual philosophy, without running into all the absurdities of some of our modern transcendentalists. We think, however, that his tendencies are too spiritualistic, that he makes too broad a distinction between soul and body. Man, in actual life, is neither soul nor body, but both at once. The body is as essential a part of man as is the soul, and it is just as proper to say man is a body, as it is to say that man is a soul. We have no great faith in the existence of disembodied spirits. We do not believe that the soul ever exists without a body. It is not body, nor the result of body, nor a property of body, but it is made to live always in connexion with a body. We therefore do not like the philosophy which treats man as a being existing independent of body.

We also think Mr. Muzzey falls into the common mistake of separating too much the faculties of the soul one from another, and of considering each capable in some sort of acting by itself. Thus he speaks of faith and love as superior to intellect; just as if all the intellect a man has does not necessarily enter into and form an integral part of his faith and love. Man is an intellectual being in his very nature, and consequently it must always be as an intellectual being that he believes or loves. He is a unity existing in multiplicity, a simple essence with the threefold power of acting, knowing, and loving, and it is always as such that he manifests himself. Whenever he acts it is always as an agent with this threefold capacity. He cannot one moment act, at another know, and at still another love; but it is always all three together. The classification that we make by analysis of his faculties belongs to the dead subject, not the living.

Mr. Muzzey speaks of consciousness as a principle of evidence. This seems to us hardly correct. Consciousness is not a faculty, nor a principle, but simply the *Me* recognising itself as the subject of its own phenomena. We perceive always, but are not always conscious of the fact. When our perceptions are so vivid and distinct, that we recognise ourselves as their subject, we are conscious. Consciousness is nothing but a higher degree of the ordinary power of perception.

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*The Connexion between Taste and Morals: Two Lectures.* By MARK HOPKINS, D. D., President of Williams College. Second Edition. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1842. 8vo. pp. 63. — Anything from Dr. Hopkins, a man of acknowledged abilities, will always command our respectful consideration; but we confess that these Lectures, although they have reached a second edition, have failed to meet our expectation. We have read them with care; turned them over and viewed them in every possible light, but have been wholly unable to discover anything in them beyond commonplace. They are a couple of very respectable sermons, a little prosy, a little dull, as is not unfrequently the case with sermons, but nevertheless very respectable as sermons. As philosophical lectures on the great subject of the relation of Morals and Taste, or in other words the connexion between the beautiful and the good, they are hardly worthy the distinguished head of one of our literary institutions. Dr. Hopkins can do better, and should, or else not publish his lucubrations.

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*The Neutral French: or the Exiles of Nova Scotia.* By MRS. WILLIAMS. Two volumes in one. Providence: Published by the Author. 1841. 12mo. pp. 238 and 109. — Mrs. Williams has here given us a very interesting tale, and a thrilling narrative of the horrors practised by the English on the French settlers of Acadia or Nova Scotia. We recommend it to the serious attention of all who are laboring to exalt the humanity of the English at the expense of the Americans. We had no conception of the gross wrongs and outrages to which the early French Colony had been subjected, till we read Mrs. Williams's Introduction. We could only say while reading it, thank God, we have not a drop of English blood flowing in our veins; if we had we should blush and hang our head, and never again speak of our glorious ancestors. The English people have many noble traits of character, and we are not conscious of any hostile feeling towards them; but we can conceive of no crime too gross, no barbarism too revolting to be approved by the British government — a government, which, as Mr. Jefferson well remarked, never admitted a chapter on morality into its political code.

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*Mission to England in behalf of the American Colonization Society.* By Rev. R. R. GURLEY. Washington Morrison. 1841. 12mo. pp.

264. — We have read this account of his Mission to England, by Mr. Gurley, with a good deal of interest. It contains much matter of great value to the friends of African Colonization. While we express our warmest regard for the objects of the Colonization Society, and our fullest confidence in the sincerity, integrity, and philanthropic zeal of Mr. Gurley, we cannot but dissent from the policy of attempting to enter into negotiations with the British African Civilization Society, and especially of soliciting funds in England for the furtherance of our own philanthropic objects. The conduct of the abolitionists in soliciting aid from England is enough to expose them to the utter condemnation of every patriot and enlightened statesman, and we are sorry to find the Colonization Society, by its own example, sanctioning it even in the remotest degree. We ought to be able to sustain our own philanthropy; and above all should we be careful how we allow England a pretext for interfering even indirectly with our domestic affairs. England cares no more for the negro, than she does for the man in the moon. If she could colonize Western Africa sufficiently to monopolize the trade of the whole coast, she would no doubt like to do it, and have it supposed that she was doing it for the suppression of the slave trade.

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*Lecture on Civilization, delivered before the Young Men's Association of Saratoga Springs, March 8, 1841.* By HON. SAMUEL YOUNG. Saratoga Springs: For the Association. 1841. 8vo. pp. 40. — Hon. Samuel Young, of the New York State Senate, is one of the ablest men and most enlightened statesmen in the country, and should have served his country long ere this in a more conspicuous sphere, and would have so done, had it not been for an unprincipled Regency that for many years ruled the State of New York. We have been accustomed to reverence him from our boyhood, and were in early life indebted to him for some favors, which he has not remembered, but which we have not forgotten. We like him, for he is one of the very few men who profit by experience, and grow more liberal, as they grow older. We have read his lecture with much pleasure. It is able and eloquent, and though not recognising the great fact of the growth of humanity, successfully vindicates the progressiveness of all civilization, and especially of that to which we belong. We commend it to our readers as liberal, and democratic in the best sense of the term. Mr. Young goes for the largest liberty, and for the elevation of the mass. His Lecture may be obtained at the principal bookstores in New York, Albany, Troy, and Schenectady.

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*Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme où se trouve exposée la vraie définition de la Philosophie, et où l'on explique le sens, la suite, et l'enchaînement des divers philosophes depuis Descartes.* Par PIERRE LEROUX. Paris: Charles Gosselin. 1839. 16mo. pp. 351. — This is a work directed against the eclectic philosophy of M.M. Cousin and Jouffroy. We do not like the spirit manifested towards Cousin, nor the virulent

personal attacks on him, in which M. Leroux indulges even to excess ; but we cannot deny to the work the merit of great ability and uncommon philosophic powers. M. Leroux does not always do justice to M. Cousin, and differs in fact less from him than he fancies ; but he is unquestionably the profoundest philosophical writer France can boast. We confess that we have read his work with great pleasure, and not without profit. He is deserving the serious attention of our countrymen, although we would caution them against some of his speculations touching Christianity. He is a profounder and a more vigorous and inspiring writer than Cousin, though less chaste, elegant, and polished.

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*My progress in Error, and recovery to Truth : or a Tour through Universalism, Unitarianism, and Skepticism.* Boston : Gould, Kendall, and Lincoln. 1842. 16mo. pp. 240. — This is one of those books which many good people will tolerate for its odor of orthodoxy, but which every enlightened Christian must deplore, as calculated to bring religion and religious people into contempt. It deserves the severest condemnation of every man who really wishes to promote faith in the Gospel. The author, whoever he may be, and we are glad he conceals his name, should be placed under guardians. If he knows no better than he writes, he should be watched lest he fall into the fire ; if he does, he should be sent to the house of correction, as a brawler and disturber of the peace.

Seriously, the work is the production of a low-minded bigot, ignorant of the simplest rudiments of the Christian faith, and destitute of every spark of Christian grace. He acknowledges that he has been all his life a hypocrite, dishonest, unworthy of confidence, and he proves that he has by no means been regenerated. He belies Universalism, Unitarianism, and Skepticism, and shows that he knows no more of them than he does of manly feeling and Christian liberality.

We must tell our orthodox friends, that it is not by such books as this, that they will check the progress of heresy and infidelity. There is no form of heresy, or of infidelity, that is not infinitely preferable to the bastard orthodoxy, made up of ignorance, bigotry, and cant, inculcated by this contemptible volume. The true spirit of the Gospel is free, lofty, and catholic, not low, confined, and grovelling. It elevates and expands the soul, warms and vivifies the heart, enlightens and invigorates the mind, making one ever more truly a man, more worthy of himself, his race, and his Maker. Books designed to further the Gospel must be written in its spirit.

There is and can be no greater mistake than the effort to promote a good end by unworthy means. Our orthodox Christians, we are sorry to say, are exceeding prone to fall into this mistake. Their books against infidelity are for the most part unworthy the Christian cause, and rarely answer any other end than that of making bigots or infidels. We cannot call to mind even a respectable work from this class of Christians, that we should be willing to place in

the hands of unbelievers, if we wished their conversion. Their writings against Universalists and Unitarians are no better. They are so confident that they are right, that they never take the pains to ascertain why they are right, or why others are wrong.

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*Organic Chemistry in its Application to Agriculture and Physiology.* By JUSTUS LIEBIG, M. D., Ph. D., F. R. S., M. R. I. A., &c., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Giessen. Edited from the Manuscript of the Author, by LYON PLAYFAIR, Ph. D. Second American Edition. With an Introduction, Notes, and Appendix, by JOHN W. WEBSTER, M. D., Professor of Chemistry in Harvard University. Cambridge: John Owen. 1841. 12mo. pp. 424. We are glad to learn that this work has already reached a second edition. In general we have no very high opinion of the works written for the purpose of applying science to agriculture, especially those written abroad. They are not adapted to the state of agriculture in our country, and in general it requires an outlay of capital to follow their directions, which very few of our farmers can command. But this is a work of genuine science, profound, yet simple, and may be studied with great advantage by our agricultural community.

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*Words in a Sunday School.* Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1842. 18mo. pp. 194. This makes No. V. of the Sunday School Library, now in course of publication, by Mr. Greene. It is a volume of more than ordinary merit, full of rich thought, of pure, pious, and philanthropic feeling, often expressed with much force and delicacy. It is not often that we find in a Sunday School library a work of so much real merit. Its author, we are told, is a Sunday School teacher, a young lady of a most estimable character, and we think we can promise her, if she perseveres, a literary career, which will be honorable to her, and useful to her countrymen.



THE  
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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APRIL, 1842.

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ART. I. — *Charles Elwood: or the Infidel Converted.*  
By O. A. BROWNSON. Boston: Charles C. Little and  
James Brown. 1840. 16mo. pp. 262.

THIS small volume, written for the most part in 1834, though not published till a couple of years since, was by no means designed to offer an elaborate defence of the Christian religion, far less a complete system of theological doctrines. Its purpose was to state with tolerable clearness, and with a little more than ordinary philosophic precision, the leading questions between believers and unbelievers; to show the unsatisfactory character of the answers usually given to those questions; and to indicate with some distinctness a better method of treating them. It is properly a Discourse on the method of handling the matters in issue between believers and unbelievers, with only such applications of it as were necessary to make it intelligible, and to establish its justness and sufficiency.

It is but justice to the author, to say that he never for one moment considered, that the book of itself would be sufficient to convert an unbeliever to the Christian faith; nor that viewed either as a simple argument, or as an exposition of a system of doctrines, it left nothing to be desired. His own painful expe-



rience had taught him, that the unbeliever is never converted by mere argument, however forcible or conclusive. He is never reasoned into faith. His conversion, under the blessing of God, must be the result of the operations of his own mind. Far less can be done for him, than is commonly supposed. The most that we can do for him, is to present him the proper topics of consideration in a light, which aids him from his position to see them for what they really are. This is what and nearly all that is attempted by the author of Charles Elwood. For the desired effect, he relies on the trains of thought which he believes will be naturally suggested to the unbeliever's mind, and the feelings that will be kindled up in his heart. These trains of thought, and these feelings will carry the intelligent unbeliever further than the book itself goes, if he pursues them.

The book is written in the form of an Autobiography, and this has led some to infer that the author is the hero of his story. This, except so far as the purely spiritual experience detailed is concerned, is not true. The author has merely transferred to Charles Elwood his own experience as an unbeliever, the struggles which actually passed in his own mind, the efforts he made to get the better of his doubts, his repeated failures, and ultimate success. Beyond this he has nothing in common with him. The characters introduced are fancy sketches, though perhaps not unlike some frequently met in actual life. We mention this, because there have not been wanting individuals to demand of us, whether, in sketching the character of Mr. Smith, the fanatical preacher, we did or did not mean them!

As a literary production, the work has been objected to, that its story is meagre, and its plot without interest. The aim of the author was not to write a story, that should possess an independent interest, nor to show his skill in weaving and unravelling an intricate plot. The narrative and incidents introduced are integral parts of the work, essential elements of its discussions, and necessary to its main argument, to which

they are designedly subordinated ; but to which they contribute perhaps more than our readers in general suspect. Abstract the personal interest taken in Charles himself, the æsthetic effect of his conversations with his betrothed, and of the moral beauty of Mr. Howard's life, and generous friendship for him ; and the life and force of the argument would be greatly impaired, and nearly all the efficacy of the work would be lost. The author relied more on the subtle influence these would exert on the heart of the unbeliever, than on his metaphysics. Knowing this, we were not a little amused by the following passage from a friendly critic.

“ But we do not think him [Mr. Brownson] qualified, nor do we think that *he has attempted*, in the book before us, to present Christianity and its grounds so as to satisfy the wants and the tastes of all persons. We think that all must feel — the author and all — that the views to which his logic leads do not entirely satisfy. Logic has to do with the intellect and thought — the philosophic element in man. To this element Mr. Brownson has addressed himself satisfactorily. But the heart, and its affections, and sentiments, the fancy and the love of the beautiful, have wants which logic cannot satisfy ; they require what the logical understanding cannot prove to exist ; nay they often require a faith in what it pronounces to be impossible and *absurd*.” \*

Doctors disagree. Without offering any comment on the metaphysics of this extract, we will say that it is precisely what this writer supposes the author did not attempt, that he has aimed to do ; and that it is precisely in the logical parts of his work that he is least satisfactory. This critic took up a somewhat prevalent opinion, that the author of Charles Elwood is a sort of logic grinder, without heart or soul, or at best nothing but a gizzard ; and therefore inferred, that he could dream of attempting nothing but the construction of a mere logical argument. Yet from a tolerably intimate acquaintance with the author, of almost forty years' standing, we must say, that we have formed a

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\* Christian Examiner, May, 1840, p. 198.

somewhat different estimate of his character. We are far from regarding him as the pure intellectual being, the mere dry logic machine supposed. Nay, we doubt whether he has one half the logical power ascribed to him. Abstract the deep, earnest feeling, the passion even, that he mingles up with his arguments, to an extent perhaps little suspected, and we apprehend his logic would be by no means remarkable. But be this as it may, we think that the tone of the book indicates, and we know that its whole design was to show, the utter insufficiency of mere logic to satisfy the wants of the soul, or to effect any real change in one's faith. In his conversations with Messrs. Smith and Wilson, where only logic is brought into play, Charles is represented as falling deeper and deeper into unbelief, and we apprehend that the reader sympathizes with him; but the moment he comes into the presence of his betrothed, whom he loves, and whose gentle tones go to his heart, all is changed; he manifests a stronger and a stronger desire to believe; all his feelings, all the force of his sentiments, the motions of soul are on the side of faith; and we feel that he is not far from the kingdom of heaven. A subtler influence than logic is at work now, that of love; and Charles himself says, that if untoward circumstances had not separated him from Elizabeth, she would have reconciled him to the Christian faith; and we are greatly mistaken, if the reader does not feel as much. Could he, who believed only in the efficacy of what this critic calls logic, and who addressed himself only to the "logical understanding," have written the following? —

"'O, there is a God,' spoken by the sweet lips of eighteen, by her we love and hope in a few days to call our own by the most intimate and sacred of ties,—it goes well nigh to melt even the atheist. It comes to us as a voice from another world, and wins the heart though it fail to convince the understanding. It is no easy thing to be an atheist when one loves, is in presence of the one he loves, and hears her, in the simple, confiding tones of the child, exclaim, 'O, there is a God.' For a moment I gazed on the beautiful being before me, as upon one inspired. Could I see her, hear her, love her with all my heart, and not believe in the Divinity? She seemed

sent to me from a fairer world, to bear witness to the reality of brighter beings than the dull inhabitants of earth."— p. 29.

Or this —

“ ‘ There may be intellectual beings, who are moved by thought alone,— beings who never feel, but live always in mere abstractions. Such persons are dependent never on the state of the affections, and are influenced not at all by the circumstances around them. Of these beings I know not much. I am not one of them. I have believed myself to have a heart as well as a head, and that in me, what the authors of a new science I have just heard of, call the affective nature, is stronger, by several degrees, than the intellectual. The fact is, my feelings have generally controlled my belief, not my belief my feelings. This is no uncommon case. As a general rule would you gain the reason you must first win the heart. This is the secret of most conversions. There is no logic like love. And by-the-by, I believe that the heart is not only often stronger than the head, but in general a safer guide to truth. At any rate, I have never found it difficult to assign plenty of good reason for doing what my heart has prompted me to do. Mr. Howard understood all this perfectly, and uniformly practised on the principle here implied, not as a calculation, but because he was led to it by the benevolence of his own heart. He found me out of humor with myself and the world, suffering acute mental torture, and he saw at once that I must be reconciled to myself and the world, before I could look upon Christianity in the proper frame of mind to judge of its truth and beauty. Then again he was not extremely anxious to convert me. He did not regard me in my present condition as an alien from God, or as deserving to be an outcast from man. To him I was a man, a brother, a child of God. If I had been unable to come to the same belief he had, it might be my loss, but could not be my fault. He would gladly see me a believer, but he thought probably the influence of Christian example, and above all, communion with truly Christian dispositions, would go farther than any arguments addressed merely to my understanding towards making me one.” — pp. 125, 126.

It must be owned that critics do sometimes commit mistakes. If we could be persuaded that we fall into as gross errors with regard to the spirit and design of the works we criticise, as others do in regard to the spirit and design of our own productions, we would throw up the trade of critic at once in disgust.

Moreover, we are not willing to admit that the plot of this work is quite so insignificant, as some represent it. The philosophical discussions unquestionably in part overlay it, and it is by no means worked up, as far as it might be ; but it is far from being without

dramatic capabilities. It turns on the struggle between love and religion, the two strongest sentiments human beings ever experience. Ordinarily these two sentiments flow into each other, religion purifying and exalting love, and love softening, condensing, and individualizing religion ; but now and then their harmony is interrupted, their alliance broken off, and they assume to each other hostile relations. The conflict which then ensues is terrible. As when Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war. Few bosoms can survive the struggle unharmed, — a struggle which almost always results in death, or in complete or partial insanity. We have ourselves witnessed, during seasons of great religious excitement, several instances of this conflict between love and religion, which we shall not speedily forget. In writing the portions of the work relating to Charles and Elizabeth, the author had in mind a real fact related to him by the young gentleman whom it concerned, and who was at the time one of his parishioners. The poor girl, a most lovely creature, full of life and soul, of captivating manners, and severe principles, was a lunatic, the last time we heard of her. We must, therefore, feel that the story of the book is naturally rich enough in materials, and materials of high dramatic interest. It would have been comparatively easy to have amplified it, and multiplied the incidents ; and had it comported with the didactic design we had in view, and had it not been for our horror of writing a big book, which we hold to be a great evil, we should have so done, or at least tried our hand at so doing, whether qualified to succeed or not. But enough of this.

We have heard it alleged, that throughout the book the infidel has the better of the argument. He unquestionably does have the better of the argument in the first nine chapters ; but not in the rest of the book, at least so far as we can judge. In these chapters it was unavoidable. The design of the writer was to show the real strength of the infidel argument, and the insufficiency of the replies usually given by standard

authors on the evidences of our faith. Charles, therefore, must be more than a match for Messrs. Smith and Wilson, the representatives of those authors. But we cannot admit that Messrs. Smith and Wilson are mere men of straw. They reason as well as men can from their point of view, and better than one clergyman out of a hundred does reason in his actual controversies with unbelievers. They had the wrong side of the question on the particular points at issue, and their failure was inevitable, and not the fault of the writer.

The fact is, and there is no use in pretending to the contrary, that the works in defence of religion, most in vogue among our orthodox people, excellent as they are in some respects, are utterly inadequate to meet the wants of the unbeliever. They do not reach his case ; they do not touch the actual difficulties with which he labors ; and they are never able to effect his conversion. Reduced to their elements they are, as arguments, logically defective ; and this is what Charles but too easily demonstrates. They, who rely on these works, are themselves believers, and therefore feel no need of their aid to convince themselves. They have never reduced them to their simple elements, and consequently have never discovered their intrinsic weakness. Hence, when the author of Charles Elwood so reduces them, and shows that weakness, they think he has done them injustice. But we will thank those who complain that the infidel has the better of the argument, to tell us what argument for the truth of revelation is to be found in any popular treatise on the evidences of Christianity, that Mr. Smith does not recognise and urge ; and what consideration of any value connected with the argument from nature for the existence of God, that Mr. Wilson does not suggest, or that Charles does not meet. These arguments and considerations, it is true, are stated in the briefest possible manner, but as arguments they are stated in all their strength. They are not developed, nor was it necessary. Messrs. Smith and Wilson could have talked more, they might have been made to multiply words, and to bewilder

their opponent in the mazes of sophistry, or to overwhelm him with declamation; but they could not have been made to reason better, unless they could have been made to change their point of view; because from their point of view religion is wholly indefensible, — a fact they would perceive at once, did they rely on their own arguments as the grounds of their own faith. Men are for the most part sounder in their actual faith than in the reasons they give for it. It is rarely the case, that they are able to assign the reasons which have actually induced them to believe as they do.

Throughout the rest of the book the charge cannot be sustained. We do not now insist on Mr. Morton's metaphysical arguments, for Charles is represented to be virtually a convert before he makes Mr. Morton's acquaintance. Mr. Morton is in reality instructing the neophyte, not converting the unbeliever. His arguments would have no weight with one, who was still in fact disposed to question the truth of religion. Mr. Howard is the one who converts Charles to religion, and Mr. Morton labors merely to give a rational and philosophic form to his faith. In judging of the merits of the book this fact is important, and yet it seems to have been altogether overlooked. We do not recollect having seen any notice taken of the ground assumed by Mr. Howard, the only original ground assumed in the whole work, and the only additions, if any, that it makes to the usual arguments adduced in defence of Christianity. The following extract will show what this ground is.

"One evening, while we were conversing, I remarked to Mr. Howard, that since I had been in his family, I had been almost persuaded to become a Christian.

" 'Perhaps,' he replied, 'you are, and always have been, much nearer being a Christian than you imagine.'

" 'But I can hardly be a Christian without knowing it.'

" 'I am not so sure of that. Christianity is not a creed, but a life. He who has the spirit of Jesus is a Christian, be his speculative belief what it may.'

" 'I have not as yet advanced far enough to admit even the existence of a God. I see not then how I can have much of Christ in me.'



“‘Christ is not a dogma to be believed, but a spirit to be cultivated and obeyed. Whoever loves truth and goodness, and is willing to die for their honor and the redemption of man, as Jesus did, I hold to be a Christian in the only worthy sense of the term. He may not indeed have the ‘letter’ which ‘killeth,’ but that is no great loss, so long as he has the ‘spirit’ which ‘giveth life.’”

“‘You seem determined to make me out a Christian, and that too without changing my faith.’

“‘The belief in Christ lies in the bottom of every honest man’s heart. Christianity is nothing foreign to our soul. It is the ideal, the realization of which would constitute the perfection of our nature. Just so far as you advance in the work of perfecting your own nature, do you grow in Christ; and could you attain to the highest perfection admitted by your nature as a man, you would attain to the stature of a perfect man in Christ Jesus. In yielding obedience to the moral laws of your own being, you are yielding obedience to the Gospel. One of these laws, the one which I term the social element of human nature, you obeyed in your efforts to reform society and augment the sum of the common weal of your kind. Consequently in obeying this element, you were conforming to the Christian law. You fancied you were obeying a law of infidelity, but that was an error of judgment, easily accounted for. You saw that element generally overlooked or discarded by the Christian world; you therefore inferred that it could not be an element of Christianity; and you rejected Christianity because you supposed it rejected this element. But had you seen that Christianity recognised this element as its great, its central law, you would not have thought of rejecting it.’

“‘But I was an unbeliever long before I ever dreamed of turning social reformer.’

“‘Very possibly; but still for a Christian reason. All the infidelity I have ever met with springs from one of two causes acting separately, or from both combined. The first cause of infidelity I have already spoken of. Some men feel a strong desire to redress social or political grievances, and are repulsed by the church. They therefore imagine the church opposed to political freedom, and social progress; and identifying Christianity with the church, they disown it, and very properly. The second cause of infidelity is found in the development of the philosophical element of our nature. This element is strong in some men. They must be free to inquire what and wherefore they believe. This inquiry the church has prohibited; they have therefore concluded it prohibited by Christianity itself; and therefore have rejected Christianity; and I add again, very properly. In both of these cases the supposed rejection of Christianity has been induced by Christian motives; and the infidel could not have been, with his lights, a Christian, had he done differently.’”  
— pp. 127 – 129.

Mr. Howard assumes that there is no radical difference between the inward life of an honest, intelligent unbeliever, and that of an honest, intelligent believer.



His argument, therefore, properly consists in establishing the identity of the inward life of the one with that of the other. He proceeds on the ground, that the work to be done is not so much to give the unbeliever a new and a different faith, as to enable him to find and comprehend the faith he already has; for paradoxical as it may seem, the unbeliever has a faith. Every man, who is really a *live* man, has a faith; but not always the faith he thinks he has, nor that which he writes out in articles, or to which he formally subscribes. His faith is the intimate conviction of his soul, that which constitutes his spiritual life, and controls him in his general relations with the unseen world of truth, and in his relations with the world of mankind. This faith, Mr. Howard assumes to be in the case of the unbeliever, in point of fact, as well as with the believer, essentially the true Christian faith. He therefore takes up the inward life of Charles, and shows it made up of Christian elements, that Charles had never really rejected Christianity, and that in supposing he had, he had done great injustice to himself.

In confirmation of Mr. Howard's view, we may appeal to the experience, not of every one who has been a scoffer and has subsequently become a professor of religion; but to every honest man who has at one period of his life doubted, or supposed that he doubted, the truth of Christianity, but has come finally to embrace it, and to find his happiness in living for it. Every such man feels that he is the same man after his conversion that he was before, and that in fact the elements of his faith are the same. He tells us that he was an unbeliever only because he misinterpreted his own faith, and because he misconceived the true character of the Christian religion. We know at least, that such was our experience, and it was our own experience that led us to place the argument adduced, in the mouth of Mr. Howard.

We may also come to the same conclusion, or to the conclusion that there cannot be this radical difference, commonly supposed, between the believer and the un-

believer, by the higher consideration of the fraternity of the race, and the unity of the human mind. If there is any one thing incontestable, it is that the brotherhood of the race is a doctrine of Christian revelation. This doctrine of brotherhood must mean something, and more than that all have sprung from the same original stock. It implies that all men have not only a family relation, but a family likeness, and therefore the same general manner of feeling and of thinking. The human mind too is essentially one; modified in different ages and individuals it may indeed be, but it operates everywhere, and always, by the same general laws; and we see by the records of the remotest past, that the human mind, then at work, was the selfsame human mind that is at work now. All thinkers, then, must be of the same family, the same brotherhood; and instead of supposing themselves to be enemies, they should feel, and know, themselves to be friends and brothers.

Mr. Howard, therefore, we insist is right, in contending that Charles was already a Christian in fact. The only thing he should have guarded against, which he has neglected to do, is the universal application, which he does not make, but which some may suppose he makes, of his doctrine. Charles Elwood, though an unbeliever, belongs to Christian civilization, and therefore lives necessarily the life of Christ, so far as that civilization has realized it, whether fancying himself a believer or an unbeliever. Mr. Howard is right, then, in telling him that Christ is at the bottom of his heart. But would the same remark hold true of a savage, or a man born and brought up in an order of civilization less advanced than the Christian, say the Mahometan, or the Braminical? Not to the fullest extent. Christian civilization embraces the elements of all inferior civilizations, but adds to them, what is peculiarly its own. The man brought up in these inferior civilizations could then be a Christian only in a general and feeble sense; only so far as those civilizations constitute elements of the Christian civilization. The question

would be not of a difference of kind, but of degree. But in the bosom of Christian civilization itself, no man can be born and brought up without being, in his practical or actual faith, a Christian, so far as that civilization itself is Christian. There is, then, no room for this bitter controversy which rages between believers and unbelievers, when one comes to understand the matter. With this qualification, we are willing to be responsible for Mr. Howard's argument.

To avoid all occasion for misapprehension, we say, what we suppose is sufficiently obvious without being said, that in Mr. Howard's statement, or in our own present statement, it is not a question either of the account men render of their faith, nor of their actual conduct ; but simply of what may be called their spiritual or interior life, so far as spiritual life they have. Hume was a speculative skeptic, but an actual believer. In his philosophy he doubted of everything, but in reality he was as firm a believer as Reid himself. Men differ widely in the accounts they render of their faith, when virtually their faith is the same. In their actual conduct men also differ, and differ widely ; but the conduct of the professed unbeliever not unfrequently conforms more nearly to the Christian law, than that of the large mass of professed Christians. The Church is very far from embosoming all the virtue in the community. The profession of religion is a cloak which sometimes covers a multitude of sins.

Taking this view of the argument, with these explanations and qualifications, we must needs believe that the charge, that the infidel gets the better of the argument, is unfounded. The infidel is not convicted of being wrong where he was right, it is true ; but he is convicted of having misconceived Christianity, and of having rejected it through ignorance of its real character ; and he is brought to believe it, by being made to understand it. What more could have been required, we know not.

A writer in the *Christian Review*, Dr. Wayland, we believe, President of Brown University, objects to

Charles Elwood, that he remains the same man after conversion, that he was before ; and says that the book ought to have been entitled " Charles Elwood, or Christianity converted." This is very clever ; but the Reviewer does not seem to have even suspected, what he charges upon the author as a fault, was done with " malice aforethought." In the first place, the very design of the book was to show, not the radical difference, but the radical identity, between the true believer and the honest, intelligent unbeliever. It would have been then a great blunder on the part of the author, to have made his hero a different man after his conversion from what he was before. Moreover, Charles had, prior to his conversion, we will not say all the Christian graces and virtues of this learned and philosophic Reviewer, but at least all that fall to the lot of ordinary Christians ; and it would have been difficult to have improved his character by radically changing it.

The Reviewer also overlooks a very important fact, at least in the estimation of Christians of his persuasion, that Charles Elwood is represented to have experienced religion in his early youth, to have been regenerated even, before he became an unbeliever. To have regenerated him again would have been rank heresy, for which no one would have been more ready to censure the author, than this Reviewer, who, we presume, holds to the doctrine, " once in grace always in grace." Here is the account that Charles gives of himself.

" ' Do not fancy that I have become what I am without a struggle. I am not ignorant of what men call religion. It has been the study of my life. My first lesson was the catechism, and my earliest delight was in reading religious books, conversing with religious people, and thinking of God and heaven. I was not yet thirteen when I was affected as you have been, — had deep and pungent conviction for sin, — heard, as I fancied, the Son of God declare my sins forgiven, and felt all the ecstatic joy you now feel.' " — p. 31.

Now, the author meant to represent Charles as having been really regenerated, or he did not ; for in a subsequent part of the book he shows that he holds to the doctrine of regeneration, and therefore could not have intended to represent a religious experience to

be of no value. If he did not mean to represent Charles as having had a genuine religious experience, how could he have put this confession into his mouth? If he did mean to represent him as having been really born again in early life, he could not with any consistency have made his subsequent conversion a regeneration.

Moreover, the author designedly represented Charles as an amiable, intelligent, and worthy man, even while an unbeliever; not only because there are unbelievers who really deserve to be so represented, but because he had never been able to persuade himself, that the best way to make an unbeliever in love with our religion, is to begin by declaring him a bad man, a great rascal, deserving the utter reprobation of every friend to religion and virtue. When he was himself an unbeliever, he frequently met with good, pious clergymen, who sought to convert him by a similar method; but he never observed that their success equalled their efforts. He had also observed that in books written against unbelievers, and designed for popular reading, the infidel was always represented to be a profane wretch, a drunkard, a gambler, or a debauched villain. Such representations have a very bad effect. They mislead believers; they irritate unbelievers; and in no way advance the cause of religion and morality. They have the very opposite effect from the one intended. They create the impression with unbelievers, that believers have no solid arguments to offer for their faith; for they not unnaturally infer, that a man rarely resorts to misrepresentation and abuse, so long as he has anything better to offer. The author aimed, therefore, to avoid this error, as he regarded it, and to be just to the unbeliever, both for the unbeliever's sake, his own, and that of the cause he advocated.

But it is said, that Charles is proud, and does not repent and humble himself before God. As to repenting, we do not know, so far as his character is drawn, what Charles had to repent of. No sin or misdemeanor is laid to his charge. That he had doubted is true;

that he had dared to be faithful to the light he had, and to follow his convictions, though they exposed him to much popular prejudice, and cost many and heavy sacrifices, cannot be denied ; but this, so far from being matter to be repented of, was on all sound moral principles his merit, and his glory. To have made him repent of his honesty, his sincerity, his independence, his moral courage, his devotion to truth, and his willingness to sacrifice himself for the good of mankind, would have been to teach a morality, we should be sorry to find approved by any professed follower of Jesus. And yet, the author must have done this, had he made him repent, and talk like a sinner just converted.

Touching his pride and want of humility, we see not wherein the charge can be sustained. Charles Elwood is a man who respects himself ; who claims to be a man amongst men ; yielding them their dues, but conceding them nothing on the score of the unpopularity of his own faith, or want of faith. He does not make an apology for daring to think for himself ; nor does he beg others to grant him the privilege of thinking for himself. He thinks as he can, as he must ; and if he thinks differently from others, it may be his misfortune, but it is not his crime, *nor their virtue*. He meets them as an equal, and demands to be met as an equal. In all this we see only a proper self-respect, which whoso will not cherish merits only contempt. Towards God he manifests no pride, and no mock humility. He reverences truth, owns his obligation to seek for it, and to obey it ; and he is willing to obey it at whatever personal hazard, when once assured that he has found it. Nor has he an overweening confidence in his own judgment. When he utters his own views, he does it in strong terms, simply and directly, in the tones of an earnest mind, believing the truth and importance of what he utters. But he is willing to be taught, listens with the docility of the child to whomsoever profess to be able to teach him, — unless they begin by abusing him, or assuming to be his masters, who have

the right to command him ; and yields up his previously expressed opinions without a blush, whenever he sees a reason for so doing. Now this does not look to us like an excess of pride, or a sinful want of humility.

It is true, Charles Elwood does not adopt the usual phraseology of religious people, especially of what is called the Evangelical school. Herein we acknowledge his heresy. He is a man whom the garment of Cant can never be made to fit. He cannot go about, and with infinite pains, try to make people believe in his piety. He speaks in his own natural tones, and wears his face as God made it. He makes his confessions, if he makes them at all, to his God, and not to his brother. He never tells people what a great sinner he has been, and how hot a place in the nethermost hell he deserves, in hopes that they will flatter his pride by telling him, "the greater the sinner, the greater the saint." When he prays it is not standing in the synagogue, nor in the corners of the streets, nor in the market place ; nor does he in revenge go to religious conference meetings, and tell his brethren how often he prays in secret. In a word, he takes none of the usual methods to make men believe in his piety or virtue. He aims to be, and to do right, to *be* always what he *seems*. It would have been easy to have corrected all this, to have filled his mouth with pious phrases, to have drawn down his face, turned up his eyes, and made him speak in a sanctimonious tone ; but really we are sinner enough to doubt, whether this would have essentially improved his character in the sight of God, or in the estimation of truly Christian people. We have no disposition to deny, that there are some practices, into which many who are called pious people fall, for which we have no great respect. We cannot help thinking and feeling too, that we have a large number among us, who take unnecessary pains to make us believe them pious worshippers. They quite overshoot the mark. Less ostentation of godly conversation, and more deeds of justice and love, would serve their turn altogether better. There was something worth remembering in

the remark of one of our old divines, who when asked by one of the pious striplings of the day, if he had any religion, replied, "none to *speak* of." Religion should be like the light, the medium through which we see all that we do see, but remaining ever itself unseen. It should be an all pervading spirit, but showing itself only in greater sweetness of temper, kindness of heart, fidelity to the great trusts of life, and untiring zeal and perseverance in the cause of well-doing. It should be worn for use, to cover our nakedness and to keep us warm, not for mere show, to attract the gaze or the remark of the throng.

According to our method of judging, Charles Elwood, so far as his character appears in the book before us, is not obnoxious to the charges preferred against him, and we would rather take our chance with him, even in the days of his grossest darkness and blindest unbelief, than with the loudest of his impugnors. They who think otherwise would do well to "go and learn what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice."

We say at once, however, that we by no means pretend that Charles Elwood is a true representative of all unbelievers. He represents only the serious, honest, intelligent portion of them, the only portion it behoves us to consider in our controversy with those who reject our faith. For the others, the miserable scoffers one meets in grog-shops, on board steamboats, and in stagecoaches, all we have to say is, that we can address them only in the terrors of God's law, from the height of the Christian pulpit. We cannot honor them so much as to enter into a serious controversy with them; for the doubts they profess hang as loosely about them, as do their moral principles. Such are the infidels converted in revival seasons, and who keep up a plentiful supply of fanatics and fanaticism. We turn them over willingly to the Nettletons, the Beechers, the Finneys, the Knapps, and the Maffits.

Thus much we have judged proper to say in defence



of Charles Elwood. We recognise the justice of none of the charges which, to our knowledge, have been alleged against him; and the authors of those charges, by bringing them, seem to us to impeach their own piety and Christian understanding. There are, we must be permitted to say, many things for them to learn, and some graces for them to acquire. Perhaps they would not do amiss to follow the example of Paul after his conversion, and retire for a season into Arabia, before entering upon the discharge of their functions as Christian teachers.

Nevertheless, the book is not altogether free from faults. So far as concerns its spirit and design, its main argument, and the special moral and theological doctrines it inculcates, we do not apprehend that any serious objections can be sustained against it; and if it be interpreted throughout in special reference to the special purpose for which it was written, we are willing to expose it to the rudest criticism. But it bears traces of a system of philosophy, which we are not willing to be responsible for, without some important reservations, and which, if accepted and applied universally, cannot fail to induce some grave errors of reasoning, if not of doctrine. It is not so accepted, nor so applied in Charles Elwood as to affect at all the substance of the work, or in the least to impair confidence in the important results to which the author arrives. It merely in a few instances affects the form of the reasoning by which he obtains those results.

The faults, which we should charge upon the book, belong to it as the reader will understand it, rather than as it was understood by the author himself. The author of Charles Elwood has the habit of viewing most subjects he treats under a special aspect, and of treating them with reference to a special purpose. If the reader seizes that special purpose, and interprets all that is said solely in reference to it, he will rarely find the author in the wrong, and still more rarely find any difficulty in understanding him. But this habit necessarily involves that of using terms in

a more special and definite sense, than the one in which they are used by the generality of people. Hence a perpetual misunderstanding between him and his readers. They are always accusing him of advocating doctrines which he by no means entertains ; and whenever he succeeds by a change of phraseology, or of the point of view from which he treats his subjects, in conveying to them some glimmering of his real doctrines, they forthwith charge him with having changed his opinions, and sneeringly allege, that he has obtained "a new stock of ideas." Part of this grows out of the nature of the subjects which he discusses, and the loose notions generally prevalent on those subjects ; part out of the haste with which he is obliged, by circumstances not under his control, to throw off his compositions ; but more perhaps from the peculiarities, defects it may be, of his mental constitution. His mind operates usually with great intensity, concentrating for the time being all its forces upon the precise point under consideration. It is also deficient in that power, so essential to the artist, of properly grouping his subjects, and of duly distributing the light and shadow. The main figure is always kept distinctly in view ; it is brought out boldly in the fore-ground, as it should be ; but the other figures, essential to the picture, are thrown too far into the back ground, and some of them so far as not to be detected by ordinary eyes. They are so deeply shaded that few discover them, and hence it is inferred that they escaped the observation of the artist. This is a defect which he has tried in vain to overcome, and it is this which occasions nearly all the misunderstanding between him and his readers. Yet, whoso takes the author's position will, we apprehend, if he have a tolerable pair of eyes, and if he look long and steadily, discover that the figures are all there.

Without meaning this as an apology for the author, we suggest it for the guidance of his readers. The book must be considered from the point of view of the author, and interpreted by the precise purpose he had in writing it. This is necessary when it is taken as

a whole ; it is also necessary in considering any particular part of it. The purpose for which any special statement is made must shed the light by which to interpret it ; nothing in the book stands alone, and very little that is said has, in itself, an independent value. Its value consists in its bearing on some ulterior purpose. This is not perhaps the best way of writing, but it is our way, and we can write in no other.

The faults, which we are about to point out in the metaphysical part of this work, nearly all grow out of the fact, that the author uses terms, which may seem to have a general application, in a special sense ; and therefore appears to be affirming universal truths, when he is in reality only affirming special truths, or presenting merely such special aspects of truth as serve to enlighten the particular purpose he has in view. The error involved, then, it may easily be seen, consists rather in the application which others may make of what he says, than in the application which he himself makes of it. It may also, then, be seen how the book, as existing in the author's mind, can be sound, and yet, as it actually appears, not be free from some grave errors.

The book we hold free from the defects to which we refer, till, in the progress of the story, Mr. Morton is introduced to give what may be termed the metaphysics of religion. Till then the author speaks, from his own internal experience, the views which have been elaborated in his own mind. Thus far we would offer no criticism on the book, with the single exception, that Mr. Howard, who is the representative of the peculiar views of the author, in the chapter on Rationalism, restricts a little too much the sphere of the philosophical part of human nature, makes philosophy too exclusively retrospective, and separates it too widely from religion. He, however, expressly identifies philosophy with Christianity, which is well. Had he asserted its absolute identity with religion, he would have done better, presented a juster view both of Christianity and of philosophy. His error lies in making

Christianity more abstract than it is, and in recognising in philosophy nothing but the results of cool, unimpassioned reflection. However, Mr. Howard is in the main clear, and just in his statements.

The serious deficiencies of the work commence with Mr. Morton, who attempts to interpret religion by the light of Cousin's Philosophy, slightly reinforced by some scattered rays from Benjamin Constant. In general he borrows from these two writers only what is worthy of confidence. For the most part, he escapes their errors; but we find on a careful revision that he has not done it altogether, and that, owing to the adoption of their phraseology, he has the appearance of not having done it to so great an extent, as he really has. The points, on which he has fallen into error, or has not been sufficiently explicit in his statements, or guarded in his language, are three. 1. The origin of religion in human nature. 2. The impersonality of reason. 3. The division of reason into spontaneous reason, and reflective reason. The first shows the influence of Benjamin Constant; the other two of Victor Cousin. The first concerns the foundations of religion in the human soul; the second affects the form of the argument offered for the existence of God; and the third the explanation presented of the fact of inspiration.

I. Benjamin Constant, in his valuable work on "Religion considered in its origin, its forms, and its developments," defines religion to be a sentiment of the heart, an indestructible law of man's nature, seeking ever to embody itself in outward institutions. He attempts to bring all the phenomena of man's religious history within the range of sentiment. But this he cannot do. Unquestionably religion is a sentiment, but it is also more than sentiment. It is idea as well as sentiment. Religion, in addition to the inward sentiment, is man's theory of the universe; his solution of the problem of his own existence and destiny, prescribing to him a life-plan he must endeavor to realize, imposing a duty he must labor to perform. It is always

legislative ; it imposes the law ; hence, the Jews, with singular propriety, call their religion "the Law," and never by any other name. It always involves the idea of that which binds, which lays man under obligation. It implies, therefore, always moral considerations. Morality may not include religion, — though without it, it has no adequate foundation, — but religion always includes morality. They, who in our times attempt to separate religion and morality, whether in favor of the one or of the other, fall into serious error. The common sense of mankind pronounces the expression, an *immoral* religious man, a contradiction in terms.

Mr. Morton enlarges the definition of Benjamin Constant. He defines religion to be a craving for the infinite, and certain ideas or conceptions, which he calls "intuitions of reason." This definition, though loosely given, is substantially correct. It was intended to supply the defects of Benjamin Constant's definition, and is perhaps broad enough to embrace all that has ever been considered essential to religion. We would prefer to say religion, regarded as sentiment, is the *aspiration* to the infinite, to saying that it is a *craving* for the infinite ; nevertheless, the main point is recognised, namely, that religion is both *sentiment* and *idea*.

Thus far Mr. Morton makes an evident advance on Benjamin Constant, and is worthy of reliance. But there is another point involved in his statement, about which we are not quite so clear, or rather two points. He says, religion is a fact of man's natural history, proceeding from a law of his nature, a fundamental want of his soul ; and that the ideas or conceptions man seeks to embody in his religious institutions are intuitions of reason ; by which last, he apparently means, as may be gathered from his argument, that they are fundamental elements of human intelligence, without which man would not, and could not be an intelligent being. This language is susceptible of a meaning to which we by no means object ; but it may be interpreted so as to teach a doctrine, to which we are very far

from assenting. What was the precise meaning attached to it, we will not take it upon us to decide ; though we apprehend that the author at the time of using it, beyond a certain point, had only a vague and confused meaning. If it mean no more than that man has the natural aptitude to be religious, the natural capacity to aspire to the infinite, and to recognise intuitively the ideas or conceptions of reason concerned, that is, of knowing them when presented, which most likely was his meaning, we have no fault to find ; but if it be so interpreted as to teach that the sentiment itself is innate, a law of man's soul ; and that the ideas or conceptions are elements of the faculty of intelligence ; that is to say, innate ideas ; we hold that it is altogether objectionable.

No sentiment is or can be innate. Sentiment is the soul in exercise, exercising its power to feel. It requires a power in the soul, and an exercise of that power to feel, as much as it does to know, or to do. They are out in their psychology, who consider the soul as purely passive in its sentiments. In point of fact the soul is never more active, than in what are called the passions. Love is called a passion, but it is its highest possible activity, the fullest possible expression of its interior life and energy. Man then acts when he feels. Sentiment, then, is an act, not a law ; an exercise, not an element of the soul. Hence religion, viewed as sentiment, can exist in the soul only when the soul exercises itself, or acts in a particular manner. It is not true, then, to say, as some of us do, that the religious sentiment is a fundamental law, an indestructible element of human nature. If it were so, we must have the sentiment at every moment. No man, and at no moment of his existence, could be without it. But we can have no sentiment without being conscious of it. We are never more conscious than in our sentiments. Sentiments are inconceivable without consciousness. We lose sentiment, just in proportion as we lose consciousness. If then, the religious sentiment be an ever present phenomenon of

the soul, then must we at every moment of our lives be conscious of it, at least when we are conscious at all. But this is by no means the fact. There are men who rarely, if ever, experience the sentiment; and there are moments in the lives of the most devout, when they have no consciousness of it. The power or capacity to experience the sentiment is, no doubt, innate, a fundamental law of human nature; but the sentiment itself is born and dies with the exercise of its power.

Passing over now religion regarded as mere sentiment, to religion as idea; is it, in this last sense, a law of man's nature? Mr. Morton in this last sense makes religion consist in the idea of the true, the idea of the beautiful, and the idea of the good. This is all well enough. But these ideas, are they constitutive elements of the *faculty* of reason? Man is born, we presume it will be conceded us, with all his faculties; at least in germ. If reason be one of his faculties; if these ideas are constitutive elements of reason, then he must be born with them. The question, then, is simply, are these ideas innate, elements of the soul; and does seeing them by intuition mean detecting them in the soul itself? This was not the doctrine Mr. Morton intended to teach, but it is perhaps authorized by his language.

We have no faith in the doctrine of innate ideas, — a doctrine unjustly ascribed to Descartes. Descartes says expressly, that all he means by innate ideas is, that the power or faculty, by which we think certain thoughts, God, for instance, is innate. By intuition we have in none of our writings understood seeing by looking *in*, but as the word itself says, seeing by looking *on*. The soul sees nothing by looking into itself. Nay, it can never turn itself round so as to look at, much less into itself. It is the looker, the seer, and the seer and the seen are as distinct in fact, as they are in logic. When we speak of looking within, we use *within* merely in opposition to the world of space. By *intuition* we understand merely the power of the soul

to perceive ideas, and by ideas we mean objects or realities of that world which transcends time and space. All ideas, — and we use the term in the original Platonic sense, — are transcendental. In asserting man's power to perceive them, we coincide with the transcendentalists; but in asserting, as we also do, that it is out of the soul, out of the *me* and not in it, that they exist, and that we perceive them, we depart from what we suppose is a characteristic feature of American transcendentalism.

We deny utterly, that these ideas are constitutive elements of human reason, regarded as the faculty or power of knowing. We shall spend no time in justifying this denial; for since the time of Locke it has not been necessary to show that there are no innate ideas. The faculty or power of perceiving, or recognising these ideas we, however, do hold to be innate, a fundamental law of human nature; and the fact, that man does perceive them, is a fact of his natural history; and if he did not, his actual intelligence would not be what we know that it is. This we presume is all, under the present point of view, the author of Charles Elwood intended to assert; certainly this is all that the facts he adduces go to prove. But admitting all this, admitting that man aspires by virtue of a law of his being, or an innate power, and perceives these transcendental ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, by means of a fundamental power of his soul, it may still be asked, if no foreign or special agency be requisite to induce him to aspire, and to lead him to the actual perception or recognition of these ideas. If we understand the author of the book before us, he takes it for granted, though he does not expressly say so, that man does aspire, naturally, from his own inherent energy, and that he does perceive these ideas, without any agency but the spontaneous operations of his own reason. At least this may be inferred from his language, though evidently contradicted in his own mind by the peculiar views he adopts concerning reason and inspiration.

Now, while we are by no means prepared to main-



tain absolutely that man does not aspire naturally, that is, by force of his own nature, without any foreign quickening, we are still further removed from maintaining that he does. Taken as he is, to-day, in the bosom of Christian civilization, we admit that he does aspire by force of his own nature, and both as sentiment and as intelligence. But we have no evidence to satisfy us, that this is universally true of mankind. Many facts go to prove to us the contrary. Man is progressive because he aspires, and all men have undoubtedly the capacity of progress. But we are not sure that all are naturally progressive; for we do not find progress wherever we find man. Savage tribes are not progressive; ages on ages pass away and bring no improvement in their condition, no progress in their ideas. Hence, we infer, that they do not aspire. If they did aspire, they would come out of their savage state. But we have no record of any savage people emerging by spontaneous effort from the savage state, into the civilized. This is asserted by Niebuhr, and admitted by Constant, either of whom on this point is high authority. The African negro, as a race, does not aspire, or at least only to a feeble degree. He can therefore be made contented and apparently happy in a condition, from which the proud Caucasian, under the influence of Christianity, recoils with horror. Those negroes, who among us aspire, are stimulated by the example of their Christian neighbors, and have for the most part blood of another race running in their veins.

Moreover, the traditions of every civilized people, — and we own that we are disposed to consider all traditions of great historical value, — ascribe the origin of their civilization to foreign influence, never to indigenous and spontaneous effort. It is a sacerdotal or a military colony from a more advanced nation, some providential man, or some divine interposition, that quickens their faculties, commences their education, and sets them forward on the path to civilization. The facts, so far as we can come at them, seem to authorize us to say, that if man has the natural capacity to aspire,

he does not naturally aspire, that is, by the simple force of his own nature. He is not naturally progressive. In order to make him aspire some power or influence, foreign to himself, is necessary to quicken his faculties, kindle his aspirations, and compel him to struggle. Divested of what civilization has done for him, placed at the lowest round of savage life, he is naturally indolent, careless, improvident, averse to all exertion, shrinking from all effort. His greatest delight is to eat and sleep. If the sense of hunger or some outward circumstance arouse him to a sudden effort, he relapses into his torpid state at the earliest possible moment.

Nor is it any more evident that man attains at first to the *idea* of God, than it is that from the first moment of his existence he aspires. The idea of God we hold to be an intuitive perception, to-day, in the bosom of civilization; but we have no evidence that it is an intuitive perception in the minds of those, who linger yet in the lowest forms of savage life. The first thought of the first human being, no doubt, contains, if we may so speak, the germs of the idea of God; but ages on ages of growth are necessary to develop and ripen it into the sublime conception of the Divinity, entertained by Moses, Socrates, or Leibnitz. To-day, the Christian philosopher, in the language of Leibnitz, "thinks God;" but the savage does not. The idea of God belongs to advanced life, to the growth of the natural faculties, not to the primitive man. It is only by successive efforts, and by repeated revelations, that man attains to it, as is evinced by the slow and successive amelioration of his forms of religious worship.

In this view of the case, we must take the remark, that man is naturally religious, that religion is a fact in man's natural history, with some grains of allowance. Taken as we find him, to-day, in the bosom of our own civilization, he is unquestionably naturally religious. Our children naturally aspire; and our philosophers, with Leibnitz, "think God." Our faculties, by the

nurture of ages, and through the care of an ever watchful Providence, have become equal to the sublime thought. But when we speak of man universally, man of all times, all we can say is that he has the natural capacity to *become* religious, and wherever his natural faculties, by providential circumstances or influences, are stimulated into activity, he *is* religious. More than this we do not think that we are warranted in saying. To say more than this, would require us to assert that man aspires, where we have no evidence that he aspires, and entertains the sublime conception of God, where we find no traces of it, or at best only the miserable *fetiché* of the stupid African. The worship of the *fetiché*, no doubt, tells the philosopher that there the idea of God may one day be entertained, but just as surely that it is not entertained now.

Nevertheless, Mr. Morton is not obnoxious to all the criticism here implied. He is answerable mainly for the inaccuracy of his language, into which he was betrayed by his admiration of the work of Benjamin Constant. His argument drawn from intuition remains unaffected by anything we have said, because in the intuitive perceptions of the most stupid savage, *we* can see, what the savage does not, the idea of God. The error is in supposing that because we, turning back upon those intuitions, discover it there, the savage himself must necessarily have done so. Mr. Morton undoubtedly did fall into this error, in part; but he never meant to say that the savage really was conscious of entertaining the idea. He thought, however, that he was justified in saying that it was there, because he had satisfied himself that it was a necessary conception of reason. The apparent contradiction implied here, in asserting the presence of the idea in the intelligence of the savage, while the savage knew it not; he thought he escaped by means of Cousin's doctrine of the impersonal and spontaneous reason.

II. We come now to the doctrine of the Impersonal Reason, borrowed from M. Cousin, of whose philo-

sophy it is one of the most striking peculiarities. We felt, as has every man who has been at all under the influence of religious ideas, that these ideas have a character of independence and authority. They seem to be over man and to legislate for him ; and he seems to be unable to withdraw himself from their presence, if indeed from their dominion. This fact led us to adopt, up to a certain point, Cousin's doctrine, and to make it the basis of our demonstration of the existence of God. As far as it really serves as the basis of this demonstration, though not so far as it enters into the form of the argument, we believe it unquestionably sound. The author of *Charles Elwood* never intended to adopt it in its fullest extent, and he thought he had escaped all that was unsound in it. But in this he was mistaken. There runs through all he says on it the same confusion, which meets us in Cousin himself. The source of this confusion we have on a former occasion pointed out ; \* but unhappily, without being aware at that time of the immense importance of a very obvious distinction, which we then suggested, and therefore we neglected, when preparing *Charles Elwood* for publication, to make Mr. Morton's language conform to it. We must therefore be allowed to set the matter in what we now deem its true light.

Cousin defines reason to be a faculty of human nature, that faculty by which we know all that we know, and in all the degrees of knowledge from the highest to the lowest. He also contends that reason is impersonal and objective, in us, our only light, but not *us* nor ours. Being impersonal and objective, it is good authority for the objective, an independent witness for what lies outside of us, indeed for whatever it reveals. It reveals the absolute, therefore, the absolute exists ; God, therefore, God is. But against this there lie several very weighty objections.

1. If reason be a faculty of human nature, it is absurd

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\* *Boston Quarterly Review*. April, 1839. Vol. II. No. VI. pp. 177-180.

to call it impersonal and objective. A faculty is merely a power of the soul. To say that the soul has the faculty of reason, is merely saying that the power to know is inherent in it, essential to its existence, belonging in fact to its very being. It is then merely an aspect of the subject itself, and we might as well in this case call the subject, the *me*, objective and impersonal, as the reason.

2. To assert that reason, regarded as our faculty of intelligence, is impersonal and objective, is to deny that we ourselves are persons. Cousin places personality chiefly in liberty or activity. But liberty or the power to act is not the characteristic of personality. Animals have the power to act, as well as we, and yet they are not persons. Personality is never predicated of unintelligent beings, nor indeed of all intelligent beings. The dog, the horse, the ox, are intelligent, yet we cannot call them persons. Personality is not constituted till we attain to a high degree of intelligence, to the perception of moral, universal, and necessary truths; that is, not till we come to that degree of intelligence, which goes by the special name of reason. None but reasonable beings are, in any human speech with which we are acquainted, allowed to be persons. Divest us of personality, — and we should be divested of it, if our faculty of reason were objective, — and we should cease to be moral and accountable beings. Then all foundation for morality would be destroyed.

3. If reason be our only power of knowing, as Cousin asserts, and it be also impersonal and objective, then we in ourselves must be incapable of knowing. How then come into relation with intelligence? How can an essentially non-intelligent being be even enlightened by an objective intelligence? If there be no light within, how can there be recognition of the light without?

4. If reason, in the sense that it is one of our faculties, be identical with the objective world of immaterial and necessary truth, as Cousin alleges, he merely reproduces the doctrine of Pere Malebranche of "vision

in God ; ” for reason in this sense he tells us is the Word of God, the Logos, identical in the last analysis with God. Man then does not see at all, but God sees in him.

5. If reason, as we have seen, be essential to our personality, to transfer it from us to God, is to transfer our personality to God, to sink us in God, and to destroy all distinction between his acts and ours ; which in this case would be Pantheism.

6. The doctrine is psychologically false. In the fact of human knowledge it is not God nor the reason that knows, but the *me* itself. Whatever be the object or the sphere of knowledge, it is always I who know. I as invariably, and as necessarily ascribe the act of knowing to myself, as I do the act of willing. I have as direct consciousness that it is I who knows in the fact of intelligence, as I have that it is I who wills in a fact of volition. On his own principles, then, M. Cousin can no more term reason, regarded as our power to know, objective, than he can activity or our power to will.

7. The power to know, and to know even those eternal verities which M. Cousin so eloquently treats under the names of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, constitutes the chief dignity and glory of our being. To declare this power objective, not ours, is to rob us of all this glory and dignity, and to degrade us even below the animal creation, almost to a level with brute matter.

8. The element of necessity, M. Cousin detects in the intelligence, though unquestionably involving objective existence, is not sufficient to establish the fact of the objectivity of the *power* of intelligence. The same element of necessity may be detected in sensibility ; and to a certain extent in activity itself. Our liberty is not complete. We can even will only according to given laws, not of *our* enacting, and only within given bounds, — bounds which we have not prescribed, and which we cannot overleap.

These objections are conclusive ; no reasoning can

obviate their force. And yet, in the face of these very objections, we are disposed to maintain that there is a sense in which reason is impersonal and objective.

The word reason may be taken in two senses. In one sense it means, what Cousin calls the absolute, the world of absolute ideas, immaterial and necessary truth; in the other sense, the faculty or power by which we recognise this absolute world. In the first it is impersonal and objective; in the second personal and subjective. Cousin nowhere to our knowledge clearly distinguishes between these two senses of the word. But does he really confound them? Does he mean to assert that reason in both senses is one and the same? We confess that we feel unable to decide. His language and his arguments would seem to authorize the assertion, that he holds that the absolute ideas, and the power by which we recognise them, are identical. The probability we think is, that his mind has not been drawn distinctly to the point in question. And yet, if he does confound them, he only does what others have done before him. Kant confounds them by absorbing the absolute or transcendental reason, in reason as a faculty of human nature, and thus lays the foundation of his peculiar kind of Idealism, which prepares the way for the Egoism of his disciple Fichte. If Cousin confounds them, it is by absorbing the subjective reason in the objective, which would lead to Spinozism, and in some sense justify the charge of Pantheism, which has been so often brought against him at home and abroad.

However this may be, we have his own authority for saying that he means by reason, in the sense in which he contends that it is objective and impersonal, "the world of absolute ideas, the world of immaterial and necessary truth," which he treats in his *Course* for 1818, on the philosophy of the absolute, under the names of the idea of the True, the idea of the Beautiful, and the idea of the Good. He uses here both the term idea, and the term reason, in the genuine Platonic sense. According to Plato, the reason is the world of

ideas, and ideas are very nearly if not quite, what we mean by abstract relations, universal and necessary truths ; of which sort are the truths contained in the propositions, — The same thing cannot both be, and not be ; the whole is greater than a part ; that, which is not, cannot act ; no phenomenon can *begin* to exist without a cause ; the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles ; reason ought to govern the passions ; men should do as they would be done by, &c. True science, according to Plato, consists in a knowledge of ideas, that is, a knowledge of these abstract relations, these universal and necessary truths, these eternal principles of things. Now understanding reason in this sense, — and this is really a legitimate and even common use of the word, as is evinced by the frequency with which we hear, “he should submit to reason,” “reason dictates,” “he will not be governed by reason,” “that is a truth of reason,” “reason bids us do this,” “reason bids us not do that,” — taking reason, we say, in this sense, M. Cousin is right in pronouncing it objective and impersonal ; for in this sense it is not *us* nor *ours*, *ME* nor *MINE*. But in this sense it is as distinct from reason as a faculty of human nature, as is *sight* considered as something seen, from *sight* considered as the power to see.

Strictly speaking, reason should not be termed a faculty of the soul. They, who call it a faculty, mean thereby the power of perceiving the ideas or truths of reason in the sense already defined. This has been regarded as a distinct faculty of the soul. Hence we find men distinguishing, or trying to distinguish, between reason and understanding, between the power by which we perceive the objects of time and space, and that by which we perceive the objects of the world lying beyond them. But there is no ground here for any distinction. The power, by which we perceive in one world, is precisely the power, by which we perceive in the other. The conditions, degrees, and objects of knowledge may vary, but the *power* is in all cases one and the same faculty of the soul. I perceive by one and



the same power the corporeal world and the ideas of reason. To avoid confusion, we ourselves call this power by the general name of *intelligence*, or power to know. Man with us is not a reasonable being because reason is one of his faculties, but because he has the power to perceive the truths of reason, and to follow the dictates of reason. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to quarrel about words, and we will not object to calling our faculty of intelligence by the term reason, if in this sense it be distinguished from reason, as the general term for the world which transcends time and space, the world of immaterial and necessary truth.

We may consider man as an intelligence, seeing, perceiving, or knowing in three worlds. — 1. In the world of space, which seeing or perceiving is called sensation. 2. In the world of Time, called in regard to time past, memory, in regard to time to come, presentiment or foresight — history and prophecy. 3. In the world of ideas, the world of reason, the transcendental world in modern phraseology, termed intuition, or intuitive perception. Intuition, with us, is as applicable to seeing or perceiving in the one world, as in another; for with us all knowledge is intuitive; that is, by looking *on* the object. In the longest chain of reasoning each link is intuitively perceived, and reasoning is nothing but placing a given subject, in its several parts and relations, immediately before the mind's eye.

Now, to establish the objectivity of reason, according to our view, is to establish the objectivity of this transcendental world of which we speak, of these absolute ideas, called by Cousin the idea of the True, the idea of the Beautiful, and the idea of the Good. Has Cousin, according to his own system, succeeded in doing this? This is the boast of his philosophy. To show how it may be done, was the problem he had to solve, as it is the problem of every philosopher, who wishes to go out of the sphere of the subjective, and obtain a solid basis for science. We confess, that after the maturest thoughts we have been able to be-

stow on the subject, after having wavered long in our judgment, and disposed from a strong personal feeling to find Cousin always in the right, and to award him the highest praise, we are obliged to return to the judgment we expressed in a paper on his philosophy, inserted in the *Christian Examiner*, for September, 1836, though we sustain that judgment by other and stronger reasons than those we were then able to adduce. We see him perpetually on the verge of solving the problem; nay, we admit that he does virtually solve it, but not systematically, not scientifically, not legitimately. His argument is, after all, but a paralogism. He shows, what few will deny, that these ideas are at the bottom of the human intelligence; he shows that the human intelligence cannot be developed without them, and that we are necessitated to accept them, to believe in their objective validity. All this is well. But this does not advance him a single step on the Scottish school. It merely demonstrates, what Reid himself had done equally well a long time before him, that these ideas are necessary or first principles of belief.

Cousin merely proves, according to his system, that these absolute ideas are necessary elements of human intelligence, understood not as our power to know, but as the effect of the exercise of that power. They reside, if we may so speak, in the reason. But the reason, he regards ever as *in* us. True, he *says*, the reason is not us, but he places it after all in the *ME*. Whatever is *in* the *ME*, must be the *ME*. By teaching as he does, that it is *in* the *ME*, that these ideas are seen, he necessarily contradicts his own assertion, that they are objective. He falls here into the very common error of representing the *ME*, if we may so speak, as the *locus* of ideas. Locke defined ideas very well, when he called them "objects about which the mind is immediately conversant," but destroyed their objective character by supposing it to be in the mind, that the mind converses with them. Cudworth treats them as absolute ideas, in his *Immutable Virtue*, with rare sa-

gacity, and labors hard to prove their legislative character ; but fails in consequence of considering them as furnished by the mind's own energy, and as residing in the mind. This same view is taken of them by our American transcendentalists, who regard them as laws of the soul, sometimes as the soul itself, and understand by intuition, seeing them by looking into the soul. But it is idle to pretend that what is in the soul, is objective ; that is, that what is in the soul, is not in it, but out of it. Nor will M. Cousin relieve himself by proving these ideas objective to liberty, or the power to act. He himself, notwithstanding some assertions to the contrary, expressly denies that liberty, or activity, constitutes the *ME*. According to him, the *ME* is an active, intelligent, and sentient subject. The power to know is as essential to the *ME*, as the power to act. In proving these ideas to be exterior to liberty, then, he does not prove them to be exterior to the *total ME*, that is, really objective to man himself, that is again, virtually *NOT-ME*.

We grant that M. Cousin proves that these ideas are objects of human intelligence, that is, objects of thought. But this was not the main point to be made out. The main point to be made out was, that they are not only objects of thought, which nobody questions, but that they are really and truly *NOT-ME* ; that is, that they exist out, and independent of the subject thinking them. This point, the boast of his philosophy, he has not established, and he has been prevented from doing it, by that very psychological method on which he so strenuously insists, and which we have ourselves heretofore insisted upon with equal earnestness. According to this method, the soul studies its own phenomena in itself, by an interior light called consciousness, as it studies the exterior world by the exterior senses. The soul, then, can study itself by immediate consciousness. It then stands face to face with itself, and may be both the subject studying, and the object studied. Hence the *ME*, as Jouffroy innocently asserts, may be at once both a *ME* observing, and a *ME* observed ! Grant this,

and what is the evidence that these absolute ideas, though objects of thought, are not nevertheless really subjective, belonging to the **ME**, taken as the object of its own observation? Cousin's philosophy, we therefore assert, does not and cannot carry him out of the subjective, into the region of the **NOT-ME**; for the **ME** observed is no less **ME** than the **ME** observing. All he attains to is an *objective ME*! — or an objective subject, none the less subjective, however, for being objective. His philosophy, then, is really, according to his own principles, if interpreted from the point of view, which recognises the subject at all, a system of pure idealism; if interpreted from the objective point of view, a system of absolute pantheism. For, with all his eclecticism, he really establishes no distinction between subject and object.

To this conclusion we must come, if we take his principles, as officially declared in his lectures, and push them to their last results. But, M. Cousin has suffered few facts in metaphysics to escape him. He has himself, and apparently without knowing it, and at some expense of systematic consistency, furnished us, in some of his *Fragments*, with the means of relieving both him and ourselves of all embarrassment.\* The simple fact is, that the **ME** being the subject, that is, the thinker, is not and cannot be the object. But as there can be no thought without an object, for it is impossible to think, without thinking something, it follows that the objective element of every thought is really and truly **NOT-ME**. These absolute ideas, then, inasmuch as they are undeniably objects of thought, are not only objective to the intelligence, as Cousin proves them, but objective to the **WHOLE ME**, and therefore **NOT-ME**, existing out of the **ME**, and independent of it.

Cousin is, then, after all, substantially correct in asserting the objectivity of the reason, understood as

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\* *Fragmens Philosophiques*. Paris: 1833, p. 243.

the world of absolute and immaterial truth ; he has only failed in proving it to be so, by failing to follow out certain principles which he has himself recognised. Practically he is right, scientifically he is wrong. But, the objectivity of reason, in the only sense in which it is not absurd to assert it, was, after all, the main problem. M. Cousin, in attempting, therefore, to establish the objectivity of reason, as the means by which to arrive scientifically at an objective world, is somewhat out in his logic. His demonstration would be in this case a demonstration of the fact to be demonstrated, as the means with which to demonstrate it. We therefore think, with all becoming deference, that his long, tedious labors, on this point, leave us scientifically right where we were when he commenced them ; though we feel at the same time, that they have upon the whole tended greatly to advance metaphysical science.

Assuming now, what the author of *Charles Elwood* assumes, but does not demonstrate, that these absolute ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, are objective, out of the *me*, and legislative for it, as we now see that they are, we must contend that his demonstration of the existence of God is worthy of being accepted. These ideas constitute the reason. They are absolute, consequently, reason itself must be absolute. This absolute reason is not God, but is, as Plato calls it, his Logos, Word, or Speech, and implies him as necessarily as thought implies a thinker. This the author of *Charles Elwood*, we think, has demonstrated. He has demonstrated, in our judgment, now as well as eight years ago, when the demonstration was written, the absolute necessity of a God ; and this demonstration, in fact, if not in form, rests on as firm a basis of certainty, as that on which rests our certainty of our own existence.

But, let this not be taken for more than it really is. This demonstration of the necessity of a God is not a knowledge of God. God, to speak strictly, is never a direct object of knowledge. We have heretofore used language on this subject, that needs some modification.

We have assumed, and not without justice, that the absolute ideas of which we speak are the basis of all intelligence. These ideas being absolute, constituting the absolute reason, we have supposed to be in the last analysis identical with God. Now, as these ideas are, to a feeble extent at least, intuitively perceived by all men, we have held, though we know not that we have ever so asserted, that God is known by intuition. This is stating the matter too strongly. In the first place, immense numbers of our race have almost no perception at all of these absolute ideas. They and we and all nature are immersed in them, swim as it were in the mighty ocean of the transcendental, but the transcendental is rarely disengaged by the mind, and is never seen, except so far as it is revealed in the concrete and contingent, with which for the most part it is confounded. The larger part of mankind do not look beyond the outward visible object, and, — to speak the language of religion, — live only the life of the senses. Their thoughts to the wise man, to the philosopher, involve these absolute ideas, but they themselves know it not, and therefore may be said practically not to think them at all.

Then, in the next place, **THESE IDEAS ARE NOT GOD.** Doubtless they contain a revelation of God, and therefore he enters into them, as a man enters into his thought; but they are not He, any more than my thoughts, or my words are myself. But even if they were God, we know them at best only to a feeble extent. I know truth no farther than I become acquainted with that which is true; and of the beautiful, what know I beyond the beautiful objects I have seen? Or of the good? We have the power of recognising the true, the beautiful, the good, intuitively, up to a certain extent, *when the objects to which they belong are presented to us*; but our knowledge of them does not transcend that portion of them contained in these objects, or which these objects manifest. These ideas are absolute, universal, eternal, but our knowledge of them is finite, relative, particular, and transient.

We may know that they are absolute, and imply an absolute God; but we, alas, are finite and relative beings. We may recognise the absolute necessity of an absolute and infinite God, full of power, wisdom, and love, but our knowledge must always be a relative and limited knowledge. In proportion as our knowledge of these absolute ideas, in the divine works which reveal them, extends, may our knowledge of God *in his manifestations* extend. But, beyond this, knowledge of even the manifested God is not possible.

We may unquestionably attain to the discovery of the logical necessity of God. Thus far, we think, Mr. Morton in Charles Elwood has gone. But this implies no extension of our knowledge of God. God is not learned in these logical abstractions. The God that we may know is not the God *above* the universe, but the God *in* the universe; and it is by studying him in the universe, that we learn what we may know of him, not by sinking the universe, and seeking by abstraction to attain to a pure spirit dwelling in eternal solitude, but ineffable glory beyond. Doubtless he is over all, but as over all, in his awful supremacy, we cannot approach him. We can know of God only some aspects of his Divinity, as revealed in his works. We may hear his speech, but we cannot see his face; listen to his awful word, but never behold the Speaker. This is the sublime doctrine of Christianity, which commands us to behold the Glory of the Father in the face of his Son, and teaches us that it is the Son who is in the bosom of the Father, not the Father himself, who is the object of human knowledge. We must then honor the Son as we do the Father, because the Son, the Word, is all that is revealed to us of the Father. We must, in plain terms, limit our ambition to a knowledge of God as he reveals himself; study him in his works, and in the records of his providences, love him in all nature, especially in the heart of man, but bow down with lowly reverence before the thick darkness with which he hides his face from all mortal vision.

III. With the doctrine of the impersonality of reason must go the necessity and legitimacy of the division of reason into spontaneous reason, and reflective reason. We are not sure that we have rightly seized what Cousin really means by this division; for we find upon a closer inspection of his works than we had made, when writing Charles Elwood, that he gives more than one account of it, and we are not able to make his several accounts harmonize with each other. But as near as we can come at his meaning, under a general point of view, he understands, by spontaneous reason, reason operating independently of the *ME*, by its own inherent force and energy; and by reflective reason, reason operating in subjection to our wills. In the first, the *ME* does not enter as subject, in the second, it does in some sort so enter.

Reason, taken objectively, is the world of absolute ideas, of necessary truth, the Logos, Word, or Speech of God. In spontaneous reason, then, the subject, the intelligent Force or Agency at work, is not man, but God. Whatever, then, the reason spontaneously reveals is revealed by God himself. Its spontaneous revelations are, then, supernatural, really and truly divine, and deserve all the authority usually ascribed to divine revelation. This is the view Mr. Morton takes in Charles Elwood; and it is on this view that he rests his explanation of the fact of inspiration. Mr. Morton is a firm believer in divine revelation, in the full significance of the term. If he errs, it is not in his belief, nor in the doctrine he teaches; but in the account he gives of it. His purpose was so to explain it, as to enable the unbeliever to grasp it, and to sustain it by analogous facts in his own experience. But his explanation will not abide the test of criticism.

This explanation, it may be seen at once, rests on the objectivity of the reason. But we have found reason, as the faculty of intelligence, to be not objective, but subjective and personal. It is, then, the subject itself, under one of its aspects. The subject that knows is always the *ME*. To assert, then, the spontaneity of reason, is



only to assert, in other words, the spontaneity of the *me*; that is, that the *me* is in itself active, capable of acting from its own inherent energy. And this again is only asserting the freedom of the *me*; for the only intelligible definition of freedom is the power to act. Spontaneity is the highest possible expression of freedom. Then the *me* is never more present, than in its spontaneous phenomena. There is nothing which it can be more truly said to do, than that which it does spontaneously. This is admitted by Cousin himself, when treating of the spontaneous activity of the *me* in relation to morals. The highest virtue consists in the fact, that the soul is in such a state that its natural aspirations, its spontaneous emotions, are in harmony with the will of God; so that it obeys God without deliberation, without reflection, from its own natural promptings. It is then sanctified. Raising to this state the fallen soul, a prey to debased and debasing appetites and depraved tastes, is that change of heart, which religious people demand, and which goes by the name of New Birth, or Regeneration. It will not do, then, to say that the acts I perform spontaneously, whether as force or as intelligence, are performed by a subject or agent which is not *me*. The more spontaneous my acts, the more strictly are they mine, the more purely subjective and personal are they. The subject in spontaneity, then, is not God, but *me*, if we understand it as predicated of reason as the faculty of intelligence.

Nor shall we gain anything by understanding spontaneity as predicated of reason taken as the absolute, the world of immaterial and necessary truth. Our first perceptions of this world are unquestionably prior to reflection. We have entertained these absolute or transcendental ideas, before we have sought them. We found them to be facts of our intelligence, of our knowledge, the first moment we ascertained its contents. How came they there? Evidently, says Cousin, without any agency of ours. But in this he is wrong. For if there had been no exercise of our power of knowing, would they have been facts of our knowledge? Say, these ideas,

without any agency of ours, spontaneously present themselves before us; but we are by nature inherently unintelligent, or if intelligent, we do not exercise our intelligence, would they be recognised? Of course not. The spontaneous presentation of these ideas before our minds, which is all that spontaneity when predicated of the objective reason can mean, would not give us then the actual perception of them, for the act of perceiving them is always *our* act.

Cousin has been misled by the improper view he takes of the *ME*. He, though not without asserting to the contrary, as we have said already, makes the *ME* consist in liberty, or the power to act *as naked force*. Spontaneous activity of the *ME*, as naked force, he expressly admits to be personal; but the spontaneous activity of the *ME*, as intelligence, he contends, is not personal. But according to his own philosophy, the *ME* does not, and never can act as naked force, for this very satisfactory reason, that it is not in itself a naked force. He recognises three fundamental faculties of human nature, activity, or power to act; sensibility, or power to feel; and reason, or power to know. The *ME*, then, according to him, is inherently, essentially an active, sentient, and intelligent subject, or being. It must, then, whenever it acts at all, act as an intelligent and sentient force, and it is in this fact, in the unity and triplicity of the soul, that he finds the psychological basis of eclecticism, as he calls it, or synthesisism, as it would be more properly called.

Certainly there can be no fact of perception, without an act of the percipient subject. Cousin improperly assumes that this act, which he calls attention, is that of the subject as mere force, when it is, and must be, according to his own principles, an act of a *percipient* force; both because the particular force in question is inherently percipient, and because no perception could follow the act of a non-percipient force. The act of perceiving is then necessarily as subjective, when the object perceived spontaneously presents itself, as when it is sought by reflection. The force or agency perceiving

is not the object spontaneously presented, but the subject itself. This is so obviously true, that, had it not been for his mutilation of the *mx*, and his effort to make out the knowing faculty to be objective, Cousin could never have overlooked it, or asserted to the contrary.

There are unquestionably two classes of intellectual phenomena, which Cousin has done well to recognise. But he errs in considering one class to be less subjective than the other. The true distinction between them is that which Leibnitz has marked, of *perception* and *apperception*, or perception without consciousness, or without the recognition of ourselves as subject perceiving, and perception with this recognition. This is the real distinction which Cousin has in mind, as any one may see, who will read his Essay on the First and Last Fact of Consciousness, to be found in his *Fragmens Philosophiques*.

To make this distinction intelligible, it is necessary to define the meaning of this word *consciousness*, a word used with much vagueness, and concerning which, as a philosophical term, people generally have no clear or precise notions. *Cogito, ergo sum*, said Descartes. I think, therefore I am. Descartes did not here mean to offer an argument for his existence, but simply to state the fact in which he found it. We have no direct perception of ourselves. We cannot see ourselves in ourselves. We can only recognise ourselves in the phenomenon. Our knowledge never attains to being in itself, it only attains to the necessity of being, and to so much of being as enters into the phenomenon. This is as true in regard to ourselves, as we have shown it to be in regard to God. We know being, as Cousin has himself shown, only under the relation of cause. It is only under this relation that we ever find or recognise ourselves; though not as naked cause, but a cause that knows and feels, as well as wills; in one word, that thinks. Thought expresses our highest activity, and in its pure and primitive synthesis. It is a complex phenomenon, at once action, cognition, and sentiment, responding to the threefold power of the soul, to act,

to feel, and to know. Now, in thinking, we always recognise ourselves in the phenomenon which we term thought, as subject, or the one who thinks. If we decompose the thought, we shall find it made up of three elements, subject, or thinker, object, or that which is thought, and their relation, or the form of the thought ; or, in other words, what the mind takes into its view of both subject and object, that is, notion or conception. The recognition of ourselves in the fact of thinking, as the subject thinking, is precisely the fact, designated by the word consciousness, which added to the perception of the object constitutes what Leibnitz calls *apperception*. This fact was called by Descartes *consciousness*, (*cum-scientia*,) because it is something which goes along *with* knowledge, that is, perception of the object ; *apperception* (*ad-perceptio*) by Leibnitz, because it is something in addition to simple perception. I perceive a rose. This is perception. I recognise myself as the subject who perceives it, that the perceiver is I and not another ; this is *apperception*, or consciousness. Now all those phenomena, in which we recognise ourselves as subject, are *apperceptions*, or perceptions with consciousness ; all those, in which we do not recognise ourselves as subject, are simple perceptions, or perceptions without consciousness.

That there are these two classes of phenomena, is very obvious and very certain. Man is essentially an active and percipient subject. He must then, while living, always act ; and as he cannot act without perceiving, — for being intelligent in his essence, he cannot act as force without acting as intelligence, — he must perceive always and all that comes within the range of his vision ; and perceive, too, in all the three worlds with which he stands in relation. But nothing is more certain than that he does not always perceive with consciousness. The power of *apperception* as Leibnitz, who has treated this subject better than any one else, affirms, is only a higher degree of the power of perception. But we *apperceive*, that is, are conscious of perceiving, only in the few stronger and more marked instances of per-

ception. In general our perceptions are too feeble and confused for us to recognise ourselves as their subject. They may serve indeed to keep alive a dim and obscure sense of our existence, but the mass of them are too feeble to give us a distinct recognition of it.

Now, it is by virtue of these feeble and confused perceptions, which play a much more important part in the conduct of life, than is commonly supposed, that these absolute ideas, of which Cousin speaks, come to be facts of our intelligence, prior to their being found there by reflection, and prior to our having consciously sought them, or been conscious of thinking them. These are rightly termed facts of spontaneity, for they have been perceived by the spontaneous activity of the soul. But this does not in the least separate them, as to their quality, from the other class of facts. It is by the inherent power of the soul, that these are perceived, and it is by the same power, only in a higher degree of exercise, that the soul perceives, in what is called reflection, so much so that in reflection, it not only perceives, but knows that it perceives, is able to find itself as the subject perceiving. The subjective act of perceiving is by virtue of the same power, and is as spontaneous in one case as in the other.

Nor do these feeble and confused perceptions, which we have without knowing that we have them, approach any nearer the fact of inspiration, or afford any more solid ground for our faith in objective realities, than the more distinct and vivid perceptions, which we call apperceptions. No doubt, in these as in the others, reflection may discover the fact of a percipient subject, and of an object perceived. But the simple fact, that the object is perceived without the subject being conscious of perceiving it, does not constitute any additional evidence that it is veritably *not-me*. We think, therefore, that M. Cousin finds in the fact of spontaneity, or in unconscious perception, no explanation of the fact of inspiration, no evidence of the objectivity of reason, and none which he does not also find in reflection, of the existence of a *not-me*, the great points to be made out by its assistance.

M. Cousin, we are disposed to believe, has been, in all his discussions on the objectivity and spontaneity of reason, preoccupied by the desire to refute Kant's Idealism, and Fichte's Egoism. His great aim has evidently been, to show that the *ME* does not create those absolute ideas, as Fichte seemed to teach, and that they are not mere modes, laws, affections, or categories of a subjective reason, as was taught by Kant. The assertion of the objectivity of the reason, negatived the last, — of the spontaneous operation of the reason, the former. He, however, succeeds in neither case. For in asserting the objectivity of reason, he begs the question between him and Kant. Do the best he can, he has nothing but reason with which to prove reason's objectivity. But the validity of the assertion, by reason of its own objectivity, was the point to be made out. In regard to Fichte he shows, indeed, — what Fichte never asserted, — that the *ME* does not create those ideas by free, conscious effort. But he was still obliged to admit the intervention of the *ME*, as percipient subject, in the facts of spontaneity, or else to deny the agency of the *ME* in any of its phenomena, not resulting from its conscious and deliberate activity, or from reflection, — a denial, that would have not only made sad work of psychology, but have as completely upset all morality, as the sensation transformed of the school of Condillac.

The refutation of Kant and Fichte, and therefore of all Idealism, Egoism, and Skepticism, whether atheistic or pantheistic, is in a simple fact, which Cousin alleges, over and over again, and which he seems never to have comprehended, — the fact already stated, that the **OBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF THOUGHT IS ALWAYS NOT-ME**. The error of Kant, and the error which has led astray his whole school and all others, is the assumption, that the *ME* does or may develop itself as pure subject, or, in other words, be its own object, and therefore at once subject and object. Kant assumes that the *ME* develops itself, without a foreign object, in cognition; hence he infers that all knowledge is purely subjective, and as-

serts the impotency of reason to carry us out of the sphere of the *ME*.\* Fichte, taking Kant's Critique as his starting point, without reference to his doctrine concerning practical reason, asserted the power of the *ME* to be its own object, and sought the proof of it in the fact of volition. Hence he fell into the absurdity of representing all ideas as the products of the *ME*, and even went so far as to tell his disciples how it is that man makes God. A bold man, that Fichte; but he lived long enough to correct some of his speculative errors. Cousin seems to have fallen in part into the error of Fichte, while seeking to get rid of it. He seems never to have got quite clear of the notion, that the *ME* can be its own object, notwithstanding he asserts the important fact, that the object is *always* NOT-*ME*. The truth is, the *ME* is never object; it is always subject, and subject only. It finds and can find itself only as thinker; it never does, then, find itself as object thought. And as there can be no thought without an objective element, this element is necessarily NOT-*ME*. This is a fact of the very highest importance in science; but, a simple fact, resting on precisely the degree of evidence that we have for our own existence. This is the great fact, which Cousin has struggled through all his writings to establish, but which he, after all, has not established, and which, though asserting it, he has failed entirely to use, — misled, as we have already shown, by his psychological method.

This fact, that the object is always NOT-*ME*, established on the degree of certainty we have stated, science becomes possible and legitimate. The certainty of knowledge, when carried into the objective, is precisely what it is in the sphere of the subjective. *There is no*

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\* We know very well that this was not the real doctrine of Kant; that it was only demonstrated by him to be the result, to which all philosophy must come, that *is based on pure reason*. He himself relied on practical reason, that is to say, on plain common sense; and his purpose of writing critiques of pure reason was, to demonstrate the unsatisfactory character of all purely metaphysical speculations. A wise man, after all, was that same Emanuel Kant.

*purely subjective, or purely objective knowledge.* We cannot think without finding ourselves as subject, and that which is not ourselves as object. We find ourselves only in thinking. Consequently, we find both the **ME** and the **NOT-ME** in the same phenomenon, by the same light, and with equal certainty. They are both fundamental and indispensable elements of thought. Without the **ME**, no thought, because no thinker; without the **NOT-ME**, no thought, because no object to be thought. Here is the whole mystery solved, and philosophy and the universal faith of mankind placed on the same basis. Mankind believe in an objective world, because they think it, and cannot think without thinking it. Philosophy can add nothing to this, obtain no other basis for faith, and needs no other.

The question as to the validity of our knowledge, that is, as to the grounds of science, disposed of,—which, we venture to maintain in opposition to M. Cousin, is the first question in philosophy, not the last,—then come up the questions concerning what we actually know, and what are the sources and conditions of knowledge. We must answer the question, what do we actually know? by drawing up an inventory of the wealth of experience; for all actual knowledge is by experience,—nothing being *a priori*, but the capacity to know. Under the head of sources and conditions of knowledge, must be considered the several ways in which knowledge is obtained, and the means we possess of extending our own knowledge and that of the race. In this department of philosophy must be considered the great and striking fact of inspiration, natural and supernatural, human and divine,—a fact which plays a more conspicuous part in the origin and progress of human knowledge, than even religious people themselves contend. We did intend to treat this subject of inspiration in this present article, but we have left ourselves no space to treat it at sufficient length, to satisfy either ourselves or our readers. We, therefore, leave it to be a distinct topic of consideration on some future occasion. We will only say at this time, that the views,



we have heretofore offered on inspiration, are not broad enough to embrace the whole subject, and by leaving out some important considerations, but imperfectly explain it so far as they do embrace it.

But we have given enough of metaphysics for one quarter, and must bring this unexpectedly protracted article to a close, and that, too, while we leave much unsaid, which we had proposed to say. In the course of the article we have spared neither ourselves, nor our master in philosophy, M. Cousin. The criticisms on ourselves will be taken, we presume, in good part; but those on Cousin, considering the relation we have been supposed to hold to his philosophy, will most likely excite some surprise, and call forth a new edition of the old stereotyped charge, that we have changed our opinions again. This charge has been rung in our ears from early boyhood, and we confess that it has ceased to be musical, and become somewhat monotonous, and wearisome. Would that our good-natured critics could find some other fault in us, so as to be able to introduce a little novelty and somewhat of variety into their accusations. Both for our readers' sake and our own, we would that we never had occasion to modify our opinions once expressed. But we are too poor in virtue to be able to part with enough to purchase that consistency, which is maintained only at the price of wilfully shutting the eyes to the light, or by obstinately adhering, in spite of conviction, to one's first utterances. If we were never conscious of having erred, we should never have occasion to modify the opinions we had once expressed. It is doubtless best never to err; but if we belong to a fallible race, and cannot well avoid falling into error, the next best is probably to adhere to one's errors no longer, than till one discovers that they are errors. For ourselves, we are still disciples, and we have not the least doubt, notwithstanding our proficiency, that there are many things for us to learn. And that we may be free to learn them, we resolve never to be the slave of our own past.

—the slave of our own shadow. Others may do differently, but perhaps not more wisely ; and after all he perhaps is not least deserving of confidence, who is the first to detect and expose his own errors.

Nevertheless, we are far from admitting that we more frequently change our opinions, than most men, who are accustomed to think for themselves, do theirs. The principal difference between them and us is, that they are prudent enough to keep the greater part of their changes to themselves, or to their few intimate friends, while we are so imprudent as to send ours all out to the public as they come. Still we could, were it worth our while, very easily convince this same public, that we have by no means undergone the frequent changes of opinion that they imagine. The great current of our faith has always flowed on in the same direction, and the doctrines, we are putting forth to-day, are the doctrines, enlarged, and systematized, which we have always been seeming to ourselves to be putting forth, ever since we have been known to this community. The only changes we are conscious of, and the only changes we have acknowledged, have occurred in relation to our views of the value, or soundness, of the views of others, — views which we partially adopted for a time, without making all the qualifications and limitations they demanded. Our faith has been and is the same. Where we have investigated a subject for ourselves, and relied on the free action of our own mind, we have rarely had occasion to change our views.

Even in the criticisms we have offered on Cousin's philosophy, we have said nothing not substantially anticipated in former remarks upon it. We have, it is true, placed our objections to that philosophy in a more prominent light now, than we had done before, because we are confident that they are of more importance than we formerly considered them. Every man in criticising favorably, or unfavorably, any system, must view it from the position where he stands. When we approached Cousin's philosophy at first, we felt deeply the need of a profounder, a more religious philosophy, both for our-

selves and our countrymen, than that taught in our schools. We did not feel able to construct such a philosophy as we felt was needed; we knew no one amongst us that was able. There was too great indifference on the subject. It was necessary to kindle up an interest in philosophical studies. It was at that time more important that our countrymen should think, than it was what they should think. Philosophy had no audience. We thought, and so thought some of our friends, that of all philosophical writings, within our reach, Cousin's were best adapted to the wants of our countrymen. Our first aim was to get them read and studied, confident that by so doing we should prepare the way for a sound philosophy, even in case Cousin's should be found to be not altogether satisfactory. It was the best, the most satisfactory, that we were acquainted with. It had great and positive merits, and we felt that it was admirably adapted to the state of philosophic thought in our community. We therefore, did what we could to commend it. We had no disposition to dwell upon its defects, for our purpose was, not to criticise it, but to induce others to study it. We commended it not for these defects, but for its merits. But, we own, that these defects were greater than we at the time thought them, and now that an interest is awakened among us in philosophical studies, we have felt that it was time to point them out, as they had not been pointed out before.

But we still maintain our respect for Cousin, as a philosopher, and as a man. We abate nothing of what we have heretofore said in his praise. If his philosophy, taken as a whole, is not all that we at first thought it, we still contend, that he deserves a high rank among the eminent men, who have at different epochs contributed to the progress of metaphysical science. His writings contain nearly all the materials requisite for constructing a sound system of philosophy. There is scarcely a point involved in the whole subject, on which he has not shed more or less light. We have borrowed from him the very light, by which we have

been enabled to criticise him ; and if we are able on some points to offer a more satisfactory explanation of our mental phenomena, than he has done, it is to him that we are indebted for our ability. We know very little that we would say, which he has not already said or implied ; and if we were asked what books were best to be studied by one wishing to form just philosophical views, we know of none, that we could more conscientiously or unreservedly recommend than his. They are the best, all things considered, that we are acquainted with. Whoever would become familiar with metaphysical subjects, must study them. They have a permanent value, which no progress in science, or changes of doctrine can altogether destroy. We are pleased, therefore, to find them introduced as text books into our venerable University at Cambridge ; and equally pleased are we, too, that their introduction has not caused the expulsion of Locke from the same University ; for we are not ashamed to own, that our respect for Locke is every day increasing, and we would not repeat the severe things which the indiscreet zeal of his admirers have, on some former occasions, induced us to say of him. The more we study him, the more are we struck with his merits. The philosophy, that commends itself by detracting from the imperishable glory of such a man as John Locke, can be in vogue only for a day, and must soon take its place with the things that are as if they had not been.

M. Cousin is a true philosopher, and would have given us a sound philosophy in all its parts, if he could have undertaken to do it at once, in a regular systematic treatise. His errors and defects grow, we apprehend, from his having studied philosophy somewhat after the fragmentary manner in which he has treated it in his writings, and from having confounded, too much, philosophy with the history of philosophy. He has nowhere given us a complete system of philosophy ; and we confess, that we do not find ourselves able to mould all that he has at different times advanced into one and the same system. We find, or we seem to ourselves to

find, in his writings the elements of incongruous systems, which are not, and cannot be made parts of the same whole. We have been forced to this conclusion, by undertaking to mould his scattered fragments into a complete and systematic body of philosophy, an undertaking we have been compelled to abandon. We could not succeed. We have, however, attempted the construction of a system on our own account, with what success it is not for us to say, though with a success more satisfactory to ourselves than we anticipated. We have the satisfaction of feeling that, for the first time in our life, we have a system, which, though not constructed without assistance, is yet as a system our own. Some of its elements appear in this article; and those familiar with metaphysical matters will not judge them unimportant. The whole system will be laid before the public, at the earliest day possible; and we are confident, when seen as a whole, it will be found able to reconcile many jarring creeds, and in no small degree to meet the wants of both the Old School and the New. This much we may say in advance of its publication, that, viewed in relation to the systems of philosophy already extant, it assumes English philosophy as its starting point; that is, it takes up philosophy where it exists in our literature, and in our national character, and continues it; but attains to all those moral, spiritual, and religious results, for which we and others have valued the metaphysical speculations of modern France and Germany. Without claiming for man more than finite powers, or pretending to solve all problems, it will, we think, show a solid basis for science and religion. We pretend not, however, to have made any discovery that will supersede the necessity of Divine Revelation, or a childlike trust in the wisdom and goodness of Providence, whose ways are often dark and mysterious, and whose purposes are not seldom past finding out. Man does well to aspire; it is the glory of his nature, and the condition of his advancement; but, he does well, also, to remember that he is a limited being, and his intelligence but a feeble

taper burning in the bosom of infinite night. For a feeble distance it may furrow the darkness, and as it grows by burning, it may furrow it farther and still farther ; but can never overcome it, and enlighten infinity.

EDITOR.

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ART. II. — ASSOCIATION AND A SOCIAL REFORM. No. I.

BY ALBERT BRISBANE.

I WISH in a short series of articles to lay before the readers of the *Boston Quarterly Review* a general idea of the system of Association, discovered by CHARLES FOURIER. The social principles, given to the world by that great genius, are beginning to excite a deep and widely extended interest. Since his death in 1837, his doctrine has spread rapidly, and his disciples, who may now be counted by thousands, are to be found in every civilized country on the earth. Besides Europe and the United States, where it is natural to suppose new social principles would first penetrate, circles of converts to the theory of Association and Attractive Industry are to be found in South America, and even in the distant India.

Men of wealth and talent have been gained to the cause in Europe ; papers have been established in Paris and London, and the political parties of France have been compelled, by the persevering efforts of the disciples of FOURIER, to devote their attention to social principles, and the grand question of a reorganization of Society. The day is not, I believe, far distant, when in some of the most advanced countries, the present superficial and controversial systems of politics will give way to a true Social Science.

The illusive doctrines and schemes of politicians are, to a true science of society, what the wild speculations

of astrology were to astronomy, or the wilder researches of alchemy to chemistry, and they must lead to and be replaced by a positive Social Science.

They, who wish to keep up with the social movement of the age, should become acquainted with the discoveries of FOURIER. He has treated almost every subject, which belongs to the domain of Social Science, such as the system of Property, Education, the organization of Industry, the division of Profits ; the question of Liberty, Equality, human Happiness, the Harmony of the Passions, the Destiny of Man, the Theory of Immortality, &c., with that profound research and clear analysis, which carry irresistible conviction to the impartial mind.

It is impossible to furnish in a few short articles, like those which I propose to write, anything more than a general idea of some one or two branches of so vast a system. I will, in the present one, direct my observations to the defects of the system of *Isolated Families and Free Competition*, and point out some of the evils which result from them, in order to predispose the minds of readers favorably towards Association, against which the instinct of selfishness and individualism, so universal in society, arouses objections of every kind.

Association, combined Action, Unity of Interests, are the principles upon which a true Organization of society should be based. Our present societies, founded on individual action, conflict of interests, free competition or universal strife, and the system of isolated families, are false, and are not the Social Destiny of the Human Race. Man is a social Being, a being made for varied and extended social relations, for unity and harmony ; not for isolation, antagonism, duplicity, and discord. The feeling, which exists in the minds of people against association and union with their fellow men, arises from discordant interests, antipathies, poverty, vulgarity of manners, brutality, and the desire of the shrewd and scheming to take advantage of the mass. It will be impossible to associate men, so long as these causes of disunion exist, and so long as they

remain, as they now are, with their prejudices, ignorance, incompatible tastes and habits, their want of refinement, and their vices.

Our present societies, with their repugnant and degrading Industry, with their Poverty and miserable methods of Education, can do nothing towards elevating and refining the mass, and correcting the above evils and defects. It is reserved to Association, with its system of *unitary* Education, *Attractive Industry*, and general welfare, to effect these ends. Association will be an order of things in which the condition of the mass can be effectually and practically improved, — in which Man, — *Universal Man*, can be made what he should be, — a nobly developed Being, possessing the education and refinement to which the most favored of the race have attained. Make educated, intelligent, and refined beings of men, and they will then feel no repugnance to associate with each other.

It is the rude and undeveloped condition of the mass, and the selfishness engendered by conflicts of interest, which excite in men's minds an instinctive dislike for Association.

The System of isolated households, or system which assigns to each family a separate dwelling with a separate interest, is the fundamental defect of our societies; it is the source of repugnant industry, of poverty, of disunion, of an anti-social spirit, of absence of unity in manners, habits, opinions, and language, and in fact of most of the evils referred to above.

Where had this defective system, which Association is destined to replace, its origin? In the rudest and lowest order of societies, in the Savage State. In this society, uncultivated Nature assembles individuals by couples in the hut or wigwam. This system of couples in separate dwellings is the most defective of domestic organizations, the smallest and most imperfect of associations, and is the result of ignorance, poverty, and accidental circumstances. It had its origin in a *rude and primitive* state of society, when men's feelings and social sympathies were undeveloped, and they had very



few relations with the beings around them, when their wants were extremely limited, when they were without Industry, Art, Science, or any of the elements of society, and when they were too poor and ignorant to construct anything more than a rude hut or wigwam.

Although, in our civilized societies, an immense progress has taken place, still their mechanism is, in its most important features, *based upon that of the savage and barbarous periods*, so that they are but extensions of the rudest and most imperfect of societies.

The cottage, the mansion, and the palace have replaced the wigwam or hut of the savage state, but the isolated household, with its single couple or family, and its separate interests,—which is the primitive or savage system,—still continues the domestic organization of our present societies, and is the main cause of the conflict of interests, discord, waste, poverty, antagonism, and selfishness, which exist so generally in the world around us. Society is divided into an infinite number of isolated families, between whom no Association, no Combination or Unity of action, and very few Social Relations exist.

Each family seeks to forward its own interests, separate from, or at the expense of all the other families around it; and from the conflict and opposition, which such a state of things necessarily engenders, arise that envious competition, the overreaching fraud, injustice, and duplicity of action, which prevail so extensively in all the commercial, industrial, and other relations of society, and which make every man the opponent and antagonist of his neighbor.

So long as the system of isolated families, with opposing interests, continues, we shall have, what we may properly term *a commercial and industrial War*,—a War of all the Elements, and interests of society. This conflict and opposition in the business operations of men, rendered so intense by the desire of fortune or the fear of want, engender discord, cheatery, and animosity, without end, and impel man to prey, like a tiger or hyena, upon his fellow man.

Society offers us, says **FOURIER**, the spectacle of an incongruous and ridiculous mechanism, in which parts of the whole are in conflict with, and acting against the whole. We see each class desire from interest the misfortune of other classes, and place individual interest everywhere in opposition to public good. The Lawyer wishes litigations and lawsuits; the Physician sickness. — The latter would be ruined if every body died without disease, as would the former, if all quarrels were settled by arbitration. — The Soldier wants a War, which will carry off half his comrades to secure him promotion; the Monopolizer of bread stuffs wants a famine, that will double or treble the price of grain; the Merchant, the Grocer, the Market-Man resort to adulterations, forestalling, and other means to increase their profits, which must be done of course at the expense of their customers; the Manufacturer and Mechanic manufacture bad wares, which do no service; the Employer strives to cut down the wages of his workmen, and to prolong their day's labor, while the Workmen, on the other hand, slight their work, and do the least possible in their paid day's labor. The most envious competition, opposition, and antagonism are excited between all classes in society, and every individual is forced to wage war upon all others around him, to escape want, or to secure a competency.

In this conflict of interests, this collusion of fraud and injustice, this incoherent turmoil and wrangle, this greedy and unprincipled strife, which is decorated with the name of Free Competition, and which superficial minds believe the impelling principle and life of society, one half of the time, talent, and labor of men, is wasted or misapplied. In the confused efforts, which are made by each and all to attain separately the grand desideratum, — Fortune, they only trample each other down, and the vast majority are overtaken in the end by poverty and disappointment. No Social Providence exists in Society; no encouragement and protective aid are lent by it to its members; each must fight his way alone, and the world cares and heeds not the means

which he chooses, so long as he does not resort to open and direct robbery. If he fails and poverty is his lot, he is left to suffer unpitied and alone.

The first step to be taken, towards improving society and elevating the social condition of Man, is to discover a system of Association, which will conciliate and harmonize all interest and feelings, and establish unity of action between the separate and discordant families of which society is composed, so as to induce them to direct their talents, and to labor in the best and wisest manner for the mutual welfare of all.

Nothing can be done so long as men are not associated, — so long as all branches of Industry and Commerce are prosecuted by isolated individuals with conflicting and opposing interests. Society is wrong in *its very foundation*, and political reforms and changes, which exercise an influence merely on the surface of social affairs, can effect no real and permanent good. Is it not perfectly evident that so long as disunion, strife, conflict, and opposition exist in the daily business and social relations of men, they will exist in all the other departments of society, and particularly in politics and legislation? Men's views and opinions are governed in a vast majority of cases by their interests, and where there is conflict of interests, there will be conflict of opinions, and that without any hope of reconciliation or impartial conviction.

Association, with its concert of action, and unity of interests, is the only remedy for social and political evils. It would give a powerful onward movement to society, and while it stilled party violence and individual dissensions, it would, with its vast economies and its immensely increased product, banish poverty from the earth.

The abuses and defects, which grow out of the system of isolated families, with their endless conflicts of interests, are so numerous, that it is singular the attention of political writers has not been directed to them. It is evident that they must seek, with apathy and very blindly, for the means of ameliorating the condition of

the mass, when they neglect such important problems, as unity of interests, increased production, and collective economies. I will quote from **FOURIER** a few of these defects, which will show how much a Reform in our present household or domestic Organization is required.

#### **DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF SEPARATE OR ISOLATED HOUSEHOLDS.**

1st. Smallest possible Association; a single Family without Capital, Credit, or extended Relations; and often even without the necessary Implements of Industry.

2d. Labor without emulation, prosecuted alone the entire day and year through, without variety or change.

3d. No Variety of occupations, no Elegance in the Organization of Industry, in manufactories and workshops, calculated to please and stimulate the working classes.

4th. No system for developing fully the talents and faculties of children, and for giving them an industrial education.

5th. Misapplication of the labor of Sexes and Ages; bad adaptation of cultivation to the soil; excessive power given to capital, and its control over industry.

6th. Complication in labor, obliging a single individual to execute every part and detail of a work.

7th. Waste of Talent and Capacities, and want of a just Remuneration, guarantying to all, to the child and woman, as well as to the man, a share of the general product, according to their Labor, Capital, and Skill.

8th. Separation of the three primordial branches of Industry — Agriculture, Manufactures, and domestic Labor.

9th. False and anarchial Competition in Industry; opposition of like branches of business and labor, instead of Association and emulative Rivalry.

10th. Stoppage of work for want of implements, machines, workshops, capital, and credit, — wants which are constantly paralyzing Industry in our societies.

11th. Absence of system and economy, which cannot be attained in the isolated household. Large Associations are necessary to systematize all branches of work and to effect great Economies.

12th. Production and consumption subservient to Commerce, dependent upon it for all sales and purchases, which

dependency opens an unrestricted field to the adulterations, frauds, and monopolies of a mass of intermediate dealers.

*Lastly.* Ruin of the children by the death of the parent.

Our whole system of Industry is, with these defects operating in it, a perfect chaos, an industrial war, an arena of conflicts, fraud, and confusion. This state of things causes not only the poverty and degradation of the Laboring Classes, but it exposes the Rich in innumerable ways to unforeseen reverses and ruin.

If we look at society, if we examine its business and industrial operations, what do we see? We see commercial excesses and fluctuations, financial schemes and frauds, an unregulated banking system exposed to the cupidity and ignorance of individuals, an unstable currency without counterpoises, and subject to sudden expansions and contractions, a mania of speculation, and a feverish strife after wealth ; — the whole accompanied by waste and extravagance of every kind.

These abuses are fatal to all classes of society ; they draw in the rich, — even the most cautious among them, — and engulf them in ruin. If we look at the few past years, we find that our first bankers and financiers, that our richest merchants, have been ruined, and their fortunes, and often their reputations, swept away in the flood of our ever fluctuating and incoherent system of commerce and industry.

For the welfare of the rich as well as the poor, of the producing classes as well as the capitalists, a good and stable organization of industry, commerce, and banking is most deeply to be desired.

It is, however, upon the Laboring Classes that the evils of our false social organization, and our falsely organized system of commerce and industry, fall with a suffocating weight.

To improve and elevate the condition of the Laboring Classes, *we must first improve industry, we must ennoble it, and render it honorable and attractive.* Man will always be obliged to exercise Industry ; it is one of the means by which he fulfils his earthly Destiny, and by

which he improves and embellishes the globe he inhabits. It is also the source from which he draws the means of satisfying his wants and comforts, and of securing his physical happiness. — Ennoble Industry, render it **ATTRACTIVE**, and it will become a delight and a blessing, instead of the mournful burthen, which it now is.

No complete Liberty, no real happiness can be enjoyed by man, so long as Industry is suffered to remain in its present rude, repulsive, and degraded state ; it must be radically reformed, which it cannot be so long as the present system of isolated families is continued.

The miserable condition of the Laboring Classes in France and England, where Political Liberty exists, proves practically that Politics can do nothing to improve their condition, so long as the fundamental Organization of society is false. The working classes are somewhat better off in this country, because there is a thin population, and a vast extent of soil, — not because they possess more political liberty, or enjoy the right to vote. Their condition, however, is growing gradually worse with the increase of population, and a century or two more will sink them into the same poverty and dependence in which they are now plunged throughout Europe.

I will take from **FOURIER** a list of the most palpable evils which oppress the Laboring Classes, in order to show that the wrongs, which they suffer, have their origin in social, not political causes, and that political measures and reforms are impotent and valueless as a remedy, — a tantalizing mockery, as the experience of all countries, where political controversy has existed, proves.

#### **EVILS WHICH OPPRESS THE LABORING CLASSES.**

1st. Necessity of sacrificing frequently their health to obtain work in unwholesome occupations, in prolonged labor, on which their support and that of their families is dependent.

2d. Unjust suspicion attached to the poor man ; the more

he is in want, the more certain he is of being refused aid and credit to enable him to turn his labor or skill to account.

3d. Fear of want for the present, or danger of being thrown out of work, the right of which is not guaranteed him by Society.

4th. Dreaded suffering for the future; fear of an increase of evils in his old age, heightened by the recollection of those already endured, and by seeing no means of escaping from them.

5th. Communicated suffering, or power of feeling the evils of his family, whose privations add to his own.

6th. Poor and destitute, he has, in case of sickness, no other asylum than the poor-house, to which he is often refused admittance.

7th. Increase of the privations of the destitute multitude with the increase of Luxury, which, inventing daily new means of enjoyment for the rich, tantalizes the poor with the display of these increased means of enjoyment, from which they are shut out.

8th. Indirect privation of the protection of the law; no justice for the poor man, who cannot undergo the expenses of law-suits against a rich rival, who appeals from Court to Court.

9th. Selfishness or ignorance of the great portion of political Leaders, who, strong in their protestations of devotedness to the cause of the People, use them as tools to get into power, distribute all offices among themselves, propose no useful and positive ameliorations, but leave them to support alone the repugnant labor and hardships of our false societies.

10th. Lastly, the profits of the labor of the producer are often not for himself, but for an employer, or a capitalist, who, taking no part in his toil, receives the larger share of its product.

These Evils are general in their nature. I will point out a few which I gather from the statistics of Nations. In the city of London, there are, it is computed, about two hundred and thirty-two thousand thieves, beggars, and vagrants. What a sink of misery, corruption, degradation, and crime is such a capital!

In Paris there is in proportion to the population nearly an equal degree of vice and wretchedness.

In France, out of a population of thirty-three millions, twenty-two millions have but six cents a day to defray expenses, — food, clothing, lodging, and education.

In some of the Provinces the peasants are so poor that they have no beds. They make couches of dry leaves, which, during the winter, become decayed, and grow full of worms, so that parents and children, on rising in the morning, pick the worms from off their bodies.

In Ireland, out of a population of eight millions, every third person experiences, during thirty weeks of the year, a deficiency of third rate potatoes.

According to the Journal of the Statistical Society of January, 1840, there are, in Liverpool, seven thousand eight hundred sixty-two inhabited cellars, damp, dark, dirty, and ill ventilated ; and in these lodge thirty-nine thousand three hundred of the working classes. In Manchester, of one hundred thirty-two thousand two hundred working people, fourteen thousand nine hundred sixty live in cellars. At Bury, one third of the laboring classes are so badly off, that in seven hundred seventy-three houses, one bed serves for four persons, in two hundred seven, one for five, and in seventy-eight, one for six human beings. In Bristol, forty-six out of every hundred of the working classes have but one room for a family. In Glasgow, thirty thousand Irish and Highlanders are said, according to the description of Doctor Cowan, "to wallow in filth, crime, and wretchedness, in the cellars and wynds of this great commercial city." From ten to twenty persons, of both sexes, lie huddled together in their rags and filth on the floor each night. The cellars are beer and spirit shops. Multitudes of young girls, says Mr. Lymonds, applied to Captain Miller, the head of the Glasgow Police, to rescue them from these scenes, to which they are driven by sheer want. A year or two served to harden and hurry them from drunkenness, vice, and disease to an early grave.

The Register General states that he has seen in one



small garret, "the husband sick of a typhus, a sick child laid across the sick man's bed, two others sleeping under the bed, the two window recesses let to two Irish Lodgers at sixpence a week, as resting places for the night, the wife, a young healthy woman lying in the same bed with her sick husband at night, and supporting the family by taking in washing, which was hung across the room to dry, — the Parish Authorities having forbidden the exposition of Linen out of the windows."

In our own country, three millions of negro producers whose labor pays for a large portion of our imported luxuries, are barely supplied with their commonest physical wants, and work from fear of the lash.

If we examine the history of the past, we find that the changes which have taken place, since the commencement of societies, in the condition of the Laboring Classes, who compose the vast majority of the human race, have been only so many varieties of one general misery, and tyranny.

In India, we find these Classes, Parias and degraded castes, and spurned and despised by the higher classes. In Greece and Rome they were slaves, — reduced to a level with beasts of burden. In the middle ages they became serfs, and by being attached to the soil, instead of being personal property, the means of their enfranchisement were opened to them. In modern civilized societies, the Paria, the Slave, the Serf, have, with a few exceptions, disappeared, and the hired Laborer stands in their stead. Slavery, as it existed in antiquity, has given way in our age to a system of Hired Labor, or Labor for Wages, which, in a thick population and with competition among the Laboring Classes for work, reduces them to a condition nearly as miserable as that of slaves, and places them, bound by want and poverty, at the mercy of those who have the credit and capital of society in their hands.

Politicians, Legislators, and Philosophers have discovered but two systems of Labor, — *Slave Labor*, and *Hired Labor*, or Labor for Wages. The first makes

use of the *lash* and *punishment* to force the Mass to work, and the second, of *want* and the *fear of starvation*.

To impel Man to undergo the repulsive and toilsome drudgery of our false societies, the slave system applies the lash to the back, and tortures the flesh ; while the system of Labor for wages, to attain the same end, starves the stomach, and harasses the mind with anxiety. Both systems are a disgrace to the genius of the political leaders of the world, and a deep reproach to human Reason for having so long neglected the great practical question of a good Organization of Labor. It is reserved for Association to do away with these two vile systems, and replace them by a system of *Attractive Industry*.

Why is it that the Laboring Classes are forced from want and starvation to labor in our societies? What organization of things is it, which produces such a result? I will explain the causes.

To the Savage, the forests and fields are free ; he takes as a right their products wherever he finds them, and applies them to his wants. But in our societies, every field is fenced in, every fruit tree has its owner. If the poor laborer takes the grain of a field, or the fruit of a tree, which his wants require, he is warned that they have an owner, and that he incurs a penalty by the act. Everything is walled around, barricaded, and guarded ; the soil, workshops, and whatever yields the means of livelihood, are owned and monopolized, so that nowhere can he find a meal or a shelter free, and no alternative is left him but to labor or to starve.

It requires the stimulus of poverty to force Man to undergo the monstrous and repugnant drudgery of our present false system of Industry, which, with its prolonged and monotonous occupations, its ill-constructed workshops and manufactories, its frauds and deceptions, the rapacity and injustice of employers, the coarseness and vulgarity of workmen, and the scantiness of remuneration, is a loathsome and brutalizing burthen, which all strive to escape, — by any and every means which can be devised.

To crown the Injustice which is done in our societies to the Laboring Classes, *the right even to the repugnant Labor, upon which their existence depends, is not guarantied them.* The right of Man to Labor is the primary right which God has given him, for without it, his right to existence even is not acknowledged, and he may starve upon the earth, where he was placed to live, and upon which he has an important function to perform.

If we look at our large cities and manufacturing towns, we see the Laboring Classes wandering from manufactory to manufactory, or from workshop to workshop, inquiring for work, and refused it. Without any means of subsistence while out of employment, pressed by want, harassed by anxieties, they reduce the price of their day's labor to tempt the employer, and sell twelve, fourteen, or more hours of monotonous drudgery out of each twenty-four for a miserable pittance. If they manage to avoid positive want, they are beset by cares and perplexities of all kinds, which drive numbers of them into vice and dissipation, and often into crime.

To Beings thus situated, what a mockery to offer them the right to vote, the guaranty of not being thrown into prison without a writ of habeas-corpus, or equality of rights before the Law, when they have no money to defend those rights! Are they free because they possess these illusory guaranties, when they are at the same time the Slaves of Labor and the Serfs of Capitalists? It is true that the whip does not force them to their task, like the real slave; but does not the alternative of want or starvation do it as effectually? If their bodies cannot be sold, they have to bargain their Liberty and their time, without the power of disposing scarcely of an hour.

No; the political Liberty and the illusive Rights, which politicians have secured to the Mass, are the mere shadow of that high and true Liberty, and those equal and comprehensive Rights, which in Association will be secured to all.

Association and combination of Action, are the two

great principles upon which society should be based. It is only in Association that Industry can be ennobled and rendered attractive, integral equality and liberty practically realized, and harmony of interests and feelings established. The system of isolated families, or households, is the fundamental defect of our societies, and is the source of repugnant Industry, poverty, conflict of interests, and universal discord.

Why has this system of isolated Households, which had its origin in the savage Period, been continued in the later societies, which Man has established, and why have not politicians and legislators endeavored to reform it? It is because those leaders of mankind have been absorbed by personal ambition, and have seen in social affairs only the government or administration; they have preferred to operate on the superstructure of society; that is, the administration, as it led more directly to personal success and aggrandizement. *They neglected the domestic or household System, and with it Agriculture and the whole Organization of Industry.* This fatal neglect has not, up to the present time, been repaired, and we see the politicians of our day, as were those of Greece and Rome, still engrossed with superficial political reforms, administrative controversies, and party strife, to the entire neglect of the mighty question of a Social and Industrial Reform.

Another reason, why the system of isolated Households has been continued, is because the Rich, so long as a true system of Association is not discovered, avoid any intimate connexion with the poor. They are attached from interest to the system, and prefer to live by themselves in separate dwellings.

The Middle Classes are induced from self-interest to follow their example, for every one in our societies shuns connexion with the more needy and less prosperous, and the Poor find themselves forced from necessity to adopt the mode of living, which the higher classes have established.

Thus the neglect of politicians, and the strife of individuals to secure their happiness and welfare, separate

from the rest of their fellow creatures, have combined to maintain the present system of isolated Households, and the false social order which is based upon it.

It will appear to most persons a Herculean task to discover the means of associating separate and discordant families, of conciliating different interests and feelings, of introducing unity of action into society, and of harmonizing differences of character; but as difficult as it may appear, the problem is solved. FOURIER'S discoveries offer us the practical means of overcoming these difficulties.

A practical trial of Association could be made with four hundred persons, or a hundred families, and if Association for about four hundred thousand dollars, when put in operation, proved of great advantage to all classes, — to the Rich as well as to the Poor, it would spread rapidly, like any discovery of great importance, — like the Mariner's compass, the art of Printing, or the Steamboat, — and soon become universal.

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**ART. III. — *Mr. Parker and the Unitarians. — Reply to a question concerning the Doctrine of Immortality, Repentance, Remission of Sins, &c.***

[WE willingly insert the following letter to the Editor of this Journal, and the accompanying Essay, though we cannot do so without taking the liberty of making a few prefatory remarks, "defining our position," as say the politicians. For Mr. Parker, personally, we have the highest respect; but we say to the public, as we say to him, that while we can interpret his South Boston Sermon so as to make it harmonize with our views of Christian truth, we by no means accept it as a full statement of that truth. In our review of it, our purpose was to show that it did not necessarily run athwart the more generally approved views of Christianity; but we presumed then, as we do now, that Mr. Parker's own faith was what it is represented to be in the following Letter. We hoped, however, by our statement to show him and the admirers of his sermon, that they might accept all that was attractive in the

views he set forth, without rejecting what we consider to be the spirit of the teachings of the Church generally. If we succeeded in doing this, we trusted we should do something to check the growth of what we could not but regard as an incipient but fatal heresy.

We wholly coincide with the views which our correspondent takes of Unitarianism, so far as regards its original phasis. We took substantially the same view, in the *Christian Examiner*, the Unitarian organ, for September, 1834, in an article reviewing Benjamin Constant's work on Religion. But we did not then, nor do we now, nor have we at any period since, thought it necessary to cut ourselves loose from the Unitarian PARTY. With that party we have considered ourselves associated ever since we recovered our faith in Christianity, in 1831, and we have seen no reason for wishing to seek other religious connexions. We are by no means satisfied with the amount of Christian truth which they set forth in their struggles with Orthodoxy, but in those struggles, theirs was the cause of Christ. They represent the true Christian movement of this country, of the Christian Church in America, and as such they have a right to command the active coöperation of every man, who loves God, and believes in the Lord Jesus Christ. They brought out that phasis of Christian truth most needed at the time, and in their contest with exclusive and intolerant Orthodoxy, they did noble battle for humanity. They have been the champions of freedom; they have interposed a shield between the rights of conscience and the encroachments of ecclesiastical tyranny, common to all other sects in the country; and we have no hesitation in saying that the freedom of the Church of Christ, under God, has been and is in their keeping. In our closets we may read the works of Calvin, of Flavel, of Owen, and Gill even, with much approbation; but the moment we go forth into the midst of the Orthodox people of the day, and listen to their sayings, and observe their doings, we almost pray for infidelity as a blessing to the race. It is to the labors of Unitarians, that we, who sometimes complain of them, owe it, that there is one spot in this New World where men can think and speak freely; and let the Orthodox churches swallow up our Unitarian churches, and it would not be long before a padlock would be placed on every man's lips, who could not subscribe to the Westminster Confession, the Thirty-Nine Articles, or bow to the ignorant but iron rule of Methodist Episcopacy.

We, therefore, while we freely acknowledge the deficiency of the Unitarian creed, in its old phasis, regarded as a definitive statement of Christian truth, hold to the Unitarian *movement*, and contend that the Unitarian community is the truest *Christian* church now on earth. In our efforts to advance the cause of Christ, they must be taken, to use a military phrase, as our *point d'appui*. Without them we have no basis for our operations, and can operate to no advantage.

In the next place, we hold that the form of Christian truth, which ought to prevail, and which must prevail, if the church is to live, must come out from the Unitarian views of the Gospel, and not from the Orthodox views. Orthodoxy cannot be moulded into the form of

Christian faith, that will express the mind of Christ to this age. It belongs essentially to the past, and it has no longer any true life. The life of our Orthodox churches is spasmodic. They are recruited by means of artificial machinery, and if left to themselves would decay, dissolve, as the body when the soul has fled. By means of Revivals, which are a sort of voltaic pile, or galvanic battery, they are made to exhibit certain motions, and certain appearances of life; but no man need mistake the counterfeit. The vital spark has become extinct. From them, we hope nothing. But in the Unitarian community there is true life. There is freedom. There is active and intense thought. This being so, the Unitarian community cannot remain in the first stages of its development. There is no longer any vitality in the first forms it assumed. But it is rapidly assuming a new form, and must inevitably assume a form that will combine the freedom it has asserted, with the rich spiritual truths heretofore expressed by Orthodox symbols.

Mr. Parker and his immediate adherents are deeply impressed with the insufficiency of Unitarianism, as they find it, and seek to remedy the evil by carrying its original protest still further. This is their error; but one which they will soon correct; for to carry the protest farther than Unitarianism originally carried it, would be to go out of the pale of Christianity entirely, and to enter into the regions of mere NATURALISM. But in mere naturalism they cannot remain. They are evidently wrong; and in seeking to modify Unitarianism in that direction, they are seeking to make it retrograde instead of making it advance. They are really the party of the past, and not of the future, as they honestly believe themselves. Unitarianism must cease to be protestant, and become affirmative and catholic. It must advance in the direction of supernaturalism, and not in the direction of naturalism, but a supernaturalism, freed from the superstition and metaphysical absurdities of the Orthodox School. The problem it has to work out is the reconciliation of naturalism and supernaturalism. The solution of this problem we sought to indicate in our review of Mr. Parker's Sermon. If that review is understood by our readers as by ourselves, it points out the synthesis of the two. There is not a word in it that a single Unitarian need object to, and there is nothing in the creed of the Orthodox, which the Orthodox man really holds to be essential, that is not there recognised. But, whether we have worked out the problem or not, the Unitarian Community will soon do it; and then they will be in the condition to become the dominant church of the country. Believing, as we firmly do, that it is only in the bosom of the Unitarian Church, that the problem can be worked out, we cannot but regret, that so many of our young men leave it to go and wander, they know not whither. This church is our mother, and God forbid, that we should disown her. She may disown us if she will, but that is her affair and not ours.

We state our position to be with the Unitarian Church, and our belief to be, that in the evolution of a new form of faith from its old creed, now going on, we shall find all that we can ask. We stay where we are, and do what we can to assist this evolution; and

we presume that the writer of the following letter has no disposition to do otherwise. There is no home for her, more than for us, anywhere else. The Orthodox would disown their own faith as we hold it, nay, would be unable to recognise it in our statements, so ignorant are they of the deep significance of their own doctrines. —  
Ed.]

MY DEAR SIR,

It seems a late day to publish anything more about Mr. Parker's Sermon at South Boston, and perhaps you will think it unreasonable to be asked for a place for anything more in your Review, after you have yourself given so long and able a defence and explanation of it. But I will tell you the history of these few remarks which I enclose.

Just after the publication of the Sermon, there appeared, in three Unitarian Periodicals, this inquiry ; — Is the doctrine of Immortality, are the doctrines of Repentance, Remission of Sins, &c., no part of the Permanent Christianity according to Mr. Parker, but only the Love of God, and the Love of Man ?

The very statement of such a question seemed to me to argue a want of apprehension as to the relations of things, which was Mr. Parker's best justification for repudiating, on the one hand, these technicalities, into which Unitarians, even more than other sects, have divided the great Truth of Religion, thereby destroying its life and power, and, on the other hand, for asserting Christianity to be the two great principles of Spiritual Life, whose inevitable consequences, in the Intellect, are an impossibility of questioning the immortality of the soul, the nature and efficacy of repentance, and the other doctrines into which Christianity is analyzed by the speculative and scientific. Nevertheless, as the inquiry seemed to be put in good faith, and from not apprehending the scope of Mr. Parker's views, and as two of the Inquirers were popular Unitarian ministers, I thought the answer ought to be given. But this answer was refused a place in all the publications, where the questions had appeared, and my only reason for wishing it printed, at this late day, is on account of



some of the reasons given for the refusal. I want to show what views are rejected by the present Unitarian leaders, as fatal to their own. — It affords me an occasion, also, of saying something more, which I will do, if you please, in the form of a letter; and you can extract what you think best, as an introduction to the article.

You have said, in your Review, that Unitarianism is dead, to which they have opposed the facts, that new Unitarian Churches are formed continually here and there, about the country; and that there is a good deal of religious movement within the old Unitarian Churches in this vicinity. They do not seem to comprehend, that the formation of Unitarian Churches at a distance is merely a proof, that there is always a protest against the Exclusiveness and Dogmatism of Conservative Orthodoxy and Ecclesiastical Tyranny; and that the characteristic of the movement in the old Unitarian Churches, which is the true sign of the times as to Unitarianism, is destructive of the Unitarian formula, and tends to quite a different statement of the doctrine of Life. If the Unitarian sect had known what it was about, or rather, if it had not forgotten entirely the Ideas in which it originated, it would have embraced Mr. Parker as its last hope, and supported him in his statements. For I do not interpret his sermon exactly as you do, though perhaps it may bring minds to your conclusions. I do not think it was any part of his plan to *assert* that Jesus of Nazareth was the Saviour, in the sense of the Orthodox Church. His assertions may lead his hearers and readers to this point, but Mr. Parker, as I understand him, meant to say this, and this only: that Jesus of Nazareth was inspired, as Socrates, or any other great moral and spiritual philosopher is inspired, except that his degree of religious genius is not measurable by any individual man's, who has yet appeared in the world; that his inspiration consisted in the clearest vision of the Law of Holiness; a vision, which, in point of fact, may possibly be unsurpassable by all the men that ever will be created,

but which no man can say is *absolutely* unsurpassable. Now, whether this view be true or false, I maintain that it is the legitimate consequence of taking the Unitarian point of view and method. If Jesus Christ was not in a peculiar sense God, he was a creature of God, and could have no other inspiration, no other authority, than that which his perception of Truth gave him, and his authority was measurable by the degree of Truth he had ; for no perceiver of Truth can have Truth absolutely without measure, though what he perceives may be above any measure, men at present can apply.

It is therefore suicidal in Unitarianism to attack this ground of the authority of Jesus. By so doing it has commenced its own burial. I will not say that individuals of this sect, or other sects, were wrong in asking if this was the ground taken by Jesus and his Apostles, for this would be a fair question ; but they give the death-blow to Unitarianism, by denying Mr. Parker's positions to be the necessary consequences, to which a clear and honest mind must come, that starts with the premiss, that Jesus Christ was created on the same platform as Adam, or even as the highest archangel.

For, if Jesus Christ was not himself the substance of Christianity, that is, was not the absolute manifestation of the Essential God, then he must have been a limited creature, and Seer of Christianity ; and if a Seer, then abstract Christianity is the absolute, in opposition to Jesus the relative. Consequently the importance of his individuality is *transient*, and must diminish to his disciples, according to their advancement in spiritual life ; and to the world, in proportion as it becomes obedient to the Law of Holiness.

This, I apprehend, is Mr. Parker's view ; for he cannot, like some other Unitarians, give up that there is an Absolute Christianity, old as God. Consistently with this view, his statement throws Jesus back into Nature, from the position in which the Orthodox Church has placed him ; — a position against which Unitarianism did at first oppose the moral Imperative in the hu-

man soul, and by doing this in good faith, though by an exaggeration, has had all its life. — As a Hebrew youth, faithful to the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world, living out the moral law, as no other man is recorded to have done, and by this means having all the advantage of his religious genius whereby to see and to express the moral beauty and obligation of holiness; and teaching holiness, free from all the limitations with which impure character and defective intellect curtail it in other men; and finally as a martyr to it; — Jesus Christ is represented with the most subduing power which Unitarianism admits of. And it cannot be denied, that this is a view which must stimulate the conscience of a *fellow* being, strictly speaking, to the most painful degree; and if Jesus were really a created being, acted upon by moral considerations, and obeying a power out of himself, his success, in moral character, must, on the one hand, be an infinite reproach to his brethren, and on the other in proportion as they believe it to be real and potentially theirs, an encouragement.

Mr. Parker meant to make this representation, and to this effect. It is his own view, and it is evident from his whole tone of preaching, and from the tone of the lectures, into which he amplified his South Boston Discourse, that it has upon his own spiritual being these effects. Looking upon the world lying in sin and wretchedness around him, with these sins organized into institutions, that oppress and degrade and even obliterate the image of God, originally stamped upon man's nature, he is filled with a mighty indignation which cries aloud and spares not. The Law of Holiness, as Jesus exhibited it in action, this is the Law for every mortal man, from which he cannot, and ought not to wish to escape. To wish to escape its utmost requisitions, is, in his view, the Sin against the Holy Ghost.

It is no wonder that the assertion of this tremendous doctrine, deduced from the common premises with iron-linked logic, and uttered with all the fervor of conviction, should strike into the preachers of Unitarianism

terror or rage, according to their several characters ; and awaken their congregations to ask, whether this young man is a Babbler and false Prophet, or whether their ministers have been recreant to their duty in letting them sleep in a false sense of peace. Unitarians, as long as they remain such, can see no other alternative. The more they examine their own principles, the more they must see that they cannot escape from the duty of unfolding, each in his own person, the character of Jesus of Nazareth, in all its purity and all its height and breadth of righteousness, on the penalty of not having the Christian's Heaven and God. Nor is it any wonder, that Mr. Parker himself, being full of human sensibilities on all sides, and imposing on himself the same moral responsibilities, he imposes on all men, should tremble and quiver with a terrible eloquence, as the tides of his heart pour themselves out in every form of indignation at wrong, and of exhortation to "be up and doing." He could only sustain the mighty burden of suffering humanity, which he so courageously invokes upon his own heart, by the safety valve opened to the burning energies of love in the other pole of his statement, — Jesus, the brother, a nature not discriminated from his own, except in cultivation, did succeed in keeping the Law. One finite creature apprehended Infinite wisdom and acted it out, so that no jot or tittle of the Law passed away until all was fulfilled. More than this, without mediator, *by moral exercise*, one mortal creature triumphed over evil. Without mediator, *by moral exercise*, every mortal man *may* come into precisely the same reconciliation with God, since He is no respecter of persons. All this is inevitable from the combined premises, that God is just, and that Jesus Christ is the Saviour, purely by virtue of the righteousness of his humanity. In vain it may be said that he declared God would pardon sin. His own certainty of it could be transferred to no other soul, except so far as that soul came into the state of his own, which would be putting the desired consequent for the antecedent. No one could be sure this certainty was not the transport of

benevolent affections. There are but two ways in which the sinner can believe his sin forgiven. One is the Orthodox way, that God remits it to fulfil something else in himself, than abstract Justice ; and the other is, that the sinner himself actually does something, so good and beautiful, both inwardly and outwardly, as to balance and out-balance the Evil he has done, by presumption or infirmity. The last way, if they do not desert their premises, is the Unitarian way ; and by denying Mr. Parker's statement of it, and denouncing him for setting it forth, they have acknowledged that their first principles involved a vital error. The Christ of the conservative Unitarians is an impossible being even with God, for the uncreated cannot create another uncreated, nor could a created Christ, though the very Heaven of Heavens, be clean in the sight of Absolute Goodness, Wisdom, and Power.

Mr. Parker's statement is, therefore, the last word of Unitarianism. Honest and courageous, he has followed out its principles to their legitimate issues, with the manliness all men must respect, for he is true in relation to the principles, whether he be true to Absolute Truth, or not.

I will now tell you the historical relation, all these remarks bear to the Essay which I enclose, on the generation of the doctrines of Christianity in the intellect of the man who loves God and his neighbor.

The outcry some of the Unitarians made upon Mr. Parker, and the shabby desertion of him by some who believed his conclusions, merely because he had uttered them without their leave, excited me to examine anew the basis of Unitarianism, and to ascertain the significance of its principles with respect to spiritual well-being. Going back to their origin in the soul, I found Unitarianism was a reaction of the moral nature, against the corruption by the recreant Orthodox of their original statement of the doctrine of Life, which I had never before understood ; and that it was not, as I had always believed, or rather never doubted, a legitimate unfolding of the moral nature in its *fair* proportion. As, by virtue

of our moral nature, we can receive power from God to manifest our gratitude to Him, for His manifestation to us of His Goodness in Jesus Christ, when we are spiritually *alive*, we shall exhibit a progress in the Love, Wisdom, and Power, which show us to be the sons of God. But all, who have received the doctrine of life into their Intellect, have not been faithful to it, perseveringly exercising their moral powers, according to their individual ability. And some have never understood or received it at all, who have yet professed it formally. Thus the Goodness of God has been disgraced, and made of no effect. Seen through the medium of those unfaithful stewards, the radiance of its glory has been lost, and the formula of it viewed as a mere bargain, and a bargain also between dead abstractions; and thus the souls of men have been thrown back from the Living God, revealed in the face of Jesus Christ, upon such a God as might be inferred necessarily to exist; and this God must be an Inexorable necessity, whether called Law, or *called* Love, for he is clothed upon with absolute Justice, by that moral Imperative in the human constitution, which affirms his existence. It was in this sally of the moral nature, outraged by the corruptions of the Orthodox Church, that the Unitarian sect took all the life it has ever had. Never was a heresy more respectable; but inasmuch as it was a human reaction, it involved an element of Death. And the re-assertion of it now, more clearly, to be rejected by Unitarians, is a proof that Unitarianism has lived out its life, and is dead. Mr. Parker may presently see, if he does not already see, that there is no step farther but into quite another world, in which the Moral Law, which he worships, will appear, as it is, *relative*, and not the Absolute; and that the freedom of our nature, by which we choose whether or not to do right, — is a faint and perverted image of that in God, by virtue of which He forgives the inevitable sins of partially intelligent creatures, and gives holiness, or life in the spirit, as he gives individual existence, or life in objective nature, of free grace.

So you see I take the side of Mr. Parker, inasmuch as he is attacked or opposed by the conservatives, especially the Unitarian conservatives, without asserting whether or not he has stated, or even discerned the deepest secret of Life, which lies in seeing and partaking the Freedom of God. He has certainly discerned the true method of seeking it. For moral exercise is a prevailing prayer, as long as we do not grow superstitious upon even this means, which enthusiasts are always liable to do ; for all enthusiasts are partial, even moral enthusiasts.

It is not without emotion, that I so decidedly pronounce dead the foster mother of my religious life, to whom, perhaps, I owe more than I know. But I must say the Unitarian Church has proved herself, in my inward experience, for years, no real mother to me, and I have languished even unto death for the author of my Life. The search for the nearest duty, however, and its fulfilment as best we may, though under the consciousness that this is infinitely below the whole Law of Rectitude, is not without its blessing. Moral exercise, when not esteemed for more than the exercises of a created being can be worth, is a prevailing prayer for light. In looking round among Unitarians, I see, on the faces of all the best, a sadness, and, in their tones, I hear a note of sorrow. But whenever I see that they make this prayer of moral exercise, in true humility, my heart applies to them, at least prophetically, the following beautiful lines ;

Abon Ben-Adhem (may his tribe increase,)   
Awoke one night from a deep dream of peace,   
And saw within the moonlight in his room,   
Making it rich and like a lily in bloom,   
An angel writing in a book of gold.   
Exceeding peace had made Ben-Adhem bold,   
And to the presence in the room he said,   
"What writest thou?" the angel raised his head,   
And with a look made all of sweet accord,   
Answered, "the names of those who love the Lord."   
"And is mine one?" said Adhem, "nay, not so,"   
Replied the angel. Adhem spoke more low,

But cheerly still, and said, "I pray thee then, <sup>o</sup>  
Write me as one that loves his fellow men."  
The angel wrote and vanished; — the next night  
He came again with a great wakening light,  
And showed the names the love of God had blest,  
And lo! Ben-Adhem's name led all the rest.

It is but fair for me also to say, that the Orthodox Church militant in all its forms, seems to me sufficiently corrupt to justify the Unitarian protest; and that it owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Parker, for bringing the question of principle between the two churches, to a fair issue.

Of the questions, which Mr. Parker has brought before the public mind, one of the most fruitful in answers is this; What is the relation of the doctrines of Christianity with the two great principles of spiritual life; — the love of God and the love of man? It has been asked under which category is to be reckoned the doctrines of the immortality of the soul, the efficacy of repentance, the remission of sins, &c.

We begin our remarks with the doctrine of Immortality. By nature we have no sense of Mortality. Mortality is a conception abhorrent to our whole soul. When we think of ourselves as dead, we think only of our body, and in imagination survive, to pity this dead body, so intimately associated with our consciousness of life. The notion of annihilation of soul would not distress us, but that we survive, by the same necessity of imagination, to pity this dead soul. We may puzzle and distress ourselves about death and annihilation, but we cannot, by thought, disinherit ourselves of a consciousness of Life, which appears in our Intellect as the Idea of Immortality. We may cease to enjoy it, but it will cling to us, tormenting us; for Life is the Law; that is, inasmuch as existence is the imperative gift of God, every mind that has become conscious to itself, has the conception of something permanent therein, as well as of much that is transient; and the permanent awakens love. This conception and



love of permanence constitute what we call an Idea of Immortality. Sense of immortality, according as we are intellectual or sentimental in our general character. Faith in Immortality is but the fact of Life, appearing to our own Reason, or our Sensibility. Life embodies itself in form successively, annihilating each successive form by quitting it, but it cannot deny its own essence. What is called the voluntary sacrifice of Life itself, proves that nothing can be sacrificed, but the phenomena and circumstances of life. It is common enough for men to give away what they call their lives, for an object such as glory, love, integrity of soul. But what is this which stands over my phenomenal life and gives it away? Is it not Life itself? The giver is not the thing given.

The question then arises, How should there ever have been a doubt of Immortality? \* It can on

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\* We venture to affirm in this place, that this doubt really never occurs. No man does, or can doubt his immortality. To doubt is to think. But he cannot think a single thought, without including himself as the subjective element of the thought, as the subject thinking it. This consciousness of himself, as the thinker, is always an inseparable element of thought, not merely logically considered but considered as a simple fact of intellectual life. When, therefore, we speculate on our annihilation, we always and necessarily survive in thought; we always and necessarily include ourselves in the thought as the subject of the phenomenon we term annihilation. We cannot think of our own annihilation, without thinking at the same instant of ourselves as undergoing it, enduring it, and therefore surviving it, which negatives the assertion that it is annihilation. In all our thoughts, whether of the future or of the past, we have direct consciousness of ourselves as living subjects of the thought. The soul is always present to itself, in all its phenomena. It cannot therefore conceive itself either as past or future, or as absent. The *ME* we speculate about, whether in the past or the future, is not the *ME*, not ourself, but a fact of memory, the product of our past living, or a fact of foresight, a presentiment of a fact of future living. The confounding of this *ME*, which is veritably NOT-*ME*, and with which we hold numerous dialogues in what is termed self-examination, with the *ME*, properly so called, the *ME* of consciousness, is the cause of the illusion, which leads us to fancy that we doubt our immortality. Men, who profess to doubt, who really believe that they doubt their own immortality, are deceived, by supposing that the object of what they are thinking, and which they affirm will cease to be, is the

have been, when Thought was superficial, because by false living the phenomenon was put in opposition to the principle of Life. To live under the guidance of the passions, more especially of the sensual passions, or in too close connexion with finite circumstances, scatters the power of thinking and wastes or deadens consciousness. Attention becomes unduly fixed on manifestation, and forgets the principle. Experimenting in morals under the leadings of sense, instead of simply obeying principle, according to the heart, has obscured, or weakened, or checked in its development, the Idea of Immortality from the days of Adam and Eve to this day. Because they ate the forbidden fruit, they missed of the tree of Life. To recover the lost heritage, they must become as little children, love God and their neighbors. Then the Idea, which gives man his true dignity, will again dawn on his benighted soul. He shall see and eat of the Tree of Life.

It is this practical truth which Mr. Parker sets forth. Because he has not yet lost his birthright of spiritual discernment, he has seen it, and stated it with a breadth which has made him unintelligible to the mass of *educated* people, who, by *intellectual wire-drawing*, lose "the Primal Light of all our seeing." Faith in Immortality is no discovery to be made by intellectual

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selves. A little sound philosophy would set them right, and teach them that they can never be the object of their own thoughts. It is never then of themselves that they can affirm the non-existence.

Furthermore, so far as experience goes, there is not a single fact to warrant the induction of man's mortality. All the soul's experience is of life. It has always survived all its phenomena, and what evidence has it that death is a phenomenon it will not be able to survive? It survives deep sleep, it survives stupor, fainting, unconsciousness, all that most resembles death. Where, then, is the evidence that it will one day cease to survive? Surely, some strong evidence is needed to warrant an induction contrary to all experience. For our part we regard the question of the immortality of the soul, involved in the question of its identity, and we are so far from believing the question, Am I immortal? unanswerable, that we do not believe it even askable. Whoso examines the words, will find, that in them he asks no question at all. — ED.

process, first hand, or second hand. It is an inheritance forfeited by falling from the first principles of spiritual life, and recoverable only by returning to them. Faith in Immortality is indeed only another name for spiritual discernment, or power of rising over creation, towards the Creator, that is, of abstracting the mind from circumstances. Loving God regulates the passions, denies the supremacy of the senses, so that the faculty by which he is discerned acts. Its action is at once Life and the consciousness of Life. Hence the Idea of Immortality is inevitably unfolded in the growth of the Human Constitution.

Socrates's conversation on the Immortality of the Soul is a magnificent fact in the history of the human mind, and the greatest record of the mere Intellect's attempt at self-recovery. But it fails of the End, of maturing this Idea into a Faith.

No one ever closely followed it, who did not sympathize with Simmias when he said, It is proved, but I feel a lurking doubt. This remark, which is an internal evidence of the reality of the conversation, shows that Faith in Immortality is not an act of the understanding. It was because Simmias, like most of us, was diseased in the moral life, that his spiritual discernment was not perfect. Socrates, as Plato says, smiled. He knew the difficulty. He had presented the fact of Immortality only to the dialectic and æsthetic faculties. He suggested that Simmias should employ his Imagination to create the symbols of a divine life, and to enter into the significance of the Fables of the Popular Religion, and, in connexion with this, often to go over the argument in his thought. This was wise as far as it went. But Socrates was only the Apostle of the Intellect. His teachings were addressed not to man, but to a class of men, the intellectual *par excellence*. It has often been remarked that himself was the proof of Immortality, rather than his arguments. When we rise from the perusal of the Apology before the Areopagus, or in Plato's life-like picture, see him drink the cup of hemlock and smile, we see evidence of the immortality of the soul.

But Jesus of Nazareth, from the depths of a life in which no Death is, taught a method of realizing Faith in Immortality more simple for the individual, and more universally possible. He saw that the faith in Immortality could not be a tradition, or an intellectual apprehension, to be held in a symbol, but must always be an original Idea springing from the life of each man. Love God, he said, and Love man ; — in short, live immortal, and you will believe in immortality. The belief is a birth from and of the spirit. It is as much an individual act, and even more, than the birth of the body. No man can be born for another spiritually, any more than bodily.

Some persons would have it that spiritual discernment is a consequence of intellectual acuteness and cultivation, and so is not possible to all men. If this were true, then some men could not worship God. But all the pure in heart see God. The intellectually acute, by scientific analysis, may make the Idea of God part of our theology, but cannot make us feel its truth, if, by our giving the senses dominion over the soul, our purity of sentiment is injured. Nothing, therefore, could be more philosophical, than Jesus Christ's remanding all those, who come to him for the kingdom of heaven, to the first commandment. Yet Mr. Parker's reiteration of this condition of receiving faith in Eternal Life is taken in our *Christian* community, as the proof that he is not a Christian ! But it is not the nine letters of that word which make the man a Christian, but having the same mind that was in Christ Jesus. When he was born into Judea, the commandment to love God stood at the head of the law, yet who had the Idea ? It may be that now those who sit in Moses' seat, have farthest departed from the spirit of the prophet. No mind, ordinary or extraordinary, can discern spiritually, except so far as it is free from all reliance on forms and formulas. When a sensual mind, or a technical mind, represents to itself God, it forms some Idol. It may be the embodiment of some desire, or it may be a form of words. The more describable is a man's God the

more probably has he fallen below the Idea of Spirit. But God seeks to worship him those to whom all circumstance, whether Mount Gerizim or Jerusalem, is indifferent; for He is Spirit, and must be worshipped in Spirit and in Truth. The moral obligation to worship God, therefore, involves a moral obligation to spiritual discernment, which of course God puts within the reach of all. Nothing, therefore, can be more impious than to say, there are minds incapable of spiritual discernment. It is the only germ of immortal life, and consequently, the necessary foundation of faith in that life. But this discernment is enfolded in the sentiments of Love of God and Love of Man. Mr. Parker calls all men to this Love. This is the one thing needful, because it involves all other things desirable. The mind, which loves, and therefore apprehends God in Spirit, can apprehend everything ever uttered by the wit of man, only let him carefully discipline the mortality in which his light is planted while on earth.

Love of God AND Love of Man. Moses was a pure Theist. He made God the Supreme object of human aspiration. But he did not propose a practical life, which fully tested this great principle. Love God, and the Children of Abraham after the flesh, was his word. Jesus went beyond him. He gave a test by which we may measure infinite depths of our love of God; for he showed that our neighbor is the Samaritan, the lost, the dead, the farthest removed from the Visible Church. Mr. Parker has endeavored to state this practice, as always essential to the preservation of the principle of worship. The philosophy of the day, which gives form to the theology of the most enlightened sects, the ecclesiastical arrangements, which grow up out of this theology, all this, he says, is transient. It may have temporary merit, but it is not to be named in the same day with the Eternal principles of moral life. Be loving towards all that lives, towards the Absolute Source of Life, and all the streams therefrom, yourself not quite forgotten, and the Law of Life will retain or recover its natural supremacy, and preclude all question,

that is, all doubt of Immortality ; for Love is our Immortality, the Everlasting gift of the Absolute God to his creatures.

Jesus Christ's life and death, — his death was but a greater life — express and explain the Immortality of the souls of men. But they must be looked at in the largest way. Some Unitarians have the narrowest way of understanding all his words. They see nothing universal in anything he says. Whenever he speaks of the relations of matter and spirit, they would have it, that he is thinking of Judea and Judaism, and their overthrow by the Romans ; whenever he speaks of the secret of Life, they would have it that he speaks of a reconstruction of the earthly kingdom in which he was born. This sublime being, who uses all things as symbols of Thoughts which pervade Eternity, is interpreted with a narrowness, which would degrade him below minds with which we are constantly familiar. For no great mind dwells on circumstances as such ; and Jesus perpetually uses kingdoms, persons, above all his own person, as symbols of spiritual facts. Should not we all do so ? Does not every mind of spiritual discernment see in Jesus' life on earth the evidence, that phenomena need not obscure the law ? As soon as he began to reflect, he saw his Father's business to be his own. It is possible that he had not discerned the ignorance and darkness around him, till the time of his enrollment at the temple, as a Jewish man, when twelve years old. For to him nature was transparent, the manifested word of God, whose very existence was by and through himself, and man he only knew as he was in the bosom of the Father in Heaven, — "the Son of Man which is in heaven." Measuring by this standard, the wisdom of the wisest of his time was folly. He judged the doctors by his understanding and his answers. Even if, as some say, this story of Luke's is of doubtful authority, as a fact of circumstance, it is the happiest apologue of what must have been true of his experience on earth. At some time, by means of the spirit within, he saw the want of spirit-

uality about him. He therefore separated the Transient from the Permanent in all his conversations and discourses, by way of awakening the sleeping spirits of men to attend to God's great manifestation of Himself. Through the phenomenal men around him, he discerned that Divine Idea, we call the man's soul — a chained Life — a Life in Death. Sometimes he spoke to the phenomenal men, the dead, as when he says, "Ye are of your father, the Devil. He was a liar from the beginning." But, also he addressed the spiritual men, alive in their humble faith; as when he said, "thy sins are forgiven thee." His whole Sermon on the Mount was a statement of principles. His parables, all he said, had the one object of leading all, who heard him, to go beneath dogma and institution to the spiritual facts of Law and Love. There were, as he knew, those who did not understand him, but he did not forego his spiritual communications on that account. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear," was his word. He never stooped to those, who should come to him, in the power of humility. As Lawgiver he says, "Be perfect, as your Father in heaven, is perfect;" but as supreme Lover, "I am the Resurrection and the Life." — "He that believeth on me shall never die. I will be in him a well of water, springing up into everlasting life." — "Have I been so long with you, and you have not known me, Philip?" "Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? Henceforth ye know him and have seen him; my Father and I are one." (Translate *I* into the word *Wisdom*, and my Father into the word *Love*.)

We have no accounts of Jesus arguing, as Socrates did, upon the Immortality of the soul. He did not recognise that disorder of mind, or rather that disease of soul, which wants the sense of Immortality. He assumes the fact of Eternal Life, as the basis of all he says. God is eternal and man is his son. Consequently, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living. Only as ever-living souls, and not in their narrow individuality, did they become the nucleus of a national Religion.

Alas ! did he anticipate that the time might come when his own name would be used to crush the faith he would inspire ; by being sequestered to his phenomenal life ? He seemed to do so, when he said, " but when the son of man cometh, shall he find Faith on the earth ? "

He never connected the thought of Immortality with time, " leaving an infinite present for a limited future." He occasionally asserted it in connexion with the Past, but this was to make the Past less of a dead weight,—to show, in short, that *the Past* was a figment of our brain. " Before, Abraham was — I am."

Because the Love of God and the Love of man are the organs, by which the soul apprehends and preserves its Immortality, and Jesus of Nazareth has made the clearest manifestation of this, he is said to have brought Life and Immortality to light. He made it a part of Religious science by showing its generation in the Soul.

There was life, and consequently a faith in Immortality, before the full manifestation of its generation ; but the manifestation of this generation, in life and word, is of an immense importance. Being in the world of sense, constant regeneration is necessary, and Love is the only means of spiritual discernment. It enlarges and strengthens the mind, and makes it capable of every spiritual exercise. It constantly stimulates thought, which is higher than sense, and assimilates the soul to the object of its love. The love of man is but another phasis of the love of God, preventing the mind from becoming the victim of its own power of abstraction. This alone saves the soul from *Religionism*, a great vice ; for Religionism forgets that God is Creator, and loves his own image, as the temple of his Spirit, while *Religion* loves God the Creator, and especially as the Father. How can we love the Father, and not love the children of the Father ? Fatherhood implies a certain communion of nature. Would you know whether you love God ? You may ask yourself if you love goodness, wherever you see it. He, who does not love it in the beggar at



his gate, does not love God, who is the absolute goodness. Goodness is one and the same thing, whether in God or man. Man is interesting, therefore, just in proportion as we love God, who may dwell in him. "We have as much piety as we have charity, and *no more*."

By process of reasoning similar to the above, we should proceed to prove that, in all living minds, all the other doctrines, mentioned in the inquiries to which we are replying, are generated by living out Love of God, and Love of man, which two principles are in fact one, since we love the same spirit in God and in man, looking to God as object, man as subject. This common abstraction of the Christian doctrines from the Christian life, the separation and substitution of the effect in the Intellect, for the cause in the Soul, is Mr. Parker's best justification for his practical statement. It is doubtless a legitimate action of the human intellect, to look at the fact of Religion in the soul, in daylight, and to class its phenomena scientifically, and, therefore, to speak of the *doctrine* of Immortality, the *doctrine* of Repentance, the *doctrine* of Remission of sins, &c. But, alas, for the mind reduced to depend on scientific formulas for any of its impulse, or for what it calls its life! That mind is dying the death. Religion is not an assent to deductions of the understanding from the phenomena of human development, but it is living totally according to spiritual facts which it loves. A man may fancy he thinks God is love, but *to love*, is the only expression of that thought which avails. Let no man fancy he believes in Repentance, Remission of sins, Immortality, except just so far as he feels penitent, pardoned, immortal; for all such beliefs are mere speculations, and if not known as such, deceptive.

The above remarks imply how much deeper are the foundations of Christian faith, than in the authority of any created being. Flesh and blood may not reveal Eternal Life, but only the Father who is in Heaven. No man can convey to another the Idea of Immortality. Words cannot hold it. The speech of even Jesus of Nazareth did not make ears. He taught whom the Father gave him only. The most others can do, for any soul,

is to indicate what it is to avoid and do, in order to realize and accept its own limitations, or feel its own wants, when it will find itself crowned with Immortality by God.

He who feels a doubt of his Immortality should dismiss all speculations on the subject, and make the most of any germ of the love of man he has in him, and act this out as impartially as possible, in consistency with man's relation to God. As he dwells on himself and neighbor, as Sons, who had not existed but for Love, the fire will burn within him, and before he knows it, the Idea of Immortality will have returned, or rather the clouds of doubt, superinduced by the prevalence of lower laws than the Law of Life, will have passed away from his heaven. The real doctrines of Christianity, that is, the consequences of the Christian life in the understanding, though they change their form with the understanding itself, are as permanent as their generating cause is real; and without sharing this causing Love, all the authority of ages on ages cannot make them part of an individual mind, however large a figure they may make in its creed. "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father."

We have not a word to say in answer to some other misunderstandings and misrepresentations of Mr. Parker and his Sermon. "These things must be." They are the proof, though it may seem paradoxical to say so, of his being *in some degree understood* where he is nearest the truth. The word of God, as in the time of Jesus of Nazareth, has become of none effect by reason of "traditions." To approximate the utterance of it, frightens a Judaizing Christendom, not less than Jesus frightened the Sanhedrim.

We love to call ourselves liberal Christians. Some of us have dared to organize as such. Our organization has betrayed us, as organization ever must, as soon as it is trusted in as permanent and authoritative. But the soul is immortal. The Son of Man comes, as the

truth of our nature, and if he does not find faith on the Earth, he brings it. However delayed, the word of LIFE is sterling; and the Lord of the Sabbath day, having set doing good to man against every institution made for man, shall come again in glory; and as the lightning cometh out of the East, and shineth even unto the West, so shall that coming of the Son of Man be!

E. P. P.

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ART. IV. — *An Elementary Treatise on Algebra, for the use of Students in High Schools and Colleges.* By THOMAS SHERWIN, A. M., Principal of the English High School, Boston. Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey. 1842.

“To the making of books there is no end.” We are glad of it. Why should there be an end? If a book tend to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge, either by presenting new information, or by serving up old in a more attractive form, it ought to be welcomed; and it will be by those, whose pecuniary or other exclusively selfish interests are not liable to be injured by its introduction.

We have no objection to a book, because there are already a score of a similar kind in the market. We have no objection to a book of instruction, even if it is made with a pair of scissors, provided the instruments are judiciously employed, to cut out such well treated portions of the subject matter, as best announce and illustrate it.

We seldom find a single author treating all the branches of a subject equally well; and it therefore becomes important, especially to the young, that some discriminating person occasionally collect, into one compact treatise, the isolated improvements, which

have been made by successive authors, and which have stood the test of experimental instruction, during a course of years. The more these portions are fashioned into symmetry, and receive new life and spirit from the compiler, the better will his book fulfil its design.

We do not mean to insinuate, that the book before us is a mere compilation; for, although in it, as an elementary treatise, we find only long established principles, yet the exhibition and demonstration of them, as well as their arrangement and the mode of instruction, (considerations of the utmost importance to the learner,) are original.

The object of this notice is, to state what we consider the requisites of a good elementary instruction book of Algebra, a science, dignified in itself, and so important in its various applications, that it surely makes legitimate claims to well digested treatises and excellent manuals for instruction.

Mathematical knowledge seems to be gaining a more extended diffusion in our country; and we hope, at the same time, that the standard of mathematical acquirements is steadily and rapidly rising. Our common schools, which were formerly considered in good condition, when a few of the most advanced pupils, (by dint of sundry mystical operations prescribed, not explained,) had succeeded in "getting through," Daboll's arithmetic, now send forth their annual crowd of boys and girls, at an age much younger than of yore, not only better acquainted with arithmetic, but often with a very useful, though doubtless a limited knowledge of algebra and geometry. It seems fair to infer, that, the common schools being thus indisputably better than formerly, the higher schools and colleges have risen also; but the fact, in regard to those high schools in which boys are prepared for college, is, that Latin and Greek are the principal objects of attention, while barely enough of arithmetic and algebra is acquired, to pass an examination at college; consequently, the boys, not being thoroughly prepared in elementary knowledge, find themselves unable to accomplish the course of mathe-

mathematical studies prescribed by the college faculty. These facts show, that at least one description of high school has not been very successful in raising the standard of mathematical knowledge; and, what is worse, has consequently impeded its advancement in the colleges. The blame, we suppose, must be shared between teachers and parents; the teachers for not insisting on keeping back the unprepared pupil; and the parents for excessive eagerness to get their sons into college. Hurry, however, is our national characteristic.

The text books of our colleges have, within a few years, been changed for the better; and doubtless individual students are occasionally found, who have made progress far beyond those of the same rank and pretensions in former times; but, the "*rari nantes in gurgite vasto*" are few indeed, compared to those, who sink down through utter weariness and disgust; for we believe it to be an indisputable fact, that there prevails in our colleges a very general and lamentable disrelish for mathematics. There are other causes of this disrelish besides the insufficiency of preparation; such are, the great amount of time and labor requisite for proficiency, the supposed improbability of making an every-day use of them in the professions, the small chance they offer to one's vanity as a means of display. As to a want of natural capacity, we cannot believe this to be quite so general as the dislike, and, therefore, cannot set it down as peculiarly influencing this branch of knowledge. The most common complaints, which the students make openly, are, "the books are too difficult;" "we are driven on too fast;" &c.

Now many utter these complaints, who are glad to find any plausible pretence to cover their real indolence and negligence; and yet, we believe, the rogues have sagacity enough, in the present instance, to use a just discrimination in their choice of pretences. We do truly believe, that many of the mathematical text books, in our colleges, are too difficult for a great majority of the persons called upon to use them. The treatises of Professor Peirce, for instance, elegant and

symmetrical as they are, are too condensed and general for boys; they presume a greater preparation in mathematics, than boys usually get before going to college, and greater than the examinations for admission seem to demand; in fact, they appear to have been made, with a prospective view to a much higher standard of mathematical acquirements, than the present state of things in our schools and colleges immediately promises; and, we believe, they are thoroughly perused and understood but by a very few collegians, and these remarkably well endowed with faculties for mathematical studies.

It may be said, that the subject demands this great generality; that it is its chief virtue; is all, perhaps, that renders it valuable in the higher departments of science dependent on analysis; and if boys do not readily show talents for such reasonings, they must leave the subject to heads better constituted by nature for mathematical investigations. In reply to this, we declare, that children must be fed "with food convenient for them," with children's food, so diluted as not to clog by repletion, and yet so strong as sufficiently to stimulate their faculties to healthy activity. Boys must be trained in a long course of exercises in the elements of the exact sciences, must be made perfectly familiar with their instruments, before they can be justly expected to grapple with general views and discussions. Many people, and especially persons of great natural powers for acquiring mathematical knowledge, forget how slowly young persons attain an acquaintance even with arithmetic; that not one in twenty, of the boys admitted into our colleges at the age of fifteen, nay, of the whole that enter, inclusive of those whose age approximates thirty, has a thorough and firmly settled knowledge of this first branch of mathematics, although they have, on an average, attended to the subject ten years.

It would appear at first glance, that, if the very elements of science can scarcely find a lodgment in their crania, after so long, so Troy-like a siege, it were ad-

visible to desist; but many a dull boy, by patient perseverance and accurate instruction, has finally arrived at an enviable acquaintance with the deepest science,

quæ, sera, tamen respexit inertem,  
Candidior postquam tondenti barba cadebat.

We do not wholly approve of setting up a procrustean system, and declaring that books should be made only in accordance with it; but, in an instruction book of an exact science, we can tell, *a priori*, what are indispensable requisites; and we claim a right to examine such books, with reference to our preconceived notions of what they ought to be. We proceed to mention some.

The first requisite, in the formation of an instruction book, is, that the author, being thoroughly acquainted with his subject, invariably tell the truth. One of the most popular elementary instruction books of algebra, and that made by a teacher of great celebrity and success, contains in its key, as explanatory of the process by which the fraction  $\frac{ax+by-xy}{ay+cy+az}$  may be reduced to its lowest terms, the following morceau; "since  $ax$  occurs in the numerator and denominator, this term may be cancelled in both. Ans.  $\frac{b-x}{a+c}$ ." The enunciation is too formal and express to allow of the charitable construction of a *lapsus*, and the subsequent reduction of similar quantities, by the same rule, settles the blame of ignorance of a first principle on the author. How he could ever have made progress in analysis, with such notions of reduction, is a puzzling question.

From this single instance of false teaching, all will readily see the absolute necessity of stating truth alone, in elementary books; as an error, imbibed early and habitually assumed, will constantly recur and annoy the student, even after a better acquaintance with the subject has exposed its falsity. The truth should also be so strictly observed, that no statements, made in general terms, for the sake of producing a strong impression on

the Student's mind, will in any part of his progress be necessarily withdrawn.

In the second place, clearness is essential ; and such clearness, withal, as a young person can appreciate. Too concise and condensed a statement is as much to be avoided as verbosity. Each rule and direction ought to require no second look to correct a false view taken at first. The subject has intrinsic difficulties enough to exercise the mind, without the foreign aid of mistiness : and so far are we from believing, that simple and easily acquired views of the subject debilitate the mind, that we believe the very thing, which would strengthen it, is kept from it by the hardness of the exposition ; for, the simplest truths, most clearly expressed, will task the majority of young persons to the extreme of their ability, and this same majority are soon disheartened by a strain even slightly severe.

In the next place, we like to have statements made with precision and formality. This can be much assisted by the typographical execution of the book. A distinct and formal announcement of each topic attracts the attention, and fixes it more securely to the subject under consideration.

Minuteness in explanation is quite necessary, leaving no breach in the process too broad for the unpractised step of the young.

There should also be a frequent reference to fundamental principles, and a constant repetition of them, to refresh the learner's memory, however much these may mar the symmetry and conciseness of the treatise ; for, the object of the book being instruction, iteration and re-iteration can hardly be too much insisted on. A great portion of the trials of a teacher arise from his not making sufficient allowances for his pupil's feeble recollection ; he is often surprised to find, that a topic, dwelt upon with great patience and care, and left only when it was believed to be perfectly fixed in the learner's mind, has, after some little time, quite vanished from his memory.

Then all the parts of the book should be so arrang-



ed, that each may presuppose no information in the learner, which has not already been actually imparted.

And, lastly, it should strictly adhere to its design, not touching on topics too high for the learner, and yet being adequate to the wants of the class of persons, for whom it is prepared.

The question now arises, how the book before us complies with the requisitions we have premised. Does it possess nothing but truth? Does it possess clearness, precision, minute explanations, frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, happy arrangement, and a successful accomplishment of its design?

The first six sections of the book consist of problems in equations of the first degree, with one unknown quantity, commencing with extreme simplicity in the inductive method, each section developing but one new principle, and exemplifying it, till the learner acquires knowledge and facility in the use of the signs. We incline to the belief, that many pupils will find some of these problems a little more difficult than the author intended they should be; the difficulty lying not in the operations, which the author renders very clear, but in reducing the conditions of the questions to the form of equations, a process very often more difficult than solving the equations themselves.

The Sections from 7th to 15th inclusive contain the various operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.

The Sections from 16th to 22d inclusive treat of the subjects of factors, divisors, and multiples, and very happily apply them to operations on fractional quantities. These sections are particularly good. The subject of resolving algebraic quantities into their prime factors is quite too much neglected in every other book, with which we are acquainted. We are glad to find so much attention paid to it here, and equally so to observe the frequent use made of factors, in the subsequent sections of the book. The habit and power of discovering and adroitly managing the prime factors of quantities are of

great service to the analyst, in every stage of his progress.

Section 23d contains a few problems in literal equations; and thus the learner is prepared for Sections 24th and 25th, on Equations of the first degree, with several unknown quantities.

Section 26th contains numerical substitutions in algebraic quantities; and like the section on factors, shows the author's intimate acquaintance with the real wants of his pupils.

Section 27th is the most appropriate article on generalization, we have met in any book. The examples are practical and useful. We also discover a judicious location of the examples. Most authors refer the pupil to various parts of their books, to seek out examples for generalization, which the pupil invariably neglects to do, unless strongly urged; whereas this author has arranged a sufficient number of suitable examples in the section itself.

Section 28th investigates negative quantities and negative results.

Section 29th discusses the courier problems and examines the symbols  $\frac{m}{n}$  and  $\frac{a}{b}$ .

Sections 30th to 46th inclusive treat of the various relations of roots and powers, and the operations connected with them, including pure and affected equations of the second degree, and pure equations of the third degree. We notice, with peculiar satisfaction, the articles on approximate roots, irrational quantities, and the binomial theorem. It is too often found necessary to suffer boys of moderate capacity to omit the demonstration of the binomial theorem, and content ourselves with teaching a practical application of its results; but, by the previous gradual training derived from this book, and the cautious advance of the demonstration itself, leaving no gaps requiring more mental agility, than even heavy boys possess, we believe most pupils will be able to get through it profitably. Still it is strict and concise, contrasting well with Colburn's, which occu-

pies some twenty pages, and over which we have seen many a pains-taking boy toiling in hopeless disgust.

Section 47th contains the consideration of inequalities, a subject not unimportant, and yet wholly neglected in most treatises on algebra. Sections 48th to 53rd inclusive exhibit the doctrine and application of ratios, proportions, and progressions. Sections 54th and 55th contain some elegant exercises in equations of the second degree, with one and two unknown quantities. These are introduced in this place, to test the learner's proficiency in all the principles and operations treated of in the foregoing sections. They are such exercises as will not only effect this object, but will render the learner familiar with many expressions and quantities, a knowledge of which tends greatly to assist him in the higher branches of mathematics. They are likewise as difficult as the nature of the book demands.

Sections 56th, 57th, and 58th treat of the construction of the tables, the uses, and applications of logarithms, with characteristic minuteness and perspicuity.

Sections 59th and 60th are on Compound Interest and Annuities.

The book ends with a selection of miscellaneous examples.

It will be perceived, that attention has been paid to all the branches of the subject, which can be necessary for a book of its class; and scarcely can a passage be found, which does not admirably conform to the requisites, which we have presumed to set forth. We have noticed but one, that does not strictly agree with the first. On the 140th page, it is said, "imaginary quantities," (such as  $\sqrt{-16}$ ,) "indicate absolute absurdity in the questions from which they arise." The author has here inadvertently dropped his usual caution, in making the assertion too general.\* When he was discussing the symbols  $\frac{o}{o}$  and  $\frac{\infty}{\infty}$ , he was guarded and discriminating, and remarked, that in problems of geometry, such symbols indicated no absurdity, but true results. Now imaginary quantities also indicate no absurdity in

problems of geometry; for instance, the equation,  $y + 3x\sqrt{-1} - a = 0$ , considered geometrically, is far from absurd, it being in fact an equation, which has for its locus a point, whose coördinates are  $x=0$ , and  $y=a$ . Even in pure algebra imaginary quantities are employed advantageously, and without involving any absurdity.

In regard to the other requisites, we must say, that, had we not been told, in the title page, the author's name, we could have been sure, that the book was made by a person, who knew exactly where young people fail and need assistance; who had been accustomed to *teach* the subject, and not merely to hear recitations or receive a stated number of answers to a daily pile of questions; and who knew how to supply the pupil's wants, and to correct the deficiencies of existing books. Men, who are not accustomed to teach, and who know not what mighty stumbling blocks very little things are to beginners, may be surprised at meeting so many precise directions on the minutiae of the operations; but we feel assured, that many a learner, and many a teacher, will acquire habits of accuracy, and be freed from a vast deal of perplexity by them.

The distinct announcement of the subjects of the sections, so that the learner cannot fail to know exactly what he is going about, and the referring of the pupil back to principles, are much facilitated by the excellent typographical execution of the work. The beauty of the type and paper, and especially the very small number of errors, render it, in a mechanical point of view, superior to most American works of the kind, it being not unusual in mathematical books to find whole pages of errata.

The great excellence of the book, we remark, in conclusion, consists in its being adapted to the capacities of the majority of young persons. The clearness and minuteness of its rules and demonstrations render the subject accessible to pupils of very moderate talents, while the more gifted will find ample exercise for their powers, as well as a sufficient amount of algebraic

knowledge, to introduce them to the professedly more profound treatises, to analytic geometry, and the calculus.

F.

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ART. V. — SPIRIDION. PAR GEORGE SAND, (MADAME DUDÉVANT.)

WE have for some time been seeking an opportunity of offering a few thoughts on modern French Literature. With the modern political and philosophical writings of France we have for several years been familiar ; but we had paid no attention to its lighter literature, till we saw it denounced in no measured terms, in an article, published, three or four years since, in the London Quarterly Review. That article led us to believe that modern French Literature must possess some admirable qualities, and be deserving of no little respect ; for we have generally been in the habit of construing the Quarterly's denunciations into high praise. Its denunciations were so loud, and so bitter, that we lost as little time as possible in making ourselves acquainted, to some extent, with the class of writers condemned ; and we have been not altogether unrewarded for our pains.

However, taking modern French Literature, as represented by Victor Hugo, H. de Balzac, Alexandre Dumas, and George Sand, otherwise Madame Dudevant, we cannot say that we have found as much to approve, as we were led by the outcries of the Quarterly to expect. We have found not much to justify the charges of indecency, of licentious and antisocial tendency ; but we have found more than we looked for, offensive to our taste and feelings. In a word, we have not been able, taking it as a whole, to sympathize with it ; or to find either the pleasure or the profit, in becoming acquainted with it, that we have a right to expect from

the Literature of a refined and highly civilized people.

France has few, if any writers, that can compare advantageously with Scott, Bulwer, Washington Irving, or even Charles Dickens. Victor Hugo by no means wants genius, talent, or learning; but he is misled by his theory of Art, and fails to give us a work that can be read with unmingled pleasure. He is the best of his class. His natural disposition, we should judge to be tender, affectionate, and even sunshiny; but having adopted the notion, that the grotesque is an essential element of the beautiful, and the horrible of the pathetic, he gives us works, which chill rather than please, and harrow up the nerves, instead of melting the heart. We have never yet been able to submit to the torture of finishing the perusal of his *Notre Dame*; and the "Last days of a Convict," we have left with the leaves uncut. His *Han d'Islande* has, however, some passages of great beauty and tenderness. His Dramas are better; and we have read with much pleasure *Marion de Lorme*, *Angelo*, and *Hernani*, horrible as they certainly are. The *Roi s'amuse*, and *Lucrèce Borgia*, have proved too much for our nerves. We abandon them to the tender mercies of the London Quarterly Review.

Balzac is certainly a writer of great power and fertility, but there is something dry and hard in his spirit. He lays open the vices and corruptions of society, it must be admitted, with the hand of a master; nothing can surpass his pictures of its hollowness, its hypocrisy, its vanity, its licentiousness; but we nowhere meet in him the warm and genial aspiration to something better. We do not feel, while reading him, as we do while reading Bulwer, and Boz, or our own Irving, that there is at bottom a genuine love of humanity, a hearty sympathy with mankind, and a strong desire to make society better, more favorable to the growth of religion, virtue, and happiness. We rise from his pages, soured, indignant, and misanthropic. We feel contempt for our race, not love; and find ourselves disposed to bid them hasten on to the devil, not to sacrifice ourselves for their redemption.

Of Alexandre Dumas we know less, than of Hugo, and of the others. He is not, however, so cold and freezing, as de Balzac. He has warmer sympathies, a more genial spirit, and is more able to look on the brighter side of things; and yet he has his faults, and faults of the same class with those we have pointed out in Victor Hugo, to whom he is inferior in talent and genius. Of George Sand we will speak more particularly hereafter.

Excluding de Balzac, who seems to write for the Parisian Saloons, we may say of modern French Literature, that it is strongly impregnated with what we have sometimes, without much precision, called social democracy. It has a tendency to recognise the rights, the claims, and to some extent the worth, of the masses. It does not bow to the aristocracy, nor court in any respect the high-born and the rich. It is plebeian in its spirit, and recognises, and sometimes without a sneer, the existence of the proletariat. Its heroes can be born without titles, and it can expose vice in high places. It furthermore is indignant at tyranny, impatient of restraint, loud in its demand for freedom, and the elevation of the masses. It moreover has a certain humanity. It opposes itself to cruel and sanguinary punishments, and would excite sympathy for even the wicked, by showing that they are never utterly abandoned. This is its good side.

But this is the good side of all modern literature. It is a remarkable fact, that since the French Revolution literature has ceased to be aristocratic. Everywhere, or nearly everywhere, throughout Christendom, and especially in Western Europe and America, there has been a decided disposition among all writers of much note, either to expose the vices of the great, — to hold up the more favored classes to ridicule or indignation, or to laud the virtues of the low, — to paint the less favored classes in the most lively colors, and under the most attractive forms. We everywhere meet the plebeian classes rising into notice or into power. They are no longer introduced upon the stage as sub-

jects of ridicule, for the amusement of the well-born and the refined. They furnish the author his heroes. Their patience under wrong, their quiet and unostentatious lives, their simple habits and gentle virtues, or their rights, and the wrongs and outrages to which they are doomed, constitute the materials of his romance. He only can fetch an echo from the heart of this age, who speaks out for universal man, and in tones of sympathy with the wronged and down-trodden.

It is well worth one's while to trace this tendency. We may see it even in the dominant taste with regard to the use of language itself. In our own language, what scholar would now write in the latinized English of old Dr. Johnson? Good taste is now to avoid as much as possible the Latin element of the language, and to use those words which are of Teutonic origin. We have discovered an unsuspected richness in the old Anglo-Saxon, and the nearer we approach to the language of Alfred and Edward, the Confessor, the more correct is said to be our taste. In France we see something similar. The writers show an increasing affection for words of Celtic origin, or at least for that portion of their language most in use with the great body of the people. All this is easily accounted for. Formerly the reading public was composed almost entirely of the aristocracy and their retainers; and of course all works, written with the intention of being published and read, must breathe the tone, and speak the language of the aristocracy. In France and England, the aristocracy were of an anti-national origin; they could therefore have but few sympathies with the great mass of the people, and hence little fondness for the purely national language. But now, the plebeian classes, the body of the nation, demand a literature, and must be addressed in their own tongue. To speak to the hearts of the great mass of the people, we must use the terms with which they are familiar, the language in which they think, and in which for generations they have been accustomed to express their feelings. Now, as the great body of the English and American people are of Anglo-Saxon origin,



the Anglo-Saxon is their principal mother tongue ; and in addressing them it is necessary to draw upon the Anglo-Saxon funds of the language, because then we speak to them in their mother tongue. The Clergy, once the literati of Europe, educated in the Latin language, made always in all their writings as much use of it as possible. So long as they gave the tone to literature, the national languages, the mother tongues of the people, would be discountenanced. But the clergy are no longer in relation to literature what they once were. The laity have been to school, and now control our literary tastes. The laity have less fondness for Latin, and more sympathy with the people who speak their national tongue. This tendency to the Anglo-Saxon elements of the English, and to the old Gallic elements in modern French, and to strict nationality in modern German, indicates the rising importance of the plebeians and the laity, and shows that the clergy and the aristocracy count for comparatively little in modern literature.

If we pass from language into the historical works of the day, we shall find the same tendency. We republish old Chronicles and Ballads, study the Bards, Scalds, Troubadours, Trouvères, and Minnesängers. We write the history of the Gauls, the Anglo-Saxons and Slavonians. We seek everywhere for the remains of the old conquered races. We sit in judgment on the conqueror, and sympathize with the sufferings of the conquered, endured in silence for so many ages. This tendency is remarked in the brothers Thierry, especially in Augustin, author of the History of the Norman Conquest. The tendency this way is first decidedly marked in England by the publication of the old English Ballads, by Bishop Percy ; but the man, who has perhaps contributed more to it than any other writer, dead or living, is Sir Walter Scott. Whether Scott knew what he was about or not, may be a question ; but his writings mark a revolution in literature, and contain even a social revolution. We plead guilty to having misconceived the tendency of Scott's literary

labors, and of having judged him, on a former occasion, too superficially. We have just finished a critical perusal of all his novels, and we are happy to be able to say that our estimate of his character, and our judgment of the tendency of his writings, are altogether more favorable to him than what we have heretofore expressed. His sympathies are not always with power, but almost always, and apparently unknown to himself, with the conquered or oppressed classes. In regard to his own country, he has labored to exhibit the merits, the virtues, the noble qualities of the defeated party. In passing into England he is true to the same tendency. In his *Ivanhoe*, he has resuscitated the old Saxon race, and showed the struggle between them and their Norman masters, which continued long after the Conquest; and by so doing he has furnished the scholars of Europe with a key to the real history of modern society. When treating of the English Revolution in the seventeenth century, he may not in all cases have been just to the Puritans and Republicans; but still he is far less unjust to them than is commonly supposed. Then, in selecting his characters, his noblest are always from the lowest or plebeian classes. In *Ivanhoe* we have Gurth, the swineherd, a noble specimen of the true man; and the man, who could have drawn such a character, and so described his exultation, when the collar of bondage was struck from his neck, could not have been without the soul of the freeman. In this same novel, we find his best female character, — a character in which he rises far above his ordinary conception of female worth, and in which he has altogether surpassed himself, — Rebecca, the Jewess, taken from the despised tribe, the persecuted of all lands. Edie Ochiltre, the beggar, may put to shame the whole race of his noble Dukes, Counts, and Barons, and Little Barons. Something of this same tendency is to be found in the prosy Wordsworth. He, all tory as he is, has a fellow-feeling with simple humanity. The tendency is still more decided in Bulwer, and altogether more yet in Boz. Amongst ourselves we see it in Ir-

ving, in Cooper's *Bravo*, and *Headsmen*, and in some of Hawthorne's *Twice-Told Tales*.

Now this marks not merely a literary, but a social revolution. These lower classes, these plebeians and proletaries, among whom Scott, Wordsworth, and others find their heroes, are, at least, so far as concerns England and France, the descendants and representatives of the conquered races; and this tendency which we have marked indicates that a revolution in their favor has in some degree commenced, and is now in progress. The old Anglo-Saxon rises against his Norman master, the simpleman against the gentleman, and seeks to reëstablish his language and his rights; the Gallo-Roman seeks to throw off the yoke imposed by the Teutonic Frank, and to be the freeman of his natal soil.

All modern literature bears the marks, if we may so speak, of the revolt of the conquered tribes. It is insurrectionary, rebellious. Consequently it is held in great horror by the representatives of the conquerors, whenever they perceive its real character and tendency. We, whose sympathies are always with the rebels, of course approve this tendency. We discovered it in Bulwer, and hence our high regard for his writings; we discovered it in many of the modern French writers, and hence the reason of our respect for them; we did not originally discover it in Scott, Wordsworth, Irving, and Boz, and hence the reason why we have never spoken in their praise. In Irving it is slight, but he belongs after all to modern literature; in Boz it is strong, but not so strong as a superficial reading would indicate. It will, if we are not much mistaken, show itself stronger, and at the same time gentler still, in the author of *The Gentle Boy*.

In Scott it is stronger than in any of the rest, though he was probably unaware of the fact. Few, comparatively speaking, have suspected the real tendency of his writings, and hence the praise he has received from those who dread the revolution, which none more than he has contributed to bring about. We, for our part,

belong to the conquered race, if not by blood, at least by position, and we feel impatience under the yoke of the conqueror. We cherish the old national feeling, and call all our brothers who labor to retrieve the losses of the defeated party, to restore in England dominion to the Anglo-Saxon, and in France to the Gaul.

Now, as modern French literature is decidedly ruled by the old Gallic spirit, and in this respect purely national; and as it marks an effort of the mass, who have been held in bondage, to recover the rights originally wrested from them by invading tribes; and not only marks that effort, but strengthens it, and promises to render it successful; we approve it, we prize it, and bid its authors God speed. Viewed in this light, it is eminently moral and social, tends eminently to the emancipation of the masses, and to the introduction of a better and a nobler social order.

But, viewed under the relation of art, and its bearing on mere private morals, we cannot commend it without important reservations. But in this respect even, we are far from thinking it at all inferior to the great mass of contemporary English literature, while it is decidedly superior to the old French literature. Its general conception is undoubtedly just, but it abuses its freedom from old classic restraints, and runs into innumerable extravagances. Having come down from the stilts on which it stalked over the stage, in the age of Louis Quatorze, and finding itself on its natural feet, it is so delighted that it frisks about sometimes in a manner quite unseemly, and exhibits a variety of antic motions and tricks, with which we could very easily dispense.

We do not infer the degeneracy of France from this literature, nor that French society is necessarily exceedingly corrupt. Nor do we believe this literature will be found generally corrupting. But we should relish it better, if it would veil its horrors, if it would smile less grotesquely, and exhibit less of the satyr. We believe that the writer, who puts us in good humor with ourselves and with the world, who draws us off from the dwarfed and the deformed, to dwell with the grand and beauti-

ful, will do the most for private morals and for social progress. We believe he, who unveils the glories of Paradise, and permits the sinner to see the beauty and bliss of the saints, will more effectually convert him to God, than he who only exposes to his view the tortures, and fills his ears with the howlings, of the damned. We are sure, that when we stand looking upon a smiling landscape, beneath a serene sky, and inhaling the sweet fragrance of flowers, at peace with ourselves and with the world, we are in our happiest mood to labor for our fellow men, or to give ourselves up to live or to die for a great or noble cause. No doubt virtue leads to happiness; but it is a truth equally deserving our consideration, that happiness leads to virtue. The more happy you render your fellow men, the more virtuous will you render them. The man, who finds a paradise in the bosom of his family, who is surrounded by all the charms of home, and whose heart is best formed to enjoy the sweets of domestic affections, the love of wife and children, is *not* the last to hear the voice of his country or of his race, and to rush to the frontier, to make a rampart of his body against the enemy.

The fault, then, of French literature, a fault which we find also with English literature, is that it presents us too many images of vice, crime, and horror, and does not call forth the warmer, gentler, and holier aspirations of our nature. It affects us painfully; it raises a storm of passion in our bosoms, and leaves us mad and miserable. We have been affected by the nightmare, and it is long after reading it, before our blood circulates freely again, and we recover our wonted strength and equanimity. There may have been a period in our life when we should have delighted in the stormy passions described, but we are not ashamed to own, that, as we have had occasion from the vicissitudes of life to enlarge our own experience, and to suffer from the wounds that few in the warfare of life can escape, we grow weary of the battle, and come to envy those who cultivate in peace their native vales, and dance to the rustic pipe. We hear not the war-trumpet

with delight, and we shrink from the conflict. Thus it is this stormy literature, which only rouses passion and stirs up all within, like the ocean when lashed into fury by the tempest, ceases to charm, and we wish it more peaceful, more serene, more sunshiny.

So much for modern French Literature in general. We come now to George Sand, otherwise Madame Dudevant, though we disclaim in the outset all intention of offering anything like a regular review of her writings. We have found her loudly and very generally censured, and have therefore, been led to sympathize with her. We have heard her called many hard names, and have therefore presumed, without other evidence, that she must have great and positive merits. Moreover, she is a writer of great ability; we may even say, of powerful genius; the most so of any female writer, we are acquainted with, ancient or modern. She is in many respects the first and best of the authors of modern French Literature. We cannot indeed place her above Victor Hugo, but we confess, that we prefer her writings to his, and believe them possessed of greater æsthetic and moral merits.

In assuming, as we are told she sometimes does, the male attire, Madame Dudevant seems also to assume no little of true masculine thought and spirit. In originality, depth, and vigor of thought and expression, her writings betray very little of the woman. Her style is rich, flowing, graceful, delicate, and at the same time, terse, vigorous, and free from that diffuseness, the besetting sin of most French writers, and of French female writers in particular. In a word, she writes so well, that for some time she was able to impose upon the acutest critics of France and England, and to make it believed, that George Sand was really, as *his* name and dress purported, a man. This, which we think is high praise, we presume will be thought by some, in these days of "Woman's Rights," to be but a sorry compliment. Somewhat of a revolution in the relative position of the sexes would seem to be going on.

Man's long-admitted superiority, which has stamped itself upon all the institutions of society, and is inwoven with the very texture of language itself, is now questioned, and we are told that he must cease to regard himself as lord of this lower world, surrender the sacred *symbol* of authority to woman, don the petticoat, and henceforth handle the distaff. Alas! we have fallen on evil days. With your Mary Wolstonecrafts, Fanny Wrights, Harriet Martineaus, your Chapmans and your Folsoms, we can no longer escape by conceding woman's equality to man, but we must own her superiority; and instead of thinking that we praise a woman, by saying that she writes almost as well as a man, we must rather praise the man by saying that he writes almost as well as a woman.

Nevertheless, at the risk of being "brained by my lady's fan," we must still hold on to the old doctrine of man's superiority, save in what may be called woman's more appropriate sphere of life. In her own sphere, as a wife, and a mother, in the quiet affections and duties of home, which after all is the more important and the more elevated sphere, we readily own woman's equality, and even her superiority; but we question her power to compete successfully with man in any of the other departments of life. Science is indebted to her for no important discovery, and Art for no master-piece or *mistress-piece*. She devotes more time and study to poetry than man does, and yet she has produced no *Iliad*, no *Paradise Lost*; in music she produces nothing, and cannot even equal man in the bare execution of the melodies composed by the great masters. She has succeeded in copying with tolerable accuracy, but has never been able to give us an original picture or an original statue of much merit. Indeed, she generally does not contend for her power to equal man. They, who assert her ability, as a general rule, to compete successfully with man in Art and Science, in the several departments of outdoor as well as indoor life, only expose themselves to her scorn. She does not wish to be, nor does she wish to be considered, superior to man.

Her great want is, — not to love, — but to reverence ; and she would soon cease to love man, if she could not look up to him, and reverence him. She is so made, — not so educated, but so made, — that she finds the highest and sweetest gratification of her ambition in the success of her husband, or her son. She rarely is ambitious for her own sake. Her desire is unto her husband, in whom she would live and reign, in whose existence she would completely merge her own. It is for him only, or as a mother for her children, that she would acquire wealth, fame, or distinction. It is the order of nature that it should be so, and it is in this way that woman becomes really a "help meet" for man, and the peace and loveliness of domestic life are secured. We think, therefore, our "Woman's Rights" people would do well to let it remain undisturbed. We think also, that there is more gallantry than wisdom in the growing fashion of altering the marriage covenant, so that the wife no longer promises to *obey* her husband.

This last reminds us of another ultraism coming into vogue. There is already a class of radicals among us who think it a gross outrage upon natural rights, that children should be required to obey their parents, and we have even heard it seriously contended that we should have a Rights of Children's Society, to protect the pretty dears from the despotism of their fathers and mothers,—fathers more especially ; and to secure them the free and unimpeded enjoyment of the natural liberty of going and coming when and where they please. When this society shall have gone into operation, we propose the formation of another to save the needle from its slavery to the pole, and the body from its subjection to the law of gravitation. It is intolerable tyranny, that of compelling the needle at all seasons, in all weathers, by day and by night, without the least time for rest or relaxation, to "point trembling to the pole," and calls aloud upon all the friends of freedom for redress. Moreover, what slavery more gross or complete than that of our bodies, nay, of all nature to



the law of gravitation? Now, we may as well complain of those laws to which the natural world is subjected, as of those by which God governs the moral world. This slavery of women and children to the tyrant man, which does so sorely vex the modern friends of freedom, perhaps, correctly rendered, would be merely the protection of the weak and helpless by the strong. The power, man claims over his wife and children, is only that which he needs in order to be the protector of those he loves.

Against this power, so far as concerns the wife, the writings of Madame Dudevant are a loud, indignant, and yet an eloquent and touching protest. Her writings to a very considerable extent seem to have been called forth by a deep sense of the real or imaginary sufferings of woman. Women are represented to us as the victims of a false and hollow-hearted civilization, of unjust and tyrannical laws, of barbarous husbands, doomed to be tied to men they cannot love, to suffer from the want of some object for their affections, in a word, to go through life sighing and pining for what they have not, and cannot have, and to die poor, miserable, broken-hearted things. Poor Madame Dudevant, we doubt not that thou hast suffered much, and that thou hast faithfully unfolded to us much of thy own painful experience, for which we are duly grateful. We can easily believe all the sentimental tortures, thou so eloquently and pathetically settest forth as endured by thy sex, are really endured by them. But after all, my dear Madame, a few hours each day of employment in the labors performed by thy cook or chamber-maid, with a simpler diet, would improve thy digestion, and save thee from the greater part of them. *Ma chère amie*, have you ever reflected how much the digestion has to do with these sentimental tortures? The lady, who should be compelled to live on six pence a day, and to earn it by bodily labor, would keep clear of them all. It is idleness, luxury, refinement, that produce them; and the best way to cure them would not be to sue out a divorce from thy husband, but to dismiss thy servants,

and do thyself the labor of thy own house-keeping. Nay, do not frown, and turn away in disgust. Thou hast no conception how it will improve the temper and manners of this brute of a husband, to sit down to a dinner of thy own cooking. Penelope kept off the suitors, and herself faithful to her lord, by keeping herself constantly at the loom.

Seriously, we think it is time that some one venture to contradict this nonsense becoming so fashionable, about the hard fate of woman, representing her as the slave of man's passions, and the victim of his tyranny, — a poor, frail, sensitive being, that finds earth to her nothing but a vale of tears, and domestic life, for which she is so well fitted, but a sort of hell in miniature. We do not believe a word of all this. Here and there a husband may be found, no doubt, who is disposed to tyrannize, and who does abuse his wife; but as a general rule, man has no such disposition. Wives, no doubt, suffer in many instances from the temper of their husbands, but husbands sometimes suffer from their wives; but they have the self-respect, for the most part, to suffer in silence. We see no reason for thinking that the lot of woman is one of peculiar hardship. The principal evil, to which she seems to us exposed, is idleness, brought about in consequence of the changes which have been effected in the forms of our industry.

Moreover, we believe, that much of this which is said about woman's exquisite sensibility is sheer nonsense. The great relief from the ills of life is employment, in a word, work. Man was made to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and when he does not, he suffers. The changes which have been introduced into society, imposing less active duties than formerly on the women of the easy classes, have given to these women ample time and opportunity to experience the sentimental sufferings, which necessarily spring from comparative idleness and luxury. There is, no doubt, then, much real suffering in these classes. But we have yet to be convinced, that woman is so organized as to be susceptible of acuter sufferings than man. For our

part, we believe the reverse, if there be any difference, is the fact. Man is more angular, has more elbows to be struck, and a more irritable temperament. Women submit to pain more readily than men, not, we apprehend, because they have more power of endurance, but because they actually suffer less than men in similar circumstances. If we pass from physical to mental sufferings, we believe it is the same. Man can love as deeply, as truly, and as tenderly as woman, and he feels, we apprehend, not less acutely than woman the pang of unrequited or disappointed affection. He, however, bears up against it, because it is not manly to give way to it. We fancy the husband, who has been disappointed in his wife, who finds that between him and her there is nothing of that compatibility of temper, oneness of feeling, and ready sympathy, he had anticipated, suffers no less than the wife, on making the same discovery. And then for remedy, — the wife has as many resources as the husband ; for she may employ herself as well as he ; and when she becomes a mother, she finds, in the pleasures of maternal affection, ample amends for the want of the conjugal. In the love of her children, she has even a resource which the husband has not, or at least only to a feeble extent. He, it may be said, can take an active part in politics, in the Church, in the world, in chasing ambition or wealth, and thus find wherewithal to fill up the vacuum in his heart. So may the wife take an active part in house-keeping, in superintending her domestic arrangements, in educating her children, and solacing the afflicted. There is as ample room for her activity, as for his.

Nor can we go along with our sentimental reformers, in looking to divorce as a remedy for the evils they find in married life. Married life unquestionably is not that perfect paradise, which the brilliant fancies of the young couple, who for the first time tell to each other their mutual love, have painted it ; and most wisely ordered is it, that it should not be. The life of man in this world is destined to be one of toil and struggle. Man is born to work. If marriage, then, realized that

Claude Lorrain dream of youth, if it brought us, without interruption, that exquisite delight and perfect satisfaction, which the inexperienced expect from it, we should find it impossible to make the necessary efforts to sustain life, to perform our part in the world ; and marriage would be only a sort of euthanasia. A little uneasiness, some little want, is necessary, to compel each to work ; for love, when perfect, though very desirable and very pleasant, is after all a little too absorbing. We do not think it, then, an evil, that married life is not a life of perfect bliss.

But even were it so, divorce would be the worst possible remedy, save in very rare cases. The truth is, we have more power to control and regulate our feelings, than modern philosophy admits. Idleness and indulgence are the principal causes of our inability to control our sentiments. Constant employment, and constant effort at self-mastery will work miracles for us. The parties, who find themselves not so well matched as they expected to be, then, may get over the difficulty, if they will make the effort. They can conform one to the other, and come to harmonize tolerably well. It is a bad doctrine in morals, this, that our feelings are altogether beyond our control. We can, if we will do our best, bring our feelings to go hand in hand with what we believe to be our duty.

Then again, we protest against the lawfulness of divorce. Marriage by its own nature is absolutely indissoluble. When a couple enter into the marriage relation, they do it for life ; they understand it, and they mean it for life. If they entered it with any reservation, with an understanding that it was to continue only for a period, only so long as it should be mutually agreeable to themselves, they would not look upon it as marriage ; it would want, in their eyes, the character of sanctity, and would be not at all distinguishable from a mere transient commerce of passion and caprice. Divorce, then, can never be claimed by the parties themselves, as a matter of justice, can never be granted, merely on the ground of the mutual consent of the parties con-

cerned ; and can be tolerated only in those rare cases, which justify the exercise of mercy on the part of the lawgiver ; when the lawgiver may arrest the ordinary course of the law, through compassion to one of the parties, grossly wronged or offended by the other, or to prevent a greater moral and social evil. It can be properly granted only by the special act of the lawmaking power. Consequently, it will be wholly impossible to grant that freedom of divorce, contended for by reformers on this subject, without abandoning the marriage institution altogether. But even if divorce were lawful, and marriage were dissoluble at the will of one party, or of both parties, it would bring woman very little relief. The passions or the sentiments, which would crave a divorce, would rarely be able to find the satisfaction demanded. The cause of the suffering complained of is not, after all, so much the result of the incompatibility of the parties, as we sometimes suppose. It is inherent in one or both of the parties, and would be not less active, as a general rule, in any new relations one or the other might form.

So far as it concerns certain property relations, we think our laws might, and should be modified in favor of woman. In a commonwealth like ours, where so much attention is paid to female cultivation, where there is a constantly increasing excess of females, and consequently where a large number must inevitably remain single through life, women's facilities for acquiring, holding, transferring, or disposing of property, should approach as near as possible to those of the other sex. But beyond these, we see no special occasion to clamor for woman's rights, or any more ground to complain of man's wrongs to woman, than of woman's wrongs to man. Man is by no means generally disposed to tyrannize over woman ; and we do not believe that the instances, in which husbands love their wives, are so rare as is sometimes imagined. Man is more frequently woman's slave, than she is his. The cords with which she binds him may be finer, and apparently weaker than those with which he binds her ; but they are not

the less effectual. Through his susceptibility, through those very qualities in him, which it is contended by some that she alone possesses, she is able to do with him very much as she pleases ; and we have yet to learn, that she never exercises her power, save with moderation. Man, to say the least, is as weak before her, as she is before him ; and if she does not enjoy her rights as fully as he does his, the fault is no more his than hers.

As for this political equality, which some are claiming for woman, we have less and less sympathy with it every day. We formerly contended for it, and have preached and written in its defence. But we do not think woman would gain anything by its admission, at least, so long as we retain our present political organization. The peculiar temperament and genius of woman does not fit her to excel as a legislator, or as a judge. The only branch of government, in which she would acquit herself tolerably, would be the executive. She is a good administrator, and a keen judge of character, which would enable her to select faithful and competent agents. Nevertheless, were she to enter freely with us the political arena, she would soon compel us to forget her sex, and to treat her as a second or third rate man. We hope the time will never come when, in our intercourse with her, the difference of sex can be forgotten on either side. We have never yet known any good to come from attempts to obliterate the great landmarks of nature. We must therefore conclude with saying, that, upon the whole, we have no sympathy with the clamor about woman's rights ; no belief in the alleged fact, that she is universally the victim of that horrid brute, man ; or that she has any peculiar wrongs to be redressed. Life, no doubt, has its evils ; men and women both suffer, — the married and the unmarried, the divorced, and the undivorced, and suffer often, and long, and deeply ; but the remedy is not in pitting one sex against the other, but in laboring together with such mutual love and confidence as there may be, to remove those evils which are removable, and in aiding and encouraging each other to bear

with firmness, and without a murmur, what must be borne. The cure for these vague, sentimental sorrows, these pangs of disappointed or unrequited affections, and the horror of being wedded, a frail, delicate thing, all life, all love, all sensibility, to a coarse, unsympathizing husband, will not be found in reading sentimental novels, nor in indignant, though eloquent protests against all institutions, domestic or social; but in a firm resolve to do one's duty, in active employment in some useful calling, and in unremitted efforts to lighten the burdens, and solace the afflictions of our brethren. No small portion of our misery springs from our love of it, and fear of losing it. We hug it to our bosoms, we cherish it, lavish on it the fondest caresses, and cannot be persuaded to let it go. If at any moment it seems to be escaping us, we are alarmed, and like the Countess in one of Dumas' Plays, not a little grieved to find ourselves on the point of being — happy!

As society advances in wealth and artificial refinement, as the numbers of those who find themselves in easy circumstances increase, the more decided must be the tendency to these sentimental sufferings, and the more general this ill-at-ease of which we hear and experience so much. Naturally, then, will it find more and more expression in our literature. This is unquestionably an evil, and an evil which has been greatly exaggerated of late, by the large accessions which have been made to the number of female writers. Women are at this moment gaining almost a monopoly of our literature; they have suddenly stepped forth from the retired apartments of domestic life, to lay open before us their feelings, fancies, and caprices. The result is the inundation of the land with a flood of sentimentality.

But after all, this evil is of short duration, and one which will cure itself. Woman wants what may be termed productive genius; but she excels as a critic. She has a finer, and in most matters a more correct taste than man. Her powers of execution are not equal to her judgment. Her own productions will

never satisfy herself. Nor will she be satisfied with productions by the other sex possessing characteristics similar to those of her own. Woman is herself always more or less sentimental, and sentimentalism will always characterize her productions ; but she detests mere sentimentalism in man. He, who would commend himself to woman, must indeed possess deep and genuine feeling, real tenderness and delicacy of sentiment, but he must not sigh and shed tears ; he must not whimper ; he must be robust, bold, vigorous, energetic, in one word, **MANLY**. Those dapper little gentlemen, who talk sentiment, or write verses in albums, and who are really fit only to stand behind the counter and sell tape by the half or quarter yard, are never the men, who can gain the approbation or the affections of a genuine woman. She demands always the genuine man. No matter if his arm is brawney, his frame somewhat huge, and his manners unrefined, if there be at bottom a true man with a bold spirit, a brave heart, and an heroic soul.

Now these qualities, which woman demands in man, she requires him always to express in his literature ; and it will ere long be discovered, that as soon as the novelty of being herself an author passes off, she will tolerate no literature that is not strong and manly, giving expression to bold and energetic feelings, to brave thoughts, and high aspirings. The sickliness of her own productions she will not tolerate for a moment, in those of the other sex. The growing literary influence of woman, which now swells the flood of sentimentality, will ultimately tend to make our literature more robust and healthy. And as men must study to be as unlike women as possible, in their characters, in order to please them, their natural desire to please them will make them, as authors, study to be strong, healthy, and unsentimental. In this way literature will recover its tone, and in turn contribute to the health of society.

But we have rambled so far from our subject, that it is now too late to return to it. George Sand, upon the



whole, though a woman, is to us the most pleasing and the most inspiring of the modern authors of popular French literature. She has great purity of feeling, great depth and delicacy of sentiment, and rare beauty and strength of expression. If she exposes vice, or the defects of existing domestic or social arrangements, it is never in mere wantonness. You feel always that you are reading the utterances of an earnest spirit, always and everywhere aspiring to something better. You feel the unrest in which she is, and from which she tries to escape, and you honor her as a brave and struggling spirit, who would be better, do better, and make the world better, all men and women happier and lovelier, if she could. But you feel all the while, that she is out of health, that the tone of her feelings is diseased; and you are unable to rise from the perusal of one of her works, cheered and invigorated for the combat of life. O sing us, my dear lady, a livelier strain; do not oppress us ever with that monotonous wail of the soul, seeking in vain to solve the problem of its own destiny. Enough of those melancholy notes. Sing us a song of gladness; if you cannot, sing us a bold war song, and send us forth ready to do valiant battle against the enemies of our peace and virtue.

Spiridion, the work named at the head of this article, is properly a religious work, written with the same purpose that we had in writing *Charles Elwood*, or the *Infidel Converted*. It details the experience of an ingenuous mind, in its progress through the several stages of doubt, unbelief, to absolute infidelity, and from that depth of horror and desolation, up to something like faith in God and immortality. The conclusion to which she arrives, the solution she offers of the enigma of existence, is worthy of study, as marking the tendency of religious speculation among the popular writers in France, and more especially as showing the growing influence of the doctrines of *l'Ecole de Saint-Simonienne*. We intended to notice this solution at length; but we have left ourselves no room. We, however, recommend the book to all who are capa-

ble of appreciating fine writing, of sympathizing with free thought, and liberal feeling. We consider it a very remarkable book, a book not without a deep significance. It is worthy of a place in Mr. Ripley's series of *Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature*. We have never read a book on religious subjects, that contained so many passages, which seemed to be perfect transcripts from our own experience.

EDITOR.

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## ART. VI. LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

*Twice-Told Tales.* By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston: James Munroe and Co. 1842. 2 vols. 16mo. — These volumes are not introduced for the purpose of being criticised, for their author, in his own department, is one of those very few men, born to give law to criticism, not to receive the law from it; nor are they introduced for the sake of being commended to the public, for they are already well known; and no lover of American literature can be presumed to be ignorant of them. We notice them simply, to tell the author that these *Tales*, excellent as they are, are not precisely what he owes to his country. In them he has done much, and shown us that he can do more. He is a genuine artist. His mind is creative; more so than that of any other American writer that has yet appeared, with the exception, perhaps, of Washington Irving. He has wit, humor, pathos, in abundance; an eye for all that is wild, beautiful, or picturesque in nature; a generous sympathy with all forms of life, thought, and feeling, and warm, deep, unfailing love of his race. He has withal a vigorous intellect, and a serene and healthy spirit. He is gentle, but robust and manly; full of tenderness, but never maudlin. Through all his writings there runs a pure and living stream of manly thought and feeling, which characterizes always the true man, the Christian, the republican, and the patriot. He may be, if he tries, with several improvements, to the literature of his country, all that Boz is to that of England. He possesses a higher order of intellect and genius than Boz, stronger, and purer. He has more earnestness. The creator of "The gentle Boy" compares advantageously with the creator of "Little Nell." The Gentle Boy is indeed but a sketch; yet a sketch that betrays in every stroke the hand of the master; and we think, it required a much higher order of genius to conceive it, so gentle, so sweet, so calm, so full of life, of love,

than it did to conceive the character of Little Nell, confessedly the most beautiful of Dickens's creations.

But we have no room for remarks. We have wished merely to enrol ourselves among those, who regard Mr. Hawthorne as fitted to stand at the head of American Literature. We see the pledge of this in his modesty, in his simplicity, and in his sympathy with all that is young, fresh, childlike; and above all in his originality, and pure, deep feeling of nationality. We pray him to remember that, while we approve his love of children, and admire much the books he has sent out for them, we do not forget that he is capable of writing for men, for all ages; and we ask him to attempt a higher and a bolder strain than he has thus far done. To those, if such there are, who have not read these Twice-Told Tales, we recommend them as being two as pleasant volumes to read, as pure and as healthy in their influence, as any two that can be found in the compass of our literature.

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*The Ideal Man. A conversation between Two Friends, upon the Beautiful, the Good, and the True, as manifested in actual Life.* By a Philokalist. Boston: E. P. Peabody. 1842. 12mo. pp. 160. — The title of this book is long and unpromising; the pages also are broad, and have a heavy and forbidding look; there is nothing in the style or matter that suddenly arrests the attention of him who is listlessly turning over its leaves; and almost every one will be disposed, after a hasty glance, to throw it down, with the feeling that, though it may be a very good book, it must be also a very dull one. And yet this judgment would be altogether wrong. We have found the book quite readable, and have been favorably impressed with the author's goodness of heart, seriousness of purpose, and general literary ability. We will not claim for the book uncommon brilliancy, or great originality, but we have noted several of its passages which are very felicitous, striking as to thought, and beautiful in manner. When we consider that the author is a foreigner, and writing in a foreign tongue, we are struck with the general purity, freedom, and flexibility of his language. The author is an exile in this country, from his home, his native land, the unhappy Poland. We hope our countrymen will make him regret his exile as little as possible. He has decidedly a literary turn of mind, a free spirit, and a warm heart; and they will find themselves well repaid for encouraging his literary enterprises.

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*Psychology, or Elements of a New System of Mental Philosophy, on the basis of Consciousness and Common Sense. Designed for Colleges and Academies.* By S. S. SCHMUCKER, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology, in the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, (Pa). New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1842. 12mo. pp. 227. — We have only this moment received this volume, and have had time barely to glance at some few of its pages. We have, however, read enough in it to satisfy ourselves that, notwithstanding it issues from the

press of the Messrs. Harper, it has very considerable merits. The author has evidently bestowed much time and pains in the investigation of metaphysical subjects, and not altogether without success. What important discoveries he has made, which entitle him to call his system "new," we have not yet ascertained; but we like his general classification of the mental phenomena. He rejects the usual classification of English philosophy, modifies that of the German, and virtually accepts, without acknowledgment, that of Cousin. He divides the mental phenomena into 1. Cognitive Ideas; 2. Sentient Ideas; 3. Active Operations. Cousin's classification is, 1. Sensations; 2. Cognitions; 3. Actions, voluntary and spontaneous. The two classifications are, then, virtually the same.

Mr. Schmucker bases his classification on the operations of the mind, not on the faculties or powers of the mind, because, as he says, we know nothing of mind in itself. But we know mind, so far as it enters into its phenomena. If among these phenomena we find cognitions, we have a right to affirm that the mind has the power or faculty of knowing; if we find sensations, or "sentient ideas," we have a right to infer that the soul has the power or faculty to feel; and so on. In strictness, we believe it more scientific to found the classification on the powers or faculties of the soul, than on the observable differences of the phenomena themselves. However, this is a slight matter. In the next place, Mr. Schmucker deserves praise for enlarging the third division, so as to embrace the whole activity of the soul. The Germans include in this division only volitions; but volitions are merely those of our actions which are performed with consciousness; but I act just as much when I raise my arm unconsciously, as when I raise it consciously.

But we must object to the author, that he calls our mental phenomena *ideas*, in the sense in which Locke uses the term, thus laying again the foundation for the theory which Reid spent so much time in overthrowing. The mind is immediately conversant, not with certain ideas or mental representations of objects, but with the objects themselves. What Mr. Schmucker means by ideas is best expressed by the word notion; and is termed by Cousin very properly the *form* of the thought. In consequence of his view of ideas, the author is unable to get from the subjective world to the objective. He really can make out scientifically the existence of no world besides my own internal world. He himself virtually admits this. We converse not, he says, with objective entities themselves, but with certain ideas or mental representations of them. These mental representations are, then, all that we can know. How will he show that there must needs be an objective reality, or entity, to answer to this mental representation? He nowhere shows, so far as we have seen, what we conceive to be the great discovery of modern metaphysics, that this mental representation, as he calls it, is merely the relation of the thinker and the object thought in the fact of consciousness, and is the notion which the mind forms, in the act of thinking, of the subject and object, and can never be formed, save when both subject and object are taken into view by the subject thinking.

Moreover, Mr. Schmucker, in making this classification which he does of the mental phenomena, appears to us to forget, that there are in real life no pure cognitions, no pure sentient ideas, no pure active operations. The mind is a unity, and manifests itself always as a unity; but as a unity existing in triplicity. Every phenomenon of the soul is cognition, and sentiment, and action at once. This analysis which we make is fatal to all true philosophy. We must take thought, not as analysed, but in its primitive synthesis, as the basis of our systems. We remark also, that the author is very far from perceiving the precise nature of what is termed consciousness, and is somewhat misled by the Scottish School, which has treated consciousness, of which it makes great use, *not* with rare sagacity. We refer, the reader for our view of it, to the first article in the present number.

Several more criticisms we could offer on even the few pages we have read, but we forbear. While we are far from believing that the work merits to be regarded as a standard work for schools and colleges, we think it still worthy of being studied. The author is a man of ability, of a free mind, and of an earnest purpose; and he writes with great ease and perspicuity. This style, bating his terminology, is very suitable to a work of this kind. Upon the whole, we are gratified to meet with the work, if for no other reason, at least as indicating a growing interest in metaphysical subjects.

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*Psychology, or a View of the Human Soul: including Anthropology. Adapted for the use of colleges.* By the Rev. FREDERICK A. RAUCH, D.D., late President of Marshall College, Penn. Second edition, revised and improved. New-York: M. W. Dodd; Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1841. — The first edition of this work did not meet our eye, and we knew not of the existence of such a work, till the appearance of this second edition. It is by a very worthy German, now no more, who was obliged to leave his own country, in consequence of entertaining liberal political opinions. It is a work of more than ordinary pretension, and of even more than ordinary merit. It is much superior in learning, ability, and the justness of its views, to the work of Mr. Schmucker. As we intend to return to it soon, and to give it an elaborate examination, we content ourselves now with merely commending it to our readers, as one of the very best philosophical works ever published in the country, and one which, if it does not always teach the truth, rarely, if ever, teaches falsehood. The author is, from beginning to end, on the very verge of discovering the basis of what we regard as the true system of philosophy for our epoch. His style is diffuse, but his expression is hearty, and rarely inelegant, and often very beautiful. His general method of handling his subject is worthy of praise, and very remarkable in a German.

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*Lectures to Ladies, on Anatomy and Physiology.* By Mrs. MARY S. GOVE. Boston: Saxton & Pierce. 1842. 16mo. pp. 300. — The only fault we have to find with this book is with the title, that it reads *Lectures to Ladies*, instead of *Lectures to Women*. Woman is a better and a higher term than Lady. Ladies are sometimes very weak and disagreeable. Women are always deserving of honor and respect from

every manly heart. Mrs. Gove has here treated an important subject in a delicate and agreeable manner. She deserves great credit for doing what she can to call the attention of her sex to the importance of physical education. She is, so far as we can judge, in general just in her views, and correct in her information. She has ventured to treat some matters, on which many have thought it most prudent to be silent; but while we have been keeping silence, the evil has been growing; and we know no reason in the world, why we should not struggle to save the community from the deplorable effects of pollution, and especially self-pollution, which extends far, and is practised by those whose moral principles would recoil with horror from what Mrs. Gove calls *social* licentiousness. Masturbation does more than any other cause, perhaps than all other causes combined, to people our lunatic asylums; and sincerely do we thank Mrs. Gove for daring, in our falsely delicate society, to raise her warning voice, which she has done, and in tones which can offend nobody.

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*Lectures on Agricultural Chemistry and Geology.* By J. F. W. JOHNSTON, M.A., F.R.SS. L. & E., &c. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842. 12mo. pp. 255 and 40.—The importance of introducing more and more science into the culture of the earth, of making our farming operations more scientific, is every day becoming more and more widely felt. This is well. But we are anxious to see our own farmers trying experiments, and works for their aid should be written in this country, founded on experiments made upon our own soils, and in our own climate. Works by foreigners, written for a country widely different in the character of its soils, and the temperature of the climate, or in its atmospheric changes, must always be taken with due allowance. These Lectures, however, by Mr. Johnston, of which the volume before us comprises the first part, we should think, might be studied with advantage by all our farmers. This volume would make a good introduction to the one by Dr. Liebig, noticed in a previous number of this journal.

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*War and Peace: the evils of the first, and a plan for preserving the last.* By WILLIAM JAY. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842. 12mo. pp. 101.—A book possibly written by a well-meaning man, for a praiseworthy object; but by a man who, if he believe in his own nostrums, is much better fitted for the moon than for the earth. Nobody questions the evils of war; but there are greater evils. It is better to fight, to kill or be killed on the battle-field, than to live and die a slave. He, who will not fight for freedom, for justice, country, humanity, in words, and in deeds too, should be banished from society; and if, when his country is threatened with a war, and has need of the whole martial support of her citizens, he came forward to prate of the evils of war, and the blessings of peace, why, up with him to the lamp-post. His *philanthropy* makes him a traitor. Wars will not cease till men become good Christians; and till they cease, men cannot be good Christians without now and then doing battle for justice, for country, or for humanity. War is one of the rights of humanity.

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*Ancient Greece.* From the German of ARNOLD H. L. HEEREN. By GEORGE BANCROFT. Second American edition. Boston: Little & Brown. 1842. 8vo. pp. 344.—The character of this book is told, when

we mention the names of its author and translator. The original work is one of great merit, and the translation is all that could be desired. The translation by Mr. Bancroft, we believe, has been republished two or three times in England, and without acknowledgment. It is adopted as a text book in Cambridge University.

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*Chapters on Churchyards.* By CAROLINE SOUTHEY, (Miss BOWLES,) Authoress of *Solitary Hours*, &c. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842. 12mo. pp. 322.—A very pleasant book on a grave subject, we are told by those who profess to have read it.

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*An offering of Sympathy to the Afflicted; especially to parents bereaved of their children. Being a collection from manuscripts never before published. With an appendix of extracts from various authors.* By FRANCIS PARKMAN. Third edition. Boston: James Munroe & Co. London: John Green. 1842. 16mo. pp. 270.—This is a valuable little work. Man in this world is ever in need of solace. He, who has the greatest power to sympathize with him, to soothe his sorrows, and lighten his afflictions, is his best friend. Dr. Parkman has here prepared a volume, which may indeed be regarded as an offering of sympathy.

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*Primer of Reading and Drawing.* By MARY T. PEABODY. Boston: E. P. Peabody. 1841.—From the examination we have made of this book, we believe it admirably adapted to its purpose, and worthy to have a place in all our primary schools. It is on a plan somewhat novel, but one that will finally commend itself to all who are instructors of children.

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*Key to the French Language.* By J. A. WELSH. Boston: E. P. Peabody. 1842.—This little book, in the compass of 210 pages, gives a complete grammar of the French language, with a sufficient number of exercises. It has singular merits. It does not contain a superfluous word; and what it does contain, is just the answer of the questions learners ask. We understand its author prepared it with primary reference to his own teaching, and it confirms his title to the reputation of being one of the very best teachers of the language. We understand he has lately come into this vicinity, and this is the certificate he offers. It is certainly most satisfactory. The book has another advantage; it is the cheapest French grammar offered for sale.

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*Ollendorf's German Grammar.* Frankfort-on-the-Maine. 1840. 12mo. pp. 436.—This grammar is the production, also, of a practised and practical teacher. It is the very best manual for the acquisition of a foreign language we have ever known; and we are glad that by a large importation of it, at a moderate price, one of our Boston booksellers, E. P. Peabody, has put it in every person's power to learn German without an instructor. At the same time, the book is a capital one for a school, enabling the teacher to instruct a large class at once, and in the best manner, the ear being brought to bear upon the memory of the words. A solitary student will find himself, also, much aided, by compelling himself to study the lessons aloud. When this is done, the exercises hardly need to be written.

THE  
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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JULY, 1842.

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ART. I. — *De l'Humanité de son Principe, et de son Avenir, où se trouve exposée la vraie définition de la Religion ; et où l'on se explique le sens, la suite, et l'enchaînement du Mosaïsme et du Christianisme.* Par PIERRE LEROUX. Paris : Perotin, 1840. 2 tomes. 8vo. pp. 1008.

MR. LEROUX, though but recently known in this country, has for some time held a very high rank among the literary and scientific men of France, and indeed of Europe. He first distinguished himself, we believe, by his contributions to the *Revue Encyclopédique*, which was in its day one of the ablest, if not the very ablest, of European periodicals. He is now one of the principal conductors of the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*, a philosophical, scientific, literary, and industrial Dictionary, intended to render an exact account of the present state of human knowledge ; a work which owes much of its value and distinctive character to his contributions ; and which, judging from the names of those engaged in it, must be a work of no ordinary scientific and literary merit, and proper to be consulted as an authentic record of the doctrines and aspirations of "la jeune France."

We can claim no great familiarity with the writings



of Mr. Leroux, having read but two or three of his productions ; but from what we do know of him, we feel warranted in saying that he is one of the most remarkable men of our times. He possesses talents of a very high order, various and profound learning, rare philosophical insight, and rich poetic fervor. Few men can read him without being warmed and instructed. He is a true lover of his race, a firm friend of liberty and equality, and a bold champion of social and religious progress. He is a democrat in the highest, as well as the lowest, sense of the word. He is no mere speculative philosopher. He is sincere, deeply, almost terribly, in earnest ; and sometimes he speaks to us in the thrilling tones of the prophet, and makes us tremble before the awfulness of the preacher. He evidently regards himself as a man of destiny, to whom God has given a work to do, and he aspires to be the founder of a school, if not even of a religion, — the school, if not the religion, of HUMANITY.

At bottom, however, Mr. Leroux belongs to, and continues the school of Saint-Simon, though in some instances modifying, and in others, rejecting its teachings. This in the minds of many of our countrymen will not tell to his advantage. Saint-Simonism is not in the best possible odor, and perhaps because it is so little understood. The Saint-Simonian School was a great school, and may be justly regarded as one of the profoundest and richest schools to which the race has given birth. Saint-Simon is worthy to be mentioned with Pythagoras and Plato, Saint Augustine, Descartes, and Leibnitz. He was one of those providential men, whom God raises up, at distant intervals in the world's history, specially endows, and sends among us to disclose a loftier Ideal, and to initiate us into a higher order of life. Saint-Simon will be to the church of the future, very nearly what Saint Augustine has been to the Church of the past. He has been in our day the truest interpreter of the thought of Jesus, the first since Jesus, to comprehend the social character of the new Covenant, which God has made with

man, to reinstate, if we may so speak, humanity in its rights, and to give it in our systems of religion its due place and influence. Christianity may now become, what in the Augustine "City of God" it was but imperfectly, the RELIGION OF HUMANITY, and without losing for that its character of the RELIGION OF GOD.

Of course, we have no sympathy with the follies and extravagances of the Saint-Simonians; nor with their mistake of confounding Christianity with the Catholic Church; nor with their substitution of immortality in humanity for immortality as individual men and women; nor with certain pantheistic tendencies which they have not escaped, but which are in fact no necessary elements of the school. There was an original vice somewhere when they passed from a school to a sect. During the life and influence of Bazard, one of the most distinguished men they were ever able to claim, a man of large intelligence and much practical sagacity, they advanced with great rapidity, and threatened to become the dominant party in France. Bazard was a salutary restraint upon the bolder, profounder, more religious, but impracticable *Enfantin*, and prevented the school from breaking entirely with the existing social organization. But after, in a fit of disgust, or discouragement, he had foolishly and impiously shot himself, all went wrong with the Saint-Simonians, and their meetings were soon suppressed by the strong arm of civil power. As an outward, visible society, the school or sect is, we believe, no longer extant. *Père Enfantin*, at the last advices, was in the service of *Mehemet-Ali*; and the twelve apostles that went even to the gates of the harem of the Grand Turk, in search of a woman worthy to become the *Mère Suprême*, have returned, reported their ill success, and vanished in thin air; yet the school is not dead, nor will it speedily die. The more we penetrate its spirit, the more are we struck with its inherent vitality. Its doctrines, in a modified form, freed from the extravagances and technicalities of the sect, are the only doctrines really making any progress in

Europe, or even in this country. Its pantheistic tendencies must be abandoned, its dreams of an hierarchical organization of the race must be indefinitely postponed; but its fundamental principles, as modified by time and inquiry, will rule the future, and justify the confidence expressed by their early expositors.

“Our doctrines,—we doubt it not,—will rule the future more completely than the beliefs of antiquity ruled their respective epochs,—more completely even than Catholicism ruled the middle ages. More powerful than its predecessors, it will extend its beneficent action over all quarters of the globe. Its appearance will no doubt excite a deep repugnance; its propagation will no doubt encounter numerous obstacles; but we are prepared to overcome the repugnance, and we are sure, that sooner or later the obstacles will be removed; for triumph is certain when one marches with humanity, and it is in no one’s power to withdraw himself from the law of his improvement.”

Saint-Simonism, regarded in its elements, its fundamental principles, is at present the true *Weltgeist*, the real spirit of the age. Men hit upon it without knowing it, and advocate its doctrines without knowing or suspecting their origin. In this fact, we may read the evidence of its soundness, of its adaptation to the wants of our epoch, and of its future destiny.

Saint-Simonism is superior to all its rival schools in the fact, that it has an Ideal, and therefore is not merely speculative. The Hegelian school is erudite and profound; and, though we are far from pretending to an intimate acquaintance with it, we know enough of it to know that it contains a large share of truth; but it is merely speculative; it proposes no Ideal, does not prophesy, does not legislate for the future. The French Eclectic school, founded by Mr. Cousin, is an admirable school, a great school, rich in learning and original psychological researches, earnest, sincere, explaining with great truth and clearness the past and the present; but it is dumb before the future. To the questions, what has been? what is? it is prompt with an answer, and an answer which is by no means to be despised; but to the question, what *ought* to be? it has no answer. It has no Ideal. It cannot tell what we must

do in order to inherit eternal life. It is therefore sufficient only for those rare individuals, who are satisfied with themselves and with men and things as they are; who aspire to nothing better, holier, wiser, or more beautiful; who are contented merely to speculate as amateurs on the past and the present. But these individuals, however estimable they may be, and however admirable or desirable may be their cool, philosophical indifference, which converts them, to use the language of a popular preacher, "into statues of tranquillity, with forefinger pointing to heaven," towards which they move not, are far from constituting the bulk of mankind. Humanity is no mere amateur. It is terribly in earnest. It is with it always a matter of life and death. It cannot be satisfied with mere dilettantism. It does not, cannot feel itself here merely to speculate on its appearance in time and space, and on what passes round about and within it. It feels itself here to act, to live; and it demands a practical philosophy, a RELIGION, able and prompt to answer the ever recurring and tormenting question, What shall I do to be saved?

Humanity lives only on condition that it aspires, and it aspires only on condition that it has an Ideal. Prophets and messiahs redeem and sanctify the race by giving it new and loftier Ideals. The true Ideal of Humanity is no doubt intrinsically, eternally, and universally the same, though it enlarges ever in proportion as the race advances, and therefore seems to be always changing. In seeking, in laboring to realize this Ideal, humanity finds its life. **THIS IS ITS LIFE.** The Jews lived only so far as they succeeded in realizing the Ideal which Moses gave them. Jesus enlarged and generalized the Ideal of Moses, translated it out of Judaism into humanity, and therefore of Jews and Gentiles made one; and this enlarged and generalized Ideal the race, since his coming, have been laboring to realize. So far forth as we have realized it, we have lived a true life, and a life in some sense, nay, literally derived from Jesus, who in giving us this Ideal, which,

by his intimate relation with God, he had himself realized, and making us aspire to its realization, has become the father of the new age, the life of the world, the redeemer, and the sanctifier of Humanity.

The Ideal of Jesus has never, in its fulness and beauty, been the Ideal of the race. The Church has embraced his Ideal as interpreted by Saint Augustine, with which it was content, till the times of Martin Luther and John Calvin. Since then it has been seeking an Ideal, rather than the realization of an Ideal; and hence its apparent want of faith, and the critical and atheistical tendencies of modern society. None of the philosophers have given us any substitute for the Christian Ideal, as interpreted by Saint Augustine. The devout have continued as before to seek the City of God, as conceived by him, not as conceived by Jesus, and interpreted by Saint Paul and Saint John. Many of them have not even felt the necessity of an Ideal; some, however, have sought it; Descartes, Bacon, Leibnitz, Price, Lessing, Herder, Condorcet, and a few others have caught glimpses of it; but Saint-Simon has been the first, since Saint Paul, to give it an adequate formula. He, paraphrasing the answer of Jesus, has been able to reply to the question asked by young and eager Humanity, "Good Master, what good thing shall I do to inherit eternal life?" "Love thyself in thy neighbor, and do thy utmost so to organize society, as to effect in the speediest manner possible the moral, intellectual, and physical amelioration of the poorest and most numerous class of thy brethren."

Saint-Simonism does not, then, content itself with mere speculation on the past and the present. It surveys them indeed, for it is erudite and observing, grateful, no less than hopeful; but it does it in a deep, earnest, *religious* spirit, for the purpose of throwing light on the future, and of determining the end towards which individuals and nations should direct their labors. It aspires to be a religion; that is, to legislate, to impose the law, not merely by telling what has been, and what is, with which most schools content themselves, but by telling what ought to be.

The Saint-Simonian City of God, no doubt, differs from the Augustine; but we have not been able to perceive any discrepancy between its Ideal and that of Jesus, as interpreted by Saint John and Saint Paul. We do not find that Saint-Simon considered his Ideal repugnant to the Christian. In his secret thought he was a disciple of Jesus, as must be every full grown man brought up in the bosom of Christian civilization; and in calling his system *Nouveau Christianisme*, he did not mean to intimate that it was new in relation to the Christianity of Christ, but in relation to the Christianity enjoined and realized by the Augustine Church. His followers have not always been careful to mark the distinction between the Christianity of Christ and the Christianity of the Church, and hence the source of their most fatal errors; but the Ideal of their Master was implicitly at least in the teachings of Jesus, and explicitly in the philosophic commentaries by Saint Paul. The Church, however, seeking the Augustine City of God, instead of the Pauline, has failed to perceive the important fact, that though humanity is indeed actualized, — lives only in individual men and women, it has nevertheless a being, development, and growth of its own, as a race; and individual men and women have no real existence but in their union with it. There is in the Augustine City of God no clear, distinct recognition of the unity of individuals in the race. There is no humanity, no unity of individuals in a one human life, running through them, and identical in them all. Individuals are not members of one and the same indissoluble body; or if so, it is in a sense which tends to absorb man in God, virtually annihilating him, as may be seen in the pantheistic tendency of the Augustine Church, as interpreted by Luther and Calvin. These last, in what are now called the doctrines of Calvinism, though no more Calvinism than Lutheranism, have a perpetual tendency to lose the individual in God. Man is nothing before God, has no power, no agency, no virtue of his own. If, on the other hand, an effort is made to save man, the

Church runs into pure INDIVIDUALISM, asserting the reality of individual men and women, but denying the existence of humanity, without which individuals would be as if they were not ; nay, would not be at all. But breaking the unity of the race, the Church has isolated individuals from humanity, and conceived them, in the sense they are human, to exist as individuals, and individuals only. It recognises then men and women, but no MAN, no Adam, as in the beginning, male and female. Now the salvation the Church can seek, with this view, can be only the salvation of individuals, mere isolated individuals. Its efforts, therefore, are not to redeem humanity, and save individuals in the race, by leading them back to unity, and making them one in the bosom of humanity, as Christ was one with the Father, but to save these isolated individuals, which, *as isolated* individuals, have no existence at all ; for individuals always have their being in the species, and through the species in God.

In consequence of this error on the part of the Augustine Church, the Ideal of Christianity has necessarily been interpreted to be the improvement of mere individual men and women. It has not been felt that Christ enjoined the improvement of man as well as of men, and of men only in so far as they are man, and because they are man. Yet Saint-Simon is right, and the Christian Ideal is rightly affirmed to be the indefinite progress of humanity, and of individual men and women in the bosom of humanity. This is what Saint Paul asserts, when he asserts that "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Indeed, notwithstanding what we have just alleged, the Church herself asserts the same, or would assert the same, if she but comprehended the profound significance of her own symbols. She has taught us that in Adam all men sinned, so that all men have become corrupt and guilty. But we could not sin in Adam as individuals, for as individuals we had no actual existence, and nothing can be more absurd than to make men responsible for acts in which they do not and can-

not participate. We sinned, and still continue to sin in Adam ; but not as individual men and women. We sinned and sin in him as the race, as humanity. The corruption is therefore rightly termed a corruption of humanity, of human nature ; and we partake of it only in so far as, and because we partake of human nature. It was the race, not individuals, that died in Adam, or individuals only as existing potentially, virtually, but not actually, in the race. So it is the race that is redeemed by Christ the Lord, termed by Saint Paul himself, the second Adam, come to repair the damage done by the first. As the fall was that of the race, otherwise it could not have implicated us, but have been merely the fall of two individuals, for which they alone would have been responsible ; so the redemption must be that of the race. Adam and Eve, eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, are humanity falling into sin, and dying a moral death ; Christ is humanity, for so may the Hebraism, Son of Man, be interpreted, rising from this moral death, from this grave of sin, and reascending to unity in God. The true Christian redemption is, then, that of humanity, and of individuals only so far forth as they exist in humanity, and because it is in them only that humanity lives and is actualized. The Church herself, then, virtually rejects the individualism she has countenanced. This individualism is repugnant not only to the deeper sense of the symbols of the Church, but to the whole spirit of Christianity. The Christian Ideal is not "*Suave qui peut*," but "love thy neighbor as thyself." It is not the regeneration and sanctification of individuals, as so many separate, independent forces, without mutual relation or *solidarity*, that it proposes, but the regeneration and sanctification of the species, of the race, by means of the new life which God, through his only begotten Son, Jesus, communicated to it. This new life was not actually communicated to all individuals, but it was communicated to the race, and through the race to all individuals *virtually*, because all exist virtually, in the race, and *actually* to all who commune with regenerate hu-



manity. Translate this doctrine of the redemption of the race, and of individuals only so far as they commune with redeemed humanity, into a doctrine of social and political life, and it becomes precisely the doctrine of social progress, for which Saint-Simon contends, and which he proposes as the true ideal of all who will live godly, inherit eternal life, or in other words, live a true life, conformable to the will of the Creator.

We have no time to pause on this doctrine of Saint-Simon, or rather this Saint-Simonian exposition of the Christian Ideal; but we cannot resist the temptation to translate and insert a fine passage from one of Saint-Simon's works now lying before us, addressed to the young men of France some seventeen years ago; but worthy to fetch even to-day an echo from the heart of more than one young man of America.

**"YOUNG MEN,** we are not ignorant of the anxiety which oppresses you. The events which have transpired in our country, and which have shaken society to its lowest foundations, have left deep wants in your souls, and caused you to dream of a justice and a beauty which you nowhere behold. Not in vain have you grown up amid the clashing of swords, and the beating of drums; that you live in the midst of soldiers who have become citizens, scarcely remembering that they have lately shaken the world; and that behind you is a glorious past, rich in men and deeds. No; such recollections cannot be fruitless. Through them you become rich in thoughts beyond your age, and capable of emotions and desires unknown to your fathers. Afflicted by the need of *an actual* literature, the books of the past century no longer speak to your hearts; you cease to comprehend them; and they who write them cease to comprehend you. Nothing can bring repose to your souls. The study of the physical sciences, cannot engross all your thoughts; the study of nature, moreover, makes you only the more anxious to obtain a morality, simple and positive like herself. History, which is now popularized for you, may indeed teach you to judge the past, but cannot content you with the present, or enable you to presage the future. Art assumes in your eyes a grave and touching character, and the greater part of those, who cultivate it, seem to you to be insensible to their high vocation. Of poetry you demand something else than verse; of music, something else than songs; of painting, something else than forms. In a word, you have from the present but one thought, an immense thought, around which clusters everything you value, a thought which has become your very life, **THAT OF A UNIVERSAL HAPPINESS, AND AN ILLIMITABLE PROGRESS.**

**"YOUNG MEN,** we march not without compass, and we will show you an end. The principles of literature and morality, of which we

are about to produce the application, will furnish your minds solid food, and your hearts a pure and elevated enjoyment ; for they afford an ample scope for all the generous sentiments of your nature. We aim to inspire man with confidence in himself, without which he becomes torpid, and a prey to selfishness, which at bottom is nothing but a mutual distrust of our strength. Whilst a thousand voices around you will not cease to exclaim, 'The world is in its dotage ;' we shall continue to reply, 'Believe them not ; the world is young.' Far from keeping you in that gloomy state, to which the weak and disappointed would doom the present, and which belongs only to sickness and old age, we will make you walk with your heads erect, and with that smile of security and hope which so well becomes the strong and healthy. With us, in a word, you shall have much of the future, and you shall find your souls rise, your imaginations enlarge and extend with the destinies of Man.

"THE AGE OF GOLD, WHICH A BLIND TRADITION HAS HITHERTO PLACED IN THE PAST, IS IN THE FUTURE ; and the future shall show itself henceforth to the nations, not as a breaker, but as a port. Hitherto men have always bequeathed their descendants the love and admiration of the past ; tortured by a craving for happiness of which they see no possibility on earth, they fancy it behind them, or in heaven. A prey to positive physical sufferings, or to vague sentimental sorrows, they console themselves with illusions. They say, man is born to trouble, that the time when he could enjoy is fled forever, and that there is now happiness for him only when he shall be no more. They dream of a golden age, when all men lived as brothers, united by the sweetest social ties ; when war was unknown ; when reigned love, innocence, open-heartedness ; when flowed streams of milk and honey, emblems of health and abundance. Thus does man ascribe to the weakness of infancy, what is peculiar to the strength of manhood, and fancy that he finds in the remotest past, what he dares not promise to the latest future. Strange illusion ! As if good could precede evil, truth be demonstrated before error, and strength display itself prior to weakness ! As if such an opinion were not hostile to morality, the organization of man, and the laws of nature ! But what could the nations do, when everything tended to hold them fast in this error, bequeathed them by their fathers ? When all that was intended to instruct them, or to charm them, repeated ever this same idea, and represented it under a thousand colors by all the resources of thought, and adorned it by all the graces of imagination ? when the vices of their institutions, although successively ameliorated, made them deplore the present, and despair of the future ? Moralists, instructors of the human race, have not comprehended their mission, have even been incapable of comprehending it. Instead of instructing, they have consoled. They have attained to only a single science, that of BEARING PAIN. They have looked upon evil as a necessity, and morality as a remedy ; and they have joined their voices to the harp of the bards, to sing the happiness of the early ages, and to promise man a happier life far away from this fleeting world. Artists cast their eyes never but

behind. They draw their inspirations from the past; they seek there whatever the palette or the chisel may reproduce with advantage. The gods, to whom they erect temples, were all communicated to man in the early days of the world; but irritated by his sins, they breathe now only wrath against him, and offer to virtue merely a chimerical asylum, which can be reached only by passing through the tomb. Poets chant the great wars of primitive times, and their imagination is charmed with scenes of destruction and carnage; or if they consecrate their muse to pleasure, it is to the celebration of the pleasures of opulence. They teach men to enjoy a life, which according to them is good only in being well rid of; they say nothing for the poor, nothing for the afflicted; they show not the end to which the labors of man should be directed; they sing only for idleness, which has need of enjoyments, and which pays for their verses as for a refined luxury.

“Thus nations improve, without perceiving their improvement, and perpetuate the mischievous error, that they depart from good in proportion as they advance into the future. Kings and rulers, who alone in the past have been rich enough to purchase the labors of thought and the productions of genius, have taken good care not to discourage this false notion; they have even done all in their power to sustain and diffuse it. They have felt that it must strengthen their power, by extinguishing in the bosoms of the people the hope of bettering their condition, and by making them believe themselves bowed down to earth, ground into the dust, not by their own fault, nor that of their masters, but by the weight of an irrevocable destiny. But in spite of its rulers, moralists, artists, poets, the social body had continued to acquire strength, and to develop itself by a slow but uninterrupted progress, when all at once it demonstrated to the false prophets, revealed, so to speak, to itself the great fact, that the ages had not been lost for it, and that it had fairer days to hope than those of its childhood. Christianity, at length, through the French Revolution, succeeded in tearing away the curtain which had so confined our view; the veil has finally fallen; floods of light have broken in upon us; and the future dawns upon us full of magnificence and joy.

“Yes, we proclaim, with full conviction, that society since its birth has never taken a backward step. Its development may have been retarded; it may even yet be retarded; but no human power can prevent it altogether. The age of gold, we repeat, is in the future. Paradise on earth becomes visible; and *they only, who shall have contributed to its establishment, shall be entitled to admission into the paradise above.* \* \* \* \* \*

“All is for us, time, men, and country. We have a land favored by nature, sufficient to satisfy the wants of life, as well as the senses and the heart; covered with fertile fields, beautiful sites, and an enlightened and industrious population, friends of order because friends of labor, and worthy to be free because capable of governing themselves. We have men of science, rich with the accumulations of experience, augmenting daily our conquests over nature; writers

who have judgment, intelligence, and a felicity of expression, unequalled at any former period; poets who have more than imagination and talent, since they aspire to serve humanity, and since they demand an end and an occasion on which to act; marble with which to raise statues to the benefactors of mankind; granite with which to erect temples to the only objects which deserve them, — science, religion, and art. Young men! let us unite then. Poets, artists, theologians, literary men, men of industry, men of science, our career is marked out for us, since to-day we can occupy ourselves directly with the elevation of the mass. Let the past, to which we have paid ample obsequies, repose in peace. Let there be no more funeral orations over its tomb. Yet let us not disdain it, but honor it, since it has brought us to the present, and opened to us an easy route to a brilliant future. Let us all have but one wish, but one hope. Let us, according to the beautiful expression of the author of the book of Judges, march '*as one man*,' having inscribed on our banners, '*PARADISE ON EARTH IS BEFORE US.*'"\*

The readers of this extract, written by Saint-Simon, or rather inspired by his genius, will perhaps pardon us for adding the following complimentary notices of him by one who knew him well. They will give some idea of what he was in his social relations.

"All his labors had for their end the happiness of mankind; liberty, industry, philosophy, in their sublimest problems and aspirations, were the constant themes of his meditations. Volumes would be necessary to develop all the ideas which his clear, lively, and brilliant conversation could in a few hours render intelligible and palpable. He never spoke of himself. He appeared to have forgotten his birth, and to have remembered of the blood of Charlemagne only an elevation of mind, and a nobleness of soul, which were perhaps never equalled. He would have as completely forgotten his campaigns and his valor, had he not always felt a lively pleasure in having contributed to the success of liberty. Discarding all the distinctions which he held by the accident of birth, it was by himself that he shone; and it was the man within him, that it was necessary to acknowledge. If only his writings were considered, one would infer that his life had been purely intellectual; but to consider only his actions, one would believe that he was a man of pure sensibility. If his genius was sublime, his heart was sublimer. *All his thoughts passed through his heart.* Never, I think, had a human creature cause to complain of him; and he had made many ingrates. He found also several grateful beings, and these were the charm of his life.

"A celebrated woman has said, that they who fear the superiority of

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\* *Opinions litteraire, philosophiques, et industrielles.* Paris: 1825. pp. 12-22, Introduction, — a work which contains the germs of much that we find and admire in the later writings of the Saint-Simonians.

genius are wrong ;—to comprehend all, to feel all, is to make one very indulgent. No one better than Saint-Simon proves the truth and justice of this remark. He could place himself with inconceivable simplicity within the reach and the tone of any one who enjoyed his conversation. Such was the flexibility of that superior mind, but good, but excellent, that while the wisest went away with the hope of returning to profit by his lessons, the ignorant were able to quit him with the belief that they had instructed him. His sole passion was the public good, which he sought with a self-denial of which we may find some resemblance only in ancient times. Thus he, who had never profited by the thoughts of others, scattered his own with a prodigality serviceable only to those around him. He loved to draw young men to him, the *men of the future*, to obtain for them the means of opening for themselves an honorable career by their labors or their writings. Little concern did he feel, who employed his ideas ; the only thing which he could hold to be essential was their diffusion. The slightest sentiment of selfishness never sullied a character so beautiful. More occupied with the interests of others than with his own, which he neglected, he counted no fortune fine and honorable, but that which one acquires by his own industry ; and although he regarded the acquisition of wealth a problem of easy solution, and had solved it for himself more than once, his indifference to wealth made him diffuse it more rapidly than he could amass it. ‘If generosity were not in the heart,’ he would say, ‘it would be a good calculation.’”\*

And yet this noble-minded man, who knew so well how to sacrifice himself for others, was misconceived in his day, and, like a greater than he, had to be “made perfect, or consecrated, through suffering.”

“This fortnight,” he writes, “I have subsisted on bread and water. I have labored without fire, and I have sold all even to my wearing apparel to defray the expenses of some few copies of my work. It is the passion for science and public happiness, it is the desire to find the means of terminating in a gentle manner the frightful crisis in which all European society is now struggling, that has reduced me to my present distress ; so that it is without a blush, I avow my present destitution, and solicit the aids I need, in order to be able to go on with my work.”

One does not read these lines, traced since our own manhood commenced, by a descendant of the Duc de Saint-Simon, and, through the counts of Vermandois, of Charlemagne, by a French nobleman, who had served with distinction in our own revolutionary struggle, fighting for liberty under Washington and Bouillé

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\* *Journal de la Province de Liege.* Oct. 13, 1830.

on American soil, who had acquired a fortune more than once, which he had expended in his efforts to advance private and public happiness, — one does not read these lines, we say, without thinking of many things, concerning which it is as well to keep silence. Mankind are redeemed only by crucified redeemers. Courage, Saint-Simon; whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son he receiveth as worthy to do his service. Courage all, who suffer for truth and humanity; ye weep that we may rejoice, are bruised that we may be healed, die that we may live. Courage! the new tomb hewn from the rock, though closed up and guarded with armed soldiery, cannot confine you. Ye shall rise on the third day, fresh, and immortal, standing confest before heaven and earth to be the redeemers and saviours of your race. Not the least of the proofs of thy mission, Saint-Simon, we read in the distress to which thou wast reduced by thy efforts to redeem thy brethren. We join thy enthusiastic disciples in exclaiming, in view of the passage just quoted,

“Children of Saint-Simon, generations to come, keep as a religious monument these lines bequeathed you by your father. When his word shall have renewed the face of the world, when the great principle, **REWARD ACCORDING TO WORKS**, shall have been realized, and the lowest of mortals, by the provisions of society, find the certain means of subsistence, and a remuneration proportioned to his merits,—Children of Saint-Simon! ye will delight then to repeat that, in order to fulfil this, his regenerating mission, your father was reduced to beggary.” \*

Our readers must forgive us for this apparent digression; but we have a sort of affection for Saint-Simon and his school, which it would be in vain for us to attempt to disguise if we would, and which we would not if we could. Moreover, we have thought it not improper to say thus much of the school in which Mr. Leroux was formed, and to which, in all that concerns the elements of his system, he still belongs. He re-

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\* *Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition Première Année. 3d ed. Paris: 1831. p. 73.*

tains, since he came out of the school, or since its dispersion, nearly all it had worth retaining. He retains its Ideal, is true to its spirit, and obedient to its inspirations; while he avoids its extravagances, and shows, in the development and defence of its leading principles, a freedom of spirit, a warmth of feeling, a depth and originality of thought, not altogether unworthy of a man who aspires to found a school. Yet our praise of Mr. Leroux, though high, is not unqualified, our confidence in him, though great, is not unreserved, and our sympathy with him, though extending far, is by no means complete. We can almost subscribe to the following criticism by Mr. Lerminier, and so far as concerns the book before us, we can without any qualification.

“Considerations on the advantages of method have seldom disturbed Mr. Leroux, and with our knowledge of his mind, we are not surprised at this. Numerous notions on many subjects, but acquired in a manner a little confused, more fervor of spirit than strength of mind, more impetuosity in the chase after ideas than power to master them and to translate them, more boldness of imagination than soundness of judgment, all these, qualities of a distinguished intellect, but incomplete, explain the singularly immethodical character of this work on *Humanity*. Properly speaking, Mr. Leroux has not written a book, but a huge article originally intended for a dictionary. Thus you find it a medley of all tones. At one moment, you seem to be reading a shred of chronology from the school of Freret, at another, frothy declamations which indicate a disciple of the school of Rousseau. You pass from the most abstract axiom to an apostrophe wholly unexpected, and you whirl about in a chaos from which you can extricate yourself not without labor. Seek not, then, in the *Humanity* of Leroux for a work of art. To read it will be laborious to those even, who do not shrink from an ordinary work on metaphysics.”

This is hardly just. But the truth is, Mr. Leroux is no artist. His mind is a wild, weltering chaos, into which are thrown, in the greatest confusion imaginable, materials various and rich, difficult to be obtained, rare and of great price, in ample abundance for a new intellectual world; but they will not coalesce, combine, assume unity, and clothe themselves with form and beauty, till a more creative spirit than his passes over them. His views are various, profound, often original, ingen-



ious, and striking, but incomplete. Nevertheless he gives us some admirable criticisms, throws light on several dark problems in philosophy and theology, suggests numerous trains of rich and captivating thought, and kindles up many pure and noble aspirations. We honor him for his heartiness, honesty, deep earnestness, and lofty aims. There is nothing little, insignificant, or diletanteish about him. He is a man; thinks, feels, and speaks as a man.

### I.

With these remarks on the general character of Mr. Leroux, the school to which he virtually belongs, and its distinguished founder, we pass to the consideration of the work before us, which comes, as the author tells us, in the train of his *Essai sur l'Egalité*, which it continues. In that Essay he had analyzed the present and explained his views of the past, detected the law of progress, found that the human race, having passed successively through all the phases of inequality, stands now on the borders of equality, and a happier future. But before this future, so far as that work was concerned, the author stopped short, daring neither to prophesy nor to dogmatize. The questions came up, What is this future to *me*? What relation between me and humanity? between its destiny and mine? Shall I be on the earth when justice and equality reign among men? Shall I hope for the future, love it, and seek to usher it in? or shall I repel it, and withdraw myself as much as possible from it? The work before us was written, professedly, to answer these and similar questions.

The work is preceded by an Introduction on Happiness, of considerable length, originally an article in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*. It makes a complete work in itself of great value. It would bear being translated and published separately. We should be glad to give an analysis of it, but must pass it over, for the slightest notice of its contents would carry us quite away from our present purpose.



Mr. Leroux divides his work into six books, the sixth book occupying the whole of the second volume, and about one third of the first. The first book is taken up with definitions of man and their application. Psychologically, Mr. Leroux defines man, not the man of ancient theologies, but the abstract man of modern thinkers, to be "*sensation-sentiment-cognition indivisibly united.*" He does not demonstrate, nor attempt to demonstrate the truth of this definition. He collects it historically, taking one element from Descartes, another from Gassendi and Locke, another from Leibnitz. This is not a very scientific method, and is the more remarkable in Mr. Leroux, since he condemns it without mercy in his work against Eclecticism, in which he unjustly charges this method upon Mr. Cousin. But this is a small matter. Mr. Leroux assumes it as embracing in itself all the psychological knowledge, that we possess on what may be called the abstract, or isolated mind of man.

Critically considered, we have somewhat to object to this definition. Cognition abstracted, sensation and sentiment are virtually the same. They have a common basis, and depend on one and the same faculty of human nature, to wit, the SENSIBILITY, or power to feel. The two terms are then reducible at bottom to one; and instead of "*sensation-sentiment-cognition,*" we should define man to be feeling-cognition. But this loses the trinity of ancient and modern psychology, and moreover is not broad enough to cover the whole man. Man *acts*, as well as *feels* and *knows*. We ought then to define him to be "*action-sentiment-cognition indivisibly united.*" Furthermore, we see no good reason why Mr. Leroux should define man phenomenally, rather than ontologically, since he, as well as we, admits man's ontological existence. Undoubtedly man recognises his existence, the fact that he exists, only in the phenomenon; but he does recognise his existence, and never *as* phenomenon. The ontological is always revealed in the phenomenal, and our knowledge of being, as *the subject of the phenomenon*, is as direct and

as positive, as our knowledge of the phenomenon itself. This follows from what Mr. Leroux himself assumes in his *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme*. Man never confounds himself with his phenomena. He is never a pain, a joy, or a grief, is never sensation, sentiment, or cognition; but the subject who joys or grieves, is pained or pleased, feels, acts, or knows. He should be defined ontologically, then, from his powers, not from the effect of their exercise. Instead then of being defined "action-sentiment-cognition indivisibly united," he should be defined "activity-sensibility-intelligence indivisibly united;" that is, man is a being who *acts*, *knows*, and *feels*, and all these at once in each and all of his phenomena. Thus corrected, it is the definition adopted by the Saint-Simonians, by Cousin, and, as Leroux contends, virtually by all modern thinkers.

The main point in this definition, to be observed in its applications to morals and politics, is that according to it man is a unity in triplicity, a trinity. He is not sensation *and* sentiment *and* cognition, any more than a neutral salt is an acid *and* an alkali; but he is a simple unity, inherently and essentially activity-intelligence-sensibility, and therefore each one of his phenomena is indissolubly action-feeling-cognition. The distinction of faculties implies no division of essence; the triplicity of elements does not break the unity of man's being. We cannot then, as do our psychologues, separate the mental phenomena into actions or volitions, sensations or sentiments, and cognitions or ideas, because in actual life there is no separation at all, but each phenomenon is the product of the three elements in their indissoluble unity.

This fact marks the true distinction between a *synthetic* philosophy and an *eclectic* philosophy, though it does not mark the distinction, as Mr. Leroux fancies, between himself and Mr. Cousin; for, save in name, Mr. Cousin is as synthetic as Mr. Leroux, and even more so; and he insists every whit as earnestly on the primitive and essential synthesis of our faculties in each of our phenomena. Man, according to Mr. Cousin,

is a trinity fundamentally and indissolubly, and the fact of consciousness is always action-cognition-sentiment indivisibly united. Mr. Cousin's error consists principally in the infelicitous choice of a name, which misleads the greater part of the public, and sometimes even himself. His philosophy ought not to be called eclecticism, for by eclectic he really understands synthetic. Had Mr. Leroux been aware of this fact, he might have spared himself and philosophy several portions of his very able *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme*.

This definition of man, Mr. Leroux thinks, was not unknown to the ancients; but the failure of philosophers in all ages has been caused by their exaggerating one of its three terms, sensation, sentiment, or cognition. Plato exaggerates the last; Machiavel and Hobbes the first; Rousseau the second. Plato, by exaggerating the cognitive element (*connaissance*), subordinates to it the other two, which, when transferred to political and social life, will be the subjection of the men of industry (*sensation*), and the artists or *warriors* (*sentiment*), to priests and men of science (*connaissance*), as we see in his Republic. Machiavel and Hobbes, exaggerating sensation, see in men only a troop of animals, which must be reduced for their own advantage to submission, by the strong arm of power, or by artifice and cunning. Rousseau, in fine, exaggerating sentiment, the *me*, the individual will, arrives at a mere individualism, or mere aggregation of equal and mutually repellant individual forces, which can be bound together in society, harmonized only by means of a social compact, according to which each individual surrenders his own freedom to the community, to become free only as an integral part of the city or state, and consents to clothe the majority with sovereign power to do as it pleases, even to employ force to execute its decisions. In either of these cases we have despotism. According to Plato, we should have the despotism of a theocracy; Machiavel and Hobbes would give us the despotism of the law incarnated in the *king*; Rousseau the despotism of the majority, the worst of the three.

Philosophers break the unity of the human being; divide man into separate faculties, nay, into separate beings as it were; then seize specially upon one or another of the fragments into which they have broken him, and with that alone seek to reconstruct man and society. But the man and society, thus reconstructed, are at best fragmentary, incomplete, and must needs be ever at loggerheads with man and society, as God and nature intended them. Our consolation in this case is that God and nature are stronger than the philosophers, and humanity, preserving in actual life her own unity in triplicity, makes her way through the ages, leaving behind the philosophers and their systems.

From a psychological definition of man Mr. Leroux proceeds to give us, what he terms a *philosophical* definition; that is, a definition of man not as an abstraction, but as a real being, living and developing himself in the bosom of the race; that is, again, man defined not from the individual, but the species. The ancients defined man to be a "social and political animal." This definition included all they knew of man. "Have we moderns nothing to add to it? We add to this, **MAN IS PROGRESSIVE, SOCIETY IS PROGRESSIVE, THE HUMAN RACE ITSELF IS PROGRESSIVE.**"

"Man is not merely a social and political animal, as say the ancients, but he is also a progressive animal. He lives in society, and in society only. This society may be improved, and he improved in this improved society. This is the grand modern discovery, the supreme truth of philosophy. As in the definition, 'Man is sensation-sentiment-cognition indivisibly united,' we possess the whole substance of that part of philosophy which treats of the abstract mind of man, so in the definition, *Man is progressive*, we possess the whole substance of general philosophy, taking for its subject the human mind in a concrete and living state." — p. 142.

Mr. Leroux assumes this last definition, as his point of departure, and takes, as an axiom assented to, this thought of Leibnitz, *videtur homo ad perfectionem venire posse*. He does not attempt to prove that man is progressive, but merely that his capacity for progress is an admitted fact, an integral part of the present intel-

lectual life of the race, no more in need of proof than the fact of life itself. In order to prove this, he quotes a large number of distinguished modern thinkers ; among whom we may mention Saint-Simon, Pascal, Perrault, Fontenelle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz, Lessing, Turgot, and Condorcet.

. Saint-Simon, we have seen, when speaking of his school, asserts that "the age of gold, which a blind superstition has hitherto placed in the past, is in the future ;" that "a paradise on earth is before us," not behind us. He fully sustains Mr. Leroux, for Mr. Leroux is one of his disciples ; but we are not sure that the others quoted sustain his doctrine, save indistinctly, vaguely, and at best merely by implication. This doctrine, as Mr. Leroux after Saint-Simon maintains it, is that humanity is a collective being, living in the bosom of universal life, a life properly its own, and developing itself by a law of growth, strictly analogous to that of the individual ; that the race, taken as the Ideal (in the Platonic sense) or virtuality of man, that is, as human nature, which may be termed the potentiality of the individual, has a growth by way of accretion, or assimilation, which is as truly a growth, as that we witness in the individual in passing from infancy to manhood ; not that humanity, as an aggregation of individuals, through successive generations, merely augment their accumulations of monuments, whether industrial, scientific, or artistic, and their skill and wisdom in the application or use of these monuments, but that humanity as the virtuality of the individual becomes really enlarged, that the possibilities or capabilities of human nature itself increase from generation to generation, so that children of later generations are born not only with greater external advantages, owing to the labors of preceding generations, but with greater internal capacities. This is the doctrine for which Mr. Leroux contends, and is the one we set forth at some length in this Journal for January last, in a paper on Reform and Conservatism. This doctrine we accept. With him we say, "it is the grand modern discovery, the supreme

truth of philosophy." But we are not sure that it is the doctrine generally maintained by modern thinkers.

This doctrine consists of two articles ; first, the collective life of humanity ; and second, that humanity, as well as individuals, is progressive. Pascal maintains that "not merely individual men advance in the sciences, but all men taken collectively advance in them, as the world grows older ; for it is with successive generations of men, as with the different ages of the individual, so that the whole series of individuals, continued throughout the ages, should be considered *as one and the same man, persisting always and continually learning.*" Charles Perrault says, "the human race ought to be considered as *a single eternal man*, so that the life of mankind, like that of the individual, has had its infancy, has now its manhood, but will have no decline." Fontenelle expresses himself to the same effect. Assuredly mankind, taken collectively, have in both ancient and modern times been likened to the individual, and said to have four ages, infancy, youth, manhood, and old age ; but neither the ancients, nor the modern thinkers referred to, seem to us to have had any conception of the doctrine as we have set it forth. The progress, of which Pascal, Perrault, and Fontenelle speak, is external, in the arts and sciences ; and their "one and the same man," their "single eternal man," is merely a figure of speech, by which they express their faith in the continuance of the species, and that each successive generation shall enlarge the *accumulations* — not the *growth* — of the race. No doubt the language of these thinkers, in the mouth of Mr. Leroux, would imply the doctrine in question ; but in the mouth of those thinkers themselves, it means something altogether more superficial and commonplace.

Bacon was a great man, a man no doubt, as Mr. Leroux contends, who was an idealist in relation to progress in the material order ; he unquestionably believed that man, by means of science, would be able to extend his empire over nature, and to improve his external condition ; but we do not find in him any trace

of the doctrine of the collective life of humanity, as we embrace it ; no evidence of any faith in the progress of man's inherent capabilities, of humanity, human nature itself. We yield to no one in our admiration of Leibnitz, whom we dare maintain to be the greatest thinker of modern times ; but we confess that we have not found our doctrine of progress in any of his works which have fallen under our notice. Mr. Leroux thinks that he finds it in Leibnitz' *Law of Continuity*. We think that the doctrine we are maintaining is the only true explication of the facts which Leibnitz has under his eyes, but he himself meant, by the law of continuity, not progress, but that nature never proceeds by leaps, that she tolerates no void, no chasms, but is a universal pleroma, at least a just gradation of being from the highest to the lowest, as versified by Pope : —

“ Vast chain of Being ! which from God began,  
Natures ethereal, human, angel, man,  
Beast, bird, fish, insect, which no eye can see,  
No glass can reach, from infinite to thee,  
From thee to nothing.”

His “ *videtur homo ad perfectionem venire posse* ” seems to us to express not the doctrine, that man is indefinitely progressive, but the reverse, that he is perfectible, able to come to perfection, that is, to become perfect ; or in other terms, to realize the utmost capacity of his nature, which is by no means the doctrine contended for.\* Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, indeed

\* “ Il se peut même que le Genre-humain parvienne avec le tems à une plus grande perfection, que celle que nous pouvons nous imaginer presentement. Ainsi les loix du mouvement n'empêchent point que l'homme ne soit plus parfait ; mais la place que Dieu a assignée à l'homme dans l'espace et dans le tems, borne les perfections qu'il a pu recevoir.” *Théodicée*, § 341.

“ In cumulum etiam pulchritudinis perfectionisque universalis operum divinorum, progressus perpetuus liberrimusque totius universi est agnoscendus, ita ut ad majorem semper cultum procedat.” — “ Nec proinde unquam ad terminum progressus perveniri.” — *De Rerum Originatione. Opp. Om.* Berolini. 1840. p. 150.

These passages would seem to indicate a strong faith, on the part of Leibnitz, in the progress of both man and nature ; but after all,

all modern thinkers, a little distinguished, have no doubt had a sort of presentiment of the doctrine of progress; have felt that man must be in some way improvable, and that his future must be holier and happier than his present or his past; but none of them, prior at least to Condorcet, have, so far as we are able to ascertain, given it a distinct, scientific statement.\*

Mr. Leroux contends that the ancients had no sentiment, not even vague, of the collective life of humanity; we are not sure but he is virtually correct in this; yet we can find the doctrine in Seneca, even more clearly and energetically expressed than in Pascal or Perrault, if we may be permitted to adopt the same principles in the interpretation of him, that Mr. Leroux adopts in deducing it from the moderns. "Men indeed die," says the Roman philosopher; "but humanity itself, in whose image man was made, survives, and remains unaffected by the sufferings and decay of individuals. *Homines quidem pereunt; ipsa autem humanitas,† ad quam homo effingitur, permanet; et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus, illa nil*

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we must doubt, whether he had any clear conception of the doctrine in question. Mr. Leroux is right in considering that the doctrine of progress lies at the foundation of the whole system of Leibnitz, especially his *Théodicée*; but it was the defect of Leibnitz, that he did not perceive its importance to his argument. Nevertheless, in a more general way, no man can fail to reckon Leibnitz among those who looked for a happier future.

\* Vide "*Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*;" — a work which has never received the attention from our countrymen, which, notwithstanding some extravagances, it really deserves. We came across many years ago a mutilated copy of a wretched translation of it, which we read with an intense delight, never experienced by a man but once in his life. It was in our boyhood, when we had no surfeit of books; and we have never read it since; but we owe to it much of the good and the bad there may have been in our own influence, so far as we have had any, on our countrymen.

† Why is the credit of having been the first to use the word *humanity*, to designate human nature as it exists in the race, ascribed to the last century, and sometimes even to Herder? Seneca uses it in this sense; and the fact, that he so uses the term, almost inclines us to suspect that he was after all no stranger to the modern doctrine.



*patitur.*" \* Even the doctrine of progress, which we call a modern doctrine, was not altogether unknown to this philosopher. "*Nec ulli nato post mille sæcula præcluditur occasio aliquid adjiciendi.*" † There is much good sense, as well as dryness, in Mr. Lermnier's remark, after having quoted these passages from Seneca; "We recommend that much prudence be always observed in making assertions, founded on the supposed ignorance of the ancients."

After all, the doctrine of progress, veiled indeed, and not always recognizable by careless observers, runs through all the religions of antiquity; and so does also that of the collective life of humanity. The doctrine of progress is the real significance of the old universal faith in the periodical destruction, — sometimes by water and sometimes by fire, — and renovation of man and nature. The palingenesia of the ancients is the imperfect statement of the progress of the moderns. Christianity, which is Judaism translated from the tribe into the race, making of Jew and Gentile one, reveals, at least to us, both the doctrine of the collective life of humanity, and of the progress of the race and its institutions. This is the doctrine which lies at the bottom of the faith in the Millennium, so rife in the early ages of the Church, so prevalent even yet, and the realization of which all Christians pray for in the petitions, "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." It is the significance of the faith in a Messiah, who, all Christendom still, in common with the Jews, believes, is to come; it is what is implied in the hope of a "latter-day glory;" what Isaiah promises, when, enraptured with his vision of the Messiah's reign, he breaks forth, "He shall not fail nor be discouraged, till he have set judgment in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law!" It was chanted in the chorus of angels over the manger-cradle of the infant Redeemer, and was preached by Paul as "the liberty of the sons of God," into which the whole creation groaned to be delivered. The doctrine is, as we have shown in com-

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\* L. Annæi Senecæ. Epist. 65.

† Ibid. 64.

menting on the Saint-Simonian Ideal, peculiarly a Christian doctrine, and to Christianity are we indebted for its principal developments; but it has required eighteen hundred years of training under the Christian dispensation, to enable us to give it a clear, distinct, and scientific statement. As a doctrine clearly, distinctly, scientifically stated, it is probably not older than the close of the last century; but as a doctrine forefelt and foreshadowed, it is older than Bacon and Descartes, than Paul and Jesus, than Plato and Pythagoras, as old as Moses, and we know not but as old as the first aspiration of the race.

## II.

Mr. Leroux in his second book, — not the least valuable part of his work, — considers man's nature, destiny, and right.

"Man, as we have seen, is, by his nature and by essence, sensation-sentiment-cognition indivisibly united. His life, then, consists in the exercise and employment of these three phases of his nature, and his *normal* life consists in never separating them in any of his acts. By these three phases of his nature man is placed in relation with other men and the world. Other men and the world, here is what uniting itself to him, defines him, and reveals him, or compels him to reveal himself; what constitutes his objective life, without which his subjective life would remain latent and unmanifested.

"The life of man and of each man is then made, by the will of the Creator, dependent on an uninterrupted communication with other men and with the external universe. What man calls his life does not all belong to himself, and is not solely in him. It is in him and out of him; — resides partly, and, so to speak, *jointly*, in other men and in the world which surrounds him.

"Under a certain point of view, then, we may say, that other men and the world belong to him. For, since his life is in them, that portion of which he disposes and calls himself, — *ME*, — has virtually right over that portion of which he does not dispose in a manner so absolute, and which he calls not himself, — *NOT-ME*." — pp. 137, 138.

We are not sure that this is quite intelligible to our readers; we will therefore try to bring out more fully the meaning of the author. Mr. Leroux, — and in this we coincide with him, — holds that man, taken alone, is never competent to the task of his own manifestation. He remains in a virtual or latent state, a mere

potentiality, till assisted to actualize himself by that which is not himself. He cannot exist in his own eyes, be conscious, without acting; and he cannot act without an object, which he is not, and cannot of himself furnish. For instance, he is made with the capacity to love, but he does not from the first actually love. This capacity, when he does not actually love, is still love, but love in a virtual or latent state, — love “*in potentiâ, non in actû.*” From this latent or virtual state love can be brought only by means of an object. Or, in simple terms, man is created with the power to love; but he cannot manifest his power to love without loving; and he cannot love without loving something, some object. An object which is loved is as essential to the production of actual love, as is a subject that loves.

Love, so far forth as man loves, is his life. But as this love is, if we may so speak, the joint product of the subject loving, which is the man himself, and of the object beloved, which is not himself, his life must be partly in and partly out of himself, and depend partly on himself and partly on that which is not himself. Now this, which we say of the capacity to love, we say of all of man's capacities. They are all latent, except so far as by means of appropriate objects he is enabled to develop, to manifest, or actualize them. His whole life, then, whether intellectual, sentient, or sentimental, is jointly in himself and in that which is not himself, — in the ME and in the NOT-ME. His life unquestionably consists in the manifestation, or actualization, of his latent capacities. As this manifestation, or actualization, is but the echo of the intershock of the ME and the NOT-ME, or of his communion with that which is not himself, it follows that he can live only so far as he has an object. His life, then, is at once subjective and objective. Other men and the world furnish the objective portion of his life. They furnish it only by means of an uninterrupted communion between him and them. As he has need of living, so has he need of this communion; and his right to this communion must

be commensurate with his right to live; for it is the necessary, the indispensable condition of his life.

“Man is so made, or such is his nature, that he communes with other men (*ses semblables*) and with the world, in three ways, the family, the state, and property.

“Property, family, country, respond, in effect, to the three terms, sensation, sentiment, cognition, of the psychological definition of man. Man is manifested to himself and to others in this triplicity, because his nature is threefold. The trinity of his soul, sensation predominating, gives birth to property; sentiment predominating, to the family; cognition predominating, to the city or state.” — p. 139.

This genesis of property, family, and the state, may be, and in our view is, altogether fanciful; but the great fact stated, that man needs, as the indispensable conditions of life, family, country, and property, is unquestionably true. There is a portion of his nature, what we usually term the domestic affections, which finds its object only in the bosom of the family; another portion, the social, which finds its object only in having a country, a fatherland; and still another, only in acquiring and possessing property. In order, then, to be able to develop, manifest himself, that is, to live, man needs a free, uninterrupted communication with other men and with the world, *under the three forms of family, country, and property*. This conclusion, though not remarkable for its novelty, save in the light in which it is placed by the metaphysics of the author, is of great practical importance. It is worth considering by all those zealous world-reformers, who are seeking to obtain the palingenesia by destroying family, country, or property. They, who contend for a community of goods, would annihilate property. Hence the dangerous tendency those must guard against, who in our days are advocating “the community system.” They, who declaim against the marriage relation, or who would introduce the general liberty of divorce, and they, who strike at separate households, as do the disciples of Charles Fourier, together with those, who seek to transfer the responsibility of educating and rearing their children from themselves to the community, as was advocated by Frances Wright, in her scheme of a

national education, annihilate the family, and therefore the domestic part of man's life. They, who maintain that all government is a sin and a usurpation, and acknowledge the legitimacy of no government, but each individual's moral convictions of right and duty, — which seems to be the doctrine of our New England non-resistants, and no-government men, — by making the state impracticable, annihilate country. Each thus in turn takes away from man the objects indispensable to the development of his latent powers, to the actualization of his virtuality, and therefore the necessary conditions of his life.

The NATURE of man is to live by means of an uninterrupted communion with other men and with nature, under the three precise and definite forms of family, country, and property. His DESTINY, that is, the design of his Creator in his constitution, is not, then, to place himself physically, sentimentally, and intellectually in unlimited communion with all men, and with all the beings of the universe. This were to annihilate him by the vast solitude of Sahara, equally destructive with the solitude obtained between four walls in our modern penitentiaries. He would roam from man to man, from object to object, without resting his mind or his heart upon any; weary and desolate in the midst of endless variety and perpetual change, he would die for the want of something permanent and unchangeable. He must concentrate to increase his energy. His philanthropy is too gaseous to be of any practical utility, till condensed into love of family and of fatherland. His intellectual powers are too feeble to attain to science, unless he confines himself to a limited range of studies. The finite seeks in vain to master the infinite. "Man from the first moment of his life is placed in relation with certain of his like, and with certain beings of nature, which his true destiny requires him never to quit."

Nevertheless, by the normal methods God has established, man has the RIGHT to communicate with *all* men, and with *all* nature. No one has the right to for-

bid this unlimited communion. To forbid it, to restrict man in an absolute manner to a particular communion with certain other men, and certain beings of the universe, were to build a prison around him, which, though a palace, were none the less a prison, and in which he would be annihilated by solitude. The recognition of his *right* to unrestricted communion with other men, and with nature, is what makes his LIBERTY.

Who in fact would restrict this right? The Scientific? Science claims the right to know everything, to send her searching glance into everything that can be known; and this is what is cherished as the freedom of science, freedom of mind, freedom of thought. Artists? Art knows no limit; it claims the right to seek the beautiful anywhere and everywhere in God's universe; and this is what we denominate the freedom of art. Men of Industry? Industry claims in turn the right to possess all, and by her labors to increase its fruitfulness; and in this consists the freedom of industry. While, then, man must, in point of fact, because he is finite, restrict himself to precise and definite relations with other men, and with nature, yet he has the right to a free and unlimited communion with all men and with all nature. This conclusion is not without significance, as we shall see in approaching the third book, which treats of Evil and its Remedy.

### III.

Family, country, property, in themselves are good, excellent, indispensable conditions of man's life; but their excess is mischievous; and they may, and often do exist in excess. The family may absorb man; the nation may absorb him; property may absorb him. He may be the slave of his birth, the slave of his nation, the slave of his property. Hitherto he has been the slave of all three simultaneously, and of each successively.

THE PAST HAS BEEN EVIL, AND ONLY EVIL, because neither the family, nor the nation, nor property has

been so organized as to admit, in the bosom of each respectively, man's free development and progress. Men have been parked, and cut off from their free communion with other men and with nature. This has been done in three different ways.

"1. The first method by which to park men is to divide them in **TIME**; that is, to acknowledge for ancestors to each one only his natural ancestors; to deny all reversionary right stretching from one family to another; but to establish a strict reversion in each family, to make all depend on birth, to subordinate the son to the father who begat him, and to make of man an **HEIR**. This is the hereditary method, the **ORDER OF BIRTH**.

"2. The second method of parking men is to divide them in **SPACE**; that is, to compose aggregations of men,—not merely distinct from each other, but hostile some to the others,—under the name of nations, to subordinate the individual to the nation, and to make of him a *subject*.

"3. The third method of parking men is to divide the earth, or rather, the instruments of production, and to attach men to *things*, subordinating men to property, making of man a *proprietor*.

"There are only these three ways in which the race can be divided, and man subjected, since they comprehend time, space, and things. But this is not all. The effort hitherto has been to demonstrate and to combat the existence of despotism in the bosom of the family, of the city, or of property, by considering each by and in itself. It has not been seen that despotism in the family, in the nation, in property, is the correlative of the fragmentation of the human race; and that the evil, that has been found in one or another of these three forms of man's communion with other men and with nations, results from this fragmentation or division of mankind. In other terms, exception made of a few great religious legislators, no statesman has ever seen why it is, that either one or another of them begets evil and despotism.

"If the family, the city, property have heretofore produced so many evils, if man has found them so oppressive, it is not, once and again, because they are bad in themselves, or because human nature is inherently vicious; but because, instead of being organized in a manner to subserve the indefinite communion of man with man and with nature, they have been turned against this communion, that is, against man's rights, and the wants of his nature. *Family, country, property are finite things, which ought to be organized in view of the infinite. For man is a finite being that aspires to the infinite. The absolutely finite is for him evil. The infinite is his end; the indefinite his right.* Let this indefinite, then, which is progress, be refused him; let the family, or the city, or property be organized in view of the finite, and there is evil on the earth; man's nature is violated in its essence; man is a slave, and poor and miserable because a slave.

"I take, for example, the family. The family exists in and by

itself; but not independently of the human race. Either, then, the family will be organized with sole reference to itself, and therefore against the human race; or with reference to itself *and* the human race. If the first, its organization is vicious, and man is a slave; if the second, its organization is good, and man is free. The same may be said in regard to the city, and to property.

"All the evils mankind experience come, then, from *castes*. As soon as you embrace the whole human race in your ideal of society, evil ceases and disappears from your ideal.

"The true law of humanity is, that the individual man tends by means of family, country, and property to a complete communion, direct or indirect, with all other men and with all the objects of the universe; and that in confining this communion to a sphere more or less restricted, there necessarily result from its forms, imperfection and evil. *Family is a good; family CASTE is an evil. The nation is a good; a national CASTE is an evil. Property is a good; property CASTE is an evil.* \* \* \* \* \*

"The evil which reigns on the earth,—I mean the evil which reigns in human society,—comes from this, that the essence of human nature has been violated, in consequence of the principle of the unity of the human race, in time and space,—that all men are fellow members of one and the same body, living one and the same life,—not having as yet been fully understood nor rightly applied. The Christians were therefore right in saying that Jesus, who according to them had introduced the doctrine of unity and fraternity among men, had thereby redeemed men from the curse of original sin. The doctrine of communion, of unity and fraternity, bruises the serpent's head, strikes at the very root of evil.

"Take all the evils which result from the family, the city, or property, and you shall not find a single one which has not originated in the fact, that the principle of this communion of man with other men and with nature has been violated in the institution of one or another or of all of these forms of communion,—in the fact, that, instead of tending to the extension of the general communion of men with one another and with nature, they tend to restrict or to negative the very right which founds them, and without which they would have no right to be at all. Then, to speak the language of theology, we may call the violation of this principle the original sin."—pp. 174 – 180.

Mr. Leroux labors this point at great length, and shows that the evils of society, all the wrongs and outrages man inflicts or receives, result never from the inherent depravity of man, nor from the original vice of the family, state, or property; but from the fact, that through ignorance these three forms of man's communion have been organized with a special reference to themselves, so that each becomes, instead of a help, a let and a hindrance to the free communion of each



man with all other men and with all nature. That there has hitherto been antagonism between the family and the nation, and between the nation and the race, between the individual and the family and the nation, and between man and the proprietor, there can be no doubt. That this is the cause, the veritable cause of our evils, would seem to result from what has already been adduced, and to be pretty satisfactorily demonstrated in the following, to which we ask attention.

**"THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AT EACH MOMENT OF HIS EXISTENCE IS AT ONCE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE. Now, what furnishes the objective part of his life; that is, what is his object? Man and nature, always man and nature, and never anything but man and nature. Thus in man, the *object*, is contained a part of the life of man, the *subject*. Then the improvement of man is of some import to man. Then the human race live in *solido*, each for the whole. Then all the barriers which separate men in an absolute manner, whether in time or in space, and which are opposed to their mutual communication and improvement, impoverish and dwarf the growth of the life of the individual. You cannot obliterate the objective portion of my life, without injuring me in my subjective life. If you destroy the possibility of my communication with other men, you annihilate in me my possible object; which is to annihilate me myself, and therefore to violate my right. I demonstrate in the same way the same thing in regard to nature. The communication with nature is my right. You cannot absorb nature without annihilating me. You cannot, then, establish barriers which limit in an invariable manner my property, by which I communicate with nature, without injuring my life; since the whole universe is my possible object, and since it *virtually* belongs to me, because God has made it the *object* of which I am the *subject*. From this impediment to my communion with all other men and all nature, results the first form of evil, the form relative to the oppressed, that is, privation, suffering, slavery. Hence also the right of the oppressed.**

**"But thanks to God! the evil inflicted on the oppressed recoils upon the oppressor. If evil had been evil only for the oppressed, it would have been eternal. But from the principle which makes man the object of man, and by that unites man to man, so that at bottom and in God there are not absolutely separate and distinct men, but man; from this principle, I say, follows a consequence which goes to destroy evil itself. This consequence is, that you cannot do evil, without doing evil to yourself. Since I am your object, as you are mine, since your life has objectively need of mine, as mine has objectively need of yours, I defy you to make me wretched without injuring yourself. If you make me a slave, you are a despot. It is a misfortune to be a slave; it is also a misfortune to be a despot. Homer says, 'when a man falls into slavery, Jupiter takes away from him**

the half of his soul.' Homer might have added, that this half of the soul taken away goes and clings to the master, as an avenging fury, to torture and destroy him.

"The Bible, more inspired than Homer, has an admirable word for the expression of this solidarity of the master with his slave, — of the murderer with his victim. Cain had killed his brother Abel. 'And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel, thy brother? And he said, I know not: Am I my brother's keeper? And he said, What hast thou done? The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to me from the ground. And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand. When thou tillest the ground it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength. A fugitive and a vagabond wilt thou be in the earth.' It is so because Cain, in striking his brother, strikes himself. In vain he says he is not his brother's keeper; God, who created them one for the other, demands of him where is his brother; that is, Cain's conscience, which the Bible represents as speaking by the mouth of God, demands of him again *his brother, because his brother is the necessary object of his life*. And in vain, after having destroyed by his crime his object *like himself*, does he seek to compensate this loss of his nature, by attaching himself to the object *unlike himself*, the external universe; he finds that this universe becomes less fruitful in consequence of the murder of Abel. They together must fertilize the earth; the murder of brother by brother renders it barren for the murderer. It is thus, in effect, that sterility reigns wherever slavery reigns, and that even now the deepest poverty often besieges the rich in our cities, because their brethren the working men are still slaves.

"Then the second form of evil, relative this time to the oppressor, results from the violation of the law of the unity and general communion of men. The wicked are struck in the evil they do, and by the very principle of life, which, by the necessary objectivity, binds indissolubly their subjectivity to that of others. People ask the origin of evil. It is nothing but the violation of the law of which we speak. *Life requires an objectivity united to a subjectivity*. Moral evil, that is, evil in the wicked, is the result of the subjectivity, which is itself wronged by wronging itself in its necessary object. You reject, you persecute your fellow men; then you do not love them. Then are you already struck by default of loving. What then becomes your life; what befalls in you the subjectivity? It suffers not merely through default of an object, but through default of ability even to have an object; and the default of loving becomes its own punishment. Here you are, by degrees, brought to resemble that Satan, of whom Saint Theresa says so admirably, 'The wretch, HE DOES NOT LOVE!' Or rather, not to love is Satan himself; there is no other Satan.

"It is the same with all our vices, with all the corruptions of our hearts. This second form of evil is, then, also at bottom privation, suffering, and in this sense slavery. Yes, the despot, in making himself a despot, becomes a slave. The avaricious by spoiling their

brethren impoverish themselves ; the cruel in tormenting their brethren rend themselves. Christians are therefore right again, in calling by the name of slavery and the law of slavery, both the evil of the oppressor and that of the oppressed.

“ That this evil of the oppressor, which at bottom is slavery and privation, takes nevertheless, relatively to that of the oppressed, a form somewhat different, is not denied. Externally it may resemble power and abundance. But internally, in the virtuality of things, reparation is made and equilibrium reëstablished.

“ It is also life and the law of life, that brings about this reparation, and-reëstablishes this equilibrium. The evil done to the oppressed passes by the same blow to the oppressor. The oppressor is as the oppressed, sensation-sentiment-cognition, that is to say, a man. Let him then do evil to his like, and in wronging the man out of himself, he wrongs the man within himself ; for his brother man is in some sort within him,—is himself, and he cannot wrong him without wronging himself. Behold yourself surrounded by riches wrested by you from others. You are rich, you say. Vain boast ! you are poor. You are rich only on the outside ; you are poor and miserable within. You were made to love men, and you have chosen to love only *things* ; you were sensation-sentiment-cognition ; and you have renounced sentiment and cognition, in order to devote yourself exclusively to sensation. Think you that the being within you suffers nothing from this privation of sentiment and intelligence ? You feel no suffering, you say ; all absorbed in sensation, you complete the same metamorphosis as the companions of Ulysses under the wand of Circé. But are you sure that you do not suffer ? Push the metamorphosis to the end, become altogether stupid and completely insensible ; you would be the poorest of mortals, for you would want of that nature which God gives to all men, and had given to you, both sentiment and intelligence. Then, according to the very principle of life, by outraging human nature out of you, it is found that you have outraged human nature within you ; and by impoverishing others under the relation of sensation, you have, by a mysterious but necessary and infallible correspondence, impoverished the man within you under the relation of sentiment and intelligence.” — pp. 181–187.

This conclusion is not peculiar to Mr. Leroux ; but we confess, that though many have long asserted it, he is the first writer we have known to demonstrate its philosophical truth. We have all said, that by injuring others we injure ourselves ; but no one to our knowledge, before Mr. Leroux, has shown us why it is so. We see now that it is so, because, according to him, *to live is to manifest oneself ; and one cannot manifest oneself without an object*, and THIS OBJECT IS OUR BRETHREN. Our life exists jointly in us and in them,

and to injure them is to injure the *objective* part of our life, every whit as essential as the *subjective* part. This is the richest discovery of modern philosophy, and contains in itself the seeds of a whole philosophical, moral, religious, and political revolution. Let it be pondered well.

We, as well as Mr. Leroux, have contended that the progress of the individual cannot be effected alone ; that it can be effected only by the progress of the race, of social institutions, and surrounding nature. Churchmen, to some extent, have disputed us on this point, and assured us that it is by individual culture and progress that the race is advanced. In their view, mankind is an aggregate of individual forces or wills, coexisting, but without necessary union, without mutual dependence ; and they have sought to reform the world by considerations addressed to these isolated, independent wills or forces, as if the individual man could attain to the highest perfection of a human being, without communion with other men, or with nature ; or as if living in communion with them he could rise to a pitch of excellence altogether superior to them. This doctrine, in great vogue with American transcendentalists, appearing under various names, but more frequently under the names of individual improvement and self-culture, and when so named opposed to the doctrine of those, who seek to reform the world by ameliorating the family, the state, and property, is founded on the hypothesis, that *man can be his own object, and that his life is all in himself, and therefore wholly subjective*. Mr. Leroux has demonstrated this doctrine to be FALSE, and the opposite doctrine to be TRUE, by demonstrating that our life must needs have an objective portion, and that this portion is in other men and nature. It is, then, to me a matter of the deepest concern, what these other men are. They are a portion of my life, and the truth and reality of my life, its worth, its approach to the divine life God requires me to live, depend as much on the character of these other men, as on my own. We can obtain true normal life with a false object

no more than with a false subject. The effort, then, to advance men, by isolating them from the race, and treating them as independent wills or forces, able in and of themselves to become better, other men and nature remaining as they are, will prove, as it always has proved, unavailing. The church must enlarge its ideal, and propose, not the progress of isolated individuals, the salvation of the isolated soul, but the progress of men in their union with humanity ; and therefore, necessarily **PROPOSE THE AMELIORATION OF THE SEVERAL FORMS UNDER WHICH MAN COMMUNES WITH OTHER MEN.** We must understand that our progress as individuals is inseparably connected with the progress of other men, with whom we stand in relation, that our lot is bound up with that of humanity, and that whatever be its degree of excellence or of depravity, that degree must be ours.

But to return. Evil results from the violation of the law of unity and fraternity. This violation of the divine law is occasioned by the establishment of *castes*, under the three forms of family caste, the national caste, and property caste.

The remedy for evil, under its two forms, the evil of the oppressed, and that of the oppressor, must then be sought in a return to *unity and fraternity*, to the **COMMUNION OF THE HUMAN RACE** ; — men must be brought to the communion — made to commune. To be conformed to my nature, and consequently to be happy and moral, I have need to be intentionally and virtually in communion with all men, with all nature, and through them with the infinite God, from whom they all proceed, and in whom they all breathe and live. The family must be so constituted, that I can enlarge in all directions within its bosom, without restraint ; the state must be so organized as to permit me to develop myself and advance in its bosom, without being oppressed ; the same also must be affirmed in regard to property. In other words these three forms, by which man communes with man and nature, must be so ameliorated, as to aid my free and uninterrupted communion with all men and with all nature ; not so as to confine

me necessarily to my own estate, my own family, within the narrow enclosure of my own country. "Family, country, property, must be harmonized with man's right to free communion with all men and with all nature, without, however, on that account ceasing to be family, country, property."

This brings us to what Mr. Leroux contends is the fundamental principle of all genuine, ethical, and political science. The ancients founded ethics and politics on the maxim, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor,"—a profound maxim, which has not yet been comprehended in all its depth. Philosophy now for the first time demonstrates its wisdom and truth, and does so by showing that **THY NEIGHBOR IS THYSELF, BECAUSE HE IS THY OBJECT.** In other terms, thy life being indissolubly objective and subjective, and the objective part, residing in thy neighbor, being as much thine as the subjective part residing in thyself, there is a oneness, a true solidarity between him and thee, which makes it necessary for thee to love him as the indispensable condition of loving thyself, impossible for thee to love thyself without loving him. To love is to manifest thyself, whether thou lovest thyself or another. But thou canst not manifest thyself without an object, and this object must be other than thyself. Thou canst not love even thyself, then, save in loving an object which is not thyself. Here is the law of thy life. Withdraw thyself from it thou canst not, violate it thou mayst, but never with impunity. Here, then, is self-love itself leading to Charity, or love of neighbor.

"What are all the sophisms of selfishness before this law of life! Since our life is bound up with that of other men, since we are inseparably united to humanity, and our fellow beings are at bottom in some sort ourselves, as we have seen, what now become all the false doctrines, founded on the selfish and individual interest of each one taken separately? Evidently selfishness turns to its own defeat, is destroyed by itself. Thou wouldst love thyself; love thyself in others, for thy life is in others, and without others thy life is nothing. Love thyself in others, for if thou lovest not thyself thus, thou canst not love thyself at all." — pp. 193, 194.

Mr. Leroux reproduces here the doctrine of Pope,

who declares self-love and social the same, and virtually the doctrine of "Interest well understood," or enlightened self-interest, in which, under one of its principal aspects, resulted the philosophy of the last century; but under other conditions, with stronger and nobler sanctions. He unites, to speak truly, "in a pure and fundamental synthesis, both the teachings of Jesus and the conclusions of the philosophers."

"Jesus and all great religious legislators have enjoined *charity*, but have supported it by no other reasons than the authority of God's will. Philosophers the most irreligious have also boasted charity, but have boasted it as our interest. We have demonstrated by the very principle of life itself, that charity is both our law and our interest." — p. 195.

#### IV.

We come now to the *fourth* book, on the "mutual solidarity of men." The preceding book has prepared the way for the leading doctrine of this; but we approach now more closely the author's peculiarities, and therefore must be even more than ever on our guard.

The mutual solidarity of men, or unity of all men in the one life of humanity, is explained by the law of life already stated; namely, that life resides *jointly* and inseparably in the subject and the object, and therefore that in life the subject and object are not only placed in juxtaposition, mutually acting and reacting one upon the other, but are in fact unified, if we may so speak, *soldered* together; or amalgamated, as the acid and alkali in the formation of the neutral salt, so that a separation in time or space is impossible, without destroying life itself. The *actual* object of each man is his family and his country, his *virtual* or possible object towards which he aspires, and should be free to aspire, is all men. Then the life of each individual man resides, so to speak, jointly and indissolubly in himself and in all other men. Each man is an undivided and an indivisible part of the life of all men, and the life of all men and of each man is



an undivided and an indivisible part of the life of each man. Thus is each in life *soldered* to the whole, and the whole to each. This, as clearly and as precisely as we can state it, is what Mr. Leroux and the Saint-Simonians mean by the solidarity\* of the race.

The doctrine may be easily seized by recalling the old theological doctrine of the Federation of mankind in Adam and Christ. According to this old theological doctrine, God made a covenant with Adam, whereby Adam became the Federal Head of his race, so that in his fall all his posterity were to be implicated; God also made a covenant with Christ, the second Adam, whereby he became another Federal Head of the human race, so that through his righteousness the elect should be redeemed, and adjudged to be righteous. Understand now by Adam, the father of humanity in its anormal condition; by Christ, the father of humanity in its normal condition; and what theology has heretofore declared to exist virtually, by way of covenant and imputation, but not actually, understand to exist actually and really, as the very principle and law of human life itself, and you have the doctrine in question. It is a great doctrine, and follows necessarily from the position assumed, that to live is to manifest oneself; that man in no sense whatever can manifest himself without an object; and that his object is mankind. It is the clear, distinct, and philosophical statement of the doctrine, which lies at the foundation of what we all

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\* *Solidarité*. I have anglicised and transferred this term, because I have been unable to find any single term in our language by which to translate it. It is a legal term for an obligation *in solido*, an obligation in which several individuals are bound each for the whole demand. The doctrine Mr. Leroux wishes to express by the term is not that all men are merely bound *in solido*, but that, touching the life, all men live *in solido*; that there is a solidity of life, a one life in them all; each individual life being an indissoluble portion of the life of the whole; or rather the life of each being, in itself, in some sort, the life of the whole. The doctrine is well explained by Paul. "For as we have many members *in one body*, so we being many are *one body* in Christ, and *every one members one of another*."—Rom. xii. 4, 5. See also 1 Cor. xii. 12, and Eph. iv. 25.



say, when we say "man is a social animal ; he was fitted to live in society ; he withers and dies in solitude." We confess, important and far-reaching as the doctrine is, we are forced to accept it, not only by Mr. Leroux's reasonings, but by certain considerations which had brought us independently of him to accept, as the foundation of all sound philosophy, the fact on which it all rests ; namely, the absolute impossibility in which the human **ME** is placed of manifesting itself, that is, of living, without an uninterrupted communion with the **NOT-ME**.

We have seen that this doctrine of the mutual solidarity of men lays the foundation of a genuine charity, universal as well as special, without for that destroying the *enlightened self-interest* of the philosophers. It effects the atonement, or rather a perfect synthesis of the love of self and the love of neighbor, of the love of **ME** and of **NOT-ME**, by showing that one is never without the other, and can never be but by and with the other.

Mr. Leroux, while acknowledging the superiority of Christianity over all other religions of the past, still thinks that it has failed to show this synthesis, and reconcile the love of self with the love of neighbor.

"You bid me," he says, "love my neighbor ; you command me in the name of God. Be it so. I obey. But tell me, I pray you, what shall I do with this love of myself, which nature has evidently placed in me, and which God by the voice of nature commands me to follow, whilst you, in the name of God himself, command me to love my neighbor ?

"See me then with two loves, and two tendencies, between which you demonstrate no possible harmony. And these two loves are alike holy. For if you tell me that the love of neighbor is holy in the eyes of God, then the love of self is legitimate, holy before the Creator of all things, because it is the necessary condition of the existence of the love of neighbor.

"It is certain that Christianity has left humanity unsettled and in darkness, relatively to the antinomy of necessary and holy self-love, and equally necessary and holy charity, or love of others. All the precepts of the most excellent doctors of Christianity have always remained vague and undefined. Charity, as they have conceived and taught it, has never been able to be the foundation of a real science of life, because it has never been able to bind up together in one life the **ME**

and the not-me; and because it has made the necessary and holy love of self subordinate to the love of others, or rather, as I shall soon proceed to show, to the love of God." — pp. 198, 199.

If Mr. Leroux will substitute Church for Christianity, and if instead of saying that Christianity falls into the error here pointed out, he will say that some Christians in their interpretations of the precepts of Christianity have fallen into it, we shall have no objection to offer. And it is proper here to observe, that Mr. Leroux and others, who for the most part agree with him in his general doctrines, mean by Christianity, Christianity as it has been defined, interpreted, and authoritatively enjoined by the Church; in other words, Christianity, if we may so speak, according to Saint Augustine, and not according to Jesus, the Son of Mary. Mr. Leroux himself, notwithstanding what he says, exonerates Christianity from the charge he brings; and while claiming his doctrine as a modern discovery, seems to convey the notion, that Jesus borrowed it of the Essenians, a Jewish sect, which had no doubt anticipated many of the elements of Christian Theology and Christian Ethics.

"Certainly," he says, "I will not say that Jesus and the other founders of Christianity had no knowledge of the metaphysical principle, which is the true foundation of charity. I have shown, on the contrary, in my Essay on Equality, that a long time even before Jesus, the Essenians, his predecessors, had had a profound conviction of this truth. Besides, it is certain that Christianity, the principal symbol of which is the Communion, or Eucharist, has known and taught, up to a certain point, and under a veil, the law of life, by virtue of which man lives not by himself alone, but by communion with other men and with nature. Nevertheless, we may say, without fear of being deceived, that Christianity has not demonstrated its precept of charity, and has not distinctly referred it to the metaphysical principle in which it originates." — p. 201.

That Christianity has not metaphysically demonstrated its doctrine of charity is no doubt true, for it demonstrates no doctrine; it teaches, it does not demonstrate; but that it teaches the true doctrine of charity is here admitted; and we have ourselves proved it in our "New Views;" in the Essays on the Originality of Jesus and the Christian Movement, published in this

Journal for April, 1838; and in what we have just said in this present article in defence of the Ideal of the Saint-Simonian School.

Nevertheless, we agree with Mr. Leroux, that Christianity, as it has been widely, but not universally, nor exactly authoritatively, interpreted by both its learned and its unlearned adherents, is liable to the objections he brings. Christians have rarely comprehended the Communion, or Eucharist. It has been disjoined from charity; and instead of being a feast of love has become a sacred *mystery*; in these our days too often even a mere rite, or ceremony. We know no doctor of the Church who has explained, nay, who has even suspected its profound significance. The Catholic doctors are less untrue to it than the Protestant. Indeed, it may be questioned, if the Protestant doctors, in rejecting Transubstantiation, have not virtually rejected the doctrine itself. The doctrine of Transubstantiation, by which man is said to feed upon the human-divine flesh of Jesus, teaches the profound truth of the solidarity of men in humanity, and of humanity, through Jesus, in God; and that it is only by a living communion of the individual with humanity, through humanity with Jesus, and through Jesus, with God, that he can be redeemed and sanctified; that his true life is indissolubly united to the life of humanity, and through the life of Jesus, to the life of God. Well, well has coming to the Communion, celebrating the Eucharist, been considered the most solemn expression of one's faith in Christ, and when sincere, the most glorious act of one's life!

Still, we own that the Communion has remained a *mystery* for the great mass of believers, uninterpreted, or misinterpreted; and Christian charity, therefore, which with Saint Paul was "the bond of perfectness," "the fulfilling of the law," which was "the perfect law of liberty," according to Saint James, has been misconceived, theoretically degraded almost to a nullity. The doctors of the Church have erred in condemning holy and necessary love of self, and by that virtually rendering the love of neighbor and of God impossible.

They have forbidden the Christian to love himself; they have made his Christianity, his sanctification consist in the annihilation of self; they have commanded him to love his neighbor only in appearance, only in view of God, which is to love him not at all; and have ended by making his duty consist in pure, direct, and absolute love of God, which in this case becomes an impossibility. By these three errors the Christian doctors have virtually obliterated charity from their ethical code, and would have obliterated it from the human heart, were it not that life is stronger and more persisting than theories, however high and sacred the authority which promulgates them. "The fervent Christian, turned only towards God, really loves neither himself nor others, and is deceived in supposing that he loves God, as God would be loved."

"In point of fact, it is in the pure love of God and in the renunciation of the creature, that has ended the teachings of all the Christian doctors a little profound. Whilst with the uninstructed charity assumes somewhat of a human air, whilst these seek to find in it a rule of practical conduct and of life, the deep thinkers of Christianity understand very well that Christian charity has really only God for its object, and that understood as the love of men, it is only an abstract term for love of God." — p. 203.

Christian charity, or love, is faulty or deficient on three points, — the love of self, the love of God, and the love of others.

1. Christianity as interpreted by the doctors commands us to renounce, to mortify, to sacrifice ourselves. "You will not love yourself. But can you live and yet not live? Vainly you repulse nature; vainly you condemn the human aspirations of your soul, and anathematize them as an innate, radical, and incorrigible vice. Not to love yourself is not to love life, since life necessarily comprehends this you, which you will not love. Not to love life is to love death, that is to say, non-existence.

2. "You make your duty consist in pure, direct, and absolute love of God. You will have only God for your object, only the Infinite Being. Be it so. But the Infinite Being does not manifest himself, without you and others. God, then, manifesting himself not otherwise, and appearing to you only in an act which makes you feel at the same time both your own existence and that of others, would not be loved in any other manner; that is, he wills that you should have, in loving him, always the consciousness of yourself and of others. He does not require us to place him outside of us, and to

adore him at a distance from us. He would live in us, and has no need of being placed out of us, in order to command us. Is he not in all creatures, without being any one of those creatures, or all of them together? He intervenes in life; he manifests himself only in life;—God is the God of the living, not of the dead;—preserve then life, if you will commune with him. Love God indeed; but do not pretend to love him directly, and as it were face to face. He is infinite; you are finite. The finite can have no direct communion with the infinite. The finite can communicate with the infinite only mediately, through the intermediary of life, which embraces at once both the finite and the infinite. To love God leads you back always, in the last analysis, to life, which comprehends both the *ME* and the *NOT-ME*, a subject and an object, in like manner as it comprehends also the Infinite; that is to say, an intervention of the universal Being by which the *ME* and the *NOT-ME*, the subject and object, are distinguished even while united.” — pp. 204, 205.

This pure and exclusive love of God, to which your Pietists, your Fenelons, and your Guyons aspire, is altogether impracticable. Men may aspire to it, enthusiasts may struggle to obtain it, and sensitive dispositions may believe themselves in possession of it; but it is never a real love of God. God isolated from self, neighbor, and nature, is, *so far as we human beings are concerned*, as if he were not, — is a mere illusion, an empty form, like the image of the beloved Creusa that appears to Æneas in his flight, and which, when he would clasp it to his aching bosom, melts and vanishes. God can be known and loved only as he manifests himself. And this doctrine, so strongly insisted on by Mr. Leroux, as he pretends, in opposition to Christianity, is the real Christian doctrine, and that also of the Church; for the Church pronounced Fenelon's pietism a heresy. What else means this doctrine, that we approach God never directly, but only through a mediator? It is always in the face of the Son that we behold the glory of the Father. “No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son that is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared, or manifested, him.” “No man knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him.” “The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.” God was manifested in the flesh, that is, in humanity; and it is in and through humanity, and Jesus the father of redeemed

humanity, that we have access to the Father. Always is it God in his indissoluble union with human nature, always the God-man Jesus, that redeems and sanctifies us. If God is known only as manifested in and through humanity, then is it only in humanity, in the love of neighbor, that we do, or can love him. "No man hath seen God at any time. *If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us.*" "If any man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how shall he love God, whom he hath not seen?" Can anything more explicit be required to prove that, according to Christianity, we love God only mediately, by, and in, loving our brother? Mr. Leroux is wrong, then, in pretending that the pure, direct, and absolute love of God is a Christian doctrine. His own doctrine comes much nearer to the Christian doctrine.

3. "Christian doctors enjoin only a fictitious love of neighbor, by requiring us to love him only in view of God, for God's sake. You will not love really your neighbor, because you say you will love only God. But here again the result is the same as the refusal to love yourself. By ceasing to love yourself I have just proved that you would cease to live, and that instead of turning towards life, you would turn towards death, towards non-existence. The evil is still greater in the negation of real love applied to others. In this case you not only annihilate yourself, but, as far as in you lies, you annihilate others. You are made, you say, to love God, and God only; what to you, then, are your fellow beings? In vain you profess to love in truth only God, and that in view of God, out of love to him, you will act towards creatures as if you loved them. You do not love them, as they ought to be loved. For you are their object, as they are yours; you are necessary to their life, as they are to yours; it is not the semblance of love that is due them, but a real love. It is necessary, in order to be really useful to them, and really to contribute to their life and improvement, that you feel yourself united to them, living one and the same indissoluble life with them. Without this, charity has no efficiency in regard to life and the improvement of life. And the proof is, that in proportion as your *charity* increases, it turns more and more towards God, and the more and more despicable or worthless do your fellow men appear to you. You are willing to go to heaven alone, and leave by the way the companion who might arrest your flight.

"Thus, — all the world admits it, — the last expression of Christianity is to consider this life as a vale of tears, all creatures as

nothing, and less than nothing, and God alone as worthy of love. Christianity in its greatest Apostles, in the Gospel, as in Saint Paul, as in Saint Augustine, as in all the saints without exception, has always labored, has always implored, always been eager for the end of the world." — pp. 203–206.

This is expressed too strongly. This ascetic view of the world is not the view taken in the Gospels, nor by Saint Paul. We will not pretend to say that we may not now and then discover a trace of asceticism, imprinted on the form of Christianity, as developed by Saint Paul; but it nowhere penetrates to the foundation, nowhere affects the real substance of the true Christian's faith. Christianity founds its claims to our love and confidence on the ground, that it is the religion of *reconciliation*; that it has power to harmonize all the antinomies of the moral, intellectual, and physical world, — God and man, time and eternity, soul and body, heaven and earth, self and neighbor, family and nation, nation and humanity, individually and collectively. The asceticism of the Church is of a foreign origin, and belongs not to Christianity. Mr. Leroux, who is sometimes honest at the expense of his consistency, or apparently so at least, admits all this.

"I admit," he says, "that the Gospel, if taken in simplicity of heart, without demanding of it any philosophical solution, was truer and more advanced on this point of charity, than afterwards was Christian theology. But Christianity not having either solved or even touched the fundamental knot of the question, theology has necessarily arrived where it has arrived." — p. 210.

Theology, no doubt, has arrived where it has; but whether through the failure of the Gospel to give it a clear and firm basis is not quite so certain. If the passage already quoted from John does not touch the heart of the question, we know not what can. "If a man say I love God, and hate his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen?" Does not this plainly enjoin the love of man as well as the love of God? nay, the love of man as the indispensable condition of loving God? "No man hath seen God at any time; but if we love one another he dwell-



eth in us, and his love is perfected in us." What does this mean, but that we attain to our knowledge of God, and to the realization of his love in us, by loving one another; that it is through the love of one another that we commune with him. Is not this explicit? Jesus himself says, "A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another, as I have loved you." "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." This is the only new commandment Jesus ever gave, and of course it marks the peculiarity of his religion, since men were to be known as his disciples by keeping it. Did Jesus, then, lay any foundation for the asceticism, Mr. Leroux condemns as Christian theology? Nay, we will not rest here. Saint Paul himself says, "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law; love worketh no ill to his neighbor; *therefore* love is the fulfilling of the law." We say, therefore, once and again, that the Gospel, the New Testament, affords no countenance to the doctrine that has been drawn from it, and which Mr. Leroux does well to combat. The charge of leaving God out altogether, as an object of love, could be more easily sustained against the Gospel, than that of resolving the love of neighbor into the abstract love of God.

But we must return to Leroux, and abridge him as much as possible; for our space is rapidly diminishing, and we have much more to say. To the question, "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?" Jesus answered, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, soul, and strength, and thy neighbor as thyself." Here Jesus recognises three loves, love of self, love of God, and love of neighbor; but, Mr. Leroux contends, without fusing them all into one and the same love. While Jesus does not exclude the love of self, he merely joins to it the love of God and of neighbor, without melting it into them. Christian theology has therefore been permitted to err.

*"Love thyself"* has left the world to subsist outside of truth, abandoned it to fatality, and created by that fact the LAICAL SOCIETY.



**"Love God** has engendered ascetic devotion, monks, convents, anchoretism, the *regular clergy*.

**"Love thy neighbor** has engendered the *church*, or *secular clergy*, who seek to adjust matters, fill up the gap left by revelation between natural life and devout life, endeavoring as much as possible to harmonize nature and grace, and striving to serve as a sort of connecting link between asceticism and selfishness, between the true religious life and the laical life.

**"Yes**, the church, I say, has done its best to reconcile these three things ;

**"A God** out of the world and out of life ;

**"A man** apart from this God ;

**"Another man**, the neighbor, equally apart from God, and apart also from man, his like.

**"But** the evil has been too great to be remedied, and all the efforts of the church have proved unavailing, have foundered on the radical vice of this theology, which does not comprehend life.

**"Christianity** had left other men and the world out of us. Then never other men, never the world united to us, were able to give us that after which man aspires, happiness in God ; that is, the good, the beautiful, the just. Hence, the rejection of life and nature by Christianity. Hence its terrible God ; its paradise and its hell, equally imaginary, placed as they were beyond life ; its dogma of an approaching end of the world ; also its division of temporal and spiritual ; the Church and the State ; human and temporal affairs abandoned to the laics, celestial and spiritual affairs confided to the clergy. Hence the Pope and Cæsar, head of the spiritual society, and head of the temporal society.

**"Besides**, the time had not come. Christianity had an intermediate work to perform. It must needs prepare men, by a mystic communion, for a more perfect, a more real communion. Finding men so brutish, so divided, so hostile some towards others, that there was no means of making God felt in a real communion, it has contented itself with making God, thus separate from these men and out of their hearts, descend into the sanctified bread, which it afterwards divided among them, and with which they fed on God." — pp. 210 – 212

In consequence of the hostility which Christianity, as interpreted by the doctors, suffered to remain between the love of self and the love of neighbor, and the love of man and the love of God, the charity of the Gospel has never been organizable. It has never been possible to organize civil society according to its principles. Civil society has, therefore, with the interests of time, been abandoned to Cæsar, that is, to ignorance, violence, and brute force. The Church alone has been able, in some feeble degree, to be organized for the realization of the doctrine of love. But able now to melt the love of God, the love of neighbor, and the love of

self into one and the same love, or rather into one and the same LIFE, we may fuse Church and State, and organize the whole society under its terrestrial and its celestial relations, according to one and the same principle, and for the realization of true Gospel charity. This will be done by AMELIORATING THE FAMILY, THE NATION, AND PROPERTY, SO THAT THESE THREE FORMS OF MAN'S COMMUNION WITH MAN AND WITH NATURE SHALL TEND UNCEASINGLY TO FACILITATE HIS FREE COMMUNION WITH ALL MEN, WITH ALL NATURE, AND THROUGH THEM WITH GOD HIMSELF, IN WHOM THEY ALL LIVE AND HAVE THEIR BEING, WITHOUT BEING HIM OR HE BEING THEM. This is our work for the future. To the performance of this work we must bring all the energy and enterprise of Industry, all the instructions and directions of Science, and all the inspirations of Art.

## V.

Thus far we have followed Mr. Leroux with comparative pleasure, and as to the substance of his doctrines, with general approbation. In what follows, in the fifth and sixth books, our sympathy with him is altogether less. Having brought us to see what we are in and of ourselves, what relation subsists between us and the race, between our destiny and its, and to perceive the work that is to be done for the future, he has felt that some motives and sanctions were necessary to secure the performance of that work. Mr. Leroux is, as we have said, a sincere, earnest-minded man. He is no amateur philosopher. He thinks and writes for the purpose of bettering the condition of mankind. He works, and would induce others to work, and to work zealously and effectively. But he sees and feels, — and it is honorable to him that he does so see and feel, — that it is impossible to induce them so to work, without the allurements and sanctions of religion. He has seen and felt the utter hopelessness of all efforts for reform, not prompted and sustained by religion. He has, then, sought not a mere speculative philosophy, but a relig-

ion ; not merely to make a discursion on ethics and politics, but to give men a true, inward, abiding, and all-controlling faith ; a faith which, like the early Christian faith, shall enable them to " overcome the world." To this he says he has attained by his own inductions ; but after having thus attained to it, he has seen its connexion with ancient theologies, and he has therefore gone into elaborate historical researches to sustain his doctrines by the traditions, the religious and philosophical monuments of the race. Through these researches we have, as our readers must perceive, no space at present to follow him.

After having established his doctrine of " the mutual solidarity of men," by which he has shown us that the life of the individual and that of the race is inseparably united, — literally one and the same life ; and therefore led each to seek the good of all, and all the good of each, by all the force of both our selfish affections, and our social affections, he has wished to strengthen this force, by showing that this solidarity, this oneness of the life of the individual and that of the race, is not only temporary, during what we call our present existence, but eternal ; and therefore that we are as much and as directly concerned in whatever may be the future condition of the race, as we are or can be in its present condition. This established, then both the selfish and the social elements of man, the love of self and the love of neighbor, will be reinforced by all the superiority of an eternal good over a mere temporary one, and thus reinforced cannot be long in making evil disappear from the face of the earth.

But in order to establish this, he has felt it — and we regret that he has — necessary to make war upon the old and all but universally received opinions concerning heaven and hell, time and eternity, this life and another. He rejects the dualism between heaven and earth, and heaven and hell, as commonly understood, and thinks that the immortality looked for by believers, out of this world and out of this life, is chimerical, is the veriest illusion. The only dualism he admits is the

dualism of the absolute and the relative, the unmanifested and the manifestation. There are, he says, two *heavens*.

“An absolute heaven, permanent, embracing the universe, and each creature in particular, and in the bosom of which lives the universe and each creature; and a relative heaven, not permanent, but progressive, the manifestation of the first in time and space. Ask me not where is situated the first. It is nowhere, in no point of space, since it is infinite. Nor when it will come, when it will show itself. It will never come; it will show itself to no creature; it will never fall into time, any more than it will appertain to space, since it is eternal. It is, is always and everywhere; and always and everywhere creatures communicate with it; for it is it which contains them, upholds them, and in which they live. From it we derive our reason, our love, our strength, our light; some more reason, more love, more activity than others; but all derive from it our life, as feeble streamlets may derive a little water from the mighty river or the boundless ocean.

“As to the other heaven, it is the life of the world, and of creatures, life derived from God, life manifested. It is time, space, the finite, the manifestation of the infinite; the present manifestation of the eternal.” — pp. 233, 234.

This second heaven accompanies always the first, and Mr. Leroux says, “his faith is that the first heaven, which is for him, God, the Eternal and Invisible, manifests itself more and more in creatures which succeed one another, and that adding creation to creation, with the view of raising creatures nearer and nearer to itself, it follows that creatures more and more perfect must issue from its womb in proportion as life succeeds to life.” But who sees not that here is no creation at all? The two heavens are the *plenum* and *void* of Brahminism, and especially of Buddhism. The absolute heaven is the infinite *void* seeking to become *FULL*. This void is the *seyn* of the Hegelians, which even they define to be the synonym of the *nicht-seyn*, for its only quality is that it is. It is, according to Mr. Leroux himself, merely an infinite possibility seeking to become real, or an infinite virtuality seeking to actualize itself in time and space. God has, then, according to him, no real, no actual existence; that is to say, God is nothing but a possibility, or at least a virtuality, save in what we term creation. Abstract creation, and there would be

no real, no actual God ; there would remain only the possibility of a God, which will become a real God in proportion as there shall be an actual creation. The whole of which seems to us to amount to this, — there is no God but the universe, and the *possibility*, or, if you please, *power* of the universe to grow and expand itself indefinitely in time and space. Which in our view is, to say the least, nothing better than a mitigated form of Pantheism. Mr. Leroux evidently admits creation only by way of emanation, by an efflux, to interpret his own figure, of the infinite into the finite. This determines the character of his theodicy, and proves him a Pantheist. The distinction between Theism and Pantheism is, that the last contends that the actual universe *emanates* from God, while the former contends that God has actually *created* it ; and that though he sustains it, and is its life and being, yet is he independent of it, and as really and truly God without it as within it. Emanation is the besetting sin of all Oriental philosophy, except the Jewish ; and we are sorry to find it revived and contended for by a man so distinguished as Mr. Leroux.

The immortality for which Mr. Leroux contends may now be easily conceived of. There are only two orders of existence, the possible and the real, the virtual and the actual. The possible, the virtual, is infinite, eternal ; the real, the actual, is finite, in regard both to time and space. It is what we call this world, this life, in one word, the present. There is, then, and can be, no actual life but the present life. The only life we have, or can have, is this life, and the infinite possibility of living this life. Mr. Leroux therefore permits us to aspire to no paradise beyond this life, to no heaven beyond this world. Paradise and hell are to him mere illusions. All that he permits us to aspire to is a *renewed existence in this life*. In other words, the race is eternal, for it is the infinite virtuality of each individual, and being an infinite virtuality it will eternally tend to actualize itself in individuals ; which amounts to this, *individuals die, but the race survives*. We, as individuals, as actual men and women, are after

all only for a day ; our life extending only from the cradle to the grave. O, my friend, is it with the allure-ment of such a hope as this, that you are to captivate our hearts, and make us give ourselves up, soul and body, to the work of ameliorating the condition of our fellow men on earth ! Is this what you call my being on earth, when justice and equality shall reign among men ? Never have we feared that the race would become extinct ; never has it been over the possible annihilation of humanity that we have stood with sorrowing hearts and streaming eyes ; but over our own possible annihilation, and that of those we have loved. We did not ask thee to prove that we may exist hereafter, as we have existed heretofore, that we may be born into this world again, as we have already been in the generations which have preceded us ; but that I myself shall survive the tomb, and that the beloved of my heart, whose body the earth has covered from my sight, but who comes to me so oft in the sweet visions of my sleeping or my waking, is not dead to me, survives not merely in my own deeply cherished love, but really, actually lives, and shall be again met, again clasped to my bosom, which has been true to the last. The mother did not ask thee to prove that there would continue to be mothers and new-born babes, but that her own, her darling boy, so sweet, so gentle, so beautiful, too sweet, too beautiful for earth, so suddenly taken from her, yet lives, and that she shall press him again to her maternal heart, and know and feel that it is the same, her own long lost, never forgotten child. O mock us not. If you have no faith in such a future as this, in such another life as this, talk not to us of living again. Leave us what faith we already have ; or if we have none, leave us to the stern reality, to live, and toil, and weep, and die, and rot, and be no more.

Mr. Leroux, after all, recognises no immortality but that of the race ; for he recognises no life but this present life successively reproduced. We assuredly believe our present life contains in germ our future life ; and we believe that our future life, like the present, will be a

life in and not out of nature, and like the present linked to the universal life of humanity ; but in a far other sense than that of merely being reborn. The departed are not departed. The generations of the past live in us and out of us. They are all here, round and about us, and we might if we would, and some of us even do, at times, commune with them. But this by the way.

Mr. Leroux not only takes the view which we have ascribed to him, but he takes up more than two thirds of his whole work in endeavoring to prove, that his view of future life is the one taken in all the traditions of the race. We cannot at this time, as we have already said, go into any examination of the question, whether these traditions do or do not sustain him ; but this much we may safely assert, his immortality is not that in which the human race has always supposed itself to believe. Universal tradition sustains us in saying, that the human race has always believed that if understood, by a future life, something else than mere rebirth into this life ; and if so, would not this belief, after all, be the real traditionary belief of the race ? Suppose, then, that by ingenious interpretation we can make out that the monuments of antiquity do contain the doctrine in question, we by no means prove that these monuments contained it to their authors ; and the fact, that they have never been so understood by the world at large, is no mean proof that they did not. Then again, if the doctrine in question is absolutely that of Moses, Budha, Pythagoras, Plato, Appollonius of Tyana, of all the oriental and western worlds, throughout all antiquity, higher and lower, as Mr. Leroux contends, wherein consists that progress of the race for which he also contends ? Where is Mr. Leroux's originality, if he merely reproduces what was the faith of mankind even before history began ?

Mr. Leroux goes largely into the exposition of Judaism and Christianity. We may, hereafter, perhaps, call attention again to some of his expositions, for some of them are ingenious, and not without value. He in-

interprets the first ten chapters of Genesis, the *Bereshith* of the Jews, as a series of myths, intended to teach a system of psychology and political economy. Adam means humanity; Cain, Abel, and Seth reproduce the triad of the human soul, sensation-sentiment-intelligence, according to Mr. Leroux's terminology, the industry, science, and art of Saint-Simonism. Cain is the man of sensation, the physical man, the man of activity, who possesses himself of the earth, and kills his brother so as not to share it with him. Abel represents *void*, man of desire, of sentiment, who leads not, like Cain, an agricultural, but a nomadic life. The struggle between these two is the struggle between the rich and the poor, between the Haves and the Have-nots, a struggle in which the Haves kill the Have-nots; — which we know from history is the usual termination of such struggles. Seth is the *man of intelligence*, and represents the return towards good. His posterity form for a time a parallelism with the descendants of Cain; but ultimately drawn together by the attraction of voluptuousness the two races, — knowledge and wealth (without sentiment) — mingle and produce that moral corruption represented by the deluge. Then commences a return of the race toward a better state of things. Humanity is now called Noah, not Adam, and the triad of the soul is now Shem, Ham, and Japheth.

Now all this may be very good philosophy, and the ethical and political system Mr. Leroux deduces from it may be very excellent, as we cheerfully concede that it is; but was Moses acquainted with the highest metaphysical formula to which modern philosophy has attained? Was it embodied in a book which the world has possessed and studied for thousands of years, and yet never suspected by any one before Mr. Leroux? If Mr. Leroux had not had the formula in his own mind, we suspect that he would never have discovered it in the *Bereshith*. That he can interpret Genesis in accordance with this formula, does not surprise us. All truth is homogeneous, and is reflected by the veriest



monad God has created. Once have the truth, the true formula of truth, and you may find it in every fact of history, in every grain of sand on the seashore ; because all is created by one and the same mind, after one and the same original Idea, which Idea each race of beings and each particular being reflects from its own point of view, in each and in all of its phenomena.

We do not complain that Mr. Leroux gives to Genesis a philosophical interpretation, or that he treats the *Bereshith* as a series of myths ; but we do complain that he does not remember that the myth has been accredited as history before becoming a myth. Boötes was a man on earth before he was a constellation in the heavens. The sacredness generally attached to the myth, as history, is what leads to its adoption, as a myth. The mythical ideas are attached to well known and profoundly revered historical facts, by individual philosophers or reformers, who have new views they wish to embody and in some sort to publish. This borne in mind, we have no objection to treating the first ten chapters of Genesis as a series of myths, intended to teach certain great ethical, political, and psychological doctrines ; nor indeed to treating, with Dr. Strauss, even a portion of the New Testament in the same way. Indeed we all do so treat it, when we make its narratives cover a great psychological, moral, or religious truth ; when we accommodate, as it is called, a passage to a particular purpose which we have in view, to which it may apply, but to which it was not applied by the original writer. We use the narrative of the resurrection as a myth, representing the immortality of truth, of a righteous cause, and the certainty of its ultimate triumph. This is allowable, if it be remembered that the narrative is not only a myth, but also the record of an historical fact. This rule, carried into history, will give the philosopher his freedom, without depriving the historian of his sobriety. We think Mr. Leroux might have been worth full as much as a philosopher, and more as a historian, had he observed it. History, when interpreted so as to retain no traces of what it

has always been considered to be, ceases to be history. The belief of the race is always a running commentary, not less authoritative than the text. Mr. Leroux may find Saint-Simonism in the Jewish lawgiver, but it will not therefore follow that Moses was merely the precursor of Saint-Simon.

Moses was a real character ; and though mythical notions may have gathered up around him, he was no creation of a poet's fancy. He was no Egyptian priest, nor Indian philosopher. He was eminently a Jew, oriental indeed, by the boldness of his genius, the richness of his imagination, and the warmth of his temper ; but oriental under the Hebrew type. The attempt to confound him with any other must always be a mark of historic folly. And what we say of him may be said of the *Bereshith*. The effort to resolve it into one of the cosmological books of the Egyptian priests, and to interpret it according to Egyptian modes of thought, we should think could be made by no one, capable of perceiving the connexion between the philosophy of a people and their national character ; or the difference between the ignorant, superstitious Egyptian, worshipping leeks, onions, calves, and crocodiles, overrunning orchard and garden with gods, gods foul, stupid, uncouth, obscene, and the Jew in stern simplicity, disdaining to bend before aught finite, and standing in awe only before the living Shekinah of the invisible Jehovah. The Hebrew character has no prototypes, no analogies in any of the nations of the earth. It is distinct, peculiar, remarkable for its severe beauty, its chastity, simplicity, freedom from the extravagant, the grotesque, the superstitious, the marvellous. It is distinguished from that of all the other nations of antiquity by its good sense, its sobriety, its reserve, no less than by its force and energy. Yet was the Jew a poet. He struck the harp with freedom, boldness, and delicacy, and drew from it tones which had been caught only from the seraphim, and which were not heard without the heart's rising anew to its Father and its God. To the Jew, then, let us leave, ungrudgingly, the honor of

having originated, through Providence, his own literature ; and by that of having become the chosen of God to instruct the nations in the deepest principles of philosophy, of jurisprudence, and theology ; and at the same time to charm them by the divinest music, and kindle their aspirations for God by the sublimest poetry.

## VI.

Moreover, there is no necessity of seeking to get rid of the ordinary views of the Bible, and of Immortality. Mr. Leroux's motive is a good one. He wishes, by establishing the solidarity of men in time, as well as in space, to enable the generations, which now are, to feel a personal interest in the amelioration of man's condition on the earth, and also to vindicate the justice of Providence, by showing that all ameliorations may be retroactive ; or in other words, that in the future progress of the race, the earliest generations are to participate in an equal degree with the latest. But this may be obtained without sacrificing our hopes of individual immortality. If we admit the existence of races at all, we must admit a one life common to *all* the individuals of each race. Humanity is not an aggregate of individuals ; individuals do not precede the race, and constitute it ; humanity precedes individuals, and is their origin and support. It is human nature, that is, the human species, that makes individual men and women. The unity of the life of the race of necessity unifies, or makes one, all the individuals through which the race is manifested. All ameliorations of individuals, then, at whatever epoch they may be effected, must retroact, and affect the first-born man, as well as the one that will be the last-born.

The error of Mr. Leroux consists in supposing that, if the future life of individuals be any other than a reproduction of the present life, it must be a life disconnected with the life of humanity, and therefore no longer a *human* life ; then individuals, in ceasing to live

this life, would cease to be men ; and ceasing to be men, would no longer concern us. But man is already a being who exists in the three worlds of time, space, and eternity. If then at what we call death the individual should cease to exist *in time and space*, he would still exist in eternity ; and by means of the eternal in the individual in space and time could still maintain his hold on the race, and be affected by all the changes the race undergoes in its passage through the ages. In this way the communion between the present and the departed could still be preserved.

But we are not yet disposed to admit that those we call the dead *do not still live in time and space*, and in the condition, to say the least, of *possible* communion with those we call the living. Man is a being made to live in a body, and disembodied, he probably never lives ; but bodies may exist of different degrees of density. Bodies capable of penetrating the most solid with which we are acquainted, to which the most impenetrable that we have analyzed offer no resistance, are by no means impossible. Death may be nothing more than casting off this outer integument of flesh, so that we may be clad only in this more refined, as the ancient fathers contended, more “*ethereal*,” body, — a body, material indeed like the present, and therefore not absolutely impassible, therefore defining, distinguishing the individual ; but still comparatively impassible, and like the lightning, capable of penetrating and passing on its way through bodies, hard, solid to our senses, either unimpeded, or impeded but partially. These beings commune with one another, and to a certain extent with us who still live in these grosser bodies. In our moments of great spiritual freedom, of exaltation and ecstasy, what may be called trance, by which one seems to live solely in the transcendental, we may, and unless we choose to reject universal tradition, we do, actually commune with them face to face, — though ordinarily we must own that it is only as through a glass darkly. The secrets of the country, lying on the other side of that dark

river death, are not so well kept as is sometimes alleged. That river is continually passed and repassed. Those who have passed from us still commune with us, are objects to us, as we are objects to them. Here is the great truth the Church has shadowed forth under her doctrine of purgatory, which short-sighted Protestants have vainly, not to say rashly, pronounced a popish error. Here too is the ground of that faith which all Christians have, that the life and death of Christ are retroactive, and do mediate for those who died before the coming of Jesus, as well as for those who have been born since. Deny the reality of this communion between the living and the departed, and this retroaction is not real but fictitious, imputative. Here, once more, is the basis of the doctrine of the Communion of Saints, by which the saints above and the saints below are said to make but one communion. This doctrine also authorizes us to offer prayers for the dead, to make efforts for their salvation and sanctification, as we would were they still with us. O, it is not a popish error to pray for the dead, but a blessed privilege, proceeding from a blessed hope, which has its foundation in the everlasting truth of things. On the other hand, if the departed may continue in some degree to be our object, we may also be theirs; and consequently it is as much to them what we are, as it would be were they still clad with this grosser integument of flesh. While we are poor, and miserable, and wicked, and vile, and wretched, they cannot be happy, their beatitude cannot be complete. No, wicked man! man of vice, low and worthless, thou art not only poor and miserable thyself, thou not only makest all wretched around thee, but thou carriest grief and anguish to bosoms in the world beyond the grave. The solidarity of men is universal, and no human being can find complete beatification, so long as any portion of the race is removed from its normal condition, living a sinful life. Death will not free us either from our own sins or those of others, either from the sins of past generations or of future generations. We are all bound up together, are

all literally members of one body, and one member, be it ever so insignificant, cannot suffer, but the whole body will suffer with it. This is a weighty consideration, and should rebuke the selfishness of the sinner, and also the selfishness of the saint, who fancies that he can go to heaven alone, be happy though the larger portion of his race should be miserable both here and hereafter.

Mr. Leroux seems also to suppose that humanity can grow only by reabsorbing individuals into herself, and pushing them out anew in successive generations. But his doctrine of *reversibility*, — of reversion, — is easily enough explained, without recourse to the doctrine of rebirth in the race. The new life developed, or successively developed in the race, whether naturally or providentially, may pass from one generation to another, without supposing the succeeding generation must be the preceding in any sense, which implies that the preceding cannot still exist as individuals in the world lying beyond the grave. The succeeding generation has undoubtedly a reversionary interest in the life of the preceding, that is, the life of the preceding reverts to the succeeding generation. This reversion may be by natural generation. This is the view we took in our paper on Reform and Conservatism, in this Journal for January last. It is true to a certain extent. The body can be improved by cultivation, and through that the man. This improved body may be transmitted by natural generation, and the child of the cultivated may therefore, other things being equal, be born with superior natural capacities to the child of the uncultivated. Nevertheless there is always danger of pushing this view too far. It is the basis of hereditary nobility, hereditary monarchy, and of hereditary property. When we assert it, if not on our guard, we so exaggerate the family as to interrupt that free communion of man with man and the universe, which his nature demands, to which it is suited, and which it may claim as its right.

But we are wrong, if we suppose that the life of humanity can descend only by natural generation, that is,

in the line of the same family. It descends by spiritual generation altogether more than by natural generation. One generation does not pass off, nor does one generation come on all at once. The generation that now is laps on to the generation that is to succeed us, and thus becomes the objective portion of the life of our successors, and in this way transmits to it, not according to the order of birth exclusively nor chiefly, but according to the order of **CAPACITY** and of **WORKS**, the higher life which has been developed naturally or providentially within us. This is the true law of progress. In this way, as Mr. Leroux must see, may be secured the growth of the life of humanity for which he contends, without reabsorbing individuals in the race; and *we* also see now that in this way we can obtain this same growth, without exaggerating the family. With this view of progress we may restrict still more the principle of descent according to the order of birth, within the bosom of the family, than we have heretofore considered to be possible, leaving the state and property to the order of **CAPACITY** and of **WORKS**, as we contended in our *Essay on the Laboring Classes*, which gave so much offence, and as is the virtual faith of all genuine democrats, whether at home or abroad.

We do not in this change any opinion. The great doctrine, for which we have always contended, is that the improved life of the individuals of one generation, independent of its monuments, descends and becomes integrally the life of the succeeding generation. This is what Mr. Leroux, in 1833, very properly calls the "Law of Continuity." This descent, he now contends, is by virtue of the rebirth of individuals, by virtue of the fact, that the new generation not only continues the preceding, but is it, the very identical generation itself; we have contended that it descended by virtue of natural generation, — taking the aristocratic ground. The truer explication than either is, that all life is at once indissolubly subjective and objective, and the objective portion of any given generation is furnished by the pre-

ceding, by virtue of the fact that it overlaps it, and becomes its object.

More we would say, but we have already lingered too long. We have, after all, given our readers but an inadequate notion of the contents of this remarkable book. Many, however, will read the book, and find nothing in it but absurdities and blasphemies; we have found it one of the most profitable books that we have ever read. We were, in some sense, however, prepared for it, by our familiarity with the Saint-Simonian school, but more especially by the fact, that we had by our independent researches attained to the great metaphysical principle on which he bases his doctrine of life. We had not ourselves applied that principle much beyond the sphere of metaphysics. Mr. Leroux has applied it to humanity, and made it the basis of a social doctrine, at once grand, beautiful, and inspiring; in pursuing his social application of the doctrine we have seen — what he does not appear to have seen, — its application to the doctrine of Communion with Jesus, and through him with God, by which must be effected a complete revolution, not in religious belief, but in theological science. These three applications complete the cycle of human relations and inquiries. We hold ourselves able now to produce a perfect synthesis of philosophy, politics, including ethics, and theology, all harmonizing with the “Word of Life,” borne witness to by the Apostles, and which Jesus was. This metaphysical principle, which becomes, as it were, a universal solvent of whatever pertains to life, is simply that the ~~ME~~ can never manifest itself, that is, live, save in communion with the NOT-~~ME~~. This is the principle on which is based our new system of philosophy, of which we spoke in the last number of this Journal; but important as we had found this principle in the region of metaphysics, we had not suspected half its importance in the regions of politics and theology, till reading this work by Mr. Leroux. We see now the literal truth of what has been asserted of Christ as the mediator between God and man; we see how he can be both literally and



truly, and indissolubly God-man, and therefore strictly a mediator between God and man; how his mediation can and does hold, in God's providential plan for the salvation of men, the place commonly assigned to it; and how he can communicate his life to the world, and by so doing become literally, really, not by way of example, representation, or imputation, the life and salvation of the world. These great doctrines, which have been asserted and held on to by the Church, as if life and death depended on them, which have been great and painful mysteries, and which in these days have driven so many from the Church and from Christianity, if we do not greatly deceive ourselves, we can clear up, make philosophically plain and certain, in the most simple and literal sense, and on as high a degree of evidence, as that which we have for our own existence. A glorious discovery, for which we thank God, and which restores us without any subtlety, without any refining on terms, to the great household of believers.

EDITOR.

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ART. II. — *Select Prose Works of Milton, with a Preliminary Discourse and Notes.* By J. A. ST. JOHN. London: J. Hatchard & Son. 2 vols. 1836.

WE have had lying on our table, for some years, this beautiful edition of Milton's *Select Prose Works*, and we have often, while reading it, resolved to set about that which we have at last attempted. But we have been deterred not more by the importance of the subject, than by the recollection of the great spirits who have already earned rich harvests of applause in this field. The article by Mr. Macaulay, published in the *Edinburgh Review*, would seem to forbid further comment, where the critic has left his reader in doubt which most to admire, the splendor of his criticism, or the lofty grandeur of his original. Then, too, Mr. St. John, the editor of these neat and elegant volumes,

has given a preliminary discourse, which displays a keen and warm admiration for these writings, expressed in a fervid strain of noble eloquence, which inspires that gentle apprehension for the "bright countenance of truth," so soothing "in the quiet and still air of delightful studies." \*

In a fine London edition of the Prose Works of John Milton, published in the year 1838, there is a well written review by the editor, Mr. Robert Fletcher, in which he laments that some effort had not before been made to "popularize, in a *multum in parvo* shape, the prose works of our great poet." We have here an edition that completes his desires; an edition in which great judgment has been exercised in selecting, from various tracts, those portions likely to prove most agreeable to the public. While they give a proper conception of the opinions of Milton, they also contain some of the purest specimens of his style. Indeed, we think that some one of our own publishing houses would find it to their interest to bring out an edition of this work. The nice taste and the correct discrimination displayed in this selection would command for it a ready sale. It would be of great use to many, who know nothing of these writings, and of service to some, who, while they know of them, yet neglect and turn away from these rich well-springs of truth. †

Like all great messengers, Milton was, while living, persecuted, and since his death has been the object of malignant hatred, by those whose place of abiding is fast by the "seat of the scorner." He whose "words are oracles for mankind, whose love embraces all countries, and whose voice sounds through all ages," has been slighted, misrepresented, abused, and reviled by

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\* The writer might have mentioned, in this connexion, the splendid Essay on Milton, by Dr. Channing, not at all inferior, in our judgment, to Mr. Macaulay's. — ED.

† A judicious selection from the prose works of Milton, in 2 volumes, 12mo, was published by Bowles and Dearborn in this city, in 1826. It is preceded by a well written and valuable preface, on the character and writings of Milton. — ED.

those whose greatest glory should have been, that they were the countrymen of Milton, — not Milton the poet, — but Milton the statesman. He who wielded a pen that made Europe quake, and perpetuated political truths based upon eternal justice, — truths that were to warm and kindle up mankind forever after in the pursuit of right against might.

Before we approach these fountains of living light, let us turn and see how it was that he, who had been educated in seclusion, and mingled with the scholars, the gentle and well bred in his youth, did desert all, and peril his life in the wild tumult and hot strife of religious and political dissension, only that he might bear witness to the light that was in him.

John Milton was the son of John Milton, a scrivener of good repute, in the city of London. He was born in the year 1608, and was carefully educated under the supervision of his father, who was a man of refined taste. He was destined for the Church, and gave great promise of eminence ; for he was an assiduous and diligent youth, and was noted for his complete learning and elegant scholarship, at the University of Cambridge, where he obtained his degrees. But he declined to take orders, and refused to subscribe to the articles of faith, considering that so doing was subscribing slave.

In thus early displaying his independence of opinion in his religious belief, he did but follow the example set him by his father, while he obeyed the honest impulse of his nature ; for his father had been disinherited by his grandfather for deserting the Roman Catholic faith.

Shortly after he left the University he retired into the country with his father, who had then relinquished business with a handsome estate ; and while there he continued his studies, selecting no particular profession, but devoting himself to the cultivation of all.

It was in these years of sweet scholastic solitude, that he produced his *Mask of Comus*, than which there is not a nobler poem in any language. This brought him great fame among the polite and refined of the

day, and was widely circulated for a while in manuscript; so that when he started on his travels soon after this, (which was in 1638,) he carried with him letters commanding, in his behalf, attention from the most eminent men of the Continent.

He went first to France, and while in Paris was introduced by Lord Scudamore, the English Ambassador, to Hugo Grotius, with whom he had a very interesting interview. From Paris he went into Italy, and coming to Florence, in that city he mingled freely with the refined and learned, and, by the elegant displays of his own accomplishments and learning, won the admiration and regard of all. The scholars and wits of that place vied with one another in entertaining him, and celebrated his many merits in their compositions.

With many of those brilliant spirits of that favored land, he formed an intimacy, which was continued for years after his return home, as we find by his familiar letters. From Florence he travelled to Rome, and was there again treated with marked kindness and attention by Lucas Holstensus, the librarian of the Vatican, the Cardinal Barberino, and other persons of distinction in that famous city. From Rome he proceeded to Naples, and there made the friendship of the Marquis of Villa, a man of "singular merit and virtue," and who was afterwards celebrated by Milton in a poem, as he had been by Tasso, in his *Jerusalem Delivered*, and his *Dialogue on Friendship*. Happy and fortunate lot! thus to be the object of regard, and to have his merits recorded, and his virtues enshrined, for the admiration of posterity, in the works of these great poetic minds!

He had intended, after having thus visited the finest parts of Italy, to go over into Sicily, and thence to Greece; but the news from England of the difficulties between the Parliament and the King changed his mind, and he determined to return home, to mingle with his countrymen in their toil for freedom, thinking it unworthy of him to be loitering away his time in luxurious ease, while his native land was distracted, and his fellow men at home were battling in fierce strife for liberty.

He returned to Rome, notwithstanding the desire of his friends that he should remain away; for by the freedom of his speech when there he had aroused the vindictive feelings of many of his hearers. And to this he was no doubt provoked by having himself seen the dreadful persecution undergone in the Prison of the Inquisition, by one of the finest scientific minds the world ever knew, — by Galileo, — whom he visited when imprisoned for asserting the motion of the earth, and opposing the old notions of the Dominicans and Franciscans.

From Rome he went to Florence; and after being there a while he went to Venice, and from that port he shipped his books and music for England. He then took his route by Verona and Milan, and along the lake of Lemano to Geneva; and thence he returned through France the same way he came, and arrived safe in England after an absence of one year and three months, “having seen more, learned more, and conversed with more famous men, and made more real improvement than most others in double the time.”

On his return home, he again devoted himself to the solitude of his study, and to the teaching of several youths, (among whom were his nephews,) who were intrusted to his care; and in his own house he formed quite an academic institute, where his scholars, like the disciples of the philosophers of old, gathered around him, and by assiduity added to their stores of knowledge, while with his advice and counsel they were purifying and elevating their feelings.\*

In the year 1641, the nation was in great ferment with the religious disputes of the day, which were intimately connected with the chief political questions then agitated. This roused Milton, who was alive to the close association of the two subjects; and for the furtherance of his political designs, the support of lib-

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\* That is, in plain terms Milton became a schoolmaster. We do not like this squeamishness in Milton's Biographers, about admitting a fact by no means dishonorable to him. — Ed.

erty, he issued a powerful tract upon Prelatical Episcopacy. This served to work out a good end, and strengthen the cause of the liberalists. For this, as for other reasons of a like nature, he was prompted to write several other polemical tracts, during that year, and then he dropped the subject forever.

In 1643 he married, being then 35 years old. After a month his wife, by his permission, went to visit her relations; and when sent for by him, — for reasons which are as yet unexplained, — she refused to return, and dismissed his messenger with contempt.

He was deeply wounded by this treatment, and maintained towards her a dignified and resolute indifference. Mortified, and full of sorrow, he found relief in the contemplation of his very source of woe; and after reflection upon it, he projected and published his work upon Divorce, which is to this day one of the most famous works on the subject ever printed.

Affairs had now assumed a new aspect, and the Presbyterian party had, after a great struggle with Royalty, gained the ascendancy, and then ruled supreme in the councils of the nation.

The King and his abettors were fighting in the field for that authority, they had before vainly endeavored to establish with the arm of civil power. The Presbyterians were now in their day of prosperity; they had been oppressed but were now triumphant. Adversity had not been of use to them. They did not learn charity, or humanity, from her lessons, but now exercised authority with a lordly air, and wielded the sword of State with presumptuous arrogance. Among other acts of great inconsistency and oppression, they established a supervision of the press under the control of an authorized licenser, and at the same time endeavored to suppress the freedom of speech. This base desertion of the principles for which they had contended, this mean exercise of authority in that, in which they had suffered the most, and against which they had clamored the loudest, excited Milton to the writing of the *Areopagitica*. This pamphlet was written by him upon this

shameful abuse. He had before acted in concert with them, as the movement party of the day; but when they abandoned and treasonably betrayed the rights of Man, they left him where he had always been, standing on the rock of truth fast by his principles.

There is not a nobler vindication of the freedom of speech, and the liberty of the press, to be found anywhere, than in this pamphlet.

This book was published in 1644, and in this year he was reconciled to his wife, who sought him out, and unexpectedly to him fell at his feet, and with tears besought his love and forgiveness. In this as in other instances, have we a strong evidence of the mildness and gentleness of his feelings; for although his resentment had been aroused by her wicked abandonment of him, yet when she returned home, repentant and in sorrow, he joyfully received her, and forgave all. Nay more, when defeat and route had fallen upon the royal standard, he generously took home her father, and his whole family, — who were attached to the cause of the monarchy, — protected them during the heat of his party triumph, and finally interested himself to secure their estates from confiscation, although they had in their days of prosperity prompted his wife to her disobedience and desertion of her republican husband; thus showing a high-heartedness which was above malice, and in keeping with and but a practical domestic application of the pure upright faith professed by him, which was stern and unyielding in the pursuits of right, but humane and gentle in the use of power and advantage.

He was now an eminent man, and his bold pen had won for him a public fame and name. About this time he was well nigh being swept into the mid current of popular politics, and it was contemplated making him the Adjutant General, under Sir William Waller; but this design was abandoned upon the remodelling of the army, and he was left at his studies.

The King was imprisoned and tried, and then it was that the true faith and intentions of many were made

clear. The Presbyterian party, who had professed Democratic Republicanism, while their hopes of office were high,—like many in our own days, who, when they have attained their hopes, or been rejected by the people for better men, desert their cause, abandon their principles, while they hold on to their name, and fight under their old banners, that they may more surely but more basely injure truth,—being now in the minority and out of power, became noisy in their lamentations over the King's fate, and endeavored by every means to prevent his execution, using all arguments, and stopping at nothing to undo what they themselves had brought about. For when they found that there was an unflinching determination of the Democracy to punish this man for his enormities and wicked misgovernment,

“They who”—to use Milton's language —“had been fiercest against their prince, under the notion of a tyrant, and no mean incendiaries of the war against him, when God out of his providence and high disposal hath delivered him into the hands of their brethren, on a sudden and in a new garb of allegiance, which their doings have long since concealed, they plead for him, pity him, extol him, and protest against those who talk of bringing him to the trial of Justice, which is the Sword of God, superior to all mortal things, in whose hand soever, by apparent signs, his testified will is to put it.”

Upon the happening of this event, Milton published his “*Tenure of Kings*,” from which is quoted the above passage, so applicable in its spirit to our own times, so true of all political trucksters, who shout loudly for the Democracy, while they have hopes of using and abusing it, but who basely betray its confidence and abandon it, whenever they are required to put in practice their own professions. This book was published 1649, and served very much to tranquilize and calm the public mind upon that which had passed.

After the establishment of the Commonwealth, he was called to the post of Latin Secretary, by the Council of State, which station he held till the Restoration. This was an office of great importance, inasmuch as all the public correspondence with foreign States devolved upon him. While holding this high and honor-



able public station, one so congenial with his feelings, and one for which he was so well fitted, he produced many State papers of great merit, and which contributed to advance the fame of the Republic abroad.

Upon the execution of Charles Stuart, there was published a book which was styled *Εἰκὼν Βασιλική*, and which was pretended to have been written by the King, and left by him as a legacy and parting word to the world. It had a most unprecedented sale, owing to the curiosity excited by its appearance. As it was a work which was then likely to excite public sympathy, when public sympathy would be thrown away upon a bad and unworthy object, while at the same time it would abuse and mislead the public mind, the Parliament called upon Milton to write an answer to it, and to furnish an antidote for this lying poison, which it is well believed was never written by the King, but was manufactured and industriously circulated by the enemies of the people, and the friends of arbitrary power, with a hope that by its means they could unsettle the public mind, weaken the Republic, and reëstablish the tyranny.

Milton accordingly wrote his *Ἐκκονοκλαστικὴ*; and truly was he an Image-breaker; for with merciless force he entered the temple, and with his own right arm shattered the Idol that they had bid all mankind bow down before.

Charles the Second, who was then residing upon the Continent, hired Salmasius, a man of great learning, and the successor of the celebrated Scaliger, as honorary professor at Leyden, to write a work in defence of his father and of the monarchy. For this work Charles paid Salmasius one hundred jacobuses. In the execution of this book, Salmasius filled it pretty plentifully with insolent abuse of all the public men of the Commonwealth, and those prominent in the Revolution; both from a natural inclination, and according to directions. In this he was quite expert; for though he was a fine scholar and very famed for his learning, yet as it has been said of him, — "This prince of scholars

seemed to have erected his throne upon a heap of stones, that he might have them at hand to throw at every one's head who passed by."

Immediately upon the appearance of this book, the Council of State unanimously selected Milton to answer it; and he, in obedience to this call, prepared and published his *Defence of the People of England*, a work of great worth and power, and which was written at intervals, during the moments snatched from his official duties, when he was weakened and infirm. This book was read everywhere. Europe rang with it, and wonder at its force filled all minds.

By some it has been said that the Council presented him with £1000 as a reward, which was no mean sum in those days of specie circulation. But empty thanks were all that he received. Neither this nor any other of his writings ever obtained one cent for him from the public purse, as he asserts in his *Second Defence*. While Milton was thus receiving attentions from all quarters, it was much otherwise with his arrogant opponent; for he suffered not only by the severity of Milton's reply, but was slighted and treated ill by Christiana, Queen of Sweden, who had invited him to her court, among other learned men. Upon the reading of Milton's "*Defence*," she was so delighted therewith, that her opinion of Salmasius changed, and she became indifferent to him, which he perceiving, left her court, and retired to Spa, in Germany, where he shortly after died of chagrin.

Milton had been for many years suffering from a weakness in his eyes, arising out of his severe application to his studies. Year after year his sight became more and more dim, until his physicians warned him that unless he ceased his continual toil, he would become totally blind. This for a while he heeded; but the urgent call made upon him in the production of this answer to Salmasius, led him again to over-application, and he became wholly blind. Notwithstanding his blindness, he still continued the discharge of his official duties, and employed his leisure moments in

the production of various other political tracts, in answer to the many abusive works issued by the royalists.

On the death of Oliver Cromwell, and the taking place of the difficulties that followed, he wrote a "Letter to a Statesman," [supposed to be General Monk,] in which he gave a brief delineation of a "free Commonwealth, easy to be put in practice, and without delay." Finding affairs were growing worse and worse, the people more and more unsettled, and that a King was likely to be reëstablished, and the Commonwealth subverted, he wrote and published his "Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, and the Excellence thereof, Compared with the Inconveniences and Dangers of admitting Kingship in this Nation." This short paper was published in 1659–60, and even after this he published his "Notes on a late Sermon entitled the Fear of God and the King, preached at Mercer's Chapel, on March 25th, 1660, by Dr. Mathew Griffith," the very year, and within a month of the Restoration; so that his voice was the last to bear witness against the overthrow of liberty and the restoration of tyranny.

Upon the return of Charles, he fled, and lay concealed, during which time his books, the *Εἰκονοκλαστικὴ*, and "Defence of the People of England," were burned by the common hangman! An indictment was found against him, and a warrant for his arrest placed in the hands of the sergeant-at-arms. The act of indemnity was passed, and he received the benefit of it, and came forth from his concealment, but was arrested, and shortly after, by order of the House of Commons, discharged, upon his paying the fees to the sergeant-at-arms, who had endeavored to exact them from him, which he resisted, and appealed to the House. And thus, although a prisoner, he still displayed a determination and resolution to oppose that oppression in his own person, against which he had so stoutly battled for the whole people.

He now retired from public life forever; and when an offer was afterwards made to him by the King, to

return to his old post of Secretary, he refused it, although pressed by his wife to accept it, and to her entreaties answered thus: "Thou art in the right; you and other women would ride in your coach; for me, my aim is to live and die an honest man."

This offer has been denied by Doctor Johnson, in his life of Milton, and that too without sufficient foundation, for the contradiction is made without proof; and when Dr. Newton, in his admirable account of Milton, published in his splendid edition of the Poetical Works of Milton, confirms it, and asserts that these very words were from Milton's wife only twenty years before the publication of his edition. The Doctor has in this, as in other instances, displayed a malicious desire to detract from his merits; his envy no doubt being excited by this unbending integrity of one, whose political opinions were serious enough in the Doctor's eyes to affect even his merits as a poet. For this, as for other offences, has he received again and again that censure\* which he so richly deserved; but from no one with more force than from Mr. St. John, in his able Preliminary Discourse to these volumes. We quote a passage.

"Another sore point with Johnson was, that Milton should be said to have rejected, after the Restoration, the place of Latin Secretary to Charles the Second. Few men heartily believe in the existence of virtue above their own reach. He knew what he would have done under similar circumstances; he knew that had he lived during the period of the Commonwealth, a similar offer from the Regicides would have met with no 'sturdy refusal' from him; he knew it was in his eyes no sin to accept of a pension from one whom he considered an usurper; how then could he believe, what must have humiliated him in his own esteem, that the old blind republican, bending beneath the weight of years and indigence, still cherished heroic virtues in his soul, and spurned the offer of a tyrant! Oh, but he had filled the same office under Oliver Cromwell!

"Milton regarded 'Old Noll' as a greater and better 'Sylla,' to whom, in the motto to his work against the restoration of Kingship, he compares him, and evidently hoped to the last, what was always, perhaps, intended by the Protector, and understood between them,

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\* We do not assent to this censure of Dr. Johnson. Dr. Johnson may have failed to appreciate in all instances the merits of Milton, but to accuse him of malice or envy towards Milton is altogether wrong. Mr. St. John, in the passage which follows, is just to Milton, but unjust to Johnson. — Ed.

that, as soon as the troubles of the times should be properly appeased, he would establish the Republic. In this Milton consented to serve with him, not to serve him; for Cromwell always professed to be the servant of the people. And after all, there was some difference between Cromwell and Charles the Second. With the former the author of *Paradise Lost* had something in common; they were both great men, they were both enemies to that remnant of feudal barbarism, which, supported by prejudice and ignorance, had for ages exerted so fatal an influence over the destinies of their country. Minds of such an order, — in some things, though not in all, resembling, — might naturally enough coöperate; for they could respect each other. But with what sense of decorum, or reverence for his own character, remembering the glorious cause for which he had struggled, could Milton have reconciled his conscience to taking office under the returned Stuart, to mingle daily with the crowd of atheists who blasphemed the Almighty, and with swinish vices debased his Image in the polluted chambers of Whitehall. The poet regarded them with contemptuous abhorrence; and, if I am not exceedingly mistaken, described them under the names of devils, in the court of their patron and inspirer below. Besides, even had they possessed the few virtues compatible with servitude, it would have been matter of constant chagrin, of taunt and reviling on one side, and silent hatred on the other, to have brought together republican and slave in the same bureau, and to have compelled a democratic pen to mould correct phrases for a despicable master. So far, however, was the biographer from comprehending the character of the man whose life he undertook to write, that he seems to have thought it an imputation on him, and a circumstance for which it is necessary to pity his lot, that the dissolute nobles of the age seldom resorted to his humble dwelling! The sentiment is worthy of Salmasius. But was there then living a man who would not have been honored by passing under the shadow of that roof? by listening to the accents of those inspired lips? by being greeted and remembered by him whose slightest commendation was immortality? Elijah, or Elisha, or Moses, or David, or Paul of Tarsus, would have sat down with Milton and found in him a kindred spirit. But the slave of Lady Castlemaine, or the traitor Monk, or Rochester, or the husband of Miss Hyde, or that Lord Chesterfield, who saw what Hamilton describes, and dared not with his sword revenge the insult, might forsooth have thought it a piece of condescension to be seen in the Delphic Cavern of England, whence proceeded those sacred verses which in literature have raised her above all other nations, to the level of Greece herself! ”

Upon his release from arrest he retired to the obscurity and solitude of his own dwelling, where he passed his time in the composition of his *Paradise Lost*, *Paradise Regained*, and *Samson Agonistes*. During this time he also produced a *History of Britain*, with seve-

ral other prose works. In 1674 he expired, worn out with illness and a life of toil ; he died without a groan, and so gentle and placid was his departure, that they who were round him did not perceive it.

Although all of his political writings were called forth by the events that were passing before him, and were for that reason local in their immediate application, yet they are so catholic and elemental in their spirit, that we can hardly believe that they were written in an age when feudal tenures were not abolished, and before any people had as yet secured their own freedom.

His *Areopagitica* was his first political work ; and although it was written for a special purpose, and with a view to a then existing evil, it is still a pamphlet that might very well be published at this day, as the declaration of our opinions upon this subject of the liberty of the press.

The very motto of the book, taken from Euripides, and translated by himself, indicates the whole spirit and intent of it.

“This is true liberty, when freeborn men,  
Having to advise the public, may speak free,  
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise,  
Who neither can, or will, may hold his peace ;  
What can be juster in a state than this ?”

After discussing the real merits of the question then before him, he departs altogether from that topic ; and as he always did, generously claimed the same right for mankind, that he had sought for Englishmen. And then it is he utters this fine sentence, which shows a noble enthusiasm in his cause, and a firm belief in its justice. “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above *all liberties !*”

After this work he wrote his “*Tenure of Kings.*” The design of this pamphlet has been already explained. We may judge of its liberal character by these few passages. At first he alludes to the treasonable desertion of principles by those, who were then turbu-

lent for the King's release, and who had mainly helped to provoke and carry on the war. Afterwards he declares this general principle; "No man, who knows aught, can be so stupid as to deny that all men naturally *were born free*, being the image and resemblance of God himself." And after this proclamation of that essential truth, he proceeds to analyze the history of society, and shows by reason, scriptural authority, general history, and the universal opinions of mankind, that all government proceeds from the people, is created by them for their comfort and good, and is subject to their control, whether it be patriarchal, despotic, or aristocratic; and that no king or potentate holds by any other authority than the consent of the people; which being withdrawn his rule ceases, and for his crimes his life may be forfeited;—declaring that this must be so, "unless the people must be thought created all for him singly, which were a kind of treason against the dignity of mankind to affirm."

And after all this he shows his charity for his fellow men, wherever they may be, by saying, "Who knows not that there is a mutual bond of amity and brotherhood between man and man all over the world; neither is it the English sea that can sever us from that duty and relation." It is this sentiment, and such like this, that demands of us our admiration and regard for this purest of men.

In the same manner does he fight the same fight in his *Ἐικονοκλασῆς* and "Defence of the English People," fearlessly breaking new ground in behalf of the "Rights of Man," as if he considered it to be his greatest glory to be the champion of his race, while he was defending his countrymen.

In the *Ἐικονοκλασῆς*, after refuting the many lies uttered by the king's lip-workers, he says, "It is my determination that through me the truth shall be spoken, and not smothered, but sent abroad in her native confidence of her single self, to earn how she can her entertainment in the world, and to find out her own

readers." Hearken then again to his words, which now, near two hundred years after they were published, come like a solemn and prophetic voice from out the writings of the old, blind republican.

"Men are born and created with a better title to their freedom, than any king hath to his crown. And liberty of person and right of self-preservation is much nearer, and more natural, and more worth to all men than the property of their goods and wealth."

This is *our* truth, the corner-stone of our faith. Here we stand, and alone of nations have made this our practice, and thereby given a healthful example to all men. These things he believed, and, for the first time for ages, did he announce to the world those truths which were to unsettle tyranny and open the way to universal freedom.

When the King was about to return, he published "The Mode of Establishing a Free Commonwealth." This was the last blast blown to rouse the people from their lethargy. With a prophetic energy did he predict the ills that would fall upon the nation, should the King again be established. How sadly have his words been realized in the gilded misery that now surrounds his country, where starving millions toil like beasts of the field to fatten a licentious and debased aristocracy !

In this book he told the people that "no government was nearer the precepts of Christ than a free Commonwealth, wherein they who are the greatest are perpetual servants to the public, and yet are not elevated above their brethren, live soberly in their families, walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration." After extolling the excellent beauty of freedom, and exhorting them to stand by their rights, he thus concludes, with these passages so full of grand and pathetic eloquence.

"I have no more to say at present ; few words will save us, well considered ; few and easy things, now seasonably done. But if the people be so affected as to prostitute religion and liberty to the vain and groundless apprehension, that nothing but Kingship can restore



trade, not remembering the frequent plagues and pestilences that then wasted this city, such as through God's mercy we never have felt since ; and that trade flourishes nowhere more than in the free Commonwealths of Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries, before their eyes at this day ; yet if trade be grown so craving and importunate, through the *profuse living of tradesmen*, that nothing can support it but the luxurious expenses of a nation upon trifles or superfluities, so as if the people generally should betake themselves to frugality, it might prove a dangerous matter, lest tradesmen should mutiny for want of trading ; and that therefore we must forego, and set to sale religion, liberty, honor, safety, all concernments, divine or human, to keep up trading. What I have spoken is the language of that which is not called amiss, 'The Good Old Cause ;' if it seem strange to any, it will not seem more strange, I hope, than convincing to backsliders. Thus much I should perhaps have said, though I was sure I should have spoken only to trees and stones, and had none to cry to, but with the prophet, 'O Earth, Earth, Earth !' to tell the very soil itself what her perverse inhabitants are deaf to ; nay, though what I have spoke should happen, [which Thou suffer not, who didst create mankind free ! nor Thou next who didst redeem us from being the servants of men !] to be the last words of our expiring liberty."

The political works of this great man have been diligently suppressed, and his political fame traduced ; while they, who could not deny him merit, have been busy before the world in lauding him as a poet, thinking thus to lead men off from a knowledge of that wherein consisted his true greatness. We question much whether the dullest mind could read these books now, without being roused and filled with enthusiasm for this apostle of liberty, and for his cause.

In them he nobly vindicates the people and their rights. "The Good Old Cause," as he calls it, warms him up, and he writes with an exulting energy that would make your blood gush with delight. His opinions were not the distempered thoughts of a factionist. He never allowed his feelings to be warped by a selfish regard for party advancement. He knew no party, but generously devoted his whole soul to the cause of his country, and in defence of the rights of mankind. In his old age his greatest glory was, that he had always written and spoken openly, in defence of liberty and against slavery.

The truths which he wrote in his matured years, as

applying to the condition of his unfortunate country, were but repetitions of the faith of his youth, as he had powerfully expressed it in his *Comus*.

“ Impostor, do not charge most innocent Nature,  
As if she would her children should be riotous  
With her abundance ; she, good cateress,  
Means her provision only to the good,  
That live according to her sober laws,  
And holy dictates of spare temperance :  
If every just man, that now pines with want,  
Had but a moderate and beseeeming share  
Of that which lewdly pampered luxury  
Now heaps upon some few with vast excess,  
Nature's full blessings would be well dispens'd,  
In unsuperfluous even proportion,  
And she no whit encumbered with her store :  
And then the giver would be better thanked,  
His praise due paid ; for swinish gluttony  
Ne'er looks to heaven amidst his gorgeous feast,  
But with besotted, base ingratitude,  
Crams and blasphemes his feeder.”

Even now, while we conclude these few pages, our pen falters, and we feel disposed to abandon the task. His magnificence overpowers us. How can we point out the excellence of that which commands the admiration of all men, and is beyond the loftiest praise of the most eloquent? Again and again have we turned over the leaves of this work, with the intention of selecting passages worthy of comment and regard, and so thickly have they flowed in upon us, that page after page has been exhausted, and we had not finished. How idle, then, to select from these masterpieces of eloquence and storehouses of truth! How vain to dwell upon his merits, when every line of his splendid composition tells of his measureless learning and infinite purity of thought. His style, at once grand and simple, is happily suited to convey conviction to the mind, and inspire the soul with fervid energy.

While his works are filled with noble conceptions, clothed in language of corresponding state and grandeur, we nowhere find any attempt at fine rhetoric for

mere empty display. The whole subject sweeps on with solemn magnificence, but with no idle pomp. From the depths of his soul did he speak, and his words were as fire, scorching to his enemies, and life-giving and cheering to those who love "truth and wisdom, not respecting numbers and big names."

The most inspiring view, that can be taken of the soul of these writings, is that they are, even at this day, far in advance of the social condition that exists in this land of liberal and enlightened principles of government. The precepts, by which he would wish us to be guided, are the pure and humane doctrines of the Saviour of man. He did not fight only for the liberties of *Englishmen*, contending for *English* rights, citing the charters of *English* liberty, — no, not he, — all mankind were alike to him, and for *man* alone he spake. No such Hebrew spirit animated his noble soul.

He proclaimed the rights of man, as man, and asserted his rights, natural and social, without ever launching out into Utopian speculations and visionary conceptions, the practical utility of which no one can affirm, and the application of which would have worked out ills innumerable, rooting up and overthrowing ten thousand times ten thousand social rights, that had grown up with the state itself. He asserted abstractions; but with an intimate knowledge of men and their affairs, he steadily avoided violating those relative rights, to suddenly encroach on which would have been even as great a despotism as the rugged foot of feudal barbarity, with which his country had been oppressed.

From the generous and life-giving precepts of the Gospel did he draw his faith. He there learned charity for the misdoings of men, as well as belief in their power to resist evil and attain truth. He there learned love for mankind, as he imbibed a stern, unyielding hate for tyranny and hypocrisy.

No timid navigator, skirting along the shores and headlands, but a bold, adventurous spirit, he pushed forth upon a wild, tempestuous sea of troubles, with murky night of ignorance and superstition surrounding

him. The "Telemachus" of Fenelon might have been the "first dim promise of a great deliverance, the undeveloped germ of the charter of the code," for the whole French people. But in these writings of Milton we have a *full* and manly assertion of those rights and duties, which all men owe one to the other, and all to society, and which are far, far beyond the simple truths conveyed in this beautiful and easy fiction.

Well might the French monarch have "The Defence" burned by the common hangman! Well might he for whom "a million peasants starved to build Versailles," look down with horror and fear upon that work, for in it were truths which have roused up men to assert their rights. It was the vindication of a noble people, who had trampled under their feet the yoke that oppressed them, and had brought to punishment the tyrant who reigned over them. These works and the events that produced them have an interest to us. Englishmen may slight them, but we look on them with exultation, — they are associated with our own history, — they are connected with our own family legends, — and as they record the mighty struggle of the mighty with the powers and principalities of this earth, they should be revered and held sacred by us; they should be our household companions, as they were of those men whose blood now warms the hearts of an empire of freemen, who boast their lineage from a prouder source than kings, — the Puritans of New England. The men of that Revolution have never been fully understood. He who would wish to know the justice of their cause, let him read Milton, and let him read the real documents of the times. They have been abused and misrepresented by most historians. Mr. Bancroft, in his History of his Country, has comprehended these martyrs in the cause of democratic rights, and dared to tell the truth concerning them. They and theirs were the settlers of this country. From them came the mighty forest of sturdy oaks, which in years after were to breast the storm of royal oppression and wrath, in this their refuge; and from

which tempest we, — **WE THE PEOPLE**, came out gloriously triumphant !

Think not 'ill of them. Tread lightly upon their memories as you would upon their ashes. They who perished upon the scaffold, — they who found a home here, — they who died upon the field in England, or, worn out with anxiety and public care, sank to rest forever in their homes, — they who, like Cromwell, fought in the field and ruled in the council, — and they who, like Milton, have proclaimed from the study that "*man is free*," have earned names that time will brighten, and have stood by truths that will secure the affections of a world hereafter.

B. H. B.

*Philadelphia.*

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**ART. III. — *Zanoni*.** By the Author of *Pelham*, *Rienzi*, *Night and Morning*, &c. New-York : 1842. 2 vols. 12mo.

Or the general literary, moral, and philosophical merits of the author of *Zanoni* we have spoken so frequently, and at so great length, that we have no occasion to enlarge upon them again. We may say, however, that these merits do not seem to us to be so extraordinary as we once thought them. Sir Edward's Novels are not to us what they were. They please us less and less as our own experience ripens, as deepens the romance of real life, and as we become more and more earnestly engaged in efforts to meliorate the actual moral, intellectual, and physical condition of our brethren. We no longer crave, nor are we willing to submit to, the kind of excitement administered by these and kindred works. Such excitement is needed by no man, who comprehends what it is to be a man, and who is determined to perform in the great drama of life the part of a full grown man. Such a man needs no contrivance to save him from communion with him-

self, or to help him get rid of time. Get rid of time ! alas ! his grief is that time flies so swiftly, leaving him opportunity to do so little of the good that he would !

Nor is this excitement healthy. It is never good to excite the mind or the heart overmuch, save when it can find immediate vent in actions which concern real life. A confirmed novel-reader is always morbid ; on some sides preternaturally sensitive, on others preternaturally callous ; capable, it may be, of talking much fine sentiment, but wanting in that spiritual strength, in that moral robustness, which is equal to the performance of a useful but difficult part in real life. The less fine sentiment we have on our lips, the more genuine feeling shall we have in our hearts, and the more noble and generous actions shall we perform. He, who stops to sentimentalize about poverty, will be the last to throw his cloak over the tattered gabardine of the beggar. This is no doubt all very antiquated, and altogether old-fashioned. But we hope our young friends, seated on rich ottomans, or reclining on soft couches, with the last new novel still moist from the press, will forgive this our antediluvianism. It is with no vinegar visage, nor pietistic cant, that we tell them to throw that novel aside, to rouse themselves from their indolence, and go forth and devote the sensibilities of their hearts, the richness of their fancies, and the creativeness of their imaginations, to the great and noble work of relieving actual distress, and of upbuilding the cause of truth and righteousness on the earth. O, my young friends, there is not such an overplus of generous sentiment, of warm and noble feeling, in this cold, wintry world of ours, that you have any to waste over a Paul Clifford or a Jack Shepherd. No ; go forth into real life, and let your sensibilities flow out for the actually poor and wretched ; let the tear, so lovely in the eye of beauty, start at no fictitious wo. That poor mother, watching by her dying boy in that miserable hovel, needs it ; those poor children, ragged, incrustated with filth, growing up to fill your penitentiaries, need it ; the wrongs and outrages, man is everywhere inflicting on man, should

call it forth. Throw away the last new novel; go with me through these dark lanes, blind courts, into these damp cellars, unfurnished garrets, where poverty, vice, and crime are crowded together, — layer upon layer, — where breeds the corruption that pollutes our whole moral atmosphere. Here, my friends, is a volume that may excite you; here is a work which you may read. Forget your luxury; forget your luxurious ease; blush for your repinings, your sentimental whimperings, your vapors and indigestion; and remember that you are men and women; and that it is your business to make this earth a paradise, and every human heart a meet temple for the living God. Decidedly, my young friends, you have no occasion to seek excitement in Jack Shepherd or in Ernest Maltravers; decidedly, you have no time to kill between dinner and the hour to dress for the evening lecture, the evening meeting, the theatre, or the assembly. No; you have duties, high and solemn duties, and no fine sentiment, no ability to talk sweetly and pathetically of the last new novel, will weigh one feather in your favor, if you are not true to duty, in earnest to silence the groans of this nether world, and to deliver the whole creation into the glorious “liberty of the sons of God.”

Passing from these general observations to the author under consideration, we cheerfully admit him to be the best of his class. We have heretofore defended even his morals. Morality has two aspects, one looking towards society, the other towards the individual. We regarded his earlier works as of a moral tendency under the first named aspect. He seemed to us to have some republican sympathies; to be on the side of the people, against their masters; and to demand, in loud and earnest tones, social ameliorations. We therefore pronounced the tendency of his works moral. But we have been deceived in him. He is, after all, a mere dilettante, a mere amateur reformer. He has no true sincerity, no deep earnestness. He is not the man to live and die for the popular cause. He is, after all, an aristocrat at heart, who finds nothing so honorable as

“ancestral halls” and “ancestral honors.” Under the other aspect he never taught any but a despicable morality. We honored and defended him as one of the champions of the popular cause; but finding upon a more intimate acquaintance that he has no real love for or attachment to that cause, we cease to defend him; for we now see that he wants the only thing which could ever redeem him, and the only thing for which we ever gave him credit as a moralist.

As a philosopher, it is enough to say that Sir Edward Lytton Bulwer is a phrenologist, with a slight dash of mesmerism. He, who can stop with phrenology as a system of philosophy, proves, according to his own doctrine, that he wants at least the bumps on which philosophy depends. Since George Combe made his tour in America, it has ceased to be allowable, for a man that would not be treated as a moral patient, to talk of phrenology as a science. As mere craniology it may, for aught we know, be true; but nothing can equal its anti-philosophical and anti-scientific character, when carried beyond, unless it be the innocence of its advocates. Sir Edward has no doubt a mind somewhat given to reflection; he possesses considerable acquaintance with books, though his reading is not very profound, nor much out of the common course; he has some insight into the world as it goes, and makes many shrewd and striking remarks; but he shows nowhere the acquirements or the capacity of a philosopher. His philosophy of life, notwithstanding his pretensions, it would puzzle one exceedingly to collect from his writings.

As an artist Bulwer's merits are still less. He has no creative power, and we do not recollect a single original character, which, either in his novels or dramas, he has introduced into English literature. Pelham is a compound of Fleetwood and Gil Blas; Sir Reginald Glanville is a feeble copy of Falkland in Caleb Williams; Lester is old Magnus Troil, and his two daughters are Minna and Brenda; Montreuil is Raleigh Osbaldistone; and so we might go on through the



whole list. The only originality he can possibly lay claim to is in the descriptions he gives of individuals of the genus dandy, and it is only when describing dandies that he ever gives evidence that he is dealing with a race of which he has some personal knowledge. His women we have given our opinion of on a former occasion. They are miserable enough. The only decent one amongst them, so far as we can recollect, is Madame de St. Ventadour, and she was most likely sketched from a casual acquaintance.

Leaving his novels in general, and coming down to Zanoni, we find the same want of creative power, originality of conception, and ability to sketch real character; the same flimsy sentiment, and false morality. As a work of art, Zanoni cannot be praised. It is the author's latest and darling production. He has been at work upon it for many years; he originally designed it to embody the wisdom of the ancient sages, and to contain the philosophy of the occult sciences. At least he said as much, some years since, when publishing some chapters of it in his *Student*. We had been long expecting it, and seized it the moment it was published, promising ourselves that we should at last obtain the author's masterpiece. Well, we obtained it, read the greater part of it, and threw it down with a feeling of sore disappointment. Notwithstanding many passages written with great force and beauty, many just sentiments and shrewd remarks, we regard it as a complete failure, both as to its conception and execution. The most tolerable portion is the first three chapters of the first book, relating to Pisani and his barbiton, which may be considered as an ingenious paraphrase of one of Mother Goose's Melodies; only here Pisani and his fiddle *suffer* together, whereas in Mother Goose they are happy together, which is more agreeable. Aside from this, what most pleases us in the sketch of Pisani is only slightly modified from the life and character of Beethoven. Nevertheless, we like old Pisani, and sympathize with him and his fiddle, and we bless Viola for insisting upon bringing out and

sustaining his opera of the Siren. She was a good daughter, that Viola, and had we been there, we would have told her so, and in the name of all suffering fathers have thanked her.

There is nothing new in the conception of Zanoni. We had had the magician already in Saint-Leon, by Godwin, of which the character of Zanoni is in the main only a reproduction, and with variations and also with striking coincidences in *Le Centenaire* of de Balzac, of which Mejnour is a slightly improved copy. We have simply the conception of two Chaldean sages, who by means of science, known to the ancient fraternities, which the modern Rosicrucians in some sort continued, that is, by possession of what is called the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life, are able to preserve themselves in immortal youth, or in the prime and vigor of manhood, and in possession of unbounded wealth. They have command over the elements, and to a certain extent over the thoughts and emotions of the human heart. They can make nature and the volitions of men work for them. This is the conception, and one to which literature was by no means a stranger.

Having conjured up these old Chaldeans, who have been alive on the earth for more than five thousand years, it is but fitting that the novelist should give them an appropriate task. The gods should not be summoned, unless there be a work to be done to which only the gods are equal. Well, we have our two Chaldean sages, one an enthusiast for science, the other an enthusiast for art ; — one the incarnation of mere intellect, the other of intellect softened and quickened by love. They are mighty magicians. They stood by the cradle of nations which have been long since forgotten. They know all the past ; are hoary with the wisdom of five thousand years. Matter is passible to their touch, and offers them no resistance ; the secrets of nature and of humanity are open to their glance ; they know what men are thinking at the opposite side of the globe ; well, these mighty magicians rise up before us, they come upon the stage, strut up and down, talk

largely, especially Mejnour, and in a manner not a little prosy, of the long time they have lived, the much they know, the great power they possess; but in the conduct of the drama perform no part really transcending the reach of any ordinary mortal. The author never succeeds once in making the reader feel that they are magicians. For a little while, in one or two scenes, you feel that Zanoni is not indeed an every-day man; but never that he must be the hoary sage he is said to be. The author proves that he himself, to say the least, is no magician. We can converse with his progeny at midnight, without any extraordinary emotion; that is, assuming that we are awake at that hour, though, to our shame be it said, we did fall fast asleep over Zanoni, even before midnight.

But let this pass; we will take these sages as they are presented to us. Of their alleged longevity we say nothing, for they do not seem to have longer memories than the rest of us. The other powers ascribed to them are by no means extraordinary. We can very easily believe it possible for men, without living five thousand years, to have all the powers they were said to possess. Our power over nature is greater than we dare exercise. The influence, which these sages were said to have over the thoughts and volitions of others, is only what the mesmerizers tell us every day they can exert. That soul can commune with soul without the medium of words, and when our bodies are separated in space, is tolerably certain to any one who has ever loved, and been loved in return. That one man may throw the force of his own soul into the soul of another, is evinced every day, by every hero, every successful orator, and by every leader of the mob; and is an obvious induction from the very law of life itself. A handsome man, in the prime of life, rich, benevolent, distinguished, possessing generous feelings, needs not to have lived five thousand years, and to have studied all the occult sciences, to be able to inspire a timid but confiding girl with courage and strength to use her own natural faculties.

Viola is a very good girl, a charming daughter, as we have already said ; but we do not find that she was anything very uncommon. She had light hair, dark eyes, a sweet voice, and a gentle disposition ; she was sixteen, small and slender of her age, ignorant, superstitious, and given to dreaming. Is this the girl to take captive the heart of the mighty Chaldean, hoary with the wisdom of five thousand years, yet young in feeling and in looks, a sage who knew all the past and could foresee all the future, the man who had seen all that earth had of the noblest, fairest, and loveliest ? We would by no means speak slightly of Miss Viola. She is a very pretty girl, and a very charming singer ; but she is not in our judgment precisely the siren to charm the magician, to make him abandon all the fruits of his experience, to resign his immortality and power, and consent to become as very a Giles, or Hodge, as ever is to be found in all England. Zanoni when first introduced to us is a noble personage ; we do not wonder that he should have touched the heart of Viola. She, we can conceive, could have loved him, but with a far different love than that which is ascribed to her. Her love of him would have been pure, deep, and everlasting ; but it would have been worship, adoration of a superior being, of a divinity, not ordinary love of a fellow mortal. That Zanoni should have felt a lively interest in Viola, that he should have loved her as the strong, the noble, the generous love the weak, the pure, and the confiding, is also very conceivable ; but that he should really have loved one so far removed from his own lofty nature, really have fallen in love with her, and become willing to sacrifice, in order to make her his wife, the fruits of five thousand years of study, toil, and suffering, is what we cannot conceive. That he could have parted with all he did for the love of woman, we hold to be very possible, but not for Viola. Light hair, black eyes, slender form, simplicity, sweet voice, dreamy temper, in one of sixteen, are no doubt somewhat magical, and may do much ; but we should suppose Chaldean sages, with

the frosts of five thousand winters on their heads, though having in their hearts the accumulated heat of five thousand summers, might withstand them. They are very well; nay, if you will, indispensable; but they are not all nor the chief requisites that a wise man demands in her he would make his wife. The wise man seeks in a wife a companion, another self, with a nature as rich, as strong, as lofty, and as aspiring as his own; but sweeter, gentler, and therefore, if you will, superior to his own.

But suppose Mr. Zanoni was capable of falling in love with Miss Viola. Had he been the magician he was said to be, he ought to have been able to transfer her affections to Glyndon, and thus have relieved himself as he wished, and made two human beings happy. But he has no more power this way than you or I should have. Viola will love him, and not Glyndon. Very well. Here, upon second thought, we can pardon the author; for love, after all, is the oldest and mightiest of magicians; and when he takes up his lodging in the heart of even a Miss Viola Pisani, it will take more than Chaldean sages of five thousand years' experience to expel him. It is said even the Gods themselves yield to Love.

But be this as it may; admitting that there is nothing incongruous in the mutual affection of Zanoni and Viola, we do not understand why Zanoni's love should have deprived him of his power. Lust unquestionably dims the intellect, and weakens a man's whole force, moral and spiritual; but pure love, such as Zanoni's is said to have been, unfolds the soul, exalts its power, and expands the intellect, and becomes to one wisdom and experience. This is Bulwer's own doctrine, in the case of Miss Alice, who was an idiot before she experienced love for Ernest — if not indeed afterwards. In true love the higher nature raises the lower to itself; the lower does not bring down the higher to its own level. There is the greater inconsistency here on the part of the author, because he everywhere represents the power of Zanoni over nature and others, as ac-

quired by genuine science. He holds nature and humanity in subjection to his will, because he knows their laws, and has their secrets. Does the author mean to tell us that the pure love of Zanoni for Viola deprived him of this knowledge?

If the author had proposed to teach us that it is better to love and live in communion with our fellow men, though we are weak and mortal as they, — which is the moral of Saint-Leon, — we should not have complained. He would have taught us an old but a salutary moral. Never seek to isolate yourself, even by superiority, from your kind. Your true life is in communing with them. If by possession of knowledge or powers, which they do not possess, you make to yourself a solitude above them, you must die. Or if he had proposed to teach us that science without love, without the human affections, though it give a man power over the elements, and over the thoughts and intents of men, is not worth possessing, that the simplest love of the simplest human heart is worth more than it all, we would have applauded him to the skies. But then in that case he should have made Mejnour and not Zanoni the lover; for Zanoni, we are told, had never abandoned his human affections; but had always retained and exercised the power of living in sympathy with his race. For five thousand years, then, he had been able to live and love, without coming down from his lofty eminence. There was then no reason why his love should disrobe him of his magic power, and make him as helpless as ordinary mortals.

It may be said, as we have heard it said, that Bulwer wished to teach by reducing him thus, that the real immortality is that to be attained not in the flesh, but by passing through the tomb. This is no doubt true. Zanoni, by the lifeless body of his wife, utters unquestionably a great truth. But the book throws no light on that truth; the author does not make us see or feel the superiority of the immortality, to which Zanoni attains, over that which he sacrifices for love of Viola. Our creed may make us assert that Zanoni dying is

greater than Zanoni the mighty Chaldean, but we *feel* precisely the reverse, and we regret that he was not able to bring Viola's nature up to his own.

Furthermore, we think old Mejnour a real charlatan. Why, he suffered himself to be baffled by even that boy Glyndon, who wanted strength to look even the horror, which awaits the scholar on the very threshold of knowledge, in the face. No, Sir Edward, no ; either let us have magicians, or else let the old Chaldeans sleep in their graves. Do not resuscitate them, unless you can clothe them with power sufficient to make their resuscitation worth something.

We are sorry that Sir Edward's experience has been so unfortunate, as to lead him to believe it possible that the wife could, in the case he supposes, be so entirely lost in the mother. The wife of Zanoni could never desert him, in consequence of a tale told her by the pitiable Glyndon, — desert the husband she adored through the influence of new-born maternal affection. There is no truth to nature in this. Viola could have gone through heaven or hell with Zanoni ; but she could never have deserted him. He was her God ; the very religion of her soul was to love him, and be his ; and the very fact, that she had become the mother of his child, would have deepened and exalted her worship of him. Ah, Sir Edward, thou shouldst not talk of magicians, for thou hast never been the object of woman's adoration ; if thou hadst thou wouldst not have made the wife desert her husband who loved her, and whom she loved, because she feared that he would spoil the morals of her child, especially when that wife is an Italian woman, and that husband Zanoni.

The truth in regard to this Novel, we presume, is, that it has been changed from its original design, and moulded into its present shape, for the very laudable purpose of giving the author an opportunity of venting his new-born horror of the French Revolution. This has made the whole work a very clumsy affair. Of the remarks touching the French Revolution we have very little to say. Happily, the character of that Revolu-

tion is not likely to be learned by posterity from the pages of Zanoni. In his Athens, Bulwer nobly defended the People. He there exposed the falsehoods of the aristocracy, and enabled the Athenian democracy to stand forth vindicated from the foul charges which had been brought against them. Pity he could not have done for modern Paris, what he had for ancient Athens. All that he says of the French Revolution proves him grossly ignorant of its real character, or a contemptible time-server, who wishes to gain the good graces of the *haute noblesse*, who despise him, by his ultra denunciations of French democracy.

We have nothing to say in vindication of the French Revolution. We see crimes in it, as many and as black as those over which Sir Edward Lytton Bulwer, the radical, whilome associate of Robert Owen, whines and whimpers; but they are the crimes not of the PEOPLE; they are of the court and nobility. We too see in the French Revolution a beacon of warning, but not to the people; — of warning to kings, and nobilities, and hierarchies, that their days are short upon the earth, unless they rule in the interests and according to the convictions of the people. Yes, that Revolution teaches a solemn lesson. It discloses the terrible might of a people reduced through misgovernment to the brink of starvation. It tells to kings and nobles, that when twenty-five millions of working people rise up and demand “bread,” something else than a new gallows must be given them; or something else they will take. It tells those who would lord it over God’s heritage in church, state, or business, many things, to which it will be well for them to take heed; or a day of reckoning may come, a day of blood, when it will not be all plebeian blood that flows. It tells those, who will hear, that there is an avenging Nemesis in the city of God, and that one day the voice of the feeble peasant, for so many ages so faint as not to be heard beyond his low, thatched hovel, in which his pale and starving wife and children are lying on pallets of straw, shall become as the voice of many waters, crying, “war to the cas-



bles, peace to the cottages," — a terrible cry, — a lurid light that too which shall then suddenly gleam out through all the land. Yet castle and palace shall send up their red light upon the midnight sky, and the blood of king and noble shall flow on the Place de Grève. Shriek who will; but when that terrible retribution comes, shrieking will avail nothing. The French Revolution has taught the world this lesson, that kings, nobles, and aristocrats *can* bleed on the Place de Grève. Courage, ye people! there is redemption then even for you. *Tyrants can be made to bleed on the Place de Grève.* The French Revolution has settled that question. Let the English nobility look to it, that an English Revolution does not settle it over again. The weak, the timid, the selfish, may shriek over the French Revolution as they will; we see in it one simple fact, namely, that there is a point beyond which oppression cannot be carried, and when driven to that point, the people turn upon their masters, who are in their hands henceforth but as so many dead men. It cost much to establish this fact. The French Revolution has established it. Let the people's masters profit by it to rule justly; let the people themselves profit by it so far as to bear in mind that, when things become so bad as to be no longer endurable, they can be mended, for their masters are tender both of their necks and their castles.

"What is writ is writ;" and yet upon second thought we are not certain but it conveys a stronger impression unfavorable to Zanoni and its author than has been our wish. We are by no means disposed to deny to either very considerable literary merits. Zanoni, taken for what it professes to be, is extremely faulty; but passing over the fact, that it was evidently intended to embody the highest moral, philosophical, and poetical conceptions of the author, we are willing to award it very high praise. Aside from its false and high tory views of the French Revolution, it is perhaps the least objectionable, the ablest, and most thoroughly

finished of any of its author's productions. It has numerous passages written with rare beauty and felicity of expression ; passages which will bear reading more than once, and which are precisely such passages as one wishes always to read aloud to the one he loves best. There is not much of that ideality, about which its author talks, in its conception or its execution ; but it is by no means destitute of sentiment, and of sentiment for the most part pure and elevated. The moral effect of the first half of the book will in general be not unhealthy.

Zanoni himself, though, as we have said, to a great extent a copy, and very unnatural and inconsistent, when looked upon as the Chaldean sage of five thousand years' standing, is nevertheless upon the whole a character of considerable worth, of generous and noble sentiments, and decidedly superior to any other of Bulwer's heroes. Between him and Ernest Maltravers there is a distance. Viola is unquestionably an improvement upon Alice and Fanny. Old Mejnour also says now and then a sensible thing, and would be tolerable on a stormy evening, when more agreeable company could not be looked for.

Possibly also the author has partly intended that Zanoni should be taken as half allegory, as we take some of Goethe's works. Taken in this way, it contains some sound philosophy. In Zanoni we see the immortality of the affections. Nations may rise and fall ; time may change the face of all things around us ; we may have loved and been loved, loved and been deceived, followed one by one the objects of our love to the tomb, and yet we despair not, lose none of our power to love, none of our craving for sympathy with our kind, and for one dearer than all the rest. Your hoary Chaldean sage, over whom has passed a hundred centuries, who has experienced all the vicissitudes of life and love, ever, as in the first flush of youthful feeling, goes out of himself to find the object by whom and in whom alone he can live, — can still sympathize with all human kind, and bind himself indissolubly to one. This

is all well, and all true to nature ; but nothing very recondite, nothing very original. The heart never grows old ; the affections are immortal. Time and change may pass over us, and over all dear to us, but they remain fresh and green as in the springtime of life. So long as man lives he loves, for to live is to love ; and our life is pure and intense just in proportion to the purity and intensity of our love.

Thus much are we willing to concede to our friends, who, we find, with scarcely an exception, are admirers of *Zanoni* ; but we cannot agree with them to commend a work merely for the beauty and finish of its parts. We have no sympathy with that taste that dwells on the imperfection merely of some of the details of a work of art, which, taken as a whole, is to every large and generous soul, true, beautiful, grand, and inspiring ; and just as little with that other taste, which can satisfy itself with the simple excellence of detail, the exquisiteness of a single couplet in an intolerably dull poem, a single passage of great truth and beauty in a huge unreadable volume of prose, when the work taken as a whole exhibits a faulty design, a false philosophy, or a false morality. The merits of *Zanoni* belong to its parts ; its faults to its general spirit, design, and philosophy.

We are sorry to disagree with our friends, still more sorry are we to speak disparagingly of one whom we have heretofore defended. We have been among the staunchest friends of Sir Edward Lytton Bulwer. Ours, we believe, has been the only Quarterly Review in this country that has ventured to praise him. We hailed, in another place, with cordial welcome, the first appearance of his *Pelham*, and have read, as soon as possible after publication, every one of his works that has issued from the American press. We stood by him from the appearance of *Pelham* to that of *Night and Morning*. It has been therefore not without a struggle that we have found ourselves obliged at length to part company with him. A man, who has furnished us the amount of intellectual food this author has, and with

whom we have communed, through the medium of his works, for so many years, has of necessity become to us a portion of our life, and we part with more than a brother when we part with him. But there is that which is dearer than this intimacy contracted between an author and his readers. We forsake our dearest friend the moment we suspect him of being false, or capable of proving false to the sacred cause of popular enfranchisement, or social amelioration. He, who paints the vices or crimes of the people in their efforts to establish a free government, so as to gladden the hearts and strengthen the hands of tyrants and aristocrats, not only proves himself capable of betraying the popular cause, but actually betrays it; and if he be one who has been reckoned among the prominent advocates of that cause, we will not hesitate to do whatever we can to fix the brand of infamy upon his name. We have never forgiven, we never will forgive, Edmund Burke his infamous *Reflections on the French Revolution*. In publishing that work he more than cancelled all his former services to the cause of freedom. All we can say of him is, let his memory be forever execrated by the friends of truth, righteousness, and freedom. No literary, no personal merit, can outweigh even indifference to the cause of social progress, much less the betrayal of that cause.

It has been suggested to us that Sir Edward's attack on the French Revolution has resulted from despair of the popular cause. We can pardon something to feelings of despair; for there is something in the stupidity of the mass, in their readiness to follow their enemies and to desert their real friends, that may almost justify a momentary spleen, almost a momentary despair. But after all, this spleen, this despair can affect none but a sentimentalist. He who has risen, as Bulwer would have us believe that he has, from the sentimental to the ideal, can never be affected by either. He never is splenetic, never desponds. He is always calm, serene, hopeful, for he knows in whom he has believed, and his faith is equal to all emergencies, like that of the

early Christians, overcoming the world. If the people were ready and able to respond to the first note of reform we sound, they would prove either that they need no reforming, or that they are already so nearly up with us, that the adoption of all we can propose would prove to be no advancement. He who has had faith in the progress of humanity, but has lost it, has lost it because it was with him only a sentiment, never an idea.

But even if Sir Edward had undergone no change, if he were as true now to the cause of the people as we once thought him, we are not sure that we should not censure him. We own that we believe feeling worthy of as much reliance in estimating a work of art, as what is called cool, impartial judgment. We own that we judge of all works according to our feelings. Time and events have changed to no small extent, what was for years the habitual state of our feelings. The world and its contents, life and its concerns are not to us what they once were. Ask us not whence nor wherefore. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth." Life's mysteries who can explain? or who tell whence come these new tones of feeling, changing the hues of all on which we gaze? Our convictions, our doctrines, our purposes may remain the same, but suddenly light streams in from an unexpected quarter, or through an accustomed medium, and lo, we stand in a world both new and strange. The hues of this world have changed, and we confess that our tastes have been revolutionized. The kind of literature, in which our youth and early manhood found delight and nourishment, has lost its charms for us, grown distasteful and offensive. There was a time, when we sympathized, like most of our age, with what has been not inaptly called the "Satanic school." We admired the daring, self-relying spirit, that deemed it a derogation from its own manhood to kneel even before High Heaven. We embraced Cain and Lucifer as brother spirits. But we have ceas-

ed to discover true courage in daring to blaspheme, or true manhood in refusing to acknowledge a superior. Man never appears more truly heroic than when shrinking from the least dishonest or dishonorable act ; never more truly great and noble than when, with meek and reverent spirit, he bows low at the feet of the Greatest and Best. We ask not for the spirit that dares defy heaven and hell, to brave the wrath of the Almighty, sooner than not gratify its own passions, or follow its own headstrong will ; but the spirit which, trembling before all wrong-doing, is able to obey the call of duty, truth, righteousness, love of God and of man, though compelled to go through exile and the dungeon, to the scaffold or the cross.

And even more objectionable still than the "Satanic school" do we regard this sentimentalism, which has been vented upon the world by the *Nouvelle Héloïse* of Rousseau, and the *Sorrows of Werter* by Goethe. It is weak and weakening, and whatever weakens is immoral. This refined sentimentalism, which with us passes under the respectable name of transcendentalism, is altogether more to be dreaded than open, avowed, unblushing sensualism. The last may be seen and guarded against, but the other steals in with a fine phrase, or in a caressing tone, and pollutes the heart before the least alarm has been taken. Sentimentalism also does its principal mischief among the most gifted, and those who have had the fairest opportunities for intellectual and artistic culture. It touches, pollutes first and foremost the amiable, the imaginative, the educated, the refined, making too often of the abodes of wealth, ease, leisure, and refinement, mere hotbeds of vice and corruption. Sensuality lies ever at the bottom of sentimentalism, and they who deny the body will be found to practise less self-restraint than they who deny the soul. But even when it does not pollute, when it does not serve as the pimp to sensuality, sentimentalism enfeebles, renders the character sickly, and prevents the growth of robust and manly virtues.

Bulwer belongs in part to this sentimental school, and

in part to the Satanic school. His chief admirers are either sentimentalists, or persons who at bottom have a lurking fondness for the Satanic. It is true that he inserts in his novels numerous moral, philosophical, and literary essays, of considerable value, but few ever read them. The incidents of the story, and the dramatic interest of the work, if sufficient to carry us through it, necessarily unfit us for reading dry didactic disquisitions, although well written, and full of practical good sense. The secret of Sir Edward's popularity, after the interest of the plot and character, is in the food he administers to the lovers of fine sentiment, and to the admirers of the Satanic school of Byron. We will not call him a scoffer; far from it; he even speaks of religion in very respectful terms, sometimes professes even to be religious and to believe in immortality; but his piety and faith rarely disturb those who have neither. The truth is, we suspect, that we should condemn in Bulwer now much which we formerly commended, did not notice, or regarded as merely venial.

Moreover, we fancy that we are not alone in this change of feeling to which we have confessed. The change we have personally undergone is only that which our whole generation are undergoing. The men of our age are no longer satisfied with what delighted them at twenty. There is a seriousness coming over all now approaching middle age, uncommon in its depth and religious character. Never before has there been such deep, earnest religious feelings. We are beginning to see our churches filled, not merely by women and children, but by full-grown men. This is not only true of our own country, but of all Christendom. Throughout all Christendom the tone of religious feeling deepens as we approach the heart of the century. Never were men so in earnest, never were they so open to moral and religious impressions. The old Voltairean sneer no longer curls the lip, and the Laras, Cains, and Lucifers have had their day; puny but corrupting sentimentalism droops and dies, and there is throughout the whole civilized world a manifest ten-

dency on the one hand to the Ideal, and on the other to a return to Nature and Reality.

We will be just to Bulwer. He feels or perceives this change, and aspires to represent this tendency to the Ideal. This is evident in the *Pilgrims of the Rhine*, *Leila*, and especially *Zanoni*. He has struggled to erect an altar to the worship of the Ideal. This is his merit. He attains to the Ideal rarely, if ever; but he deposes to the fact, that there is an ideal, and that they, who pursue it, are not necessarily fools or madmen. This is well, and may go far in preventing us from anathematizing him outright. The tendency towards Nature and Reality is represented by Wordsworth, and is seen in the immense popularity of Boz. Boz, compared with great men, is by no means great. His merit is that of an accurate observer, and pleasant and faithful narrator of what he has actually seen. He has neither wit, nor fancy, nor invention; but he has some humor, considerable pathos, and a hearty, genial temper. His mind has no great compass or strength, no great depth or earnestness; and his works can occupy no permanent place in English literature. His Weller jokes will have their day; he may be a lion for a season, but he cannot last. Nevertheless, the immense run of his works indicate a revolution in the public taste, and its return to a more robust and healthy state.

Still we cannot accept Wordsworth for our poet, or Boz for our novelist. We cannot be contented with these Dutch painters, notwithstanding the truth and fidelity with which they copy nature and reality. We too love nature and reality, but we cannot consent to sacrifice the Ideal, or to see its worship deserted. The worship of the Ideal is our religion. Bulwer confesses to this worship, and so far so good; but he does not worship in spirit and in truth. His novels will satisfy no one who is really in the church of the Ideal. The ideal disclosed by the Gospel of Jesus, and which, in order to be true Christians, we must pursue with heart and soul, mind and strength, is infinitely broader, richer, loftier, than the author of *Zanoni* has seen in his



most rapt moments. He that is least in the church of the Ideal is greater than he. He is too much of a dilettante, too little in earnest for a communicant of that church. He has not wedded his soul to ideal truth, beauty, goodness, and become able to launch away into the Future, the maker and the herald of a new and nobler world. He never lets go the present ; never forgets himself ; he is himself in the foreground of all his pictures ; his ideal is the place he shall hold in the living generation, or in the minds and hearts of the generations to come.

“I do confess that I have wished to give  
My land the gift of no ignoble name,  
And in that holier life have sought to live  
Whose air, the Hope of Fame.”

The true idealist, he whose soul is wedded to the Ideal, could make no such confession as this. He who can have, in what he does, reference to his own fame, save so far as his good name is essential to enable him to serve his land or his race, has never paid his devotion at the high and holy shrine of the Ideal, where Plato worshipped, and where have worshipped all the gifted and the good, who have toiled, suffered, lived, or died, to raise man from earth, and to set him forward towards his heaven and his God. These have indeed left “no ignoble name” to their land ; their bright and brightening fame is the noble heritage of the race ; but they pursued it not, craved it not ; but worked on with no thought, no hope, no wish, but to work out a higher good for their brethren, to realize for man on earth the glorious visions of truth, beauty, and goodness, which were ever present to their lofty and aspiring souls. No man has risen to the Ideal, who is not so wedded to the ideas with which he is filled, as to be incapable of living for aught else than their realization. But

“Better than fame is still the thirst for fame,  
The constant training for a glorious strife ;—  
The Athlete nurtured for the Olympian Game,  
Gains strength, at least for life.

"He who desires the conquest over time  
Already lives in some immortal dream,  
And the thought glides beneath the Ideal Clime,  
With moonlight on its stream!

"I thank thee, Hope, if vain, blessed still,  
For much that makes the soul forget the clay;  
The morning dew still balms the saddened hill,  
Though sun forsakes the day.

"And what is Fame but faith in holy things,  
That soothe the life, and shall outlive the tomb?  
A reverent listening for some angel-wings,  
That cower above the gloom?

"To gladden earth with Beauty, or men's lives  
To serve with Action, or their souls with Truth,  
These are the ends for which the hope survives  
The ignobler thirsts of youth."

True, these are the ends the Christian idealist has ever in view, but who can confound the desire to embellish the earth, to serve men by our actions, and to enlighten them by our doctrines, with the desire of fame? or confound the effort to do this with the striving after fame? And is he governed by the loftiest ideal, who struggles to do good merely to cultivate his own being, to manifest his own strength and energy? After all, beautiful as these stanzas certainly are, they present no higher ideal than that of self-culture, the cultivation and perfection of our own natures, of which we have had so much in Goethe and his followers. Here is no genuine worship of the Ideal. He, who serves men for the sake of the loaves and fishes, whether he seek those loaves and fishes in the shape of wealth, pleasure, fame, or the cultivation of his own being, is no worthy communicant in the church of the Ideal, and eats and drinks damnation to himself.

"And is not this a sister-hope with thee,  
Lovely Religion, — foe alike to time?  
Does not God's smile light heaven on earth to see  
Man's faith in ends sublime?"

Unquestionably. Man's faith in ends sublime is, no doubt, true faith in the Ideal, — is a religious faith.

But is the hope, that by serving mankind we shall gain a name, or a valuable self-development, a sister-hope with religion? Is the faith merely to believe, that to seek sublime ends will turn out better for us than to seek low and worthless ends, a true religious faith? Talk not of the ideal, of man's faith in ends sublime, thou who canst ask these questions. God, no doubt, smiles to see man's faith in ends sublime, but we see no sublimity in any end that centres in self. No, Sir Edward; the faith thou proposest is simply faith to believe that virtue is a better calculation than vice.

“ Enough if, haply, in the after days,  
When by the altar sleeps the funeral stone, —  
When gone the mists our passions raise,  
And truth is seen alone.

“ When Calumny its prey can wound no more,  
And fawns its late repentance on the dead, —  
If gentle footsteps from some kindlier shore  
Pause by my narrow bed ;

“ Or if yon children, wheos young sounds of glee  
Float to mine ear on the evening gales along,  
Recall some echo in their years to be,  
Of not all-perished song.”

Here is quite a pretty sentiment, but no genuine idealism. Surely he has not risen high into the ideal, who feels that it will be enough if they, who are now children, shall sing some of his lays in their old age, or if some gentler footsteps pause, when he is dead, by his grave-stone. Such prettinesses find no place in the thoughts of him who is filled with a great and glorious idea, of him who has an ideal truth, beauty, wisdom, or goodness, which haunts him by day and by night, and which he burns to realize. No ; he, who worships the ideal, aspires to somewhat higher and holier. As a man, he may die and be forgotten ; but he cannot rest till he has done his best to infuse a new and nobler life into his race, and to make the earth smile with the freshness and beauty of Eden, ere man ate of the forbidden fruit. He aspires to immortality indeed, but it

is to immortality in his deeds, immortality in the virtue that goes out of him, and through which the nations are healed.

But enough. Since writing the first half of this article we have received and read *Eva, and other Poems*, by the author of Zanoni. Without feeling able to award them the highest praise, we may say that we have read them with a good deal of pleasure, and to them the author owes it, that this article has not terminated in as severe a tone as that in which it commenced. The poem on *The Desire of Fame*, the greater part of which we have extracted, strikes us as very beautiful; and though it does not prove the author a worshipper of the Ideal, it has made us feel somewhat softened towards him, and enabled us to part from him in sadness, and not in wrath. It is perhaps after all but justice to say, that Bulwer represents the tendency to the Ideal, as well as it is represented by any of the popular novelists of the day, though this may be merely saying that the Ideal is unrepresented in the fashionable literature of our times. The Ideal finds its worshippers not among the rich and noble, the fashionable and the renowned, but among the lowly and obscure, poor fishermen, boatmen, and tent-makers, eating their paschal lamb with their Master, unobserved in some upper room in Jerusalem, while all the nation go up to the Temple to celebrate the feast, with pomp and parade, with timbrel and song. Yet one day the walls of Jerusalem fall, the flames consume the Temple, the plough passes through the Holy of Holies, and the whole nation is carried into captivity, to be a hissing and a bye-word to all the earth; and one day also these few fishermen, boatmen, and tent-makers, who have communed with the Ideal, till they have grown into the divinity they worship, come forth from their upper room, simple in attire, in appearance, in speech, and manners, and lo, the face of all things changes as they advance; old thrones and dynasties, old temples and hierarchies, hoary with the dust of a hundred centuries, crumble away before them, a new kingdom springs up at their word, a

new throne is set, an everlasting throne, which the saints shall possess forever and ever. Some obscure prophet, calling out now in an unheeded voice for the melioration of the laborer, for freedom for the captive, or for the second coming of Christ, content to be poor and despised of men, having no beauty or comeliness that we should desire him, is perhaps our true idealist, who is erecting in the heart of his race, unsuspected, the altar at which one day all men shall worship. Ask not who he is. When the veil of your old temples is rent in twain from top to bottom, and the emptiness of your old sanctuaries is exposed, you will recognise him, and hail him as one who cometh to you in the name of the Lord.

What we want in our literature now is some one to arise, who shall unite in himself, in a living synthesis, this tendency to the Ideal of which we have spoken, and this other tendency to Nature and Reality. Such a man we must have, such a man we shall have, perhaps we have him already in our midst, unrecognised. But this man is not Sir Edward Lytton Bulwer. He is neither a true idealist, nor does he excel as a representative of nature and reality. He will not be the father of the literature of the nineteenth century. From him there is nothing to hope.

EDITOR.

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ART. IV. — *An Introductory Address, or Remarks made by the Editor on resuming his labors as a Preacher of the Gospel.* Boston: First Sunday in April, 1842.

It is well known, for we have been somewhat communicative, that the Editor of this Journal was, has been, or is a professed preacher of the Gospel. In 1836, he left a parish over which he was settled, and came to this city, at the request of a few friends, for the purpose of gathering into a religious society a portion of

the community, which usually attended no place of religious worship. In prosecuting this object, he committed some blunders, and after making a good many sacrifices, and suffering much in reputation, he abandoned the enterprise the third year from the commencement. Receiving a small place under government, he ceased for a time to preach. The effort he had made, the misrepresentation of which he had been the subject, had discouraged him, and it need not be disguised, had soured him towards a portion of the clergy of this city, who had not extended to him the sympathy to which he knew himself entitled, and without which it was impossible for him to succeed in the very delicate undertaking to which he had been invited. It did therefore remain for some time doubtful in his mind, whether he should ever return to his profession or not. He was determined not to do it, unless he could do so without having to fight the religious world as well as the irreligious.

Let me drop the third person and speak in my own name. I have always loved to preach the Gospel. Theology has from a child been my favorite study. Politics have been but a mere episode in my life, and would not have been even that, had I not seemed to see my country in such a crisis, as to call for the aid of every citizen. I felt that I could do somewhat, at least that I could try to do somewhat for the cause of freedom and good government. I have done what I could. My countrymen will, to say the least, be none the worse for what I have done. Even while most thoroughly engrossed with political discussions, I was carrying on at the same time my religious and theological investigations, and I felt occasionally the wish to resume preaching. The three years I had spent as a layman had enabled me to see the world on some, to me, new sides; and I felt that they had but qualified me all the better to discharge my duties as a minister of Jesus. Nor was this all. Those three years were to me years of intense suffering. I felt that I had deserted my post, abandoned the cause to which I was early

consecrated, and I could not be satisfied with myself. An opportunity offering last April, I returned with joy to the pursuit I should never have forsaken. The following are the introductory remarks I made on returning once more to the pulpit. I insert them, because I hold all my readers my personal friends, and foolishly fancy that my personal movements are not altogether indifferent to them. They must pardon me ; nay, I will not say so. Those with whom I have communed, and who have communed with me quarterly for these now nearly five years, *are* my personal friends and need no excuse.

EDITOR.

It is with no ordinary feelings, that after a virtual suspension of my labors as a minister of Jesus, for nearly three years, I resume them again, with the hope of continuing them so long as God shall lend me life, strength, and opportunity. I return to my early profession, that which I entered from choice and conviction of duty, and to which I solemnly, and at the time, sincerely, pledged my life ; and I return to it with chastened feelings, but with a fervent prayer to God, that my future labors may be more acceptable to the Great Head of the Church, and more profitable to my fellow men, than have proved my past labors.

Some of those who hear me now have listened to me before. They will find me the same man that I was when they first heard me, but I hope wiser and better. Six years have passed over my head since I first came to this city, and I would fain hope not without effect. They have been to me years full of events. In them I have lived much, had no little of painful experience. I come to you now, as I said, with chastened feelings. But I do not come in despair. I come with less of spasmodic zeal, with less of apparent warmth,

it may be ; but I come with a stronger faith, with higher and firmer hopes. It has taken me long to find and fix my faith ; it has taken me long to qualify myself, even in my own estimation, to preach the Gospel. The long experience through which I have passed has in some sort fitted me to preach, for it has given me a full and living faith in God, in man, and in man's progressive and immortal capabilities. I come before you, therefore, at least a firm believer.

When I commenced preaching in this city some six years ago, I had not precisely the same special purpose in view that I have now. I aim now at more, and at less than I did then. Then my special purpose was to preach down infidelity, and to gather the laboring classes and their friends into a society. This is not my special purpose now. I have no concern with infidelity ; and standing in a Christian pulpit, I know no distinction of classes. I come now to preach the Gospel in simplicity, and as far as God permits, with power, so that Christ may be proved unto them that believe, to be the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation.

The cause, for which Jesus lived and died, is the cause of God and of humanity. No man can defend that cause from pulpit, tribune, or press, without defending humanity, pleading everywhere for the wronged and the oppressed, and proving that his sympathies are with the masses, his hopes are for the millions, and his labors for the down-trodden ; but if true to that cause, he will recognise all to be of one blood, all to be children of the same God, and he will speak and act for what he believes to be the *common* salvation. The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain, and it is for the deliverance of the whole into the glorious



liberty of the sons of God, that we should live, labor, and, if need be, suffer and die. I am not then now a preacher to this or to that class. I preach, as God gives me utterance, to simple human beings, who come to hear me, come they from the more favored or from the less favored classes. All are alike human beings ; all are alike sinners ; all alike need repentance ; and none of them can be saved but by one and the same crucified Redeemer.

I come moreover not as an inquirer, as I did six years ago, but as a preacher. I am not here to inquire what I ought to believe, but to tell you what I believe. I have positive doctrines to state, a positive faith to preach, and my purpose will not be to speculate, to philosophize, but so far as possible to point every hungry soul to the bread of life, the living bread which came down from heaven, and gives life to the world, and not only to point to it, but to do what I can to persuade every one to eat and live.

Six years ago I wished to depart in forms of faith and worship, as far as I could without abandoning principle, from the more generally approved forms ; now my wish is to depart in faith and practice as little as I can, without sacrificing principle to a desire of conformity. The true Christian and really independent preacher conforms whenever he can in consistency with high-minded integrity, but hesitates not a moment to dissent, and no matter how widely, whenever in his judgment God, truth, humanity, require him to dissent. True independence, manliness of character, consists neither in conformity nor in dissent, but in a calm, earnest, brave adherence to and defence of our honest convictions, whether with the multitude, or whether alone with our

God. I am not here to propose innovations, to urge departures from old forms of worship, but to do what I can to aid on the great work, which is common to all Christians, of forming Christ more and more in the heart of the individual, and in that of the community.

Thus much I have thought it not improper to say, on reappearing once more in the pulpit, with the intention of devoting myself hereafter to the duties of a preacher of the Gospel. I am here to raise no new banner. So far as I own any sectarian name, it is the one I have long borne, that is, Unitarian. But I own in reality no banner but that of Christ and him crucified, and would rally my brethren around no other standard than the Gospel of Peace and Love.

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**ART. V. — *A Muck Manual for Farmers.* By SAMUEL L. DANA. Lowell: Daniel Bixby. 1842. pp. 229.**

CONSIDERING that Agriculture is one of the oldest of arts, if not prior to all deserving the name; that it is emphatically *the* art upon which the greater part of mankind and all their dependent animals rely for subsistence; without the products of which wealth and power would have no value, and glory be an emptiness and a mockery; it seems strange, that through the long ages that have passed since the human race began, no traces should have come down of the application of the principles of genuine science to the elucidation of its laws, and the direction of its processes. That much practical skill was acquired thousands of years ago we have no reason to doubt; we cannot indeed say with confidence, that such skill might not have been on the average as great as is now possessed, but all the rules of proceeding appear merely empirical, indications from the repetitions of experiments, either made at random or from the observation of the efforts of some accident. Of the intimate structure of vegetables, and the intimate nature of their organized and organic constituents, we have no information from ancient days, and no sound reasons ex-

planatory of the nature and manner of operation of the directions inculcated.

As, however, recent researches have shown, that the ancients carried to great perfection the practice of many arts, supposed till lately to be the inventions of modern times, we have reason to suppose, that they may have had a proportionate degree of science, which, if so, must have been lost in the changes and ruin which time and fate brought upon the early and highly civilized kingdoms of antiquity. Among these vanished lights may have been the knowledge of vegetable Physiology and organic Chemistry, and it would be a matter of just surprise to find that our modern acquisitions in these branches were anticipated by the Egyptians, no more than to find, that they understood the chymical principles of other arts, in many of which they equalled and in some surpassed us, or than to ascertain, that the gigantic masses of the Pyramids, and other colossal structures, were not reared by the mere unbounded application of brute force, but by the use of mechanical powers under the guidance of high scientific knowledge.

Still with the garden of Nature before his eyes man has not been a sluggish or unobservant laborer. He has carefully watched her works, and endeavored to second or imitate her processes; and though occasionally marring his own efforts by misconceptions as to what was to be done, yet sometimes finding success as the result of well directed labor, and sometimes blundering into it by a way he did not expect, he has gone onward in modern times in the path of practical improvement, to a degree of perfection that may well command praise.

Within the last century the birth and advancement of modern Chemistry have opened to him new sources of knowledge, and furnished him with new means for obtaining it. The more perfect investigation of vegetable physiology has lent its powerful aid, and by the united application of the two, the often despised, yet always immeasurably important and truly noble, art of agriculture is rising from a handicraft to the rank of a science. Not indeed we confess with the many, for as in the practice of all other arts the bulk of the operatives must be guided by rules, formed by understandings more enlightened than their own; but still such rules are in the process of formation, and intellects of the highest power, and most extensive and varied acquirements, are tasking themselves for their production, and bending their forces and their acquisitions to the purpose of discovering and unfolding the secrets of fertility, and causing the earth surely to bring forth its abun-

dance for the various tribes that God has placed upon its bosom.

We are glad to see evidences of various kinds, that our own country does not mean to be backward in the endeavors of learning to contribute to sustenance, and that the science of our citizens and countrymen is beginning to be directed to an end, than which none can be more truly gainful to the nation, or more thoroughly subservient to its true prosperity. Having lately been presented with an American edition of a work of one of the great Chimists of Germany, through the zeal of one of our own, we are now presented with an original work tending to the same end by another ; and though the volume before us is unpretending in size, and almost unpleasantly unassuming in title, its name being as rustic as its immediate subject, yet we think that we shall be able to show, that beneath this unassuming exterior and address are contained, not hidden, the results of long study and much scientific skill, with abundance of sound judgment and good common sense.

The book is briefly dedicated to the citizens of Lowell, and is stated to be the "pith of eight lectures on the chemistry of soil and manure delivered at their request."

In accordance with their annunciation we find the five first chapters devoted to teaching the nature of soil, the properties of its various constituent parts, and their action in promoting the growth of vegetation. We have often noticed one great fault in scientific men writing for popular use, that they are apt to forget the relative position of themselves and their readers, and to incur the censure bestowed by Goldsmith upon Burke,

"Who too deep for his hearers still went on refining,  
And thought of convincing while they thought of dining."

They cannot content themselves with making such statements as are necessary for the purpose in a general way, merely indicating the nice distinctions that are established in scientific doctrine, but bring them all forth, generally uselessly and sometimes injuriously, wearying or perplexing the very minds they wish to enlighten ; forgetting that the darkness of "excessive light" is as prejudicial to useful vision, as the "palpable obscure" of Egypt. From this fault we are glad to be able to say, that our author is in a great measure free ; his language is usually very simple and direct, his general explanations clear and well directed. The chapters are divided into short sections, admitting of easy reference from one to another, for the purpose of elucidating or enforcing the point immediately

under consideration, and occasionally, as the investigation of the subject advances, the annunciation of its result, so far as obtained, is given in the form of a brief principle, easily understood and retained in the memory. In some instances we think his style rather too brief, and too much wanting in the usual expletives that make the language more naturally and easily understood; whence, in enforcing a chymical argument, or laying down the consecutive steps of chymical action, the propositions, from the brevity of their announcement, seem to crowd too fast upon the attention of a reader not familiar with them, and produce fatigue. There are also a few errors of expression, but these things we look upon as the "*maculæ*," to which Horace was willing to be charitable even in poetry, and which must therefore be of less consequence still in a work like the one before us.

The first chapter is devoted to an explanation of the "Geology of Soil," giving the meaning of rocks and earth, considered as *primary* and *secondary*, of the natural limits of plants, and of isothermal and isochymical lines as affecting their artificial cultivation. In accordance with the principles of adapting his doctrine to the purpose in view, the author's geological explanations are brief and general, and considering the subject agriculturally, after a slight indication of more minute directions, and short but satisfactory reasons, he gives, as the results of the examination of this subject, the following principles.

1. "*That there is but one rock, consequently but one soil.*"
2. "*That rocks do not affect the vegetation which covers them.*"
3. "*That rocks have not formed the soil which covers them.*"

Although partial or particular exceptions may undoubtedly be taken and sustained in opposition to these rules, yet as general principles we think they will be found true.

The second chapter is devoted to the chymical constitution of rocks and soil, that is, of soil considered as an assemblage of inorganic substances. Excluding as before the partial deposits of particular elements, and taking the constituents of the great rock formations, and of the mixture of their shattered and pulverized fragments, of which inorganic soil consists, they are shown to consist of twelve elementary substances, easily reduced into three classes, the various combinations of which are explained with much simplicity and clearness, as well as the general principles of definite proportions, in obedience to which such combinations take place; and the leading features of the doctrine of equivalents. This subject is pursued in

the subsequent chapters devoted to the properties and chymical actions of these elements ; and after an examination of the quantities of particular substances of this class, that enter into the composition of vegetable bodies, both as existing in soil generally, and as found in a given amount of vegetable growth, the result is announced in the following important but not generally believed principle.

4. "*All soils contain enough of lime, alkali, and other inorganic elements, for any crop grown on them.*"

This doctrine will doubtless appear very strange and incredible to many, and is certainly very much in opposition to the popular belief, that certain crops cannot succeed well upon the soil of many parts of New England, on account of the deficiency of lime. There seems no reason, however, to doubt the evidence here given, and apart from the irrefutability of the scientific investigation, we have long been convinced from observation of agricultural proceedings, that this belief was erroneous, and that where certain crops did fail for want of a sufficient supply of these ingredients, it was not that they were not contained in the soil, but that the mode of culture was not such as to make them available to the crop.

In the fourth chapter we come to the consideration of the organic elements of soil ; but before entering upon the full consideration of these, while pointing out the general connexion between them and the inorganic elements, the author furnishes us with two new principles.

6. "*That soil consisting chiefly of one silicate, or salt, is always barren.*"

7. "*That one base may be substituted for another in an isomorphous proportion.*"

The last principle in certain localities may be of great practical utility.

The great mass of organic matter contained in the soil Dr. Dana, in accordance with views that he has heretofore maintained, and which he briefly but clearly and forcibly recapitulates in the present work, arranges under the term of *geine* ; mentioning, however, the divisions made by chimists in prosecuting a more minute analysis. For the purposes of the practical agriculturalist we apprehend that the term is well chosen and sufficiently distinct. To investigators in the laboratory the minor divisions may have their value ; but mixed as they all are in the soil, consisting of the same general elements, and passing from one into another, as many of them do, by slight variations of continually changing influ-

ences, which modify their proportions and affinities, it seems to us to be useless to encumber with them the attention and memories of those, who are generally but too little willing to mix even a small proportion of study with their more active pursuits. Of the importance of this great element we shall give the statement in his own words. "The great practical lesson of all agricultural experience teaches, that geine is essential to the growth and perfection of seed; that without geine crops are not raised. Geine is as essential to plants as food is to animals. So far as nourishment is derived from the soil, geine is the food of plants. It may be laid down as the eighth principle of agricultural chemistry, *that geine is in some form essential to agriculture.*" — p. 62. Again, p. 98, in speaking of the action of soda upon geine, he says, "If this has been long in an insoluble and perfectly useless condition, it is now rendered soluble, and hence supplies plants with food." And in p. 100, "Fertility depends wholly upon salts and geine. Without the last there is no fruit formed."

We have been thus particular in specifying our author's views upon this subject, because we perceive in them a direct opposition to views advanced by the celebrated Liebig, to the recent republication of whose work on the Organic Chemistry of Agriculture we have before adverted. The ground taken by Dr. Dana seems to be, beyond the possibility of doubt, that geine itself in a state of solution is food for plants, that it is their usual and natural nourishment, that in proportion as they are supplied with this under proper circumstances in other respects, they become vigorous and productive, and that they cannot be naturally so without it. We do not consider him in advancing these views as having any reference to a plant plunged in a pot, basking in the regulated heat of a conservatory or hot house, and stimulated to unwonted and unnatural energy by the application of the concentrated principles of manure. Such a plant may linger for a greater or less time in a sickly existence, or, after maintaining a specious and unsound luxuriance for a season or two, perish prematurely of over exhaustion. The broad culture of the garden and the field, beneath all the vicissitudes of the seasons, with all useful growth either annual or perennial in health and hardy richness, is that to which we presume he means to be understood as generally applying his remarks, not refusing, however, to have them extended to all such instances of cultivation, as require an artificial climate and soil formed in imitation of those of which the subjects are natives.

If we understand Liebig rightly, he expressly refuses to geine, or as he terms it *humus*, for we conceive that as a generic appellation this means the same thing as the geine of our author, the property of being the food of plants, or of being necessary or conducive to their perfection. The most that he seems willing to concede to it is, that in the early stage of their existence, during germination, and till the young plant acquires its proper leaves, it may assist in forming a proper nidus, or place of deposit, and by decomposition afford a supply of carbonic acid for the early wants of the embryo. After the plant has obtained all its proper organs, he seems willing to regard it as no longer depending upon the organic constituents of the soil for the means of increase and arriving at perfection, but as deriving its whole nourishment from the chiminal constituents of the air and water; so that after its early youth the earth is of no advantage to it, but as supplying a place upon which it may stand firmly by means of its roots, mechanical facilities for enabling those roots to perform their functions of absorption and excretion, and those inorganic constituents of the soil that enter into the composition of vegetables. We will give his own statements. "Humus does not nourish plants, by being taken up and assimilated in its unaltered state, but by presenting a slow and lasting source of carbonic acid, which is absorbed by the roots, and is the principal nutriment of young plants at a time when, being destitute of leaves, they are unable to extract food from the atmosphere." — p. 117. "When a plant is quite matured, and when the organs, by which it obtains food from the atmosphere, are formed, the carbonic acid of the soil is no longer required. Deficiency of moisture in the soil, or its complete dryness, does not now check the growth of a plant, provided it receives from the dew and the atmosphere as much as is requisite for the process of assimilation. During the heat of summer it derives its carbon exclusively from the atmosphere." — p. 106. "All the hydrogen necessary for the formation of an organic compound is supplied to a plant by the decomposition of water." — p. 122. "No conclusion then can have a better foundation than this, that it is the ammonia of the atmosphere which furnishes nitrogen to plants." — p. 146. "Plants, and consequently animals, must therefore derive their nitrogen from the atmosphere." — p. 129. "Carbonic acid, water, and ammonia contain the elements necessary for the support of animals and vegetables." — p. 147. "Carbonic acid, water, and ammonia are necessary for the existence of plants,



because they contain the elements from which their organs are formed ; but other substances are likewise requisite for the formation of certain organs, destined for special functions peculiar to each family of plants. Plants obtain these substances from inorganic matter." — p. 147. "In whatever form therefore we supply plants with those substances which are the product of their own action, in no instance do they appear to have any effect on their growth, or to replace what they had lost. Sugar, gum, and starch are not food for plants, and the same must be said of humic acid, which is so closely allied to them in composition." — p. 181. We think the doctrine we have attributed to Liebig may be considered as fairly made out by these citations. He makes many ingenious and plausible statements and arguments in support of it, though we think the various trains of his reasonings are not always consistent ; with that, however, we have nothing to do at present. Our great business is with Dr. Dana's work ; and as there seems on this subject to be such wide difference of opinion between two such high authorities, such as is our duty to point out, we thought it best to let each speak for himself.

After a careful consideration of the two doctrines, we have come to a conclusion in favor of the superior correctness of that of our author, as one supported by experiment, and consonant to the experience, common sense, and judgment of agriculturists generally, in all ages, that is to say, of the far greater part of mankind. Why are the fertile plains of the West so superior to our own sterile New England, but from the greater abundance of their rich vegetable mould, that is, geine, decayed and decaying humus ? Why even in New England is the black earth of the valleys so much more esteemed by the farmer for its ability to repay his toil, than light sandy, gravelly, or clayey plains and hills ? Why are drained and reclaimed swamps and peat meadows so extolled for their perennial productiveness ? Why is the compost of peat and stable manure found so fertilizing ? Surely the observation of such multitudes, and among them so many intelligent and enlightened persons, for so many centuries, is not a thing lightly to be set aside. Were the opposite theory correct, there could certainly be but little difference in the natural productiveness of sandy plains and rich bottoms. A little humus or geine, to supply carbonic acid at starting, is all that is wanting, and dry and barren indeed must be sand that will not supply enough to last a young plant till it has put forth its proper

leaves. If after that the atmosphere will supply it with nourishment, we do not see why it may not thrive and prosper as well in one situation as another. Yet it does not. We have repeatedly seen plants coming up in the spring from seeds sown on sandy plains, go forward during their first stages with more luxuriance of growth than upon a rich vegetable mould immediately adjoining, showing that there was no want of nourishment at that time; but after having come fairly and fully into leaf, under the same circumstances of atmospheric influence, the former became stunted, sickly, and abortive, while the latter continued to increase in vigor to a full and productive maturity. Yet the soils were formed of the same inorganic elements, and differed in nothing but the greater or less abundance of vegetable mould.

Still it may be urged, that admitting an error as to the time during which the presence of decayed and decaying vegetable matter is serviceable, it does not prove that *geine* itself, in solution, affords nutriment to plants; it may still, in accordance with Liebig's theory in other respects, benefit them only by affording a prolonged supply of carbonic acid by its decomposition. To say nothing of the authority of Hassenfratz, Saussure, and Davy, not to mention others, founded upon direct experiments, which show the contrary, it is admitted by Liebig himself, that "all substances in solution in a soil are absorbed by the roots of plants, exactly as a sponge imbibes a liquid and all that it contains, without solution." — p. 147. We can hardly suppose this power to be given merely for the purpose of rejecting these substances again in the form of excretions. It seems manifestly for the purpose of supplying the plants with food, by affording them in solution such substances as are fit for assimilation. *Geine* in solution affords such substances, in the proper proportions, and perhaps more easily acted upon by the vegetable organs for having been already once assimilated. It seems irrational and at variance with what we know of the economy of nature, of its nice and exact adaptation of the means to the ends, with the smallest possible waste of material, and the least exertion of power, to suppose that the nutriment, thus taken into the vegetable body, should pass through it unchanged and unappropriated, while the saline and earthy substances that accompany it, so far as they are needed, are made use of, and even the water in which they are dissolved. If the analogy of the animal creation be of any weight, and we think that it is, a strong argument in favor of the nourishing effect of

geine may be drawn from it. Myriads of animals are supported on the flesh of other animals, in all stages from life to utter decay, and as a general rule it is found that animal food is more easily assimilated by other animals, and requires a less complicated system of digestive organs than vegetable food, and that with less bulk it affords more hearty nourishment.

We do not deny, however, that many or most plants derive some portion of their nourishment from the atmosphere, or at least some portion of the materials employed in their various secretions and excretions, though we think that the amount varies in the various races of the vegetable kingdom. To pursue the analogy already employed, as among animals, some live wholly upon animal food, some wholly on vegetable food, and others on a mixture of both in varying proportions; so we think that among vegetables, some derive the bulk of their nutriment from the decayed or decaying matter of other vegetables, either of the same or of different races, some partly from such and from the atmosphere, and some almost wholly, a few possibly entirely, from the atmosphere. Yet, even in admitting this last, it does not necessarily follow that such plants do not have some organic food. The air is filled with fine, impalpable dust, the minutely divided particles of organic and inorganic substances; these are mingled with the vapors of the clouds, and held in solution in the rain-drops that fall from them; they settle upon the leaves moist with dew, and are in part dissolved by it; and if the rain and the dew are absorbed by such plants, we see not why the substances contained in it are not absorbed likewise; and if absorbed and capable of affording nutrition, it is altogether impossible that they will not be used for that purpose. Geine, as well as other substances, and probably in no small proportion, is among this fine dust; and the ammonia, which Liebig asserts that rain-water contains, affords readily the means for making it soluble in the moisture of the atmosphere.

On all the grounds, therefore, of the authorities of science, of analogy, of common and universal observation and experience, we are convinced at present of the correctness of the doctrine supported by our author.

But to return to our book. Chapter 5th is devoted to the examination of the mutual action of the organic and inorganic elements of the soil. It is long, able, and instructive, but requiring close attention from a reader not quite familiar with chymical action and reaction, to follow the condensed, yet

direct course of the reasoning. In it are to be found, the two next succeeding principles, viz.

9. "*Carbonic Acid and the carbonates decompose the earthy, alkaline, and metallic silicates of the soil.*"

10. "*The base of all salts acts ever the same in Agriculture. Peculiarity of action depends upon the acid of the salt.*"

Upon the importance of this last, the author lays great stress. "It is," he says, "the great practical principle of agricultural chemistry." What makes it so, is the great division of opinions on the manner in which salts or mineral manures act. Different theories are framed for the operation of each. By many they are looked upon as merely stimulants, while others regard one or more as possessing more substantial properties. Through this confusion and contrariety, Dr. Dana thinks, the principle above laid down will afford a guiding clue. It will, however, require some skill and nicety of touch to follow it with accuracy, though its value seems indubitable.

The two subsequent chapters, comprising about one half of the book, are occupied with the subject of manure, natural and artificial, and irrigation. Manures are divided into three classes; the first consisting of geine, the second of salts, and the third of salts and geine. Animal excrement is assigned to the last division, and the chief element of its value is stated to consist in the nitrogen contained in the albuminous portion of it. This element is considered as acting in two ways, in combination with hydrogen forming ammonia; in one, on the geine, the other great element of the manure, converting it from its insoluble to a soluble form; in the other, on the silicates contained either in the soil or the manure, thus among other things producing saltpetre or nitrate of potash, one of the most active and useful of the fertilizing salts. By a statement in a recent number of the New England Farmer we learn, that M. M. Baussingault and Poyer are now advocating in France similar views of the action and value of nitrogen as contained in manure. This coincidence must be considered as supporting our author's doctrine, though as his views were made public more than a year since, it will not deprive him of the credit of originating them for himself. Liebig refers the action of solid animal excrement to the *inorganic* parts of it.

The different kinds of manure are carefully examined, their relative composition and value pointed out, and the

modes of action of their different great components investigated, so far as this had not been done in the previous chapters. The whole management of the subject appears to us uncommonly able and instructive. The directions given for the formation of artificial manures are practical and valuable.

The explanation of the beneficial effects of irrigation contains something, that we do not remember to have seen before so well and distinctly set forth in any treatise on the subject. This is the cause assigned for the beneficial effect of pure running water, namely, the absorption by the soil of a portion of the oxygen from the air known to be contained in water. By Dr. Dana's statements, two thirds of the oxygen of the air, that is absorbed by the water of a river or pond, cannot be obtained from it again by boiling. He infers that much of this, when the water is employed in irrigation, enters into combination with the geine of the soil and makes it soluble, and to this he refers the well known beneficial effects of the process, when performed with pure waters. The explanation seems reasonable, and more satisfactory as to the result than any we now recollect to have seen offered, though we should hardly attribute the whole benefit to this single cause, since others, more or less efficient, can hardly fail to be combined with it in some degree. Liebig's slight mention of this subject is confused and imperfect. In connexion with irrigation the somewhat opposite process of paring and burning is succinctly discussed.

The physcial properties of the soil form the subject of the last chapter, and by it is explained the boldness and seeming impossibility of the correctness of the first of the author's principles, that "there is but one soil." That is true in the chimical sense, referring to the inorganic elements; the differences in texture, lightness, fineness, &c. are considered as belonging to the physical properties, and these explain all the great diversity of appearance which the soil presents. These are briefly discussed; and in the course of his remarks the author offers an explanation of the beneficial effects, practically known to follow the stirring and loosening of the earth among growing crops in the time of a drought. We have often heard it remarked that a good hoeing in a dry time was of equal value to corn with a heavy shower; and if we recollect rightly, Cobbett, in some of his treatises on agricultural matters, insisted very strongly upon this principle as a practical one of great value, though he could give no rational explanation of its action; yet correctly enough considered that more moisture

was thereby in some way supplied. Dr. Dana says, that more moisture is actually produced and in larger quantities, in soil abounding in geine. Atmospheric air is by this process admitted freely, the oxygen of which is absorbed by the geine, part unites with the carbon of this substance to form carbonic acid, and part unites with the hydrogen to form water. From the calculations made as to the amount that may thus be formed, it would seem as if the value popularly assigned to a good hoeing was not overstated.

A short appendix contains a statement of the results of several of the author's principles, as applied to practice by others, which strongly support their utility.

From the full analysis we have given of the contents of this work, our readers will have perceived that, under a very brief and unassuming title, the public is presented with a very thorough treatise on the chimistery of agriculture, as relating to soils natural and artificial, and the means of improving them, or making their natural powers available for the purposes of the husbandman. We could have wished it some more euphonous if less alliterative name; but there are several treatises already before the public with the titles of "agricultural chimistery," "chimistery of agriculture," &c., &c., so that some variety seemed advisable; and the Dr. probably thought that "the rose by any other name would smell as sweet," or at least resolved to try the truth of the adage.

Of the merits of the work our opinion must be very evident from what we have said; but to sum it up fairly, we consider it a very excellent work, of great clearness of views, precision and simplicity of arrangement and expression, and for utility to the practical farmer, admitting of easy reference, and imparting sound and valuable information, it seems to us superior to any work on the subject that we have seen.

W.

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ART. VI. — *Mediatorial Life of Jesus.* A Letter to Rev. William Ellery Channing, D. D. By O. A. BROWNSON. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1842. 8vo. pp. 42.

THIS pamphlet, which we have sent forth within a few weeks, is properly the continuation of the article on Leroux's *Humanité*, in the present number of our Journal. If those who wish to understand our philosophical, social, religious, and theological doctrines will read in

connexion the Essays on the Church of the Future, that is, in our view, the Church of the Ideal, and Reform and Conservatism, in our Journal for January last, the Review of Charles Elwood, in the number for April last, the first article in the present number, and this Letter to Dr. Channing, they will obtain a tolerably clear statement of their outlines. If to these they will add the Essay on Constitutional Government, and that on the Distribution Bill, also published in the January number, they will have the outlines of our whole theory, philosophical, political, social, ethical, religious, and theological. We mention this fact, because we wish our readers to interpret these several Essays in the light of one another.

In the January number, on Reform and Conservatism, there is one point we would, however, rectify. Too much stress is there laid on the transmission of life, by means of natural generation. The doctrine of Life, as Leroux has enabled us to understand it, teaches us, that much which we had hitherto been in the habit of attributing to natural generation, should be attributed to what in this Letter is termed spiritual generation. This mastification, while it accepts and explains all the facts which we had before, renders it in a less aristocratic manner, than the view we took in January, which was with us a view we had, in fact, except for moments, always entertained. Those, who suppose us less *democratic* than formerly, will discover from this that we are more so.

One thing more. In the Essay on the Church of the Future, we contend that the New Church must be based on the fact, not that one man only has been the Son of God, but that all men are the sons of God. This would seem to a superficial reader to be contradicted in the Letter now before us; but is not, as we understand ourselves. When we wrote that Essay, we had not seen, at least but dimly, if at all, the true doctrine of Life, as brought out in this Letter; nevertheless, we say now, that the New Church must be built on the fact, that **ALL MEN ARE THE SONS OF GOD**, but *mediately*, through Christ, who has entered into the world, and become a newer and higher Life of humanity, by which we are *adopted* as Sons, and permitted to cry, Abba, Father.

Nor, indeed, must it be inferred from the silence of this letter, that we hold that no true life had been in the world before the birth of the Son of Mary. The Saviour preëxisted. This Life he gave, according to the Scriptures, with Seth, whose name implies *Repairer*, and was continued in an ever enlarging stream through all the patriarchs, prophets, and sages, until Jesus, who was it in its infinite fulness. Since the Ascension of Jesus, the Life is still with us, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, but disembodied, save so far as the Church becomes the true body of our Lord. We must be pardoned these remarks, which were necessary, in order to harmonize the teachings of the several Essays alluded to. In these Essays, together with this Letter, we have given our last, and our ripest views of the subjects they discuss. In these, it will be seen by the reader, that we have spoken as the teacher, not as the inquirer. In them, for the first time, we have really put forth positive doctrine. These doctrines we profess to *know* to be true, and by them we will henceforth live or die.

EDITOR.

THE  
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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OCTOBER, 1842.

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ART. I. — *A Discourse on Matters pertaining to Religion.* By THEODORE PARKER, Minister of the Second Church in Roxbury, Mass. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1842. 8vo. pp. 503.

THIS volume consists substantially of the Five Lectures, which Mr. Parker gave in Boston about one year ago, intended to bring out more fully, to illustrate, and defend the doctrines he had broached in his somewhat famous South-Boston Sermon, reviewed in this Journal for October, 1841. The Lectures were listened to, when delivered, with attention and interest, by a large, intelligent, and highly cultivated audience; and if we have them here without the charms of the Lecturer's elocution, we have them enlarged, elaborated with greater care, and accompanied by numerous notes, bibliographical and critical, of no slight value, and which prove at least the variety and extent of the author's reading.

In accordance with the original division into Lectures, the work is divided into Five Books, or Discourses. The *first* Book is entitled Religion in general, or a Discourse of the Religious Sentiment and its Manifestations; the *second*, The Relation of the Religious Sentiment to God, or a Discourse of Inspiration; the



*third*, The Relation of the Religious Sentiment to Jesus of Nazareth, or a Discourse of Christianity; the *fourth*, The Relation of the Religious Sentiment to the greatest of Books, or a Discourse of the Bible; the *fifth*, The Relation of the Religious Sentiment to the greatest of human Institutions, or a Discourse of the Church. It will be seen from the titles of the several Books, that the subjects discussed are the Foundations of Religion, Inspiration, Christianity, the Bible, and the Church. These are great topics. None are or can be more so. We hope, therefore, our readers will not be displeased to find us taking them up one after another, and discussing them with a little profoundness, with as much fulness of detail and illustration, and to as great a length as permitted by our limits.

We say in advance, that whatever the judgment that may ultimately be formed of the peculiar views which the author has put forth, no one possessed of tolerable independence, and mental fairness, can fail to acknowledge the earnestness, learning, ability, and eloquence with which the work is written. Mr. Parker deserves high praise for having sought for the truth with all diligence, under circumstances not always the most favorable, and for not hesitating, at risk of his reputation as a minister of religion, and of his standing as the member of a particular denomination, to publish freely, boldly, and without apology for so doing, the convictions to which his studies have brought him. He has spoken indeed at his peril, for it is not a light thing for a man to speak, on these great topics, opinions of his own, and whoever speaks on them is accountable for what he says; but he has shown that he has been willing to take the responsibility, as every man who is in earnest and has convictions will never hesitate to do; and all that concerns us or others is to take up his word, and determine, if we can, its value, both in relation to the circumstances in which it was spoken, and in relation to its intrinsic truth.

In examining this volume, we shall exercise all the

freedom shown by its author; we shall aim to say nothing unkind, or uncharitable, for we see nothing in the book that it is worth one's while to be angry with or about; but we shall claim the right to treat the author as a full-grown man, able both to give blows and to take them in return. He who publishes such a work as this has the right to demand respectful and fair treatment, but no generosity, no indulgence. He challenges the closest scrutiny, the severest tests; and where he is found wanting, he has no right to complain if exposed without mercy. We trust that these remarks will assure him that, though we make no professions of regard, of sympathy, or of tenderness for his feelings and the like, yet in whatever we may say, there will be no want of respect for his intentions, his understanding, or his ability, and no disposition to say aught which he or his most partial friends may consider unfair, or uncalled for. We shall treat him as we think we should be willing to be treated. We shall take up his work, book by book, and in some instances chapter by chapter, both out of respect to what he himself advances, and to the intrinsic importance of the topics discussed.

## I.

### GROUND OF RELIGION.

THE First Book is divided into seven chapters. I. An Examination into the Religious Element in Man, and the existence of its Object. II. Of the Sentiment, the Idea, and the Conception of God. III. Extent and Power of the Religious Sentiment. IV. The Idea of Religion connected with the Science of Life. V. The three great Historical Forms of Religion. VI. Of Certain Doctrines connected with Religion. 1. Of the Primitive State of Mankind. 2. Of the Immortality of the Soul. VII. The Influence of Religion on Life.

1. The aim of the author in this first book, and es-

pecially in this first chapter, is to establish the doctrine, that religion has its ground in the permanent and indestructible nature of man, in a special religious element in man's constitution ; in opposition, on the one hand, to the infidel philosophers, who contend that religion is an accident in human history, springing from causes purely local and temporary ; and on the other, to those supernaturalists, who contend that religion is something miraculously superinduced upon human nature. According to his view, man is religious, not supernaturally, not arbitrarily, not accidentally, but *naturally*, by virtue of his original constitution as a man. " Thus, then," he says, " it appears that induction from notorious facts ; consciousness spontaneously active ; and philosophical analysis of man's nature ; all equally lead to some religious sentiment or principle as an essential part of man's constitution." — p. 19.

The doctrine, that man is religious by a law of his nature, or a special element of his nature, when interpreted so as to mean that man is, and can be religious, without any transformation of his nature, or superinduction of a new *principle* upon his nature, is unquestionably sound, and worthy of all acceptation. Man was intended by his Maker to be religious ; he has a natural capacity for religion ; has a natural need of it ; and cannot fulfil his destiny as a man without it. Perhaps this is all that Mr. Parker means ; but it is not all that he seems to us to assert. He does not, as we understand him, merely assert that man has naturally a religious aptitude or capacity, nor merely that religion is a constant and universal fact of human history ; but that man is religious by virtue of a special religious nature, a peculiar element of his nature, which may be regarded as a sort of sixth sense, having very nearly the same relation to the spiritual world that the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, or the sense of touch has to the material world. In a word, we understand him to assert in man, as the principle of the religious phenomena, a fundamental element of man's nature, distinct, peculiar, *sui generis*, which he calls the Religious Sentiment, and defines to be the SENSE OF DEPENDENCE.

This theory is not without its plausibility, and is almost sure to captivate at first sight ; but we have much deceived ourselves if it will bear the test of rigid investigation. Mr. Parker relies for its support on, 1. Induction from notorious facts ; 2. Consciousness spontaneously active ; 3. Philosophical analysis of man's nature. The second ground of reliance must be abandoned at once, for it is a misapprehension of the fact of consciousness. Consciousness can have no spontaneous activity, for it is not a being, nor a faculty, nor yet a fact *sui generis*. It is simply what Leibnitz calls "apperception," the recognition by the ME of itself in the phenomenon as the subject of the phenomenon. The activity, the *causative force*, in consciousness is the ME ; and therefore the spontaneous activity of the consciousness is the spontaneous activity of the ME, which is in no wise distinguishable from its general activity. To say the ME acts spontaneously, is only saying in other terms, that it acts ; for all acting, of whatever subject predicated, is spontaneous, that is, the actor acting from itself, from its own centre, and from its own inherent force or energy. The assertion of Mr. Parker therefore amounts to this, the ME in acting, or in the phenomena of life is conscious in itself of a peculiar religious element, which is an essential part of its constitution. This is not true. We are conscious only of being the subject of certain phenomena, not of what we are in ourselves. We are merely conscious of exhibiting religious phenomena, not, we venture to state, of the peculiar power or *essential* element by virtue of which we exhibit them.

There remain, then, only two sources of evidence of the reality of the religious element, — induction of a religious principle, from the exhibition by man of religious phenomena, and philosophical analysis of man's nature. But leaving these for a moment, we must state what is to us an *a priori* objection to Mr. Parker's view. He calls the religious element in man a sentiment, or a principle. To be what he represents it, it should be called *principle* rather than sentiment, because senti-

ment is a fact of life, and not an element of nature. But assume that religion originates in a principle of human nature. Man then is religious by virtue of this distinct, peculiar principle. This principle is ontological, not phenomenal. A man then is religious, not, as Mr. Parker himself seems subsequently to contend, in proportion to the quantity of his obedience, but in proportion to the quantity of his being. The quantity of a man's being, according to Mr. Parker, is always the same; consequently the amount of a man's religion must always be the same, whether obedient or disobedient, active or inactive!

But passing over this, and assuming that Mr. Parker is right in affirming, that man is religious by virtue of a religious nature, or a special, peculiar element of his nature, we must nevertheless assure him, that the account he has given of it is one that we cannot accept. He calls it a sentiment; and that he means sentiment, when he so calls it, is evident from the fact, that he tells us what sentiment it is; namely, the *sense of dependence*. "We feel conscious," he says, page 16, "of this element within us. We are not sufficient for ourselves; not self-originated; not self-sustained." True; but one thing is the fact that we are dependent, and another thing the power by which we feel it; one thing is the power by which we feel it, and another thing the fact that we do feel it. This last only, is properly termed a sense of dependence. It is not an ontological principle, but a simple fact of experience, a simple phenomenon of life. Now, unless Mr. Parker confounds the phenomenon with the principle, the effect with the cause, the actor with the act, and asserts the identity of the two, — which is the principle of either pantheism, or of atheism, as it is asserted from the point of view of the cause, or from the point of view of the effect, — he cannot make the sense of dependence an element of man's nature, "an essential part of man's constitution." No sentiment is a principle, and certainly few people will believe that the mere feeling that we are dependent beings, which is all that can be

meant by a sense of dependence, is an ontological principle, an element of man's very being.

But even if we could admit the sense of dependence to be a principle of human nature, instead of being, as it is, a fact of experience, Mr. Parker would not have made out his case. His doctrine is that there is a religious nature in man, a special element of man's nature, that is the principle of the religious phenomena. This element, special religious nature, must be the principle of these phenomena alone, and their sole principle. The religious sentiment must be proved to be a principle *sui generis*, manifesting itself in the religious phenomena only, or nothing is proved to the purpose. The whole question is not, are there religious phenomena? but, are these phenomena, or are they not, to be ascribed to a peculiar element in man, "an essential part of man's constitution," and which may be called a special religious, or spiritual nature? If the phenomena are shown to proceed from a principle, common to them and a great variety of other phenomena, then they do not warrant the induction of a peculiar, religious element in man as their principle; or if the principle assumed be common to them and a great variety of other phenomena, then is it proved not to be that principle, even admitting such principle to exist.

Now, the sense of dependence, admitting it to be what we shall soon proceed to question, the eminent characteristic of the religious phenomena, is at least not peculiar to them. All the phenomena of life conceal at their bottom, in a greater or less degree, the sense of dependence. Man is a limited, an imperfect, a dependent being, and as such he enters into all the phenomena of his life, and as such he must recognise himself in all the phenomena of his life sufficiently marked and vivid to be ranked as apperceptions. All the appetites, passions, affections, desires, involve the sense of dependence. There are probably few of our phenomena in which we have a deeper feeling, a more *realizing* sense of our dependence, than hunger and thirst, when dying of one or the other, and no food or drink

at hand, or to be procured. Are hunger and thirst religious phenomena? If not, the sense of dependence does not constitute every phenomenon in which it appears a *religious* phenomenon. If they are religious phenomena, then there are no peculiarly religious phenomena, and then no peculiarly religious element in man.

But so far is the sense of dependence from being peculiar to the religious phenomena, it is not even their eminent characteristic. No man, not even Mr. Parker himself, will pretend that the simple, naked sense of dependence is a religious feeling. No doubt, appeals to our sense of our own insufficiency, to a sense of our dependence, are among the most successful in arresting men's attention, fixing it on religion, and in leading them to desire religion, and to struggle to obtain it; but with all deference to Mr. Parker, we must insist that this sense of dependence is not the most prominent feature in the higher religious experience. The man who has really been redeemed, sanctified, united by a living faith to Christ his living Head, is not chiefly affected by a sense of his dependence. He is, no doubt, humble, but his soul is filled with a sense of majesty, with reverence, love, joy, and peace. The Divine Influence flows continually into him, and he feels that he can do all things, for he dwells in God, and God in him.

Mr. Parker, we admit, has the high authority of Schleiermacher for calling the religious sentiment a sense of dependence; but in the first place, Schleiermacher does not fall into the absurdity of ascribing ontological existence to a sense of dependence, of making it a principle of human nature, instead, as it is, a fact of human life; and in the second place, the purpose he had in view—the reconciliation of the cultivated among its despisers to religion—required him to define religion rather according to the principle of identity, than the principle of difference; from what it has in common with all other phenomena, rather than from what it has peculiar to itself. With these expla-

nations, we are not disposed to reject Schleiermacher's definition ; though when taken, as in the work before us, as an independent definition, designed to include what is peculiar to religion, and exclude what is common to it and to other subjects, we hold it to be faulty and mischievous.

No man will, as we have said, pretend that the mere naked sense of dependence constitutes all that is essential to the religious sentiment ; certainly not all that is essential to the religious phenomena. Why then assume it as the basis or principle of these phenomena ? In actual life, and it is only in actual life that there is any religious sentiment at all, in actual life the religious sentiment is never the naked sense of dependence. Then it is necessary to include in our definition of it something besides this sense of dependence ; not only this, but all else that in actual life is essential to the sentiment.

This erroneous definition has resulted from the attempt to carry analysis beyond its legitimate bounds. The fact we analyze is never the fact of actual life, being never at best only a fact of memory. "We murder to dissect." We must kill the fact as a phenomenon of actual life before we can analyze it, and from this analysis we can never obtain life ; at best only death. To seek to carry analysis beyond actual life, to dissolve the living synthesis, and to detect and seize separately its abstract elements, will result always and necessarily in declaring the religious sentiment to be in itself of no value ; and that whatever value we may ascribe to it, must be ascribed to the elements with which, in the living phenomenon, it is actually associated. We see this very plainly in Mr. Parker himself. "The legitimate action of the religious sentiment," he says, but does not show any reason for saying, "produces reverence." The religious sentiment, be it remembered, is the sense of dependence. The legitimate effect of feeling oneself dependent is to revere. How know we that ? In a very hungry man, who has no money, it may lead very legitimately to the stealing of



a loaf of bread ; or in a vain man to holding out false appearances, designed to make him pass in piety, learning, and philosophy, for more than he is worth ; or more legitimately still, as the sense of dependence is but another name for the sense of weakness, it may lead him who has it strong to sit down, while the world lieth in wickedness, at his ease, with the feeling that he can do nothing, and that it is useless for him to make an effort. Moreover, we know that the sense of dependence never exists and operates in the human mind alone, — never, save in combination with other phenomena. According to Mr. Parker himself, it combines with love and wisdom, or with ignorance and hate. When found in combination with the first, its results are good ; when with the second, they are bad. But in the first case was it the sense of dependence, or the wisdom and love, that produced the good ? The wisdom and love, unquestionably ; for Mr. Parker himself ascribes the bad to the ignorance and hate.

More we could say, but it is unnecessary. If Mr. Parker in all cases had in his own mind, when he used the phrases, “element of man’s nature,” “religious nature,” “spiritual nature,” and the like, substituted what according to him is the equivalent phrase, “sense of dependence,” we have no doubt but he would have been the first to reject his own definition. We are not prepared in this stage of our examination to give a complete definition of religion ; but we should define, not religion, but the religious sentiment, instead of a sense of dependence looking out for some arm on which to lean, to be an aspiration of the soul to the Infinite, and a sense of its moral obligation to do its best to realize the Ideal, or form under which the Infinite reveals itself to man’s view. Man has always, to some extent, an Ideal ; an ideal Truth, Beauty, Good, which in their synthesis may be termed with sufficient exactness, an Ideal Righteousness, or an Ideal Holiness. This Ideal is to him who has it the Form, in which to him the Infinite, the perfect, the ever-living God reveals himself. The aspiration of the soul to this Ideal, the veritable

**WORD** of God, the delight of the soul in contemplating it, and its struggles, and its sense of its obligation to struggle, to realize it in art, science, industry, the family, the state, and property, in every department of life, constitute, in general terms, what we understand by religion regarded as a sentiment.

But waiving, for the present, all further objection to the account Mr. Parker gives of the religious sentiment, and assuming that it is a principle of human nature, we must still dissent from the doctrine, that on this ground it implies the existence of its object. Mr. Parker proceeds on the assumption, that the religious sentiment is a law of man's nature; or in other words, that man contains in himself the cause of the religious phenomena; and he concludes with apparent unconcern from the existence of an element in man's nature, which is their principle, to the existence of their object, or the existence of God. But when he makes the principle of these phenomena a law, or an element of human nature, he makes it purely subjective; and a purely subjective principle, we need not tell him, is, and can be of no authority out of the sphere of the subject. If, as he contends, we have given us in the very nature of man, as an essential part of man's constitution, an adequate cause of the religious phenomena, we have and can have no occasion to go out of man to explain their existence, or appearance; and to conclude from the existence of the religious sentiment, in this view of the case, to the existence of God, would in no wise differ from concluding to his existence from the solitariness of the lion, or the gregariousness of the sheep. The assumption of man is sufficient to account for the religious phenomena, without the assumption of aught beyond. Hence it is that we find many professedly atheistical phrenologists, admitting the reality of the religious sentiment, while they deny that of its object. They say it is as easy to account for the sentiment without a God, as it is to account for man himself without a God.

“The belief in the relation between the feeling

within us, and its object independent of us, comes unavoidably from the laws of man's nature." p. 20. The same principle of reasoning. Mr. Parker is intent on what is unquestionably a truth, namely, that this belief is not accidental, arbitrary, nor in the common acceptance of the term, miraculous; but in asserting the truth, he has asserted in addition, as the conditions of that truth, what overthrows his whole argument. The sentiment he says implies its object, for the belief in the relation between the religious sentiment and its object "*comes unavoidably from the laws of man's nature,*" and is, therefore, to speak the language of Kant, a category of the reason, or a necessary form of the understanding. But to declare any belief a category of the reason, or necessary form of the understanding, is to declare it subjective, and of no authority out of the sphere of the subject; for as yet philosophers have not succeeded in discovering a passage from the subjective to the objective. The categories are categories of a subjective reason; not of an objective reason, but of reason as a faculty of human nature. They imply — directly the reverse of the doctrine Mr. Parker needs — that the ME can find its own limitations in itself, be its own object, and has no need to go out of itself in order to live. The ME then is self-living, independent, and the sense of dependence, of which Mr. Parker makes so much, must be a great falsehood. Once admit that the ME may be its own object, that it can find its own limitations in itself, or that there may be a single phenomenon of life, the slightest imaginable, that is purely subjective, and you are in absolute Idealism, where Kant's Critique of Pure Reason confessedly ends, and which, whoever has the courage to follow his logic to its legitimate results, will not be slow to translate, with the bold and daring Fichte, into absolute Egoism.

And yet we agree with Mr. Parker, that the existence of the sentiment is ample evidence of the reality of its object, *but not when we regard it as a category, law of man's nature, or element of his constitution, instead of a fact of experience*; for then we can find the cause of

its existence without looking beyond man. But when we take the sentiment as a simple fact of experience, or phenomenon of life, it does imply its object. The **ME** can never manifest itself alone, never find its own limitations without going out of itself. To the slightest manifestation of the **ME**, that is, to the production of the slightest phenomenon, the object is as necessary, as indispensable, as the subject. In every phenomenon, then, necessarily enter as its elements, as its indispensable conditions, both subject and object. The subject is *always* the **ME**; the object, then, since it is opposed to the **ME**, is *always* the **NOT-ME**. A purely subjective phenomenon is impossible. Every fact of experience, every phenomenon of life, depends for its production on the **NOT-ME** no less than on the **ME**. This is the grand discovery of modern philosophy. Let it not be lost sight of.

According to this statement, every thought man thinks has necessarily a basis of reality, both subjective and objective; that is, in every thought, that is to say, in every phenomenon that rises to an apperception, there is the recognition of the **ME**, or subject, and the actual perception of the **NOT-ME**, or object. Every thought, then, has a basis of truth, and of objective truth, or truth independent of the thinker, though the *form* of the thought, that is, the notion the mind forms in the act of thinking, of itself and the object it is thinking, may be obscure, partial, in a word, inadequate. In point of fact, the form of the thought, or what Leibnitz calls the *notion*, must always be inadequate, for the reality to be noted is infinite, while the intelligence that notes is finite. Nevertheless, absolute truth lies under every notion, the feeblest, obscurest, the most inadequate conceivable; so that it is impossible for us to think pure, unmixed falsehood.

Man never thinks without thinking objective reality. Add to this that in thinking he thinks as sensibility no less than as intelligence; that he never does, and never can manifest himself as an intelligent force, without manifesting himself at the same time and in the same

phenomenon, as a sentient force ; nor as a sentient force without manifesting himself as an intelligent force. He must in all his feelings, thoughts, acts, operations, phenomena, manifest himself as he is ; and he is, in his very essence, indissolubly, sensibility and intelligence ; a force which is at once sentient and intelligent. Then no blind feeling, no naked intellection. In every perception there is feeling, in every feeling perception.

Hence it follows that, in the religious sentiment, there is really and necessarily actual perception of its object. God, the object, reveals himself to our perception — intuitive perception, if the term be preferred — under the form of the Ideal ; and under this form the soul sees and recognises him, and experiences the *emotion*, which is the prominent feature in the phenomenon called the religious sentiment. The religious sentiment is therefore as positive evidence of the reality of its object, as sensation is of the material universe.

On this view of the case, the religious phenomena, which according to Mr. Parker warrant the induction of a special religious nature in man, warrant a *higher* assumption, namely, that man is a sentient-intelligent force or being, capable of perceiving and aspiring to God in the Ideal ; a being of that order of intelligence which is able, as Leibnitz says, to “think God.” The religious phenomena are universal and constantly recurring facts of human experience, not because they are facts of man’s natural history, but because the conditions of their production are permanent and universal. God is always and everywhere present, always and everywhere, in a degree, reveals himself under the form of the Ideal, to all men, speaks to “every man in his own tongue, wherein he was born,” and is the “true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world.” We agree fully with Mr. Parker, that the religious phenomena are universal and constantly recurring facts, that man is everywhere their subject ; but we cannot agree with him in calling them facts of man’s nature, nor in ascribing them to a peculiar religious element in man, an element *sui generis*, as

their principle ; for in our view they are universal, and constantly recurring facts of *experience*, and are so because man by his general power of intelligence is able to perceive their object, and because their object is ever present to his perception ; because their object exists always and everywhere, and always and everywhere in an intelligent and sentient relation with their subject.

This, after all, should be a perfectly satisfactory explanation of the religious phenomena to even Mr. Parker and his friends. It is true, in our view he is wrong in professing to be able, by philosophical analysis and induction, to establish a special religious nature in man ; but the establishment of this special religious nature is not the primary object. He has learned that the religious phenomena are universal and constantly recurring facts of human life. Man, wherever found, in some degree experiences them ; has some sort of religious worship. This cannot be by accident, nor from local and temporary causes, whether natural or supernatural. The cause must equal the effect. The essential point, then, is to make out the universality and permanence of the cause, not that the cause is a special, a peculiarly religious element of man's nature ; and it would never have been assumed to be such element, had any other adequate solution of the phenomena suggested itself. We, on our view, secure this universality, and this permanency, to say the least, as well as Mr. Parker does on his hypothesis, while we escape the very serious objections which lie against that hypothesis, and are spared all necessity of resorting to an hypothesis at all ; for we rest on the great fact which lies at the basis of all life — namely, the utter inability of the ME to manifest itself in any degree, save in conjunction with a NOT-ME.

Mr. Parker says philosophical analysis of man's nature leads to some religious sentiment or principle, as an essential part of man's constitution. If he be right in this assertion, which we deny, his own philosophical analysis has nevertheless failed to detect such sentiment or principle ; for what he takes to be it, is the sense of dependence, which, as we have seen, is not an element

of man's nature, but a fact of man's life. Furthermore, he says, induction from notorious facts leads to the same conclusion. Induction in his hands has simply led to a phenomenon of human life, and it cannot lead to the principle in question, unless it be assumed as a fact that the *ME* is self-living; that is, independent, the *sole* cause of all the phenomena of which it is the subject. But this no man whose opinions are of the least weight can assume; for life is, as we have on more occasions than one proved, at once subjective and objective; that is, an objective *cause* is as indispensable to the production of a phenomenon, as a subjective cause. But his failure is really his success. Nothing was further from his wishes, or his thought, than to weaken the foundations of religious belief; and yet, had he succeeded in proving that belief to be a mere category of reason, or a law of man's nature, he would have proved it to be of no objective validity, at least of no authority out of the sphere of the subject. On the view we take, the religious phenomena become direct evidences of their object, because, according to the very principle of all phenomena of a dependent being, the object is as essential to their production as the subject. The view we take, then, ends all controversy on the matter. On the one side, it finds in man's intelligence one of the conditions of the production of the religious phenomena, and on the other, in the fact of their production, it finds the reality and presence of their object.

2. But it is time that we proceed to the second chapter of this first book, which treats "of the sentiment, the idea, and the conception of God." Of the sentiment we have already spoken, and we have found it, not as Mr. Parker seems to regard it, a mere feeling, but as an actual *perception* of God, and aspiration to him in the Ideal, or under the Form of the Ideal. It therefore necessarily implies all that Mr. Parker means by the sentiment, the idea, and the conception of God. For we cannot have the perception and aspiration, without there being at the same time in our minds a belief that

God is, and some conception of what he is. But not to dwell on this, Mr. Parker means, we take it, by the idea of God, the belief in his existence, or knowledge of his existence; and in what he here alleges, his main purpose is to show the genesis of this belief or knowledge, and the inadequacy of our broadest and noblest conceptions.

The genesis, or origin of the idea, the belief or knowledge of the existence of God, Mr. Parker contends, is the result neither of the argument *a priori*, nor of the argument *a posteriori*, nay, of no argument, no reasoning at all; but a fact given us by the very nature of man, coming from the legitimate action of reason and the religious sentiment, called in the language of philosophy, AN INTUITION OF REASON; A REVELATION FROM GOD, in the language of the elder Theology, pp. 21, 22. What he really means here to assert, we hold to be true, and of great importance. The substance of his statement, or the truth in his mind, which he has stated as best he could, we suppose is, that our belief in or knowledge of the existence of God is not an inference, an induction, a deduction, nor a belief or knowledge obtained by any logical process whatever; but is a primitive fact, given us directly, immediately, and which is incapable of being resolved into any other facts more ultimate, or which may serve as its basis and support. This we hold to be the truth. Man believes in God not by virtue of any process of reasoning, but by the simple virtue of thought. He believes in the existence of God for the very reason he does in his own, because he thinks it, and cannot think without thinking it.

Nevertheless, we cannot accept Mr. Parker's statement. He evidently means, notwithstanding a partial disclaimer, to teach that the idea of God is innate. What else does he mean, when he says it is "a fact given us by man's nature?" But an *innate* idea, in the sense of belief or knowledge, is a solecism, a contradiction in terms. Belief or knowledge, take which you will, is a fact of man's life, not an element of his



nature or being. The phrase, intuition of reason, when reason is used as Mr. Parker uses it in this connexion, reason acting spontaneously, independent of us, according to its own laws, p. 21, is inadmissible, though we have ourselves so used it; for the subject of the intuition is not an impersonal reason, but the reasonable or intelligent **ME**. In calling the idea of God an intuition, Mr. Parker seems also to countenance the notion of its innateness; for according to him, intuition is not the act of looking at or upon, or knowledge by looking at or upon; but it is something which the reason contains in itself, lying perhaps dormant or *latent* in it, and making its appearance only on occasion; but yet something which the reason contains, not something which it, or rather the subject of reason, beholds. This seems to be, as near as we can come to it, the sense in which our transcendentalists generally use the term *intuition*. And yet both philologically and philosophically, whether we recur to its etymology, or to the psychological fact it designates, it means neither more nor less than *looking at* or *upon*, knowing by simply beholding the object, and is really applicable to every act of knowledge, whether by reasoning, or through the organs of sense, whether of bodies, events, or ideas.

The idea is never the intuition, but always the object of the intuition, and therefore is objective and not subjective. Reason is to be understood in two senses. The first sense is that of a faculty of the **ME**, our power of intelligence, or of *intelligencing*; in the second sense it is the Logos of the Greeks and primitive fathers; the world of necessary and immaterial Truth, or of absolute ideas, according to Cousin; and the Ideal, the Word of God, or form under which God reveals himself to man, as we choose to say. In the first sense, ideas are objects of reason; in the second sense, they are contents of reason; not something which reason beholds, but something it contains. Ideas do not reside in the human mind, but in the Divine mind; and though not God, they are, in the beautiful language of Plato, his Speech; are in fact to him very nearly what our conceptions are to us.

We touch here a point of very great importance. Mr. Parker does not treat the subject of ideas with as much sagacity, or as profoundly, as we could have wished. He seems to us to be unconsciously affected by the old doctrine, which makes the idea something intervening between the object known and the mind that knows it. Philosophers have almost from the first assumed that the mind can know only what is present to it; and assuming also that the mind some how or other is shut up inside of the body, they have inferred the impossibility of its knowing anything not capable of penetrating the body, and reaching the seat of the soul. But as external objects are really out of the body, and therefore out of the reach of the mind, they can be known only by virtue of some intermediary. Hence the old doctrines of intelligible *species*, *forms*, and *phantasms*. All, or nearly all modern philosophy, saving Dr. Reid's honorable protest in behalf of Common Sense, from Descartes down to M. Cousin, has called this intermediary by the term *idea*, and understood by *idea* a somewhat in the mind, and which in all the operations of the mind is the object with which, in the language of Locke, the mind is immediately conversant. It is not the object, whether of the material world or of the spiritual world, that we see, perceive, or immediately recognise; but the *idea* of the object. Hence the question has been asked, whether there be any objective reality out of the mind to correspond to the *idea* in the mind. A more absurd question it is not possible for man to ask; for it is simply asking, whether that which is the object of the mind in its operations be or be not objective.

We know of no author in our language who has treated the subject of ideas with more sagacity, depth, or justness, than Cudworth in his very valuable Inquiry concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. Cudworth was familiar with Plato; but he read him too much through Proclus and Plotinus, and has failed to some extent to perceive the real doctrine of Plato; or at least to set it forth. He confounds the *idea* with the

pression, engraved on our souls, (*gravées dans nos âmes*,) this would serve us for our account of what we mean by ideas. Leibnitz, however, like Cudworth and Mr. Parker, has been affected by the doctrine of innate ideas; yet he never meant to teach that we are actually born in possession of ideas; all he meant was what Descartes had taught before him, that we are born with what Cudworth calls the *vis cognitrix*, or power of furnishing ideas when the occasion demands them. Cudworth says, the mind furnishes them by its own force and vigor; Leibnitz, that they come from our own funds (*nos fonds*;) but what they really meant is best explained, not by calling the *vis cognitrix* the power of furnishing ideas, but of perceiving them; so that in the *noemata*, or intellections, there is actual perception of the object, and that object as much out of the mind as in the *phantasmata* or the *aisthemata*.

By ideas, varying the terms of our definition, we understand those objects of human knowledge which, though appearing only in the material existence, or with it, yet transcend the material existence, and without which the material existence would be incomprehensible, in fact, as if it were not. In every concrete existence, as we have said, there is that which is not concrete, that which concretes, the *vis creatrix* of the concrete, that which makes it what it is, and is its possibility of being more than what it is. This in relation to any given concrete, sensible existence, is its idea, — the ideal as distinguished from the actual, though not from the real. This we have the power of perceiving, dimly, feebly, confusedly, no doubt, but still in some degree; and perception of this is the *noesis*, intellection, of the Greeks, in distinction from *phantasia*, fancy, and *aisthesis*, sensation, and which Cudworth and nearly all modern philosophers fall in some sort into the error of confounding with it; making the act of perceiving and the object perceived, nay, the agent perceiving and the object of the perception one and identical. Cudworth even quotes Aristotle to the effect, that “actual knowledge is in reality the same with

the thing known, or the idea of it, and therefore inseparable from it; it being nothing but the mind being conscious of some intelligible idea within it; and hence," he says further on, "the primary and immediate objects of intellection and knowledge are not *things existing without the mind*, but the ideas of the mind itself actively exerted; that is, the intelligible *rationes*, reasons of things." This confusion of thought results from not perceiving that objects may exist out of the mind, and independent of it, and yet not for that exist in space; and from retaining traces of the old doctrine already mentioned, that the soul can see and know only where it is, that is to say, in it itself; that as Plotinus contends, "the immediate τὰ νοητὰ, objects of knowledge and intellection, are not things without the mind acting upon it at a distance, but contained and comprehended within the mind itself." \*

But after all, Cudworth does not mean what he asserts, that the objects of knowledge and intellection are the *ME*. He evidently conceives ideas to be objects of intellection, and he regards them as existing independent of the *ME*, and therefore, in our sense, out of the *ME*; or else how could he hold them to be *rationes*, reasons of things? Reasons of things are not in the mind, for man might cease to be, and the reasons of things remain as they were; the mind merely perceives them, without creating them or containing them.

There is a truth in the doctrine of Aristotle of the identity of knowing with the object known, which, though misapprehended by Cudworth, is worthy of very profound meditation. The real doctrine of Aristotle on this point, perhaps, is for the first time explained in modern philosophy, and explained too by being reproduced, in a remarkable essay on the "Crisis of Modern Speculation," in Blackwood's Magazine for October, 1841, — an essay which for originality, acuteness, depth, and importance, is unsurpassed by anything we have lately seen from the mother country, and must

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\* Cudworth, Immutable Morality, l. iv. c. 1, § 2, *et seq.*

have been the product of a metaphysical genius of the very highest order.

We assume now, without further comment, that ideas exist out of the mind, are eternal verities, and instead of being conceptions of the human mind, as nearly all modern philosophers contend, and as is maintained by our countryman Upham, in his popular but superficial work, which we are sorry to learn finds its way into some of our more respectable universities, are objects which the human mind perceives, and perceives in the intelligible world, transcendental world, or world of absolute reason, in relation with which we were created and still subsist. The intuitive power of the soul is the power of perceiving these ideas, not as detached, not in the abstract, but in the phenomenon, in the concrete, particular, contingent existence that reveals them, and represents them. When they were supposed to be in the soul itself, the soul's own garniture or funds, the intuitive power was supposed to be a peculiar power of the soul to look into itself, select out from its stock, and bring forward the particular idea demanded by the occasion; but taking now, as we do, the true Platonic doctrine of ideas, we must cease to regard intuition as a peculiar fact, or as the product of a special faculty.

Ideas, we admit, are intuitions, if by intuition we are careful to understand not the act of knowing, but the object of knowledge; not the looking upon, but that which is looked upon. They are unquestionably intuitively perceived; but in this respect, as we have already said, they are not distinguished from other objects of knowledge. *There is no division of the cognitive faculty.* To know is always the same phenomenon, whatever its sphere, object, or degree.

On this point, as on the preceding, philosophers have fallen into some errors, which Mr. Parker has not always escaped. "Looking," he says, "even superficially but earnestly upon human affairs, we are driven to confess that there is in man a spiritual nature, which directly and legitimately leads to religion; that

as man's body is connected with the world of matter, rooted in it, has bodily wants, bodily senses to minister thereto, and a fund of external materials, wherewith to gratify these senses and appease these wants; so man's soul is connected with the world of spirit; rooted in God; has spiritual wants and spiritual senses, and a fund of materials wherewith to gratify these spiritual senses, and to appease these spiritual wants." p. 15. "We are," he says in another place, "mixed beings, spirits wedded to bodies. Setting aside the religious nature for a moment, and for the present purpose distributing our faculties into the *animal*, *intellectual*, *affectional*, and *moral*," &c. p. 184. This doctrine of a division of our nature, and of our faculties, runs through the whole of Mr. Parker's book, and vitiates the greater part of his reasoning. All this talk about an *animal* nature, an *intellectual* nature, a *moral* nature, a *religious* nature in man, when we choose to speak otherwise than loosely, vaguely, is unauthorized. Man has but one nature, and that nature is identical in all his phenomena, whatever their character. He has no animal nature, and what in him seems to be the animal, is the animal transformed. Every function in him, which seems to correspond to a function observed in the animal world, is never the same, but is transformed by his humanity; nor has man an angelic or a divine nature, as some would have us believe.

"Man, thus compounded and formed by God, was an abstract or model, or brief story of the Universal; in whom God concluded the creation, and work of the world, and whom he made the last and most excellent of his creatures, being internally endued with a divine understanding, by which he might contemplate and serve his Creator, after whose image he was formed, and endued with the powers and faculties of Reason and other abilities, that thereby also he might govern and rule the world, and all other God's creatures therein. And whereas God created three sorts of living natures, (to wit,) Angelical, Rational, and Brutal; giving to angels an intellectual, and to beasts a sensual nature, he vouchsafed unto man both the intellectual of angels, the sensitive of beasts, and the proper rational belonging unto man; and therefore, (saith Gregory Nazianzene,) *Homo est utriusque naturæ vinculum*; *Man is the bond and chain which tieth together both natures*; and because in the little frame of man's body

there is a representation of the Universal, and (by allusion) a kind of participation of all the parts there, therefore was man called *microcosmos*, or the little world. *Deus igitur hominem factum, velut alterum quendam mundum, in brevi magnum, atq; exiguo totum in terris statuit.* God therefore placed in the earth the man whom he had made, as it were another world; the great and large world in the small and little world. For out of the earth and dust was formed the flesh of man, therefore heavy and lumpish; the bones of his body we may compare to the hard rocks and stones, and therefore strong and durable; of which Ovid:

*"Inde genus durum sumus, experiensq; laborum,  
Et documenta damus quo simus origine nati.*

From thence our Kind hard-hearted is, enduring pain and care,  
Approving that our bodies of a stony nature are."

"His blood, which disperseth itself by the branches of veins through all the body, may be resembled to those waters which are carried by brooks and rivers over all the earth; his breath to the air; his natural heat to the inclosed warmth which the earth hath in itself, which, stirred up by the heat of the sun, assisteth nature in the speedier production of those varieties which the earth bringeth forth. Our radical moisture, oil or balsamum, whereon the natural heat feedeth, and is maintained, is resembled to the fat and fertility of the earth; the hairs of man's body, which adorn or overshadow it, to the grass which covereth the upper face and skin of the earth; our generative power, to Nature, which produceth all things; our determinations, to the light, wandering, and unstable clouds, carried everywhere with uncertain winds; our eyes, to the light of the sun and moon; and the beauty of our youth, to the flowers of the spring, which either in a very short time, or with the sun's heat, dry up and wither away, or the fierce puffs of wind blow them from the stalks; *the thoughts of our mind, to the motion of angels*; our pure understanding, (formerly called *mens*, and that which always looketh upwards,) to those intellectual natures which are always present with God; and lastly, our immortal souls, (while they are righteous,) are by God himself beautified with the title of his own image and similitude."<sup>e</sup>

We can relish a passage like this, which we have quoted partly for its exquisite beauty, and the rich poetic imagination it discloses in its distinguished author; and we have no objections to poets and even philosophers seeking and pointing out the analogies, real or fancied, of man to nature, to animals, to angels, or to God; but we must always remember man is not a beast, not an angel, not a divinity, but simply man, with one only nature, and that nature none other, and nothing else than *human* nature. When man is low and

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\* Sir Walter Raleigh, History of the World, c. ii. § 5.



base, sensual and selfish, it is not a lower, an animal nature at work within him, but he himself acting in a low, base, sensual, selfish manner. When he is moral, religious, upright, noble, praiseworthy, it is not by virtue of another nature, a higher nature, but by virtue of the right and proper direction, or rather activity of the self-same nature, whose misdirection had made him a sinner, vicious, guilty. Man is rightly regarded by Leibnitz as a monad, a simple unity; but a monad, or soul of a given order, endued with certain properties or qualities, which separate him by kind from all inferior, and all superior monads, or orders of beings. It is always one and the same active force, one and the same subject, that acts in all our phenomena, however diverse they may be.

If we object to this division of man's nature, we by a stronger reason object to a division of his faculties. We recognise a distinction of man into three faculties, the power to know, to feel, and to do, and we also recognise various modes of feeling, knowing, or acting; but how acting, feeling, knowing, can be fundamentally different from acting, feeling, and knowing, notwithstanding all that phrenologists have said and done to make it clear and evident, is altogether more than we can conceive.

On this point, philosophers of no mean note seem to us to have fallen into absurdities, hardly less gross than those of the phrenologists, who give us as many distinct faculties of feelings as they can discover different modes of feeling, and as many distinct, nay, separate faculties of knowing, as there are classes of objects to be known; kindly accommodating us with one faculty with which to know *things*, another with which to know *events*, another with which to know *analogies*, and still another with which to know the special relation of cause and effect. Thus Locke divides the knowing faculty into Sensation and Reflection, Kant, Jacobi, and Coleridge into Understanding and Reason, a division apparently accepted by Mr. Parker, and to which he adds, in order to carry out the analogy, the division of the sensibility, or power of *sensing*, the *vis*



*sentiendi*, into senses for the material universe, and a sense for the spiritual universe !

Philosophers have been betrayed into this absurdity, or if they please, mischievous error, by making, or calling the physical organs senses ; as if the power of *sensing* was secreted by them, or at least resided in them. These physical organs are not senses, nor are they the seats of the senses, or more properly of sense. The *vis sentiendi*, or power of *sensing*, resides in the *ME*, is the *ME*, and is one and identical, however numerous or diverse its organs ; and facts go to prove that it is confined to no special organs as the media of its operations. There are certain states, natural or artificial, as the mesmeric experiments, and numerous other facts observed by the ancients and the moderns, seem to us to establish, when the whole body, or the whole nervous, or more strictly, perhaps, the whole ganglionic system, becomes all one organ, and the soul sees, hears, tastes, smells, touches, without the aid of special organs, which warrants the assertion, that the five senses, so called, are at bottom only one and the same sense, one and the same power of the soul, and that it resides not in the physical organs, but in the soul itself, which can at times dispense with them even as instruments.

Assuming, then, that the power of *sensing* is always one and identical, whence comes the division into senses for the material world, and senses for the spiritual world ? Surely, Mr. Parker will not contend that the religious sentiment is an organ, as are in truth what we commonly call the senses. For in such case it would be either a material organ, or a spiritual organ. If it is a material organ, where is it located ? If a spiritual organ, what is a spiritual organ ? But an organ for seeing the spiritual world, in the sense of a medium, he moreover cannot admit ; for he contends that we see that world immediately, by open vision, without any medium. He even contends that we can rise directly to God himself, and as it were commune with the Infinite face to face. Hence his rejection of the doctrine of a mediator, and his sneers at the thought of approaching "heaven by attorney."

It is following the same division, transferred from the power of feeling into the power of knowing, that has led to the prevailing distinction between perception and intuition. We require for perception a medium; but in intuition we know immediately. We know in perception by means of sensation, and in intuition by virtue of reason. Hence, perception is used exclusively of the external world, and intuition exclusively of the spiritual world. The first marks our mediate knowledge, the second our immediate knowledge; in the first the *vis cognitrix* is the understanding; in the second, it is the reason. Admirable! How systematic nature is! One would think she was made for the express convenience of philosophers! And yet this is by no means the true statement of the case. Not only is the knowing faculty always one and indivisible, but the *knowing* itself is always the same, and no more mediate or immediate in relation to one world than the other. The *knowing*, taken strictly, is always intuitive. In the longest chain of reasoning, notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, we venture to affirm with Locke, that each link is intuitively perceived. For, after all, what is reasoning, but stripping a subject of its envelops, *de-monstrating*, that is, showing it, pointing it out to the mind free *from* these envelops, so that it may be seen for precisely what it is. In sensation also the perception is intuitive. The senses, the organs, the pictures, images, species, phantasms, the apparatus discovered or invented by ancient or modern philosophers, serve merely to bring the object more or less distinctly before the mind.

Then, on the other hand, in precisely the same sense in which our knowledge of the objects of the material universe are mediate, so is our knowledge of the spiritual universe. It is a great mistake, if we suppose that we have any pure perceptions of the spiritual world. We see always *through* a medium,—*per-cipio*, not *cipio*. The purely abstract is never an object of our faculties. We cannot attain to it. The spiritual is seen only in the material, the purely intellectual only in the

sensible. This is what Locke himself has recognised, and it is this fact which makes the glory of his school, and is that, too, which has misled and ruined it. The grand error has been in attempting to divide our mental phenomena into *noemata*, intellections, and *aisthemata*, sensations, as if there could be the one without the other. Man recognises the Ideal only in the Actual; it must be concreted, incarnated, made flesh, before it is open to the action of the human mind. The error of Transcendentalists is in overlooking this fact, and attempting to obtain pure intellections, to detach the Ideal, the spiritual from the material, the abstract from the concrete, the universal from the particular, the necessary from the contingent, the eternal from the transitory, the Divine from the human, and to see and know it as thus detached and pure, which is impossible; the error of the Sensualists has been not in asserting that we know only the sensible fact, but in asserting that in the sensible fact there is nothing but the material, the contingent, the particular, and the transitory; in failing to recognise the Ideal, which is the basis and possibility of the particular concrete, contingent existence in question. To say that one part of the fact is sensible, and the other non-sensible, we hold is to speak without understanding oneself. All knowledge is by sensation, and in every fact of knowledge is that which is not sensation; but the sensible does not stand opposed to the Ideal, nor to the spiritual. Sensibility is as truly a medium through which we rise to God, as through which we attain to nature. If any one doubts this, let him contemplate a rich and varied landscape, a noble work of art, an act of heroism or of disinterested affection, or listen to one of Beethoven's Symphonies. What touches the sensibility, enlivens sentiment, and exalts the soul, is a medium of communion with "the First Good and First Fair." Hence the moral and religious influence of Art, and the necessity and justification of forms of worship, and forms beautiful, solemn, and imposing.

We have dwelt long, perhaps even to weariness, on

this point, because we deem it one of great importance. Serious mischief arises from seeking to divide the knowing faculty, and trying to make it appear that we know the material world by one division of it, and the spiritual world by another division of it; one by sensation, and the other by intuition. From this arise those vexatious disputes, those never ending disputes, among philosophers, concerning the origin and validity of our ideas, of our beliefs, of our knowledge; disputes which, when passing from philosophers to the mass of the people, undermine the foundations of religious and moral faith, and generate a species of theoretical unbelief, which they are seldom slow to translate into practice. These are to be ended only by returning to the unity of the soul, and the identity and indivisibility of its faculties, and learning that the soul in all its operations acts always as one. It is always the *ME* that knows, and by virtue of its own inherent vigor and energy, *in conjunction with the NOT-ME*, and knows ideas as well as sensible facts, and sensible facts as well as ideas, but never one detached from the other, but both together, indissolubly, in the same phenomenon. Let no one, then, try to abstract the Ideal from the contingent existence which represents it, and think to make it, thus abstracted, an object of knowledge; and let no one try to confine himself to mere contingent existence; for unless he recognise its Ideal, he cannot recognise even it. We hope that we have repeated this so often, that it will be remembered.

Mr. Parker, however, it is but justice to say, does not understand by the idea of God precisely what our remarks on the word idea would seem to indicate. He uses the word idea in a subjective sense, and makes it the synonyme of belief, or knowledge. His purpose is to prove that our belief in the existence of God is a simple intuitive belief. This we too believe, when our explanation of intuition is taken. But what we protest against, is making this belief an *innate* idea, a fact of man's nature, or a law, or the effect of a law of his constitution. We protest, with what energy we have,

against making the facts or the laws of man's nature a basis or a source of ideas, or of beliefs. This was the grand defect of Reid and the Scottish school, and it is the damning vice of Benjamin Constant's otherwise invaluable work on Religion, a work to which Mr. Parker has been indebted all that he acknowledges. It results from the attempt to study man as we do plants and animals, and to convert psychology into a sort of natural history of the man-plant, or the man-animal. But man is not a plant, nor an animal. When we have in the plant or animal generalized all the facts we can observe, and traced them to a fundamental law, or "habit," of the one or the other, we have learned of the plant or animal all it concerns us to know. But in the case of man, after we have done all this, we have still to go behind the law, or the habit, and ask what is there. Our work is not merely to ascertain what are our habits, but whence come they? Whither do they tend?

The real genesis of belief in the existence of God, in Mr. Parker's language, of the idea of God, we have already given, at least so far as we can without trenching upon the subject of Mr. Parker's second book, namely, Inspiration, without which, in our view, man would never have attained to a knowledge of God. All we say now is, that man is created an intelligent being, and when stimulated, naturally or supernaturally, we stop not at present to inquire which, sufficiently intelligent, as Leibnitz says, to "think God;" that is, to perceive him in the Ideal, the Word, or Revelation of God, in which we are, as it were, immersed, and in which we live and move and have our being. We are made sufficiently intelligent to perceive the Ideal in the Actual, its basis and possibility, and this perception is the origin and foundation of our belief in the existence of God, — a belief which we may fail to name, may fail to perceive is belief in the existence of God, but which we never lose, and therefore do we never become atheists, save in the misinterpretation of our own actual beliefs. Hence the Scripture is not so far out of the way in alleging

that it is "The *fool* who hath said in his heart, there is no God."

It is impossible to have the perception of which we have spoken, without having at the same time some belief in the existence of God, and even some sort of conception of what God is. But this conception, though inseparable, yet distinguishable from the belief in the existence of God, Mr. Parker does well to say, even under circumstances the most perfect, must fall short of the reality. And yet he seems to us to be not duly impressed with the extreme inadequacy of the conception. Man is percipient by nature, and therefore perceives always; but he is conscious only in the small number of perceptions, so marked, so vivid, and distinct, as to be apperceptions. In all these, that is to say, in every *thought*, there are always three elements, subject, object, and form. The subject is always the *ME*; the object is always *NOT-ME*; the form is the notion, or the view which the *ME*, in the act of thinking, takes of both subject and object. The notion, that which the mind notes of the two elements of the thought, subject and object, is often taken for the thought itself, and sometimes as the idea, the mental representation of the external object, and is supposed by Locke and others to be the object with which the mind in its operations is immediately conversant. But this is a mistake. The mind in thinking converses directly with the object, and indirectly with itself, which it sees reflected in the phenomenon, as a man sees his face reflected in a glass. Under the *notion*, or form of the thought, are then always both the *ME* and the *NOT-ME*. *ME*, and *NOT-ME*, here, is assuredly all reality. All reality is, then, under the form of every thought; all infinitude, God and man, are under every notion, and are indispensably necessary as the basis of the smallest, least significant thought. Of such grandeur is thought! But the notion, being the view taken by the *ME* of the reality present to its perception, must be proportioned to the intelligence of the *ME*. As that intelligence is finite, and as we have said the reality to be noted, is infinite, it fol-

lows that the notion must always be infinitely inadequate, must on all sides, as it were, shade off into infinite darkness. The notion is the view the mind takes in thinking; conception is the view it takes in remembering its notions. Notions are, if one may say so, the materials out of which the conceptions are formed. As the notions are infinitely inadequate, so must be the conceptions. Do our best then, finite beings as we are, we can never have any adequate conceptions of God. He everywhere infinitely surpasses our comprehension. In the language of the Psalmist, He makes darkness his dwelling place, and clouds and thick darkness are round about him.

On this point, then, we are able to agree with Mr. Parker. All attempts to define God will be fruitless, for how define the Indefinable? How compress within a form of words Him, whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain, who embosoms all things within himself, and whose works, all magnificent as they are, are but the hidings of his power? Nevertheless, we are sorry to find that the conception of progress, we mean the progress of the race by continuous growth, seems to find no favor with Mr. Parker. He leaves us in the midst of despair. The doctrine of the progress of the race, which he nowhere recognises, would come to our relief, by showing us that, however inadequate our notions are and always must be, they are ever becoming less and less so.

3. But we must proceed more rapidly, or we shall fill up our whole Review before getting through the first Book, and we have five Books to examine. The third chapter is on the extent and power of the Religious Sentiment, and saving what necessarily grows out of the author's hypothesis that the sentiment is an element of man's nature, a religious nature, written in man himself by the Almighty's hand, which is altogether better rhetoric than philosophy, is for the most part able, eloquent, and just. The religious sentiment is as universal, as powerful, and as indestructible as he alleges.

4. The fourth chapter of the first Book is on "the Idea of Religion as connected with the Science of Life." This chapter must detain us a moment. "The legitimate action of the religious element," says the author, "produces reverence. This may ascend into Trust, Hope, and Love, which is according to its nature ; or descend into Doubt, Fear, and Hate, which is *against* its nature. It thus rises, or falls, as it coexists in the individual, with wisdom and goodness, or with ignorance and vice." — p. 44. This is a remarkable statement, and worthy of being pondered well. In the first place, we are told that the legitimate action of the religious element produces reverence. Where is the proof of this? Surely not in Mr. Parker's philosophy, nor in history, as he has transcribed or interpreted it. Then we are told it *may* descend to Doubt, Fear, and Hate, which is *against* its nature. The element, we must remember, is the sense of dependence; whence the proof that it is against the nature of the sense of dependence to doubt, fear, and hate? The sense of dependence is but a polite phrase for a sense or feeling of weakness. Now if the most active element in the production of doubt, fear, and hate, be not a sense of our weakness, and if their occurrence is not most frequent in those who are most conscious of their own weakness or deficiency, we confess that we have studied human life to very little purpose. Experience, we apprehend, proves the reverse of Mr. Parker's statement; and he has made that statement, because his unconscious reverence for religion recoiled from its opposite.

But this is not the worst. We have the religious sentiment separated from wisdom and goodness. It is not the basis of wisdom and goodness; is not necessary to their production; nay, does not contribute to their production, but rises into trust, hope, love, if they happen to exist in the individual that harbors it. Now, if this sentiment is thus disconnected from wisdom and goodness, if its action be good or bad, salutary or pestiferous, according to the qualities it finds, so to speak, in the breast, where it takes up its residence, what, we



would ask in all sincerity, is its value? Whence comes its mighty power? It is in such a case not a positive element, but a negative element; and it is idle to talk of its power and indestructibleness. We had thought, all the world, till quite recently, had thought, that religion, or, to speak more in accordance with the theory we are considering, the religious sentiment was of a purifying nature; and that when once kindled into action, instead of playing a subordinate part, being nothing save in its combinations, it would assume the mastery, take the lead, and convert doubt, fear, and hate, into trust, hope, and love, by generating in the life wisdom and goodness. What, in all conscience, is it for, if not to produce wisdom and goodness, and to destroy, by so doing, ignorance and vice? What else have mankind esteemed it for? and whence, but in the belief of its power to do this, its wide and terrible dominion over the human heart? Out upon the notion, that the religious sentiment is the slave, or that it can be the slave of ignorance and vice. Why it is, — and this is its glory, — the very power of God in the soul, with which to overcome ignorance and vice, not to succumb to them. It is a perpetual aspiration to the All-Good, All-Perfect, All-Holy. It burns with an undying flame. It may not at once overcome all the evil it finds, but consumes it ever, till all is consumed. The soul that is conscious of it knows no decline, no resting place, no peace, but in working its way upward to its native heaven. As the hart for the water brooks, it panteth for the Lord; its heart and flesh cry out for the living God; and its hourly exclamation is, “I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness!” No, no, religion does not *descend* with ignorance and vice, — is no downward tendency, — never has dragged man, nor suffered itself to be dragged downwards; but from the first moment of man's existence it has been to him an angel of God, ministering to his weakness, raising him upward, and whispering to his failing heart in the soft but kindling tones of heaven, “Aspire, aspire!”

But we pass over this, to consider the new definition

of religion, which Mr. Parker proposes in this fourth chapter. In the first chapter we had religion defined, so to speak, ontologically; we have it now defined phenomenally; there as a principle of human nature, here as a fact of human life; there as the cause, ground, or source, here as the effect, consequence, or result; there in reference to its abstract elements, reduced to its lowest denomination, here as a concrete, living power. There we were told from the abstract point of view, that religion was the sense of dependence; we are now told from the new point of view, that it is a "voluntary obedience to the law of God, inward and outward obedience, to *that law he has written upon the nature of man*, revealed in various ways through instinct, reason, conscience, and the religious sentiment."

This would seem at first sight to be unexceptionable, and we believe it is so in the mind of Mr. Parker himself. But when he puts forth a definition, it must be considered independently of any mental reservations of his own, and interpreted in the light of his general theory. To us it embraces more than is warranted by the previous definition given, and therefore he has had no right to adopt it; and moreover in our judgment it does not include all that is essential, nor what is peculiar to religion.

When Mr. Parker assumed the ground, that religion depends on a special religious element in man, and defined that element to be the sense of dependence, he precluded himself from the right to embrace within religion, as a fact of life, anything which could not be traced to a sense of dependence as its principle. But so far is religion, as now defined, from depending solely on the sense of dependence for its principle, that in order to obtain it, Mr. Parker himself has felt obliged to introduce, besides the conceptions of volition, law, obedience to law, the additional elements of instinct, reason, and conscience. Are these reduceable to the sense of dependence as their principle?

Mr. Parker gives us this definition, — voluntary obedience to the law of God, — as the definition of abso-

lute religion. To us it is objectionable, because it defines religion solely from the subjective point of view ; whereas religion is objective, as well as subjective, and is the law no less than the obedience. It is also objectionable inasmuch as it leaves out all distinct recognition of religion as sentiment, and especially of religion as an aspiration to the infinite, which last is its chief peculiarity regarded as purely subjective. We have been surprised, that with all his deep and gushing sentiment, with all his sensibility to beauty, material and spiritual, to observe how little of genuine sentiment Mr. Parker suffers to enter into his conception of religion ; and still more surprised, that with his bold and lofty spirit, — a spirit that seeks the highest excellence, in practice no less than in theory, — should yet never view religion at all as an aspiration of the soul. We do not now recollect an instance, in which this deep longing of the soul for the perfect, this inward thirst of the soul for the holy, and unceasing struggle to realize it, is ever looked upon as religion, as religious, or as in any way pertaining to religion. His conception of the truly religious man is of one who can stand unmoved amid all the storms of life, “ a statue of tranquillity, with forefinger pointing to heaven.” But this, notwithstanding an exquisite sketch of it, à la Retsch, by a highly esteemed friend, shown us the other day, we must say is to us cold and freezing. We do not want men to be statues of tranquillity ; we do not want them to be statues at all ; but living, moving, thinking, feeling, joying, grieving, loving, aspiring men, to whom all is living, and who have life to impart to all. Mr. Parker has not given the name religion to what is purest, holiest, most praiseworthy in his own life. We can extract from his life a better religion than we find in his book.

But waiving this, we have another difficulty. The law of God, voluntary obedience to which is said to constitute religion, which at first promised something, turns out, on closer examination, to be nothing but a law of man's nature, and therefore man himself. Mr.

Parker defines it to be that law which God has "written on the nature of man." This means, if anything, that the law of God we are to obey is a law of our own nature, and is a law of God, because God is the author of our nature, and shows what he wills us to do, by giving us such a nature as he has. The laws of man's nature are not separable, nor are they distinguishable from man himself. They are the man. Hence, to obey the law of God, written on my nature, is to obey the laws of my nature, that is, to obey my nature, that is, again, to obey myself. Hence, absolute religion, defined to be voluntary obedience to the law of God, proves to be nothing but a voluntary obedience to oneself; which, as we said when reviewing Mr. Emerson's Address to the Students of the Divinity School at Cambridge, we must needs believe is no improvement upon the Christian rule, "Deny thyself."

That we do not misinterpret Mr. Parker, we think evident from the fact, that his whole theory is what he calls the "natural-religious view," and from the fact, that he says it is through instinct, reason, conscience, and the religious sentiment that this law is revealed. We hardly know how to make intelligible what we feel in regard to this "natural-religious view." As we understand it, while it by no means denies the existence of something above man, it asserts that what is above man, instead of revealing itself to him by a special act or supernatural mode of activity, reveals itself only in and through his nature. Mr. Parker would be the last to deny that God reveals himself to man. No man believes, or believes that he believes, more firmly in Divine Revelation than he. We state this thus emphatically, because it is but justice to him that we should, and because that we would by no means lose sight or suffer others to lose sight of the fact, that he so believes. The question at issue between Mr. Parker and others on this point in his own mind relates solely to the mode of this revelation. He considers it a *natural* mode, others a *supernatural* mode.

But what is the meaning of a *natural* revelation?

The only answer we are able to give is, that God reveals to us what his will is concerning us, by the instinctive promptings of our nature. Whatever is *natural*, whether in thought, feeling, word, or deed, is then in accordance with the will of God. For did not God make our natures? Did he not make them as he pleased? and are they not the expression of his will? Then to obey our natures, that is, to do whatever our natures prompt us to do, is to obey his will, to conform to his law. This is the only interpretation we can give to the doctrine in question. God does not speak to us in harmony with the laws of our nature, that is, without suspending or changing the laws of our nature, but he speaks *through* our natures, so that the voice of our nature is to be taken and considered to be his voice. Hence Mr. Parker calls, what in one place he expressly declares to be an essential part of man's constitution, in another, *a revelation from God*. The voice of nature is to him the voice of God. Now what is the voice of man's nature but his natural wants, tendencies, desires, appetites, propensities, inclinations, powers, and affections? However nature utters her voice, whether through *instinct*, reason, conscience, the religious sentiment, it is the voice of God, and therefore obligatory.

Now will Mr. Parker admit that there are, or that there can be, any such things in the life of man as unnatural phenomena? Does, or can, man act, — when all conceptions of supernatural influences, and of all influences below man's nature, or of diabolical influence are excluded, — *against* his nature, and thus get out of his nature? Of course not; for we cannot place man at one end of the list and man's nature at the other, and have them run a tilt one against the other. Man, we suppose, always includes and takes with him his nature, go he where he may, and act he how he may. It must be always by virtue of his nature that he does that which is sometimes said to be against his nature. When I follow a sensual desire, however strong that desire may be, or however destructive it may be, I am

following my nature, obeying the law of God written on my nature ; and when I resist this desire, I am still obeying my nature under another of its aspects, or another of its elements.

Exclude, as "the natural-religious view" does, both divine influences and diabolical, and we must say not only that man obeys God by obeying his nature, but we must say that in all his acts, in all the manifestations of his being, he does obey God, and with the strictest fidelity conceivable, as faithfully and as strictly as the needle turns trembling to the pole, or as the stars obey him in their courses, or the ocean in its heaving billows. Is Mr. Parker ignorant of the fact, that the doctrines of supernaturalism, against which he so indignantly protests, have for ages been felt by the human race to be necessary to save us from this dark and withering conclusion, to which his natural-religionism would reduce us? Has the world lived up to this day without learning that man, left to his nature, that is, to himself, with no influences to reach him either from above his nature or from below it, can never get out of his nature, nor be in opposition to his nature, or do aught else than obey his nature, and therefore that all his actions, whatever their character, must be natural? And if natural, needs it any remarkable logical power to be able to perceive that they must be right, such as are well-pleasing to God, if the voice of man's nature be the voice of God?

Mr. Parker, while adopting the "natural-religious view," and excluding all *extra*-natural influences, whether supernatural or *sub*-natural, still looks upon man as being in a very *unnatural* state. He speaks of the religious sentiment as rising into trust, hope, love, which is according to its nature, and of its descending into doubt, fear, and hate, which is *against* its nature. Here is man restricted to his nature, yet acting *against* his nature. But on his theory man cannot get out of his nature, cannot oppose it, cannot act against it. This fact he seems to us to have everywhere overlooked, and by so doing has given us, under his natural-relig-

ionism, nothing but sheer naturalism, which, we suppose, we have no occasion to tell him, necessarily destroys, in theory, all moral distinctions. 'The only difference between his view and old fashioned naturalism, is, that he is more consistent than were his predecessors ; for he thinks man is acting out his nature in the religious phenomena, no less than in appetite, propensity, passion, love, or hate.

We do not suppose by any means that Mr. Parker intends this result, or that he will accept it ; but *we* can obtain no other from his premises. The law we are to obey is written, he says, on our nature ; it is made known to us in our *instincts*, reason, conscience, &c. God reveals himself to us in the nature with which he constitutes us. Its laws, which are the laws of our natural development or activity, are his laws, the expression of his will concerning us. Obey them and we obey him. To obey them is to obey ourselves, the promptings of our nature. Here, do the best we can, is the conclusion to which we come. And here we see not why hate is not as natural to him who hates, as love is to him who loves, and therefore as religious ; nor why lust is not as natural to the lustful as chastity is to the chaste, and therefore, again, as religious.

Nor is this all. Even passing over this, and assuming the law to be really the law of God, we still object to the definition. Religion "is *voluntary* obedience to the law of God." This, while it makes no distinction, and leaves no real distinction possible, between religion and morality, excludes from the character of religious the greater part of our acts, and those too the purest and best, and which in the clearest and most striking manner evince our sanctity and likeness to God. Volition is predicable only of those actions which are performed, we will not say with deliberation, but with distinct consciousness. In volition there is not only perception, but apperception. But these comprise only a small portion of actions. We act in all the phenomena of life. We act in desire, in affection, in passion. Moreover, we act

always with intelligence. Man is intelligent in his essence, and hence he cannot act at all without acting as intelligence. And hence again his accountability, and the moral character of all his actions, his involuntary actions no less than his voluntary actions. Hence, too, the moral character of our desires, our affections, our passions, our thoughts, and, as these all determine them, of our opinions. This moral character extends to our earliest and our latest actions, making the infant and the old man alike accountable, in a degree, that is, in some degree, with him who is in the vigor of his manhood, the full energy of his faculties. Our desires, our affections, our passions, all of which are actions, but for the most part involuntary actions, are those which reveal our real characters, and tell what we are in ourselves. The sin of the sinner does not consist mainly nor chiefly in his sinful volitions, but in his unchaste desires and unholy affections.

So on the other hand, the sanctity of the saint does not consist in his always willing to obey God; for the good one wills to do, one often does not; and the evil one wills not to do, that often one does; but in having, as it were, his very nature so conformed to the will of God, that all his natural, all his involuntary emotions and actions shall be holy. The saint is redeemed not only from the curse of sin, but from sin itself, is sanctified, finds it his meat and his drink to do the will of God. Now the greater part of the acts of this man, so redeemed, so sanctified, are involuntary; that is to say, unconscious, and yet are they not all religious? He obeys God not only voluntarily, but involuntarily. This is what is meant by Christian perfection; the being raised by grace to that state in which all the natural promptings of the soul are acts of obedience. Mr. Parker, it strikes us, is too narrow in his definition; and by confining religion to voluntary obedience, he would, on the one hand, restrict sin to merely acts of voluntary disobedience, and, on the other hand, would exclude from religion all those acts of deep and ardent piety, of unreserved devotion and lofty enthusiasm, in



which the soul seems to lose all consciousness of itself, to act without the least reflection, and to flow on with the stream of Divine Influence, inseparable, and almost indistinguishable from it; when it is transformed, so that it is no vain boast, but a real truth, that it utters, when it says "not my will, but thine be done." The great truth we here try to bring out, but which we feel our inability worthily to express, Mr. Parker himself recognises, to some extent, in a subsequent definition that he gives of religion, in which he defines it *being* good and *doing* good.

Mr. Parker says that "a sharp analysis separates between the religious and moral elements in man." Morality he defines to be "the harmony between man's action and God's law." p. 48. What is the difference between this and the definition of religion, "voluntary obedience to the law of God?" We can understand no possible distinction between the meaning of the phrase "obedience to the law of God," and "harmony between man's action and God's law." The only difference then possible for us to conceive between religion and morality, *according to the definitions given*, is, that religion includes only those actions in which man voluntarily conforms to the law of God, and morality includes all in which he conforms, whether voluntary or involuntary. In this case, his morality is broader, richer, and altogether more desirable than his religion.

The true distinction between religion and morality, is very conceivable. Religion, viewed objectively, is the law man is bound to obey; subjectively, his aspiration to the truth, beauty, and goodness of the law, and his efforts to realize it in life; morality is his realization, or rather the form in which he realizes, or seeks to realize it. A man's morality is the expression of his religion, his *cultus exterior*, by which he seeks to realize and express what is purest in his feelings, truest in his conceptions, and loftiest in his aspirations.

Mr. Parker proceeds in this same chapter to draw a distinction between Religion and Theology, and to declare the first absolute, identical, permanent, while the

second is variable and transitory. If we understand by religion a mere sense of dependence, unquestionably we may distinguish religion from theology, and speak of it as being always the same, or as differing only in degree, as more or less; so also as we consider religion, it is always the same. The law we are to obey is always the same law, and the aspiration to the Infinite, under whatever form we aspire to it, is, no doubt, always one and the same aspiration. In this sense we may say very truly that there is but one religion, and distinguish this one religion from theology; for there have been, and are, many theologies. But it is impossible to have religion without a theology. In the religious sentiment, we have shown that there is always a perception of God under the form of the Ideal, and therefore necessarily a belief in the existence of God, and some sort of a conception of what God is. This belief and conception, which must needs coexist with the religious sentiment, constitute theology. They are our theory of God. Our theologies may be, and will be as various as our conceptions, and all of them must be as inadequate as we have shown the conceptions must be. Now, when we speak of religion in general terms, independently, we mean ordinarily, religion in the sense that includes both the sentiment, the conception, and the idea; consequently, in a sense that allows no distinction between religion and theology. Moreover, it is practically impossible to separate them; and they who seek to depress theology, in order to elevate religion, will find that as they depress the one, so do they the other. He is a novice in religion, who has yet to learn the importance of maintaining the form of sound words. They who attempt to be religious, without cultivating theology, will either waste away into a flimsy sentimentalism, weak and weakening, or they will sink into entire religious indifference. If theology is not essential to religion, why has Mr. Parker written this book to correct our theology, and reduce it to a science? Mr. Parker's assertion, that religion marks the practical tendency, and theology the theoretical, seems to us not

well founded. They who cry out against theory, and in favor of the practical, are the greatest theorizers in the world ; having not only a theory for their practice, such as it is, but a theory even against theory. True wisdom requires a man to seek and insist on the theory that will lead to practice, and to right practice. Let us be careful how we fancy that there is in man a moral, or a religious nature, to be exalted above the intellectual. Man is one and identical.

Nevertheless, we fully subscribe to the doctrine that,

“ Though religion itself be the same in all, the forms of religion, or mode of worship, and the practice of religion which is morality, cannot be the same thing in any two men ; though one mother bore them, and they were educated in the same way. The conception we form of God, our notion about man, the relation between him and God, the duties which grow out of that relation, may be taken as the exponent of all the man's thoughts, feelings, and life. They are, therefore, alike the measure and the result of the total development of a man, an age, or a race. If these things are so, then the phenomena of religion, like those of science and art, must vary from age to age, with the varying civilization of mankind ; must be one thing in New Zealand, and the first century, and something quite different in New England, and the fifty-ninth century. They must vary also in the same individual ; for a man's wisdom and general character affect the phenomena of his religion. The religion of the boy and the man, of Saul the youth and of Paul the aged ; how unlike they appear ! The boy's prayer will not fill the man's heart, nor the stripling son of Zebedee comprehend the devotion and life which he shall enjoy, when he becomes a saint in mature years.”—  
p. 50.

5. Chapter fifth considers the three great historical forms of religion, Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism. We have not read this chapter critically, because we have presumed it designed to be merely an historical verification of the principles we have been considering in the preceding chapters. In the main, we believe his view of Fetichism and of Polytheism just, and it certainly indicates much reading, and fine powers of historical criticism. We, however, doubt whether he does not fancy traces of Fetichism in Judaism sometimes, where in reality there are none. We think also the attempt to obtain the monotheistical system of the Jews from the preceding systems, by natural genesis

and growth, will prove historically as fruitless as it must be philosophically and scripturally unwarranted. Something more than the natural development and growth of the human mind, we apprehend, will be necessary to account for the appearance of the Mosaic system, at the early epoch we find it, and before there was any harmony between it and the general intelligence and virtue of the race.

6 and 7. The sixth and seventh chapters all inviting as they are, and the much they contain that we approve, and the much that we do not approve, we must pass over without a word of comment, in order to come as soon as possible to the second Book on Inspiration.

## II.

### INSPIRATION.

To give an analysis of this Book is more than we have leisure to do; and to take it up chapter by chapter and comment upon all that we deem worthy of remark, would require a space not at our command. We may say, however, that it professes to treat of the Relation of the Religious Sentiment to God, or to be a Discourse of Inspiration, and is subdivided into eight chapters. I. The Idea and Conception of God. II. The Relation of Nature to God. III. Statement of the Analogy drawn from God's relation to Nature. IV. The General Relation of Supply to Want. V. Statement of the Analogy from this Relation. VI. The Rationalistic view, or Naturalism. VII. The Anti-Rationalistic view, or Supernaturalism. VIII. The Natural-Religious view, or Spiritualism.

1. The first chapter merely goes over ground already traversed in the second chapter of the first book. It reiterates the inadequacy of our conceptions of God, and infers from it that we ought not to affirm either the personality or the impersonality of God; and that we should hold on with all our might to the idea of God, which, as here explained, is, after all, only a conception;

the conception of something not dependent, cause, life, being, and substance of what is.

Mr. Parker denies the personality of God, not so much because he consciously denies what all the world means by the personality of God, as because he falls into the very vulgar mistake of regarding human personality as the equivalent of human limitation. "Our conception of personality," he says, p. 161, "is that of *finite* personality; limited by human imperfections; hemmed in by time and space; restricted by partial emotions, displeasure, wrath, ignorance, and *will*." We leave to him to show, in his second edition, the reasons he has for placing *will* in the same category with "partial emotions, displeasure, wrath, and ignorance;" and for regarding it as a *restriction* of our personality. We had supposed that will, the power to will, that is, the power to act with consciousness, with understanding, intentionally, which in a great measure distinguishes wise acting from foolish, constituted not a limitation of the being possessing it, but its chief glory.

Then our conception of personality is *not* the conception of *finite* personality. If it were, why should Mr. Parker feel the need of adding to the term personality, the epithet *finite*? The word personality would express finiteness of itself. The "partial emotions, the displeasure, wrath, and ignorance," of which Mr. Parker speaks, are not, as he supposes, necessary elements of our personality, but its limitations; the conception of them is not the conception of personality, but the limitation of that conception. The limitation of a thing, we hardly need say, is not it, nor essential to it. We are not persons because we are the subject of these phenomena; but we are the subject of them because we are only limited, finite, imperfect persons. So far forth as we are persons, we are free from them.

So far from thinking it improper to affirm personality of God, we hold, and are ready to maintain, that our personality is for us, always and necessarily, the representation of God; and Mr. Parker himself, in rejecting our conceptions of God, and insisting only on what he

calls the idea of God, gives us God as represented by human personality. "At the end of the analysis," he asks, "what is left? BEING, CAUSE, KNOWLEDGE, LOVE, each with no conceivable limitations. To express it in a word, a Being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness." Will Mr. Parker tell us what this is, but the conception of human personality freed from its limitations. In human knowledge, in all the phenomena of life, the *ME*, as Mr. Leroux has well contended, represents the infinite, not the finite, as Mr. Cousin had maintained. It is in its own eyes the one persisting, indential, universal, immutable, and eternal force. From it we obtain all our conceptions of God. It is from it we obtain our conception of substance or being. Our conception of power originates in our own causality; of permanence in our own persistence; of immutability in our remaining one, and identical, however various and variable our phenomena; and of eternity in the fact, that we are always present to ourselves. The *ME* thus represents the infinite, but undoubtedly in a finite manner. Our conceptions of personality are finite conceptions of infinite personality.

But "we can have no image of God in our mind." True; but our minds are an image of God. Man was made in the image of God, and is, as an old writer says, "the Shekinah of God." This is not to anthropomorphize the Deity. To anthropomorphize the Deity is not to ascribe to him personality; but the limitations of our personality; which limitations mark the absence and not the presence of our personality.

"But do these qualities [infinite power, wisdom, and goodness] exhaust the Deity?" p. 168. That is, do infinite power, infinite intelligence, and infinite love exhaust God, or include the whole of the Divinity? Most assuredly; but our knowledge of these qualities does not exhaust them. We know that infinite power, intelligence, love, are God; and, so to speak, God all entire; but what infinite power, intelligence and love contain; what they really are, we know only the little that we have experienced of them in man and nature.

All that people mean, when they ascribe personality to God, is that he is a free, intentional causality. Nobody supposes that he deliberates, reflects, doubts, hesitates, and is finally resolved ; but that he does what he does with infinite freedom, consciousness, and design ; and that he is not a mere fate, necessity, dark, inscrutable, overwhelming ; but a WILL, that can do, and doeth as seemeth to him good ; who is not only a WILL, but a PROVIDENCE, that careth for all ; and not only a Providence, but a FATHER, who loveth all his children, heareth them when they cry unto him, and hath compassion on them in their distress ; and not only a Father, but a REDEEMER, who has mercy on the sinful, redeems them from sin, forgives their transgressions, and sanctifies them.

Mr. Parker, we presume, will smile when he reads this passage. "We cannot," he says, "say that God hates, is angry, or grieved ; repents ; *is moved by the special prayer of James and John* ; that he is sad to-day, and to-morrow joyful ; all these are human, limitations of our personality, and no more to be ascribed to God than the form of the reindeer, or the shrewdness of the beaver." p. 168. It is a limitation of our personality, that is, it is a weakness or a defect in us to be moved or affected by prayers and entreaties ! And it is as absurd to suppose that God hears and answers prayers, as it is to fancy him with the form of the reindeer, or the shrewdness of the beaver !

We cannot say of God that "he thinks ; that is, to reason from the known to the unknown." p. 167. To reason is unquestionably to think ; but that all thought is a *reasoning* from the known to the unknown, is certainly something which we have now learned for the first time. To think, we had supposed, was to act, or that thinking is the action of an intelligent and sentient force, and when performed by that force alone, it implied its infinity.

"As the absolute cause, God must contain in himself, potentially, the ground of consciousness and personality ; yes, of *unconsciousness and impersonality*." p. 161.

We were not aware before that mere negatives could have any ground: Unconsciousness and impersonality, we had supposed, were mere negatives, mere limitations of the positive, and therefore without any ground of being; for how could that which is no being, but the negation of being, have a ground of being? Can we conceive of a ground of nothing?

2. We are sorry that we are obliged to hasten so rapidly over the second chapter, which treats of the Relation of Nature to God. A more confused or exceptionable chapter we have rarely read in any work from a source at all respectable. It is a sad mixture of conflicting and irreconcilable elements, of jarring and hostile theories. What in the world was Mr. Parker thinking of, when he laid down his proposition about God's being in space? Does God dwell in space? Would it be space if he dwelt in it, and filled it? We had supposed that God does not dwell in space, that he inhabiteth eternity; that he embosoms space and its contents,—if space can have contents, and still be space,—as we embosom our thoughts; not that space contains him, or that he can be said to be *in* space, save in a loose and vague way of speaking.

The doctrine of this chapter is, that God is the **IMMANENT CAUSE** of nature. What Mr. Parker means by immanent cause, we may gather from his saying of God that "*He is the substantiality of matter.*" God is the cause of matter, then, by being its substance. Matter, then, is a mode, or accident of God. What may be said of matter, may be said of the entire universe; it is a mode or accident of God. Is not this Spinozism? Does Mr. Parker knowingly, intentionally advocate the pantheism of Spinoza? We deny that God is the substantiality of matter. Matter, we own, is not itself a substance, but an assemblage of substances, if one might so say, a continuity of substantial points, which substantial points are immaterial, and very properly termed monads by Leibnitz. But without insisting now upon monadology, more ridiculed than understood, and which philosophy is rapidly reproducing; we say, that we are



no longer willing to call God the *immanent* cause of nature. When we so call him, we cannot possibly escape pantheism. We regard him as the permanent, persisting, unfailing cause of nature, and he is present to all nature; not as its ground, its substance, being, but as its creator. Creation is not emanation, but the actual production of substantial beings where nothing was before. Substance is whatever can support accidents. The number and variety of substances which God may create have no conceivable limit. All these have a real but limited existence. There is no step between this view and pantheism.

3. The *third* chapter, is the statement of the Analogy drawn from God's relation to Nature. If God be present in matter, the analogy is that he may be present also in man. "If it follows from the idea that he is immanent in the material world—in a moss; it follows also that he must be immanent in the spiritual world—in man." God is the substantiality of matter; therefore of a moss, and therefore of man. He is as present in the moss as in the man; for he is as present "in the eyelash of the emmet, as in the Jewish holy of holies;" and being the substantiality of each, and equally present in each, wherein, then, does man differ from a moss? Does God differ from himself? Is he not identical wherever present? If so, we would like to be shown wherein one phenomenon can possibly differ from another. Man is a moss, and a moss is a man; for are not both at bottom God? Or is not one and the same God both in the moss and the man? Does Mr. Parker propose to have us retrograde to the pantheism, to the dead unity, excluding all plurality, of Xenophanes and the old Eleatics?

Creation is, undoubtedly, in many respects mysterious; and the precise relation between God and the universe no one can altogether explain. We see where we are when we call God the *immanent* cause of the universe. We, for ourselves, usually draw our analogy from the relation between a work of art and the artist. Creation is the Art of God. In creating, God actualizes

out of himself, not himself, but his own Ideal, as the artist realizes on the canvass, in the statue, column, dome, poem, or melody, his conception of the Beautiful. Seize in the work of art what and only what is from the artist, and the relation between that and him, is in our view the image of the relation between creation and God.

4. The *fourth* chapter is on the general Relation between Supply and Want. The doctrine of it we had in the fourth chapter of the first book. "We find," says the author, "in nature every want supplied. That is, there is something external to each created being to answer to all the internal wants of that being. This conclusion could have been anticipated without experience, since it follows from the perfections of the Deity, that all his direct works must be perfect. Experience shows that this is a rule in nature. We never find a race of animals destitute of what is most needed for them, wandering up and down, seeking rest and finding none. The supply answers the demand." p. 183. This rule holds good in relation to man. In his case there is a natural supply for all his natural wants. And moreover he is furnished with the faculties, *instinct* and *understanding*, which enable him to avail himself of the supply. This is as true in regard to man's religious wants as to any other class of wants. Man has naturally religious wants, for which there is a natural supply, and which supply he has the natural faculties requisite for obtaining.

Here is the essence of Mr. Parker's whole doctrine. Man is created perfect. He is created with religious wants. There is a supply for those wants. If he is perfect he must have the natural ability to obtain that supply. Hence no need of supernatural aid to direct him to the supply, nor to enable him when discovered to possess himself of it. Here we have this novel theory, which this volume of five hundred and three pages was written to bring out and establish. The great aim of the author is everywhere apparent, — it is to get rid of supernaturalism. There is no use in dis-

guising it. Supernaturalism is the demon he seeks to exorcise, and nature the divinity he seeks to enshrine, and whose worship he would institute. What he means is, that each race of created beings is created with all that is requisite to enable it to fulfil its destiny. And yet, strange to say, he makes religion consist in a sense of dependence. Man is created with a natural supply for all his natural wants, and with the natural powers of obtaining that supply, and yet the glory and excellence of his nature is to feel himself dependent on God for life, breath, and all things!

But let us examine this theory. "Supply answers to demand." There is not only a natural supply, but a natural *power* in each race of beings, and, therefore, we presume, in each individual, to obtain it. These are the premises. Man has certain wants, which no one can question that he seeks to satisfy. He must then satisfy them, that is, obtain a supply, if in his power. It is in his power, as Mr. Parker expressly maintains, p. 185. He therefore does obtain it. Whence then the disproportion we all experience between our wants and the supply? "The supply answers the demand." And yet, all poetry, all history, all life, is one long, loud, monotonous wail of the human heart over desires unsatisfied, wants unsupplied. It is this disproportion between the want and the supply that creates the universal uneasiness of all creation, and all life's tragedy. We experience it everywhere. As students, as seekers after knowledge, burning with the eternal thirst to know, we are never satisfied. We stand ever on the borders of a universe of darkness, which no ray of light furrows, oppressed with a sense of the vanity of all that we have as yet learned. In our affections we are never satisfied. Oh, who has found that sweet ideal of his young dreams, which the heart could take in and feel that it was enough! The purest are not pure enough; the gentlest are not gentle enough. Love is an everlasting craving, stretching away and beyond all finite things, satisfied with nothing below the infinite, nor even with the infinite, till it is incarnated in the finite,

when it becomes too small to satisfy it. How reconcile all this to the position, that supply answers to demand, and that the supply is within man's power?

We may be told that Mr. Parker means only that there is a supply to every *natural* want. Be it so. But we have already shown that on his theory there can be no *unnatural*, as there can be no *supernatural*, no *sub-natural* wants. The essence of Mr. Parker's theory is in excluding all that is *extra-natural* as necessary to the proper development, growth, and perfection of the being or race concerned. God appears to it, aids it, only in the *nature* he gives it. How then can, as we have already asked, the being get out of nature, or exhibit any *unnatural* or *extra-natural* phenomena? All our phenomena must be natural. All our wants then must be natural. It is idle to talk, on this theory, of artificial wants. Then for any and every want we experience there is a natural supply, and within our reach; we know where it is, are able to get it, and try with all our might to get it, and yet all life is, as we have said just now, one long, loud, monotonous wail over wants unsupplied!

We do Mr. Parker no injustice. He assumes as his starting point, that greatest of all absurdities, *the perfection of nature*, in each genus and species, and therefore of necessity — unless we have forgotten our logic, — in each individual. This, he says, could have been anticipated from the perfections of the Deity; all of whose *direct* works must be perfect. He proceeds on the supposition, that whatever is done by a perfect being must be perfect. God is perfect. Therefore all his *direct* works must be perfect. Why *direct*? Can perfection produce imperfection *indirectly* any more than *directly*? Assume that all God's works are perfect. Then each race of beings must be perfect, and then all the phenomena of that race must be perfect. Whence then the imperfection and evil we see in the universe, and mourn over in ourselves? If a perfect God implies a perfect nature as his work, perfect nature must imply perfect phenomena as its work. And hence

the impossibility of imperfection is demonstrated. And yet what is the fact ?

Now, we deny Mr. Parker's premises. We go so far as to say, that God not only has not made nature perfect, but that he could not have made it perfect. The perfections of God are an insuperable barrier to the perfection of his works. The grand error in all ages has been in assuming perfection in nature, in creation, as the proper point of departure. But when we have begun by such assumption, we are wholly unable to account for the origin of evil. The old explanation, by means of a fallen angel for tempter, and the fall of man consequent upon the temptation, will avail nothing, unless the original imperfection of man, even as man, be presupposed. But what is creation ? We have defined it to be God realizing out of himself his own Ideal. That Ideal, as the Ideal of an infinite Being, must be infinite. Its complete realization would be an infinite creation. But an infinite creation is an impossibility. Infinite is that which is unbounded. But the Creator must always bound, mark, define his own creation, and consequently his creation must be finite. To assume that creation is infinite, would be to assume that God could create that which he could not bound, that which would surpass himself ; which were not only to make the effect greater than the cause, but to deny infinity to God ; which, again, would be to assume that a finite creator is equal to the creation of an infinite universe. If God be finite, he cannot create an infinite universe ; if he be infinite he cannot, because he must always be greater than his work. The painter is greater than his picture, the poet than his song.

But if creation be finite it must be imperfect, and not only imperfect as a whole, but in detail. We cannot then assume perfection as the starting point of any given race of beings.

But God's Ideal is infinite. There must be in him then an infinite tendency to its realization, manifesting itself in an infinitely creative effort. Consequently, creation, the universe, must be infinitely progressive,

as a whole and in all its parts. Here is the basis of the great and kindling doctrine of PROGRESS, on which we here, and everywhere, so earnestly insist. He who would arrest progress, would, if he could, arrest the creative action of God himself. But progress implies imperfection as the point of departure. If a race of beings were created perfect, that is to say, all it could become, in full possession of all lying within its possibility, which is the only conceivable definition of perfection when predicated of a limited being, there could be no progress. Hence, we say that each race of beings has its idea, which is the basis of what it is, and its infinite possibility of being more than it is. The idea of man is the basis of man, and his possibility; that which he is ever actualizing, but which ever transcends his actuality; so that man may always be something more than he is. That is to say, each individual man shall continually take in, as human nature, as humanity, a larger and a larger idea, and have before him to realize ever a loftier and a loftier Ideal.

This is the conclusion to which we come by reasoning from cause to effect, by strict demonstration, the only really solid reasoning. But experience, as far as it goes, sustains this conclusion. We see nowhere in nature the perfection boasted. The earth on which we tread, what is it but a crust of ruins? Are there no pestilential damps, no noxious effluvia, no earthquakes, volcanoes, blights, mildews, abortions? The "whole creation," says Paul, "groaneth in pain." Religious men have everywhere noted these marks of imperfection, and have accounted for them, by supposing that when man sinned, all creation fell with him, that all nature for his sake was cursed. This way of accounting for these imperfections may not be satisfactory, but its vogue proves, at least, that the experience of mankind is against the hypothesis of the perfection of all the Creator's works. Then, on the other hand, we are able, to a limited extent, to trace empirically the progress of man, the earth, and several races of beings beside man.

We therefore dissent from Mr. Parker's naturalism,

not only because it destroys, as we have seen when commenting on the fourth chapter of his first book, all moral distinctions, but because it is contrary to both experience and sound philosophy. We do not then accept the data from which he infers that supernatural inspiration is not necessary. In order to make out his case, and show that there is always, so to speak, for man a natural supply of God proportioned to his natural need of God, he has been obliged to assume the perfection of nature, which would be to transfer infinity from the Creator to the creature; to deny all progress, leaving therefore all creatures without employment, which would be their death; and also to deny all imperfection, therefore all evil, and therefore again, all sin, contrary to the universal testimony of the race, and the painful experience of every man. This doctrine of supply answering to demand is all a rhetorical illusion. The assertion that we never find a race of beings wandering up and down, seeking rest and finding none, is unfounded. No race of beings, no being throughout God's universe, but wanders up and down seeking rest, which it finds not. All creation is struck with one universal Unrest. Not a heart but throbs; not a leaf but trembles; not a solid rock but heaves and throes. Man was born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward. For six thousand years has the poor child, with aching heart and bare and bleeding feet, wandered up and down God's universe, seeking rest — some spot on which to repose but for a moment; but none, none. O mock not the poor child by telling him that he has never sought rest without finding it.

Man finds rest only in union with God; peace for his soul only in approaching God. He may be eternally drawing nearer to God, but never can become, strictly speaking, one with him. Always then must he sigh for a repose he finds not, and aspire to a good rising far above and stretching far away beyond him. Let no man dream that there is for him here, or hereafter, perfect bliss, any more than there is complete and absolute misery.

We have here given Mr. Parker's theory of *natural-religionism*, as we understand it, and drawn from it such inferences as it seems to us to warrant ; but we ought, in justice to him, to say that he, by no means draws, or will accept these inferences. In asserting the general principle of supply answering to demand, he has not meant to assert, what his words imply, that there is never any disproportion between the actual want, and the actual supply ; but that for every natural want, there is somewhere, potentially at least, the needed supply ; that is, the external object to which the want points, or needs for its satisfaction. Hence, he lays down the axiom, "A natural want of man's constitution implies satisfaction in some quarter."

As a principle thus broadly stated, this is not true, as we have already seen. A want is either a deficiency or a desire. A natural want of man's constitution is nothing more nor less than a natural or constitutional want, natural and constitutional in this connexion meaning the same. "A natural *deficiency* implies satisfaction in some quarter." Whence this conclusion ? "A natural *desire* implies satisfaction in some quarter." This can be so only on the condition that for *every* natural desire there is provided a satisfaction. The poor wretch they are leading to the gallows desires, and very *naturally*, too, not to be hung. Is there satisfaction for this desire ? The mother, pale and sorrowful, sits watching by her starving boy. She desires, very naturally, too, a morsel of food, that her dear one may not die. She shall obtain it, and the child shall live ! All this is very comforting ; but alas, men are hung, and children, notwithstanding the desires of their mothers, do starve. "The tendency to love implies something lovely for its object." The same principle of reasoning, again. The tendency to love implies our inability to find and enjoy ourselves in ourselves, and the necessity we are under, in order to live, to go out of ourselves and bind us indissolubly to another. But that it implies that another really exists, we are not so certain. Many of us make wide and diligent search



through life for the "lovely object," without finding it. If Mr. Parker had said, *love* implies the *perception* of something lovely, and perception is impossible where there is no object, he would have expressed the truth.

Mr. Parker labors hard to establish his right to conclude from the want to the supply, but to no effect. He begins by attempting to prove empirically, or rather by asserting, that in all cases, except that of our religious wants, supply answers to demand: and then, by way of analogy, infers that the same must hold good in the case of these wants; that for them also there must be the requisite supply. Analogy, when made out, is no certain evidence; and what is worse, as we have seen, Mr. Parker fails to make it out; so that he has not even analogy in his favor. We are far from questioning the fact, that there are objects which respond to the religious wants of our souls; but we do most unequivocally deny the right to conclude from the want to the object. To conclude from the want to the object, is only another form of concluding from the subjective to the objective, which is, and can be allowable in no case whatever. Where the objective is not given along with the subjective, as an indissoluble part, an integral part, of the same phenomenon, it is not attainable.

Mr. Parker also thinks, we presume, that he escapes the naturalism we have charged him with, by making God the *immanent* cause of man and nature. No one is further from intending to assert man's sufficiency for himself, or independence of God. In all he says of religion, he seems to himself to imply man's strict dependence on God for life, breath, being, and all things. We shall do him great wrong, if we suppose him destitute of religious feelings, the common religious experience, or as in any way in his own mind, according to his understanding of himself, making war on what anybody holds to be essential to religion. We are always to remember that we are reviewing the works of a religious man, and of a minister of religion, and therefore that if they contain aught against religion, it was not by him so intended. We repeat, then, that he by no

means regards himself as asserting or as implying man's sufficiency for himself. He assumes everywhere man's dependence on God. But this dependence is a *natural* dependence, and the aid man receives is everywhere a *natural* aid; that is, not aid coming from an extra-natural source to him in harmony with the principles or laws of his nature, but in and through his nature. This, however, he thinks is not naturalism in any offensive sense, because God being the *immanent* cause of man, is at the bottom of man, the very ground and *being* of man; so that it is always God that speaks in and through the tendencies of man's nature. But this avails nothing, because it destroys all distinction between God and man, save that of substance and mode, and loses God in nature, or nature in God. But God is not the *immanent* cause of nature, although we by no means separate him from nature. We have, it is true, our being in God; but our being is not his being, our substance is not his substance, any more than I am my thoughts which I remember.

5. We have, in these remarks, anticipated pretty much all we had wished to say of the four remaining chapters of this second book. What we have said comprises our leading objections to Mr. Parker's natural-religionism, or spiritualism. Of the three views he mentions, we, for ourselves, adopt, *though by no means as he states it*, what he calls the anti-rationalistic view, or supernaturalism, substantially the view taken by the catholic church in all epochs of its history. We should often except to the statements and explications of this view made from time to time, as well by its friends as its enemies; but we have satisfied ourselves that it is substantially true, and that it is impossible to explain the life and growth of man without assuming the supernatural, the miraculous intervention of Divine Providence. And in coming to this conclusion, we do not feel that we have abdicated any of our rights as a man, or surrendered any of our independence as a thinker. Some few additional remarks in vindication of this position, and explanatory of our views of Inspi-

ration must close what we have to say on this part of Mr. Parker's Discourse.

1. Life consists in growth. We say growth, not development. The modern doctrine is expressed by the term development, and presupposes that man contains in himself, from the first moment, the germs of all that he can be, and that his whole life consists in simply developing and maturing these germs. But this we hold to be false fact and false analogy. The acorn contains the law, or, if we might so speak, the *idea* of the oak, but not the oak itself. It will never become an oak unless it have the aid of light, heat, moisture, and appropriate food, all of which, though capable of assimilation, are derived from sources *extra-natural*, that is, foreign to the nature of oaks. So of man. He can grow, that is, he can live, only by virtue of a medium *extra-natural*, foreign to his nature, to his humanity; and whatever is foreign to his nature as a man, to his humanity, we take it, is *extra-natural*.

2. We have already remarked that all creation grows, or is infinitely progressive, by virtue of the infinite tendency, we would say, if we did not fear the term would be misapprehended, the infinite necessity of the Creator,—a necessity in himself, not a necessity imposed upon him,—to create or realize out of himself his own Ideal. In consequence of this, not man only, but all creation grows, is in progress, lives, goes forward. But it is progressive; it grows, or it lives, not in this case by virtue of its own inherent energy; but by virtue of the infinite tendency of the Creator to perfect his works, if we may so speak, to continue the effort to realize his own Ideal. Man, as a part of creation, lives, grows, is progressive, advances, then, by this continuous creative effort of God. The power then that carries him onward is not his own, not the power of his own nature, but the power of God, and therefore supernatural. What a moment ago we termed *extra-natural*, we may now term *super-natural*.

3. According to the very law of life in a dependent

being, and according to what is implied in the very conception of dependence, we can never live in and of ourselves alone. We have shown that Thought is simultaneously and indissolubly subjective and objective. That is, in thinking, we think, *in the single phenomenon*, both subject and object. Let no one suppose that this is a fact restricted to the phenomenon usually termed *thought*. It is equally true of every phenomenon of life, of all dependent life, whatever its character, however feeble or obscure. What we call our life,\* is not all our own. It is a one life, but resting upon a double basis, that of subject, and that of object. It is the result of the communion of subject and object; of **ME** and **NOT-ME**. Where no subject, no life; where no object, equally no life. Life, then, must be looked upon always as the *joint* product of subject and object.

4. According to this law of life, it is to be borne in mind, 1. That the object is as *actively exerted* in the production of the phenomenon, as is the subject. There is no passivity in nature. All existences are active forces, causes. The object is not, as a New-York editor in criticizing an Essay of ours supposed, the end or goal of the subject, that for the gaining of which the subject exerts itself; but a *joint* cause actively exerted with the subject in the production of the phenomenon, as essential and as causative in its production, as the subject itself. The alkali and acid are both equally necessary to the formation of the neutral salt. 2. It must also be borne in mind, that the phenomenon, that is, the life, partakes equally of the character of the subject and of the object. With a low and worthless object, it is as impossible to, have a high and worthy life, as with a low and worthless subject. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." So the hand of an apostle of Jesus laid on the head of the neophyte, the Holy Ghost enters into his heart, and creates him anew.

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\* See the article on Leroux's *Humanité* in the last number of the Boston Quarterly Review, and the Letter we recently addressed to Dr. Channing; especially Leroux's work itself.

5. From this it follows that there can be no growth, no advance, no progress, and therefore no life, if both subject and object remain altogether unchanged. To obtain any new fact of life, you must have always either a new subject, or a new object, or what is the same thing, the subject or the object under a new aspect, one or the other in some respects changed.

6. Man's life results from the communion of the **ME** with the **NOT-ME**. But man communes with God and nature never directly. He communes with God, only through a medium, or mediator, as we may by and by show, and with nature, only through the medium of his body. **THE DIRECT OBJECT OF HIS COMMUNION, THEN, IS OTHER MEN.** His natural life is the result of his communion with the members of his race. They are his object, and he is theirs. But they, as his object, can impart to him only the life they live, and he, as their object, can impart to them only the life he lives. That is to say, if left to their natural life, they can impart to him only what the race, at the epoch assumed, is already living, and he nothing else to them. Consequently, confined to this natural life, the race must come to a stand still; no more progress, no more advance. Individuals would grow up from infancy to the level of this natural life, and there stop, struck with the curse of eternal immobility, which is eternal death.

7. Now, of two things one: Either no progress, and therefore no life, or supernaturalism. The race, we see, contains in itself no self-germinating principle. Therefore, in order for it to germinate, to grow, we must obtain for it foreign aid, a power to concur with the power of the race; and to go out of the race, that is, out of human nature, is to go out of nature. The whole machinery must stop, unless there be a supernatural change or enlargement of the object, or of the subject. The last, we conceive, is done, but through the medium of the supernatural change, or enlargement, of the object; and it is by this, that human nature itself becomes enlarged, that the race rises to a higher and a truer life.

8. The object to be changed or enlarged is *other men*; that is, a member of the race. This leads us directly to what we term, in one point of view, Providential Men, and in another, Special Inspiration. If we assume the perfect equality of all men, as our point of departure, and are able to keep them equal, we place mankind out of the condition to be progressive. If no one rose above the level of the mass, or stood out from the multitude, the prophet and instituter of a higher life, the race would be struck, as we have said, with endless immobility, because it is always *man that is the object of man*. But one man can stand out thus from the multitude, or rise thus above the level of the mass, by virtue of no *natural* principle, as yet discovered or conceivable. No man can rise, in his life, above the combined worth of both subject and object. No man can then, naturally, rise above the level of his race.

9. We have now established the necessity of changing or enlarging the object; that is, of having for the progress of the race individuals, who stand out from their brethren, rise above them; and these individuals we cannot have naturally; that is, while confined to simple human nature. If they are to elevate their race, they must have communed with a superhuman, that is, a supernatural object, and therefore, become possessed of a superhuman life, a superhuman worth. Hence, in order to provide for the life and growth of the race, we are obliged to assume individuals supernaturally endowed, or inspired.

10. These individuals are what we term PROVIDENTIAL MEN,—what Carlyle calls Heroes. Their production is miraculous, cannot be otherwise than miraculous. God, by a miracle, raises them into direct communion with himself, or at least with superhuman excellence. The individual thus exalted into communion with a superhuman object, by virtue of the law of life already explained, receives into his own life, up to a certain point at least, the life and character of that superhuman object; and therefore comes to live a superhuman life, which nevertheless in him, by virtue of his subjectivi-

ty, becomes a human life. This life becomes, then, a new and a higher life, and is in its elements a life literally, truly, indissolubly human and divine. He who lives this new, this higher life, is the inspired, the Providential Man, the Prophet, the Messiah, the Regenerator of his race, the Father of the Future Age. Such was Noah, Abraham, Moses, Socrates, Paul; and in a degree, mediately, Luther and Calvin, Fox and Penn, Wesley and Swedenborg. Jesus we are hardly willing to place in the same category. All these are indeed his brethren, among whom he is the first-born or chief; but in him dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. He seems to us to have lived from the moment of his conception in the womb of the virgin, if we may so speak, in direct, immediate communion with God, and so had in its fulness, what these had only in a degree. They are images of him, he the express image of God.

11. This individual, this inspired, providential man, this prophet, this messiah, whom God has selected from the mass of men, called, qualified, and sent forth, becomes, *through the individuals who have personal access to him*, an object of communion to his race; and by virtue of their communion with him, imparts to them his higher, diviner life, which they, his disciples, through the communion of man with man, and generation with generation, send out through the race, and down to the latest posterity. Thus God inspires the race through inspired individuals.

12. This inspiration we have called that of Life. The end sought by it is the introduction of a higher life for the race, through which all men may be redeemed and sanctified. It is a life, because all inspiration must needs be by a life. We attain to truth, as well as to moral worth, only by living it; and the truth, which transcends the life we live, is to us always incomprehensible. Man, moreover, is a unity, and life, therefore, implies the activity of his whole nature. He enters with his whole nature into every one of his phenomena. Purify and exalt the life, then, and you clarify and extend perception. Hence, Jesus makes do-

ing, that is, living, the test of the truth of his teachings. No man ever comprehended the falsity of a doctrine, which he had not at one period of his life believed, or seen under a point of view in which it appeared to him not false. Hence it is said the pure in heart shall see God. If, then, the kind of inspiration we have supposed introduce a higher order of life, it necessarily introduces higher conceptions and juster views of all the objects of human knowledge, whether they pertain to God, man, or nature. It is the fact we here state that justifies the world in persisting to believe in a connexion between false opinions and an immoral life — a connexion which we hold to be very real, but which has been grossly abused, because men are always more ready to conclude from the opinion to the life, than from the life to the opinion.

13. Supernatural aid comes to man in two ways ; or, there are two modes of supernatural inspiration. God, we have said, reveals himself to man in the Ideal. By this Ideal the *race* is inspired. But by the fact already mentioned of the continued or continuous effort of creation, which follows necessarily from the infinity of the Creator, this Ideal must be always enlarging, and consequently presenting itself as a new object of aspiration. It therefore becomes to the race an *inspiration incessantly renewed*, which renders it in fact a universal and continuous inspiration of mankind ; and is therefore sometimes assumed to be *natural*. It is the Logos, or Divine Reason of St. John, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world ; the Inner Light of the Quakers, which they are careful always to distinguish from human reason ; it is the Supernatural Inspiration we contended for under the name of spontaneous reason, — that is, the spontaneous activity of Reason as the Logos or Word of God, not man's reason, — in Charles Elwood, and in our review of Mr. Parker's South Boston Sermon. By virtue of this, humanity is inspired. Hence what the Germans call the *Weltgeist*, the spirit of the times, an age or an epoch, and the cause of the fact so often remarked of men in different parts of the globe,



without communion with each other, lighting at the same time upon the same thoughts, the same discoveries in science or morals, and the same reforms in church, state, or society. This universal, never failing inspiration of humanity is, perhaps, too little considered by the Christian world, and the value of the recent theological discussions, in this country and in France and Germany, consists in their tendency to bring it more distinctly to the notice of theologians, and to install it in its rightful authority in the Church.

14. The second mode of inspiration is that by inspired individuals, or providential men. We here may regard as the inspiration, either the influence of these on the race, or the miracle of their own endowment. We regard them as raised up, specially qualified, to inspire their race, and lead it onward to higher, more advanced life. This special inspiration and the other are not two different kinds of inspiration, but two different modes of one and the same inspiration, by which God carries on his plans, and effects the progress of mankind.

15. The evidence that a man is thus specially called, designated, and qualified to inspire his race, is very obvious, and very certain. All life is subjective and objective. A man who lives a life above the life of his race, in his own epoch, according to the principles we have established, lives such life only by virtue of communion with a superhuman object. It becomes, then, a simple historical question, whether he does or does not live such a life. Take Moses, as an instance. *We*, who live now, may see in Moses nothing preternatural, or superhuman, as we find humanity to-day. But this is nothing to the purpose. Did Moses, in his day, live a life above the life to which the human race *had then attained*? That is, in any aspect of his life did he present phenomena, that required for their production a higher object than he could then find in other men? If so, his claim to be a providential man, or supernaturally inspired, is established; so of any one else.

16. But will not this imply that every great man is

supernaturally inspired? What mean you by a great man? Shakspeare, for instance. He was unrivalled in his epoch. Or say Bacon, or Newton. But did Shakspeare, Bacon, or Newton, live a life above the life already in the race by virtue of the mission of Jesus? We do not find that either of these surpassed, much less equalled this. Shakspeare's works are marvellous; but who would name his writings in the same day with the New Testament? or compare the *Novum Organum* with the Gospel of St. John? or the *Principia* with the Pauline Epistles? Shakspeare, Bacon, Newton, then, do not need to go out of the race. Already is there a life circulating in the veins of humanity above their loftiest attainments. Bring forward one who lives a life surpassing that of Jesus, and we will admit him to be supernaturally inspired; but any other, since the time of Christ, we can admit to be only mediately inspired, through communion with the Holy Ghost, which is the Life of Jesus embodied in the true Catholic Church.

These are but loose hints on a subject which would require a volume to be treated at full length, and a volume, we hope, one day to devote to it. But few and somewhat disjointed as these hints are, they will indicate, we trust, to the thoughtful, the outlines of a doctrine on inspiration, which, while it is orthodox in its main features, contains nothing to which any man who really believes in God need object. In reviewing Mr. Parker, who rejects the authority of the Bible, and usually prefers to express his religious views in the language of heathens rather than of Jews and Christians, we have not felt at liberty, nor that it was necessary, to justify our views by scriptural quotations. Yet we believe they will be found eminently scriptural; and if we have endeavored to establish them philosophically, it is not because philosophy is with us paramount to religion. Philosophy with us is not the judge of religion, having the right to acquit or condemn it. Religion is the highest authority we acknowledge, and philosophy is merely the form our religion assumes, when subjected to our own mental action.

Mr. Parker, we are aware, objects to all special inspiration ; or rather, he objects to all inspiration but that which in our view is no inspiration at all. When we mean something totally different from what the world means by inspiration, we should call it by another name. There is a morality in the use of names, which writers would do well to remember. Inspiration is never something which man attains unto, but something which is given him. It is breathed into a man, not forth from him. We leave Mr. Parker to talk as much as he pleases about inspiration, proportioned "to the quantity of a man's being and the quantity of his obedience." We have no scale or dividers by which to measure its quantity, or ascertain its proportions. All we know of it is, that it comes, when it comes, as a cloven tongue of fire, and he who feels it speaks words which are a mystery unto himself, which take hold of the heart of mankind, and are mighty through God to overcome the world, destroy sin, and establish righteousness. It depends not "on a man's own will, nor on the faithful use of our faculties," but on the grace of God, who selects now the royal David, now the courtly Isaiah, and now the rustic Amos from his herds, touches their lips with a live coal from off his own altar, and sends them forth the messengers of his truth, his justice, his love, and his mercy. Not unto us, not unto us the glory, O God. If we have spoken words which shall fetch their echos from eternity, it is because they were words which thou gavest us, and thine be the glory and the praise. We are wearied with this everlasting effort to get rid of God, and make it out that man is all and in all. Feeble worms that we are ; what were we, if God were to abandon us to ourselves ! It is man's glory to humble himself and exalt his Maker. Alas, the more we see of life, the more we know of our own weakness, the more significance do we discover in that old Myth, which made pride the primal sin, the primal curse of the angels, and the cause of man's first disobedience.

In re-reading, since the above was written, the chapter on "the natural-religious view," we have felt it due to Mr. Parker to say that, though he makes not the proper distinction between faith and inspiration, predicating indifferently of one what belongs only to the other, he has yet described many of the phenomena of inspiration with great justice, and with a depth and earnestness of feeling, a grace, beauty, and force of expression, which assure us that better things than this Discourse lie in the man, and will one day come forth. In simple sooth, his book is far beneath him, and his philosophy does no sort of justice to the purity, strength, and fervor of his religious feelings.

We very readily confess that we think most persons who read this chapter, and our account of his views, will feel that we have misrepresented him. In fact we have felt so ourselves for a moment, and have asked ourselves, if it be not true that we have misapprehended his meaning. When one year ago we wrote our review of his South Boston Sermon, we presumed his views and ours of the subject of inspiration were very nearly, if not exactly, the same. We found him speaking of inspiration, divine inspiration, God's inspiring men, and inspiring all men, in language very nearly the same we had for years been in the habit of using, and it did not occur to us even to ask, if he used this language in the same sense we did. We, therefore, ascribed to him our view on the subject, and developed and defended that view as his. Knowing our own doctrine to be that of supernatural inspiration, we had no suspicion that he was advocating a system of mere naturalism, and we repelled with indignation the charge of doing it, whenever we heard it brought against him by others.

But when in the early part of last October we listened to the first two Lectures of his Course, here expanded into the first and second books of the work before us, we became instantly convinced that we had misapprehended him; and that notwithstanding the great similarity of his language and ours, he and we started

from opposite poles. We saw, then, too, that as his language had led us to suppose that he accepted our supernaturalism, so our language might have led him and others to suppose that we adopted his naturalism. From that moment we changed somewhat our phraseology, which has led some to accuse us of having changed our belief. But we have not changed our views of inspiration at all, although we may have modified to some extent our manner of explaining and setting them forth. We seemed to ourselves to teach the same doctrine on inspiration in Charles Elwood, under the head of Supernaturalism, that we do in this article. We have always, ever since known to this community, in the strictest, in the most orthodox sense of the word, believed in supernaturalism ; and instead of its being true, as some have supposed, that we have been trying to present our naturalism so as to commend it as much as possible to supernaturalists, we have been doing exactly the reverse, trying so to present our supernaturalism, as to win the attention, and ultimately the affections and the belief of the supporters of naturalism. We shall gain no credit for this statement, and yet it is true, and the real key to much that we have written offensive to our more orthodox friends. Mr. Parker seems to us to be a naturalist, struggling to express his views in the language of supernaturalists. While therefore we should demand for ourselves the credit or discredit of being more orthodox than we have seemed, we should claim for him that of being less so.

It is this experience driving us to this conclusion, that has led us, upon second thought, to fear that after all we have done Mr. Parker no injustice. He speaks of both universal inspiration and special, and predicates many things of each, which are true and worthy of note. But his inspiration is divine only in the sense that man is divine. It is natural inspiration, and he calls it divine inspiration only because he conceives God to be the *immanent* cause of nature. With him inspiration has its source in the man, and not out of man in God. "It is," he says, p. 227, "co-extensive with

the faithful use of man's natural powers. Men may call it miraculous, but nothing is more natural; or they may say it is *entirely human*, for it is the result of man's use of his faculties; but what is more divine than wisdom, goodness, religion?" Wisdom, goodness, religion, then, instead of resulting from the proper use of man's natural powers, aided by the grace of God, are these powers themselves; are faculties of man's nature. Whoever before called wisdom, goodness, or religion, a natural power or faculty of man? Really, we are tempted perpetually, in reading this volume, to believe in sober earnest that its author recognises no distinction between a fact of life and an element of being, that is, between the actor and the act, the cause and the effect; for he is continually confounding the two.

Nor is this all. The view he here takes makes wisdom, goodness, religion, the source, not the effect, of inspiration. Is the author aware of the singular doctrine he teaches in this? "A foolish man, as such," he says, "cannot be inspired to reveal wisdom, nor a wicked man to reveal virtue, nor an impious man to reveal religion. Unto him that hath more is given. The poet reveals poetry, the artist art, the philosopher science, the saint religion. The greater, purer, loftier, more complete the character, so is the inspiration." p. 221. A man's wisdom, goodness, religion, are the sources of his inspiration; what then is the source of these? If Mr. Parker were asking by what means one man could inspire other men, he would not be so far out of the way. But this is not the question. Whence the inspiration which the man himself experiences? not, Whence that which he imparts? If a man is inspired only as the result of his wisdom, goodness, and religion, or piety, that is, as the result of the faithful use of his faculties, then it follows that he does not need to be inspired in order to make a proper use of his faculties, or to be wise, good, and religious. What purpose then does inspiration serve? If the poet's inspiration comes from his power, his excellence as a

poet ; what is it that makes him a poet ? And after you have got the *poet* without any dependence on inspiration, what need of the inspiration ? If we have the saint, what need we care for the inspiration ? We had supposed poetic inspiration necessary to constitute the poet, but Mr. Parker has discovered that the poetic inspiration is the result of the fact, that one is a poet. We had thought inspiration necessary to enable one to be wise, good, religious ; but Mr. Parker corrects us, and assures us that it is necessary to be wise, good, and religious, in order to be inspired. The great end of life, we presume no one will question, is fulfilled, when one is truly wise, good, and religious. We ask again, then, the use of inspiration ? Surely, it is bad economy to produce a thing so costly, when we can make no use of it ; when it can serve no purpose, and is not needed to enable us to fulfil the great ends of life. We have observed, from the beginning of this volume to the end, an apparently studied effort to represent all that has usually been considered by religious people as essential, to be entirely unnecessary. Thus religion itself is made to derive its character, and all its worth, from the wisdom and goodness it finds in the breast where it lodges. So we do not need religion in order to be wise and good. What then do we need it for, but to make us foolish and wicked ? And now inspiration is made to depend on our wisdom, goodness, and religion ; consequently we have no need of inspiration in order to be wise, good, and religious. What then do we need it for ; to be foolish, wicked, and irreligious ? By and by we shall see the same thing when we come to Christianity. We shall have Christianity distinguished from absolute religion ; absolute religion declared to be the only religion necessary, to be also easily ascertained, while a relative, historical form of religion, like Christianity, is exceedingly difficult to learn, and one hardly knows when he has learned it. If absolute religion is enough, and Christianity is not that religion, what need of Christianity ? If a knowledge of absolute religion is plain and easy to be ac-

quired, and that of Christianity difficult, why trouble oneself about Christianity at all? Is Mr. Parker aware whither all this leads? If so, it will be hard to clear him of disingenuousness; if not, he writes with an almost inexcusable degree of carelessness.

“Now, as in the days of Adam, Moses, Jesus, he that is faithful to reason, conscience, and religion, will, through them, receive inspiration to guide him through all his pilgrimage.” p. 234. Very true; so he, who will exercise his reason, will be cured of his insanity. Nothing more true. But alas, the inability to exercise reason is the insanity! “Reason, conscience, religion, mediate between us and God, as the senses do between us and matter.” p. 227. Here is the key to Mr. Parker’s theory. The natural activity of reason, conscience, religion, (piety?) is precisely what he means by inspiration. The activity of reason, conscience, religion, is the *me*, ourselves, ourself. Consequently when we act reasonably, conscientiously, religiously, we are inspired—act by inspiration. We have the natural ability so to act, and therefore the natural ability to be inspired. There is no more need of any supernatural aid to be reasonable, conscientious, and religious, than to eat, drink, or sleep. All may be done in accordance with and by virtue of natural laws. If this is not excluding God, as a free providence, from the moral world, we know not what is. This, we think, justifies us in calling Mr. Parker’s system sheer naturalism, and proves that we have not misinterpreted his view of inspiration.

But to make the matter doubly sure, let us hear Mr. Parker still further, and penetrate if possible his secret thought. Speaking of the fact of inspiration, he says, p. 223, “It takes the rose out of the cheek, turns the man in upon himself, and gives him more of truth. Then, *in a poetic fancy*, the man sees visions; has wondrous revelations; every mountain thunders; God burns in every bush; flames out in the crimson cloud; speaks in the wind; descends with every dove; is All in All. The soul, deep-wrought, in its intense struggle,



*gives outness to its thought*, and on the trees and stars, the fields, the floods, the corn ripe for the sickle, on man, and woman, it sees its burthen writ. The Spirit within constrains the man." That is, the soul struggles to utter what it feels, constrained by its own intense, earnest spirit, and what it reads as the "burthen of the Lord," is merely what it has projected from itself in endeavoring to give *outness* to its thought. Once for all, does Mr. Parker recognise any distinction between the soul of man and God, or does he not? We feel almost authorized, from his apparent delight in designating God as the great SOUL OF ALL, to say that he does not. If he does, how can he call the struggles of the soul to give *outness* to its thoughts, and in poetic fancy writing them on trees, stars, fields, floods, corn, man, and woman, the receiving of the truth of God into the soul?

The man "is full of God. While he muses the fire burns; his bosom will scarce hold his heart. He must speak, or he dies, though the earth quake at his word. Timid flesh may resist, and Moses say, I am slow of speech. What avails that? The *Soul* says, Go, and I will be with thy mouth, to quicken thy tardy tongue." p. 224. This is very kind in the soul, for if it should refuse to go with him, Moses would be obliged to go without his soul. Really, this is carrying the poetic license a little too far. We can take much by way of joke or pleasantry; but when a man in downright earnest, in a passage as high wrought as the one from which we quote, talks about a man's soul rising up and telling him not to be faint-hearted, not to hesitate because he is not of a ready speech, for it will go with him, be with his mouth, and quicken his tongue, we hardly know whether to grieve or to laugh.

Mr. Parker unquestionably admits degrees of inspiration, and that some are more inspired than others, because they are more obedient, and because they were created with a greater *quantity of being*. Is not God unjust, partial, capricious, in creating one man with a greater

quantity of being than another? But let that pass. These men,—for “inspiration, then, is the consequence of a faithful use of our faculties,” p. 220,—are not selected out from among their brethren, and specially called and qualified by their Maker through his grace to be his agents, messengers, or ministers in the accomplishment of his purposes. Indeed, according to Mr. Parker, there does not seem to be any grand providential scheme or plan in the universe, which God is fulfilling, and for the fulfilling of which he raiseth up whom he will and putteth down whom he will, making one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor; or indeed if such plan there be, God raises up no special agents for carrying it on, but makes use of such agents as he finds already furnished to his hand. Thus the specially inspired are not specially inspired to accomplish God’s purposes, but are chosen to accomplish those purposes because they are specially inspired, that is, specially qualified by their own wisdom, goodness, religion, or the faithful use of their own faculties. Hence, they, who have believed that God selects, calls his agents before they are born, and sanctifies them from the womb, are greatly mistaken. We bear the “burthen of the Lord,” because he sees that we are strong and able; and he chooses us to bear it, because he sees that we are able. This is the doctrine we are now to subscribe to! See me, who venture to stand forth in the eyes of the world, the herald of new views. The world denounces me, society scowls upon me, my brother abandons me, but why shall I feel it, or be cast down? Has not God chosen me to be the messenger of his truth? and *me*, of all men, because I am wiser, better, more religious? Was ever a doctrine more flattering to human pride? O, my brother, if you and I have been chosen to speak to this age words of which it hath need, and to bear the reproach, it is not because we are better, or dearer to God than our brethren, nor because we are stronger or more able to bear the “burthen;” but because God’s providence requires certain in-

dividuals to be selected, and it might as well be us as any others; and which of us would not, if we could, like Jonah, flee from the face of the Lord, and so escape the terrible mission of rebuking one's age, and denouncing the judgments of God upon one's own city?

O my brother, bear with me. This view of thine may seem to thee wise, just, beautiful; but to me, alas, who know what it is to feel my own weakness, and the damning brand of guilt on my heart, and the deep hell of remorse burning in my bosom, this view brings nothing but the blackness of despair. A God, who does nothing till man takes the initiative, and appoints none to a work to which they have not appointed themselves, is to us as no God at all. We want a moral Governor in this universe. We want a Father, a merciful Redeemer, who does not wait for our tardy movements, and frown upon us till we, unaided, have become pure and blameless in his sight; but that comes to us, all defiled as we are, that says to us, all outcasts as we are, weltering in our own blood, **LIVE.** O, leave us the hope that there is in heaven One mighty to save, for the arm of flesh fails us. O, leave the poor sinner, eating husks with the swine, the thought that he has yet a Father, and a Father's house to which he may return. Think well of it; if in thy zeal thou art not sweeping away every hope that was left us. To thee, who mayst not have felt the burden of sin lie heavy on thy conscience, this may be all foolishness; but I tell thee, my brother, that though I should be unable to sweep away the sophistry that hides my God from me, though I had nothing to answer to thy cold and freezing doctrine of human ability, I would not, I could not embrace it. I know something of the pride of the philosopher, and of the reasoner; but I would forswear philosophy, reason, and even, if possible, thought itself, sooner than the sweet hope of a Saviour's love, which makes the heart of the humblest believer glad.

## III.

## CHRISTIANITY.

WE come now to the *Third* Book, entitled *The Relation of the Religious Sentiment to Jesus of Nazareth, or a Discourse of Christianity*. It consists of seven chapters. I. Statement of the Question and the Method of Inquiry. II. Removal of some difficulties. Character of the Christian Records. III. The Main Features of Christianity. IV. The Authority of Jesus, its Real and Pretended Source. V. The Essential Peculiarity of the Christian Religion. VI. The Moral and Religious Character of Jesus. VII. Mistakes about Jesus — his Reception and Influence.

A glance at the titles of these chapters will satisfy any one, that for Christianity Mr. Parker understands something very different from the Christianity of the Church, and that he forms a totally different estimate of it from that usually formed by Christian ministers. We have no room left us to follow him as closely as we could wish, and must content ourselves with touching, in the briefest manner possible, a few of the more important doctrines he sets forth.

1. The question to be asked and answered in relation to Christianity is very simple. Religion originates in, and depends upon, a special religious element in man, namely, the Religious Sentiment. That which exhausts the Religious Sentiment, or answers exactly to all its demands, is absolute religion, — religion as it exists in the facts of man's nature, everywhere and always the true religion, the only true religion, and all the religion man needs for the perfection of his character.

The simple question as to the relation of the Religious Sentiment to Jesus of Nazareth, or to Christianity, then, is, Did Jesus, or did he not, teach absolute religion? Does Christianity, or does it not, coincide with absolute religion? If the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, which are Christianity, conform to absolute religion, they

are true and authoritative ; if not, just so far as they do not, they are false and without authority.

The question itself suggests the method of inquiry, or way we must take to answer it. It is a plain, simple question of history and criticism. We do not ask, what is religion? is Christianity true? is it, or is it not, sustained by miracles? but simply, what is Christianity? In settling this question, miracles and the character of Jesus are of no account. We have only to consult the records of Christianity, whatever they be, wherever deposited, and to the best of our ability ascertain from them what Jesus really taught, what Christianity really is. Having done this, we are to compare it with absolute religion, and note the agreement or disagreement.

This is very plausible, and may seem to many quite conclusive; but it proceeds on an assumption which we cannot allow; namely, that man, independently of Christianity, is in possession of absolute religion. Mr. Parker makes absolute religion the standard-measure by which to try Christianity. This evidently presupposes that we have absolute religion in our possession, otherwise we could not use it as a standard. But absolute religion is all the religion we want. If we can have that, nay, if we actually have that without Christianity, what is the use of Christianity? What need of troubling ourselves about it, even so much as to inquire whether it agree with absolute religion, or not?

But is it true that we are in possession of absolute religion, independently of Christianity? "Absolute religion is perfect obedience to the law of God." p. 241. No man can possess it, then, since in this case it is a fact of life, not an element of nature, without actually yielding the perfect obedience required. To yield this perfect obedience, is to attain to the perfection of the human character. If then every man is in possession of absolute religion, it follows that every man yields perfect obedience to the law of God, and is perfect. Will Mr. Parker admit this conclusion?

But it may be said that Mr. Parker does not mean to assert, that every man possesses, as a fact of his life,

absolute religion in the sense here assumed ; but that every man has by virtue of his natural powers, independent of Christianity, or any other professedly supernatural religion, a true conception and knowledge of what is absolute religion. It is not the religion, but the knowledge of it, that every man possesses. Well, be it so. We know by living ; no man knows love but by loving ; obedience but by obeying. Consequently, in order to know what perfect obedience to the law of God is, one must be perfectly obedient. Hence, we return to the same conclusion.

Absolute religion is all that is essential to the perfection of the human character. But knowledge itself is an element of human perfection, consequently an element of absolute religion. A perfect knowledge of absolute religion would imply, then, all the knowledge a human being can possibly possess. A character, which has not attained to the utmost limits of its possibility in all directions, is not perfect. This implies that it must attain to its utmost limits in knowledge, as well as in anything else. Consequently, so long as there is any knowledge possible, not yet attained, the character is imperfect. Hence, the assumption, that man has a perfect knowledge of what is absolute religion, involves the assumption, that he already has perfect knowledge ; that is to say, he knows all that it is possible for a human being to know. Surely he, who knows what is absolute religion, may be said to know all that man can know, or needs to know. Every man knows this, according to Mr. Parker's assumption. Why then talk of ignorance ? Why write startling and eloquent sermons, essays, lectures, and huge volumes for the enlightenment of the people, when every man, woman, and child is already in possession of all possible knowledge ? Why berate so unmercifully even our American priests, who stand in our way, and intercept the light that would shine in upon us from the newly risen theological sun of Germany ?

But this is all idle. Even Mr. Parker, with all his learning, philosophy, and natural sagacity, aided by all

the helps, natural or supernatural, to be obtained from human experience, cannot pretend to a full or even a competent knowledge of absolute religion. In the first place, what he defines to be absolute religion, we have shown leaves out several important elements of religion. But waiving this, taking his definition as substantially correct, we must still be told much more than he tells us, before we are told what it really is. "Perfect obedience to the law of God." What is obedience? What is the law of God? What are all its practical requirements in the several departments of life? for the law of God extends to every thought, word, and deed. Can Mr. Parker, can any man answer these questions? At best, only imperfectly; for it needs infinite knowledge to answer them perfectly. Who can tell in every instance what is the exact thought the law of God requires him to think? the exact word to speak? the exact deed to perform?

We must therefore object to Mr. Parker's statement of the question. On his own ground, the question is one of mere idle curiosity, and not worth considering; and since we are in possession neither of absolute religion, nor of an absolute knowledge of what is absolute religion, we cannot assume absolute religion as the standard by which to try Christianity. The question of the agreement or disagreement of Christianity with absolute religion is not then an open question. No mortal has the right to ask it; for no mortal, in point of fact, has the power to conceive it, much less to answer it.

The true question is, Do our views of absolute religion agree or disagree with Christianity? We do not assume in this statement that Christianity is the full, the ultimate expression of absolute religion. For aught we know, there may be higher revelations than those made by Jesus. On that point we assume nothing, one way or the other. We merely assume that Christianity is the fullest revelation that has been made to us, and therefore our highest authority for what is absolute religion. Mr. Parker seeks an authority for Christianity,

when in fact Christianity is itself the highest authority he has by which to test it. Instead then of assuming an ideal standard, by which to try Christianity, we take Christianity itself as the ideal standard, by which we are to try all our own conceptions of truth, beauty, goodness.

“By what authority do you assume Christianity as the Ideal of truth, beauty, and goodness; and therefore as in all cases the law men must obey?” We reply, that we suppose it will be conceded us, that a man’s Ideal is his Ideal. What then in point of fact is the Ideal of all men, born and brought up in Christendom? Is it not Christianity? Has any one in his loftiest flights been able to soar above or beyond the Christian Ideal? No. Mr. Parker will not pretend it; and if he does, we defy him to name us a conception transcending the Christian Ideal. The question then is answered. Our authority for taking the Christian Ideal is, that it *is* the Ideal. The question is really as inappropriate, as it would be to ask one, what is his authority for believing that what is the highest to him, is the highest to him? The authority of Christianity is established the moment it is conceded to be the Ideal. The Ideal is given us by our Maker. It is the Form under which God reveals himself to mankind, and Christianity is the Form under which the Ideal comes to us. It is for us the absolute. It is Immanuel, God with us. It is itself the sovereign, and therefore has no need to appeal to an authority beyond itself. Our question then is not, what right have we to assume the Christian Ideal to be the Ideal; but, how far have we realized, and how can we continue to realize more and more the Christian Ideal, in industry, science, art, in every department and act of life?

Here is the question. The great mistake has been in fancying the authority of Christianity an open question, or a question at all. It is no question, and save in words it cannot be asked, and never can be asked, till some one arises, who discloses to us an Ideal above Christianity, which shall be a standard by which to try



Christianity. Till then, Christianity is sovereign Lord and Judge. We see this everywhere. Wrangle and fight as we may, we never transcend the Christian Ideal. Shakspeare, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Locke, never go beyond it. Voltaire, the English Deists, German Rationalists, American Transcendentalists, have none of them disclosed an Ideal above the Christian, and therefore dethroned the Christian. Christ stands supreme as yet in the whole life of Christendom, and the arrows aimed at him by his infidel foes are stolen from the quiver of the Gospel. If the Ideal of the infidel — assuming it possible for an infidel to have an Ideal — differs from the Christian, it is not by rising above it.

We are far from thinking with Mr. Parker, that considerations of the miracles, and the character of Jesus and the Bible writers, may be waived, as having no bearing on the question before us. They have indeed no bearing on the question which he asks ; but this is not the true question. Our great need is not to be able to determine, whether Christianity agree with absolute religion or not, but to be instructed in relation to the practical requirements of absolute religion itself. Instead of its being, as Mr. Parker says, no difficult matter to ascertain what is absolute religion, we hold that this is precisely *the* difficult matter, and the only difficult matter. This is the question which all men in some form or other are asking ; to which, with what skill and force are in them, they are seeking an answer ; and to which no man has ever yet found a full and satisfactory answer. All answers, the best even, must be only proximate, and these we have shown can be obtained only supernaturally. To say, then, that it makes no difference who or what were the instructors, is to fall into the grossest of mistakes. For none but miraculous persons, or supernaturally inspired individuals, can possibly give us any instructions worth having ; and these instructions, as we have already demonstrated, in discussing Inspiration, are, and must be communicated to the world through the medium of a life.

The error of those whom Mr. Parker wars against, and which has occasioned his own, has not been in contending for the necessity of supernatural revelation, to enable us to perceive religious truths, but in contending that, after we do perceive these truths, we need miracles, or the authority of a miraculous person to endorse them, before we have the right to call them truths. Truth needs no backers. The office of the miracle, or of the miraculous personage, is not to endorse the truth, to assure us that we may believe it without any impeachment of our morals or our understanding; but to elevate us by inspiring us, exalting and purifying our sentiments, to the perception of the truth, that would otherwise be beyond the reach of our intelligence. When we are once elevated to its perception, the work is done. We are made capable of knowing the truth, when we see it. This is what is implied in the simple fact of knowing. We know the truth by perceiving it; intuitively, by looking on it. This is the doctrine of Jonathan Edwards, and of the great body of Christian writers in all ages of the Church. It is the doctrine Mr. Ripley, whom we consider in metaphysics or theology an authority second to none in this country, maintains in his controversy with Mr. Norton; and it is the doctrine which we in our humble way have uniformly maintained from the first establishment of this Journal. But all truth does not lie, to borrow Mr. Parker's expression, "in the plane of man's consciousness." Man is created capable of knowing the truth when he sees it, but not capable of seeing all truth, nor all truth needful for him. He needs miracles and miraculous persons as revelators, as *media* by which he can rise to the perception of the truth, but not, as we have understood Mr. Norton and others to contend, to be an *authority* for believing the truth after the mind has grasped it.

This distinction between miracles to *reveal* the truth, and miracles to *authorize* us to believe the truth, which is the distinction insisted on by Mr. Parker's friends, and which they hold to be of great importance, Mr.

Parker himself does not appear to have noticed at all ; and he seems to have taken it for granted that those of us, who have contended for man's power to know the truth by seeing it, have meant, that we have the natural power of seeing all truth needed for us, and therefore have no occasion for supernatural aid, either to reveal the truth, or to be our authority for believing it. If Mr. Parker had fixed clearly in his mind the distinction we have here pointed out, we think he would not have separated from his friends, and put forth a doctrine which, so far as our knowledge goes, none of them have ever entertained.

2. But we suspect that, after all, we differ radically from Mr. Parker in our conceptions of Christianity. We differ radically from him in our conceptions of man himself. Mr. Parker views man as in and of himself competent both to know and to do whatever is required of him by absolute religion. That the first assumption is unwarranted, we have sufficiently proved ; that the second is also unwarranted, is evident from the fact, that, the world over, man's power *to do* falls short of his power *to know*.

In our view, man stands in need of two things : 1. INSTRUCTION as to what is God's law and its requirements ; and 2. STRENGTH to obey that law, to conform practically to those requirements. Both, so far as he comes to possess them, are acquired by growth ; and growth, we have seen, is possible only by means of the conjunction of the natural and the supernatural. These two things, in harmony with our natural constitution, it is the design of Christianity to furnish. Christianity assumes man to be ignorant and weak, and it proposes to make him wise and strong. But according to Mr. Parker, all it does or proposes to do, is to say to man, Be wise, be strong ; imparting to him never a particle of wisdom or strength. According to our view, it is wisdom and strength ; Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God ; made of God unto us wisdom, righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption. Yet

this, so insisted upon by St. Paul, Mr. Parker nowhere contemplates. He asks no favors; he will receive nothing through grace. He condemns popular theology, because, as he says, "its heaven is a place no man has a right to. Would a good man willingly accept of that which is not his? pray for it?" p. 6.

But if Mr. Parker wants Christianity neither as a medium of knowledge nor of strength, for what does he want it? One is almost tempted to say, he wants it for nothing at all; wants nothing of it, save what Diogenes wanted of Alexander; that is, that it should stand out of his sunshine, so that he may receive, without their being intercepted, the clear light and cheering warmth of absolute religion. But not to insist on this, what after all is in his view the essential peculiarity of Christianity; which again must, since he has identified Christianity with it, be also his view of the essential elements of absolute religion? His statement, like most of his statements, is in a form so negative, that it is not easy to answer this question; but we will answer it as well as we can. As near as we can come to it, it is, 1. FREEDOM from all and every obligation to obey anything but the law of God, *written on the soul of man*. pp. 282, 283. 2. It is not a system of religion and life, but a METHOD of religion and life. p. 284. 3. It is eminently PRACTICAL. p. 286. Setting aside the strange inconsistency of declaring absolute religion, or Christianity which is absolute religion, to be the *way* of religion, and not religion itself; these three statements, reduced to a common denominator, mean, obey God's law written on the tablets of the heart; obey the law of thy nature; that is, obey thyself; that is, do as thou listest. This is, no doubt, a rule eminently practical. But does not Mr. Parker perceive that this rule is a safe rule to be followed, only on the hypothesis, that man has a divine nature, is perfect, and never voluntarily does or desires to do what is not pure, just, and holy? But we have denied to man this divine nature, and all who have any experience of life know by their own internal struggles, by the lusting of the flesh

against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, that he does not possess it. It is the design of Christ so to purify and exalt us, as to make us what Mr. Parker assumes that we are without it. But we come to that sanctified state, in which all our emotions, passions, desires are holy and safe to be followed, only through grace, through the redemption in Christ Jesus.

In assuming Christianity to be merely the *method*, that is, the *way* of religion and life, Mr. Parker entirely mistakes it. Jesus says, "I am the way, the *truth*, and the *life*." It will not do to understand this, as Mr. Parker does, to mean, simply, that Jesus pointed out the true way to life. This would assume that the only relation Jesus bears to the salvation of the world is that of a teacher of righteousness. This is not the scriptural view of Jesus; and if this were the true view to be taken of him, Mr. Parker's eulogium on him would be altogether exaggerated. Under this point of view, we confess that we should be unable to award him any peculiar praise. Mr. Parker himself shows, and takes great satisfaction in showing, that Jesus taught no doctrine, and gave no precept, not taught and given by others long before him. The only merit we can find, that Mr. Parker allows him, is that of having exhorted us to obey the law of God written in our souls, instead of the law written in the ordinances of men; that is, as Mr. Parker interprets the matter, in recommending absolute *individualism*, which, when absolute, is the real Satan and Adversary of souls. But Jesus, so far as such protest is warranted, was not the first to protest against human ordinances. Isaiah, Micah, and the author of the fiftieth psalm, had done it in stronger and more explicit terms, than he did. What then were his peculiar merits? We see no answer that it is possible for Mr. Parker to give to this question.

This difficulty comes from not taking Jesus at his word, and from attempting to be wise above what is written. Jesus says, "I am the way, the *truth*, and the *life*;" two very important things, which Mr. Parker leaves out. He makes Jesus simply the way, the

method of religion and life. Jesus himself says he was, in addition, the truth and the life. Here is the difference. For ourselves, notwithstanding the charges which have been brought against us, we have never, since our reconversion to Christianity, regarded Jesus in the simple light of a teacher of the true way of life, whether as teaching by precept or by example. In our Discourse on Christ before Abraham, written and preached in this city, in August 1837, and published in the very first number of this Review, January, 1838, the original, as some have thought, and as we ourselves thought till quite recently, of Mr. Parker's South Boston Sermon, we expressly reject the view, that regards Jesus as saving the world by merely teaching the truth; and we lay down the doctrine, which we have recently set forth in our Letter to Dr. Channing, that Christianity is not a doctrine, but a life; not an exemplar life, a life to be imitated, copied; but a life literally imparted or communicated by Jesus through his own life to the world. This life we defined to be the life of pure, disinterested love, which redeems the world by being lived. We did not then understand *how* this life was or could be communicated literally to the world. This occasioned some confusion of speech; in all other respects, the doctrine of that Discourse, the view taken of Christianity, of the aid it gives, of what that aid consists in, was precisely the doctrine we now contend for.

We say, then, as we have always said, that Christianity is not only the way of life, but life itself. It is not a mere example of the life we are to live, although it is that; but it is the identical life itself. Christianity is a life communicated, by the law of life already explained, to the world. Jesus imparted it to his disciples, made it an indissoluble part of their life, through their personal communion with him. They communicated it to others through personal communion with them; and by means of the communion of man with man, and generation with generation, the way is open for it to become ultimately the life of all men.

Now Christianity being the infusion, so to speak, of a new life into the life of humanity, it cannot be separated and considered apart from the character of him who instituted it. What is Jesus to us but his life? Let us be understood. Life is the term we use to designate all the phenomena exhibited by an individual or being. In every phenomenon we perceive a subject; but we know the subject only so far as he enters into the phenomena, and of him only what they reveal. Our knowledge of a man is limited then to his phenomena; that is, his life. When we speak of a man, it is of his life, the phenomenal man, that we in reality speak. So when we speak of Jesus, it is not of the being, the *esse*, but the phenomenal Jesus; that is, his life. Back of the life is unquestionably the *esse*, *das Seyn* of the Germans; but that transcends our view, save so far as it enters into the life. Jesus is to us all in his living, his life, the phenomena of his being. Now, in this sense, in the only sense in which Jesus exists to us, save as an abstraction, he is not the author of Christianity, but is it. Then the whole value of Christianity depends on what he was. The question of what he was is the identical question, what is Christianity? and so from the first has the Church felt, and in one form or another asserted. There is no separation between Christ and Christianity possible, or conceivable even.

Now, on what condition can Christ redeem us, or the infusion of the new life prove the redemption and sanctification of the human race? On two conditions, and two only. 1. That the life of Jesus or the Christ be a *DIVINE* Life; and 2. That the communion of man with man be everywhere in time and space free and uninterrupted. The first even Mr. Parker asserts; the second, without having precisely understood it, has been from the first the one steady aim of the Church. *But Jesus could live a divine life only by direct communion with God; and this direct communion, being born of woman, he could have only MIRACULOUSLY.* This is the significance of the miraculous conception,

a great and pregnant mystery, which whoso rejects, rejects Christianity. The miraculous or supernatural character, or life, of the man Jesus, must then be assumed in the very outset, as the only condition on which we can get for the race a life sufficiently above the life of the race, to be through its reception the redemption and sanctification of mankind.

We are speaking of the life of Jesus; the *Wesen*, not the *Seyn*; the *living*, not the *esse*; the phenomenal, not the ontological. In this view Jesus is the indissoluble union of God and man. What know we of God? Not the absolute Being itself. We know only God in the phenomenon; that is, not the being of God, but, if we may so speak, the life of God. The term God-man means then, literally and philosophically, the union of the Divine life and the human, or a life the resultant of the direct and intimate communion of man with God. All life is two-fold, or rather all life is a one life resting upon a double basis. It partakes equally of the nature of the subject and of the object. Jesus communes directly, miraculously, with God, and it is by virtue of this communion he lives. This life, that is to say, the life resulting, which is after all what we mean, what all men really mean, by Jesus, must be what the Church has always contended, indissolubly human and Divine. We are obliged then to assert even the Divinity of Christ, in order to state truly what Christianity is. The Church has been nearer right than most of us have supposed. Her error, if error she has had, has not been in asserting the proper Divinity of Christ, but in affirming this Divinity of the ontological Christ, of whom we know nothing directly, instead of the phenomenal Christ, the only Christ to us.

Christ being the life, and as we now see, by virtue of his Divinity, the TRUE LIFE, we at once comprehend how by being formed within us he becomes our Saviour. We have true life just so far as we partake of him. The medium of his reception is communion with him in those, within whom he is formed the hope of glory; that is to say, we receive him through union



with the TRUE Church. But more of this by and by. We see now that, in order to assert a sufficient Christianity, we must assert the supernatural, the miraculous character of its founder. The proof of that miraculous character is, as we have already stated, in the fact that Jesus lived a life above the life of humanity in his epoch. That Jesus did live such a life, or was such a life, is evident historically, and from the fact, that he is, as we have seen, even yet the Ideal, — none of the race being able to conceive of a higher than he.

The question of miracles is now easily disposed of. Did Jesus work miracles? It is a simple historical question. He was himself a miracle, and that he could work miracles, is evident from the fact, that he was supernaturally endowed. Life implies feeling, knowing, and doing. Increase the power to feel, and you necessarily increase the power to know and to do; the power to know, you increase the power to feel and to do; and the power to do, you necessarily increase the power to know and to feel, or to love. A miracle is that which transcends the natural, the *generic* power of the being of whom it is predicated. Exalt that being above his kind, as we have shown is the fact with every providential man, and you have clothed him with the power to work miracles. The historical question we cannot go into now, but we have no doubt of the fact, that Jesus did work miracles. Were these miracles proofs of the truth of his doctrines? No. They were *media* by which God made known to men the truths of absolute religion, and raised them to the perception and reception of a higher and a diviner life.

With these remarks we must leave what Mr. Parker has to say of Christianity in this third book, with the single exception, concerning the doctrine of a Mediator. Throughout his whole work, Mr. Parker sneers at the idea of a Mediator. "Who would go to heaven by attorney?" Now this is not merely in bad taste, but is very wretched as philosophy. Man can be saved or sanctified, we take it for granted, only by communion with God. Now, can man commune directly

with God, as it were face to face? We commune never with that which transcends our perception. Do we perceive God? Where do we perceive him? In himself; in the abstract? No such thing. We see God only in the Ideal, and the Ideal only in the Actual. By means of the Actual we commune with the Ideal, and through the medium of the Ideal with God. Then the Ideal was not the Mediator till it became incarnated. Here is the whole doctrine of the Incarnation, and of the Mediator; a doctrine essential not only to Christianity, but to man's redemption and sanctification. The Ideal is the Logos of St. John. The Incarnation of the Logos is Jesus, or the Life, the Christ, the Son of God, the Saviour of the world. Now, if Mr. Parker will show us any way by which we can approach this Ideal, but by living the Life, or God, but through the Ideal, Logos, Word or Speech of God, he will show us what we as yet are unable to conceive of, and we will then cheerfully acknowledge to him that man may perhaps commune directly with God, without a mediator, or medium of communion.

#### IV.

##### THE BIBLE.

MR. PARKER'S *Fourth* Book is entitled *The Relation of the Religious Sentiment to the Greatest of Books, or a Discourse of the Bible*. It is divided into five chapters. I. Position of the Bible — Claims made for it — Statement of the Question. II. An Examination of the Claims of the Old Testament to be a Divine, Miraculous, or Infallible Composition. III. An Examination of the Claims of the New Testament to be a Divine, Miraculous, or Infallible Composition. IV. The Absolute Religion Independent of Historical Documents — the Bible as it is. V. Cause of the False and the Real Veneration of the Bible.

The subject of this Book is one of great extent, and surpassing importance. We cannot pretend to treat it

with any sort of justice. Mr. Parker himself has hurried over it, hinting rather than stating, and stating rather than developing and demonstrating his views. A full discussion of the whole subject he promises us in a work, which he is passing through the press, and which we are waiting for with no little impatience. Moreover, we not only want room to treat this subject as we would, but we have treated it so often and so thoroughly in the pages of this Journal and elsewhere, that we really have very little to add to what we have already laid before the public.

We say in the outset, that we by no means accept the Protestant view of the Bible against which Mr. Parker contends. We do not accept the Bible as the *only* sufficient rule of faith and practice, nor do we accept the doctrine, that every word of it was dictated by a universal and infallible inspiration. On these two points Protestants have set up claims for the Bible, which never have been, and never will be sustained. We think we sufficiently refuted the claims of the Bible to plenary and infallible inspiration, in our review of Mr. Parker's South Boston Sermon in this Journal for October last, and to that we refer our readers.

But while we say all this, we are equally far from accepting Mr. Parker's view of the Bible. We believe him wrong in his estimate of the Bible, and otherwise than wrong he could not be with his views of Inspiration. By admitting only natural inspiration, he of course could admit no claims of the Bible to be a divine, a miraculous composition; and must ascribe its superior truth and beauty, not to the influx of the Divinity into the hearts of its authors, but to their greater fidelity to their own moral and religious natures. This in fact is his theory of the Bible. He regards it as the greatest of books; he sees and admits its wide and lasting influence; feels and owns its vast superiority over all other books, and finds no language so appropriate as its for the expression of what is deepest, truest, and holiest in his experience; but he after all looks upon it as a

human work, produced by human ability and genius, by the human heart and soul speaking out from their own finite depths. His friend, Mr. Emerson, in his poem entitled *The Problem*, a most remarkable production, which we are astonished to find exciting no more attention, published in the *Dial* for July, 1840, and which we have quoted already more than once, may be thought to express his view :

“ Out from the heart of nature rolled  
The burdens of the Bible old,  
The litanies of nations came,  
Like the volcano's tongue of flame,  
Up from the burning cove below,—  
The canticles of love and woe.”

And after all, these beautiful lines seem to us to take a higher view than Mr. Parker's ; for according to Mr. Emerson, it is not man that speaks out from himself, but the mighty Over-Soul — answering very nearly to what we term the Ideal ; that hovers over man, underlies him, thinks in his thought, loves in his love, and lives in his life. This is the mighty, the one, universal, living Spirit, Nature, what you will ; the Power from which all forms proceed ; the form in which the infinite I AM is revealed. This is the Creator. It is one, whether it create in what men call nature, or in what they call art ; whether it bloom in a violet or in a Madonna ; rear an Andes, or with human hands a St. Peter's. All genuine, all authentic productions are its creations. Human utterances are true, genuine, authentic ; are out from the heart, and can reach the heart, only as they are its utterances, the out-flowing of its influx. Man, to be able to speak a living word, must sink back, as it were, into the Ideal, and become an instrument or organ of the great Soul, which is one and universal. He then speaks with a more than mortal tongue. A higher than man speaks then through man, out from the deep, living heart of all, “ the canticles of love and woe.” The Bible comes from no vain or frivolous thought, is no production of human will, human weakness, or human caprice, but of the univer-

sal Soul ; is the Speech of that very Power that plants the forests, upheaves the Andes, rears the pyramids, guides the chisel of Phidias, the brush of Raphael, and builds with Michael Angelo and Sir Christopher Wren. There is then a divinity in the Bible. It has its source in the source of all that is true, genuine, authentic in nature and in art, a source which men may seek to name, but which to the truly devout soul is always the Unnameable.

We say this of Mr. Emerson, because we wish to note the difference between his views and those of his disciple, and because we have certain suspicions that, in our criticisms on his writings from time to time, we have not always done him the justice we intended. We are every day led to suspect that his thought lies deeper, and is altogether broader than we have usually given him credit for ; and in doubting his religious faith or religious feeling, we have done him great wrong. The more progress we seem to ourselves to make in true philosophical science, the more do we discover in his writings, and the profounder is our reverence for his genius. He has been the subject of much foolish detraction, and equally foolish praise ; but he is, beyond question, one of the most remarkable men connected with our literature, and altogether more of a Christian, than he owns or even suspects himself to be. We apprehend that it will ultimately be found, that his seeming denial of God comes from his deep sense of a universal Presence which he stands in awe of, before which he shudders with fear, love, and delight, but which he does not name. And is not God to every devout soul the Unnameable ? To name, is it not in some sort to define ? But how define the Indefinable ? Before the awful Majesty of Nature, is it not the highest wisdom, as the deepest reverence, to be silent ? Mr. Emerson, may we not say, appears to us often irreligious, in consequence of the very excess of his devoutness ? Our reading public little suspect the deep significance of his volume of Essays, which he published some few months since, — Essays which will live as long as the

language in which they are written, and of which they are one of the richest specimens to be found.

But to return : Mr. Parker seems to us, while struck with the fact, which Mr. Emerson somewhere mentions, of our inability to tell where man the effect ceases, and God the cause begins, to fail to note what, after all, Mr. Emerson really aims to keep always in mind, the distinction between nature in this sense of Over-Soul, of cause of the visible universe, and what may, in a more strict and definite sense, be termed human nature ; and therefore confounds in his argument the individual man with that which transcends all individuals, and loses all that is individual in its own unity and universality. Hence, he allows to the Bible only a human origin. The men who wrote it were, no doubt, extraordinary men ; but extraordinary, not because supernaturally enlightened, but because they were able to speak with greater fidelity to their own genuine experiences, than is the case with ordinary men. Consequently, the Bible is to be placed in the same category with all other books, and judged of as we judge of all others ; received as authoritative, where judged to be true, and rejected as of no authority, where judged to be false.

Now from this view we dissent, and very widely. We dissent from any, and every view, which admits nothing supernatural, miraculous in the origin and production of the Bible ; and therefore we dissent not only from Mr. Parker's view, but from that which we have ascribed to Mr. Emerson, all superior to Mr. Parker's as it really is. We have already demonstrated, if we have demonstrated anything, that the human race goes forward only by the aid of Providential Men, — men supernaturally raised up and endowed to be the lights and the inspirers of their race. Such men there have been. The Bible, in our view, is, in part, the production of men of this class, and, in part, a genuine, an authentic record of their sayings and doings.

On any other hypothesis than this, it would be difficult to account for the position the Bible has held and now holds in the estimation of the race ; for its wide,

and deep, and lasting influence over the most cultivated and enlightened nations of the earth. Indeed, this influence, Mr. Parker may well say, is a very surprising phenomenon. View it in what light you will, the Bible is the basis of all our jurisprudence, philosophy, theology, and literature. It is in every department of life the grand Statute Book of Christendom. It is our standard of faith, and even of taste. Our whole life is more or less exactly modelled after it. Without it, without the thought, the taste, the principles, the cultivation we owe to it, we were still the rude old Teutons in the Black Forests of Germany. Shakspeare's finest passages are but successful imitations of its poetry; and Bacon's, and Locke's, and Kant's philosophies are but loose paraphrases of a few of its significant texts. Byron sings sweetest, in his purest and loftiest strain, when he takes his key note from its compositions; and the pious soul can find no words so meet for the utterance of its holy aspirations, as the Psalms of David. Is not all this surprising? If the book were a mere human production, produced in the darkness of the semi-barbarous state, in which the Jews were down nearly to the time of our Saviour, the production of a petty tribe, inhabiting the mountainous districts of Palestine, shut out from general intercourse with mankind, always despised by its neighbors, and in modern times held as a by-word and a hissing in all the earth,—if the Bible were a mere human production, and of individuals from such a tribe as this, held in the estimation this always has been and is, on what principles shall we account for its influence? Whence came these individuals with the power to produce such a book; and whence this universal agreement of mankind to adopt the Book as their supreme law? It would require a greater miracle to give to anything human so wide and so deep an influence as the Bible confessedly has, than is needed on the hypothesis of its supernatural origin and production.

Then, again, where else in ancient or modern times have human genius and ability produced aught to com-

pare with the Bible? No critic will place Homer or Shakspeare above the Hebrew Bards, or admit any equality in whatever pertains to the grand, the severe, the sublime, the tender. The Book is our Ideal. In every department of thought, if we except the mere physical and mechanical sciences, we are far, very far below the Bible. Assuming, then, the doctrine of progress, which we have demonstrated, and which is the authorized creed of our age, we hold it demonstrably impossible that this Book could have been produced in the age in which it was, without the supernatural intervention of Providence. We say this not in the canting tone of the ordinary believer, but as the deliberate conclusion of the free thinker and the philosopher. Our right to be heard in questions of pure philosophy, we trust, our countrymen will not readily dispute, and no man has come more reluctantly than we to own the supernatural origin of the Bible. We have felt for that sacred Book the greatest possible aversion; we have fairly detested it, and felt that we were derogating from our dignity as a man in quoting a single text from it, without at the same time expressing our strong disapprobation of it. Slowly, and only by the hardest, have we come from that state of deep dislike to our present state of faith and reverence. The Bible is to us now our classic; we love to quote it not merely for authority, but for its æsthetic beauty and effect. A felicitous quotation from the Bible, in our judgment, is a finer mark of literary taste and skill, than a felicitous quotation from Homer or Horace. We have therefore come not only to believe the Bible, but to admire it, and to love it. We study it as our highest intellectual and literary standard. Between this view and the former one mentioned, there is a distance. What has produced the change?

Formerly, we looked at the Bible from too low a stand-point, and saw in it only the mere letter. Time, study, experience, and God's grace, have enabled us to perceive in the Book a significance, which we once did not and could not see in it. We have been



enabled to perceive its immense superiority over all other books, and we have found that all our own moral and mental growth consists in our becoming able to understand and appropriate more and more of its meaning. We survey the present state of mankind; we take an inventory of their intellectual wealth, and we find that with all their progress they have not outgrown the Bible. The Remains of that astonishing Hebrew Literature still suffice for the human soul, and the thought which pervades them is still in advance of the most advanced thought of the age. From this important inferences may be drawn. But we go back to the age when the Bible was produced, to the people among whom it originated, and ascertain what was the summit then reached by human life. We find the age, the race, was in its highest achievements far below the Bible. Arrived at this conclusion, the question is settled. All life, we have shown, rests upon a double basis; must be at once objective and subjective. A life beyond the summit of one's age, or country, can be lived only by virtue of an object transcending that age or country. The authors of the Bible could have produced a book transcending the summit attained by the race in their day, only by communing with a superhuman, and therefore a supernatural object. The whole question as to the supernatural origin of the Bible is, therefore, reduced to a simple question of fact; Was it, or was it not, in advance of the race at the epoch or epochs of its production?

The proof, then, of the supernatural origin of the Bible is complete; as complete as we have shown it to be in the case of the supernatural inspiration of Providential Men; for it is precisely the same. But it does not follow from the fact of the supernatural origin of the Bible, that its inspiration is full and infallible. The inspiration is unquestionably infallible as far as it goes, but it has its limits. This last fact our Protestant divines are accustomed to overlook. Since the inspiration must needs be infallible, they assume that the *inspired* must also be infallible; and therefore that all

their sayings, on whatever topics, must be authoritative. Hence, their assertion that the Bible is the *only* and the *sufficient* rule of faith and practice. But the inspiration, and therefore the authority, of the Bible cannot transcend that of the Providential Men who wrote it, or whose sayings and doings it records; and the inspiration of these we know to have been a limited inspiration. Had it not been limited, it would have implied their omniscience, and omniscient they were not.

Moses, we assume, was a Providential Man in the full significance of the term. He lived a supernatural life, and was able to comprehend a superhuman truth, wisdom, beauty, goodness. The only miracle there was about him was in the fact of his living a supernatural life. There was nothing miraculous in the mode in which he acted, wrote, or dictated his laws. He in all respects acted from the fulness of his own life, naturally, in harmony with the laws of human nature, as we all do; but living a supernatural life, he was able, naturally, to give laws, to write books, and to perform deeds which transcended the wisdom, discernment, genius, and ability of ordinary men. In this transcendent superiority consisted the supernatural character of his laws, his writings, and his deeds, and this superiority he could not have shown, had he not been supernaturally endowed. So far then Moses is supernaturally inspired, and therefore infallible. But was Moses able to comprehend all wisdom, all truth, all excellence? By no means. Jeremiah and Paul both allege the imperfections of his system, and in the name of the Lord promise a New Covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah. However high Moses rose above his own epoch, he fell far below Jesus. Christianity, all must concede, is an advance on Judaism. The inspiration of Moses was not complete. His law was imperfect. It required another and a greater than he, to magnify it and make it honorable — to fulfil it. His glory pales before the star of Bethlehem, and we remember him, still love and reverence him, only because he was the type and promise of the Messiah.

Now this, which we say of Moses, we may say by a stronger reason of Joshua, and Samuel, and David, and Solomon, and Isaiah and the prophets, who, though inspired, were rather inspired through the medium of the Mosaic life and inspiration, than originally, immediately from God ; as we may say that Augustine, Fennelon, Fox, Penn, Swedenborg, and Wesley are inspired by the life of Jesus, or the Holy Ghost embodied in the Church. Of Jesus and his apostles we may speak very much as we do of Moses and his followers. We have no right to assume that Jesus, we mean the man Jesus, the son of Mary, living, suffering, preaching, dying for man's redemption, possessed, in an absolute sense, all knowledge. Jesus was, and is to man the full and complete manifestation of God in the flesh ; and we are unable to conceive of aught that goes beyond him, or that will in the lapse of ages render another manifestation necessary. In point of fact, we believe the Gospel kingdom to be an everlasting kingdom, and that Jesus will reign forever ; for in him dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. We do not look for another Messiah in the sense in which he was the Messiah. He seems to us to have infused true eternal Life into the life of humanity, and that now through communion we may, as a race, be said to possess in ourselves a principle of eternal growth. Yet we ought not to assume that new and higher manifestations of divine life may not, in the lapse of ages, be needed, and be made. Be this, however, as it may, certain is it that the inspiration of Jesus, so far as the Bible contains a record of it, does not extend to all subjects, nor furnish an answer to all possible questions. The same may be said of the inspiration of his apostles. It extends far and enlarges the interior life of its recipients, so that they comprehend what far transcends ordinary vision ; but we have no authority for saying that it so enlarges that life, as to enable it to comprehend the Infinity, in the bosom of which we are lost as in the bosom of infinite darkness. They saw far, but always is there an infinity beyond them.

This assumed, we can claim for the authors of the Bible only a partial inspiration. God raised them up, endowed them with special spiritual gifts. He enlarged without changing their natures, and so enlarged them as to enable them to comprehend as much of true, eternal Life, as suited his purpose, through them to infuse into humanity. This was merely so much added to their natural ability, from which in their own minds it was absolutely indistinguishable. Under its influence, and by its aid, they went forth and uttered what was in them; but always according to the ordinary laws of humanity. They spoke from their own minds, according to their own peculiar habits and tastes, and mixed up with what was supernatural all they had that was natural. Of what they said part only transcended the ordinary powers of human beings, and the part so transcending was far from including all that transcends our natural powers. Of this which so transcends, and which their inspiration did not comprehend, it would be rash to say that we have, and ever shall have, no need. Consequently, it would be false, on the one hand, to say that the whole Bible is given by inspiration of God, and rash, on the other hand, to say that it contains *all* that is or can be essential to faith and practice. We repeat it, then, that we do not adopt the Protestant view of the Bible.

In the next place, our Protestant divines not only assert the sufficiency of the Scriptures, but also the sufficiency of the individual reason to interpret them. This last assertion is at the foundation of Protestantism, and passes in the Protestant world under the name of the right of private judgment, — a right which, if once admitted, in its full extent, involves the destruction of all social, moral, and religious order, — a right directly hostile to the other Protestant principle, the sufficiency and authority of the Scriptures. Mr. Parker's book is a fine specimen of Protestantism refuting itself. Taking the right of private judgment as his point of departure, he demonstrates but too easily that the Scriptures are not necessary, and that the Protestant idolatry of the

Bible has even less excuse than the Catholic idolatry of the Papacy. I have the right of private judgment, only on condition that I have the ability to judge for myself. But I have the ability to judge for myself, only on condition that I possess in myself a perfect measure of truth, or am already in possession of absolute knowledge of what is absolute religion. But if I have this, I have no need of the Scriptures. I know all I can know, or need to know, without them. The right of private judgment, then, necessarily negatives the authority and sufficiency of the Scriptures.

But if we deny the right of private judgment, we must also deny that of the authority and sufficiency of the Scriptures. The Scriptures are not alone sufficient and authoritative, if we need for the understanding of them an authorized or an authoritative interpreter. They can be sufficient and authoritative, only on condition that each man is competent to interpret them for himself. We cannot assert this competency without asserting the right of private judgment to its fullest extent. Consequently we cannot assert the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and declare them to be the only authoritative rule of faith and practice, without at the same time asserting, as the necessary condition of this, another principle which destroys it, by superseding the necessity of the Scriptures. Thus Mr. Parker, starting with the Protestant principle of the right of private judgment, has overthrown the Protestant principle of the authority and sufficiency of the Scriptures. The truth is, Protestantism from the first has been divided against itself. Hence its want of organic power; hence the multiplicity of its sects, the anarchic life, which is but death, it has originated; hence its no distant final disappearance from Christendom, foreshadowed in the fact, that it has really made no progress on Catholicism since the peace of Westphalia.

For ourselves, we are no Protestants. We believe the problem for our age is CATHOLICISM WITHOUT PAPACY, on the one hand, and LIBERTY WITHOUT INDIVIDUALISM, on the other. We can consent to install neither the Pope,

nor the Bible, nor the individual Reason. Of the three we prefer, as the readers of all our writings for the last eight years must have inferred, the first. But Popery died a natural death with Leo the Tenth; we do not believe that it ever can revive; and certainly we see no reason why it should. The time has gone by, when a poor old bishop, often but the tool of those who have placed him, through their intrigues and for their selfish purposes, in the papal chair, can command throughout the Christian world that respect for his decisions essential to the existence of the Papacy. Of Individualism we have, for the last three hundred years, seen enough. The world has grown weary of it. It can found nothing. In theology it gives us at best only the Natural-Religionism of the volume before us; in morals it gives us nothing better than unmitigated selfishness; in politics it denies the state, and results legitimately in No-governmentism. If you concede me the right of private judgment, I demand of you by what right you presume to enact laws for governing me, or to require me to obey any law my judgment does not approve? The Bible cannot in the Protestant sense be made the sovereign, even admitting what we, to a certain extent, deny, its plenary and infallible inspiration, because it is nothing to us save as it is interpreted. "Understandest thou what thou readest? How can I except some man should guide me?" There must be, and in spite of us there will be, an authorized interpreter of it. This interpreter is the real authority; and it is, in our judgment, neither the Pope nor the individual Reason; but the CHURCH. What we mean by the Church, we shall soon proceed to state. The Bible is to us the authentic account of God's dealings with his chosen people, the Jews, and of the sayings and doings of the men, whom he raised up to be the revelators of his will, and his agents in the advancement of mankind. But its real significance we obtain only from the commentaries of the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, the Comforter, which is the living Jesus, who was to be with us unto the end of the world, and of which the TRUE CHURCH,

the one Catholic Church, is the real, literal, and living body. In other words, the interpreter of the Scriptures and their authority, without which they would be to us a dead letter, without life or meaning, is the Ideal of which the true Church of Christ is the living expression. But more of this by and by. The right of the individual to judge is in his union with the Church, and not in his separation from it.

Taking this our view of inspiration, that it consists in the miraculous life of the inspired, which, though superhuman, is in no case, unless we except that of Jesus, a full, complete, eternal life, we easily see that the inspiration must needs be partial; and if sufficient as far as it goes, does by no means exalt its recipients to the perception of all truth. Assuming the life, which is the inspiration, to be, though superhuman, still incomplete, admitting a life still higher, and that those who lived it spoke from its fulness according to the natural laws of their understanding and imagination, we can easily get over all the difficulties Mr. Parker enumerates in the details of the Bible, without finding aught to impeach its general supernatural inspiration. We would, had we time and room, consider these difficulties at length; but we must pass them over. We can only suggest, that Mr. Parker possibly exaggerates them, and in fact feels them, because he takes too low a view of the Bible, and interprets it from the mere local coloring, one may say, the mere costume, not from its real spirit and intent. He seems to us to deny himself the spiritual discernment, which he actually possesses, and exercises in all other cases. He carps at the dialogue Moses is said to have held with the Lord; but his objections do not go beyond the dramatic form adopted by the writer. He does not ask himself, what is the real significance of the passage, nor whether he has aught to object to its real meaning. The case of Abraham offering up Isaac disturbs him. What, God command human sacrifices! By no means; and the very passage tells us as much. "Lay not thy hand upon the lad, nor do anything unto him." But

what means the passage? What is the moral it teaches? Simply that where the motive is to obey God, and is so strong as to withhold nothing however dear, even though the act, consequent thereupon, should be in itself as wrong as the offering up of his son on the altar by a father, God accounts it righteousness. Abraham's act was in itself, viewed objectively, wrong; but the motive with which he acted, his willingness to obey God, not only excused the act, but made it *imputed* or *accounted* to him as an act of obedience, and an act even deserving reward. For God does not judge us according to the consequences of our acts, but according to what we are in ourselves; — the principles and motives from which we act. Has Mr. Parker anything to object to this?

## V.

## THE CHURCH.

THE *Fifth* and last Book is entitled The Relation of the Religious Sentiment to the greatest of *human* institutions, or a Discourse of the Church. It consists of seven chapters, on the Claims, the Gradual Formation, and the Fundamental and Distinctive Idea of the Christian Church; the Division of Christian Sects, the Catholic Party, the Protestant Party, and the Party neither Catholic nor Protestant, and the Final Answer to the Question.

Mr. Parker, we must be permitted in the outset to say, appears to us to have entirely misapprehended the nature, design, and authority of the Christian Church. We can conceive nothing more superficial and unsatisfactory than his statements, unless it be our own past Protestant declamations. With his view of Christianity it was impossible for him to have any just notions of an institution, really Christian in its origin and design. With him Christianity is worthy of our regard only so far as it coincides with absolute religion, and absolute religion we may all have, at all times and in all places, without recourse to any foreign aid. Christianity is not wisdom and strength imparted to humanity for its redemption and sanctification; but a mere reiteration or republication of the great truths, apparent to us all by the light of Na-



ture. All its value consists in the fact, that we may see what is our duty more clearly through its medium, than we can without it. But it gives us no additional power to perform our duty. Jesus is not "made of God unto us wisdom, righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption;" but is an elder brother, of very exemplary character, who in his life shows us the possibility of man. In what he has done, we may see what man may do. This is unquestionably of some advantage. Since one of our number, poor and humble in life as any of us, has done so much, we are encouraged to undertake the same; and what we attempt with confidence, we are the most likely to succeed in accomplishing. With this view of Jesus and Christianity, we can at best understand by the Christian Church nothing more than "an assembly of men and women grouped around" Jesus, as the model-man, "to be instructed by his words, and warmed by his example." p. 385.

With this view, nothing can be more unfounded than the pretence of the Church, that out of its pale there is no salvation, or its claims to authority over the individual, the soul, reason, conscience, and religion. Mr. Parker denies that the Church is necessary at all to the salvation of the race, or of individuals. He says Christ established no church, and gave no directions for the formation of a church; and a church in our sense of the term is not so much as named in the Gospels. If this be so, it must be altogether wrong to contend in the name of Jesus, that out of the Church there is and can be no salvation.

Equally wrong is it to contend in his name for the authority of the Church. "The Christian Church may be defined a body of men and women, assembling for the purposes of worship and religious instruction. It has the powers delegated by the individuals composing it." p. 387. The Church then is a mere congress of independent sovereigns, and has in itself no entity, is no body, and therefore can of itself have no authority. By what right then does it claim dominion over the individual, to be the master of the soul, of reason, conscience, and religion? The individual could never delegate to another his own sovereignty to be turned against himself.

Passing onward, from the nature, design, and authority of the Church, to its fundamental and distinctive Idea, Mr. Parker finds just as little to commend. This Idea is, he says, that "God has made the highest revelation of himself through Jesus of Nazareth." But what if he has? Christianity, so

far as worth regarding, he has already said, coincides with absolute religion, and therefore consists not in what one believes, but in what one is and does; that is, in obedience to the law of God written on man's nature. This law, since human nature is everywhere and always the same, is equally revealed to all men. We may then know the law and obey it everywhere and at all times, out of the Church as well as in it. What necessity then of the Church? If I know the law and keep it, what matters it, whether I believe that God has made the highest revelation of himself through Jesus of Nazareth, Moses, Socrates, Plato, Appollonius of Tyana, Mahomet, Joanna Southcote, Joe Smith, or through my own reason, conscience, sentiments, and instincts? The fundamental and distinctive dogma of the Church, then, is utterly worthless, and so must needs be the institution it originates and founds.

But passing onwards still, leaving by the way the Catholic party and the Protestant party, rejecting entirely the old Church, as needless, and even as mischievous, what are we to have in its place? What is Mr. Parker's "final answer to the question?" He tells us that our old garments are unseemly, do not become our complexions, fail to set off the beauty of our forms, restrain our free motions, cramp and dwarf our limbs, and render us deformed and hideous. He, in his love of truth, beauty, and freedom, strips them off, and drives us forth from our old dwellings into the streets, naked and shivering. Well, wherewithal does he propose to reclothe us? What new garments has he prepared? or what directions has he to give for preparing new garments?

We would not do him injustice, but, so far as we can collect from his volume, garments he is resolved that henceforth we shall not wear. His great aim seems to be to restore us to the simplicity of nature, to live in the innocence of humanity, before men and women learned to blush that they were naked, or to seek with such fig-leaf aprons as churches and religious institutions to cover their nakedness. But we must tell him that this world is too bleak and wintry, and withal too full of sin and shame, for us to be able to go through it without some covering. Ask us not, we beseech thee, to be Adamites. Even the "Sartor" will teach thee better, that institutions for our souls are as necessary as clothes for our bodies. We cannot lodge naked on the bare ground; and yet, what else dost thou propose?

We ask this last question in no vain or captious spirit.

We have followed with no indifferent feelings our brave young theological Hercules. Thou wouldst rid the earth, we have exclaimed in our admiration, of all monsters; thou hast the courage to attack all hydras, chimeras, spectres, illusions; thou makest noble war against all imposture. Fight on, fight on, wield club, sword, spear, axe, or mattock, whatever comes to hand; lay about thee, spare not; but when thy work of destruction is done, the armies of imposture routed, the monsters all slain, what then wilt thou have to do? We too have had our day of destruction; we too, strong in our youth, and brave through our inexperience and the natural buoyancy of our spirits, went forth in this warfare against the chimeras, illusions, spectres, which make children of us all. We even carried our war into heaven and hell. We would have no God to tyrannize over us; no devils or damned spirits to jabber at us, to mock and torment us. We drove the harmless ghost from the old churchyard and deserted tower, and the fairies from the green dell where they danced in the moonlight. We would be no longer imposed upon. We would worship no dumb idols, bow down to no gods made of wood or stone, or gods created by men's passions, their hopes or their fears. We would stand upon the firm earth, upon our own two feet, and say "Get behind me, Satan," to whatsoever did not come to us in a shape real, solid, *rational*. All went on gloriously for a while, and answered admirably, till we felt that our work was completed, and we had rid ourselves of all illusions, of all impositions; but then—aye, then! Then, a sickness came over the soul, and we seemed to stand on a mere point, solitary and alone, surrounded by a deep and yawning gulf, which nothing filled or could fill. It would have been a relief to have been able to believe it filled with ghosts, goblins, and devils; for these would have been somewhat, and *anything* is always better than *nothing*.

A time comes, when we can no longer be satisfied with pulling down old temples and clearing away rubbish; a time comes to all of us, who have human hearts, human affections, and human interests, when we would erect us a dwelling, settle down, and feel that we have a home, and are at home. We care not who knows it, nor who laughs at us; but we own that we, for ourselves, have reached this stage in life's journey. Our thoughts and our feelings go beyond the work of demolition, beyond the smoke and dust raised by the fall and crash of old institutions, to something which must take their place. We must have clothing and a shelter. We must

have something positive, something that will help us, by the gaining of which we may be saved from our sins, have our hearts purified, and be enabled to commune with our God. We must have something we can grasp, hold on to, and that will not break the moment we need its support, and leave us to fall helpless, hopeless, headlong over the precipice. In deep, solemn earnest have we ourselves sought for this support; in deep, solemn earnest have we listened to our young prophet, to catch his final answer to the awful question, which not he only, but all humanity raises.

Alas, the oracle recoils from its own response. Mr. Parker himself evidently feels the insufficiency of what he has to offer. His conclusion is almost tragic. "Jesus fell back on God; on absolute religion, absolute morality; the truth its own authority; his works his witness. The early Christians fell back on the authority of Jesus; their successors on the Bible, the work of the apostles and prophets; the next generation on the Church, the work of the apostles and fathers. **THE WORLD RETREADS THIS GROUND.** Protestantism delivers us from the tyranny of the Church, and carries us back to the Bible. Biblical criticism frees us from the thralldom of Scripture, and brings us to the authority of Jesus. Philosophical spiritualism liberates us from all personal and finite authority, and restores us to God, the primeval fountain, whence the Church, the Scriptures, and Jesus draw all the water of life wherewith they have filled their urns." p. 483. But when we have retraced this ground, and left behind us the Church, the Bible, and Jesus, what shall we have then? "Thence, and thence only, shall mankind obtain absolute religion and spiritual well-being." In what shall this spiritual well-being consist? O tell us that. In the knowledge of the fact, that "**THE SOUL IS GREATER THAN THE CHURCH.**"

No, not so; we shall then be restored to God, and derive our spiritual well-being from him. Illusion, illusion all! All Mr. Parker means, by the restoration of the soul to God, is its restoration to itself, or rather the leaving of it to itself alone, to its own resources, with nothing to aid it upward in its way to heaven. And his absolute religion is absolute solely because it is indefinite, means nothing in particular, in fact nothing at all. But take a more favorable view. Does not Mr. Parker know that the Church, the Bible, and Jesus have been sought as constituting a medium, through which we may rise to God? Admit that they are not true media,

may, reject them as altogether inadequate and false; does it follow that the soul will then stand in immediate relation with God? Does nothing now separate us from God, but the Church, the Bible, and Jesus? What is it to stand in immediate relation with God, to be *at-one* with God? Is it not to bear his moral likeness, that is, to *be* good and to *do* good? Can we be good and do good, without a medium? What medium does Mr. Parker provide us? His absolute religion at best, even according to the most favorable account which he himself gives of it, merely says to us, "Be good, do right, obey God." With all my heart; but what is good? what is right? what is it to obey God? And how am I, weak and helpless as my sins have made me, and are still making me, to obtain the strength, the moral force to obey God, and to do right? I am sick, but he brings me no physician; I am blind, and he says, see, and thy blindness will be removed; I am dumb, and he says, speak, and thy dumbness will cease to afflict thee; I am lame, and he says, walk, and thy lameness will be cured; I am dead in trespasses and sins, and he says, be good and do good, and thou wilt have moral life. Thy mockery is too bitter. How without moral life am I to be good and to do good?

We have looked over Mr. Parker's whole volume to find the Saviour; we do not find him; we find nothing to meet the wants of the sinner. In speaking of Jesus, he says, "He lived for himself; he died for himself; worked out *his own* salvation, and *we must do the same.*" p. 487. Jesus then did not come into the world, preach, suffer, and die, that the world through him might be saved! In all that he did, he had sole reference to himself, and was concerned merely with saving his own soul! And we must do the same. Where then is the Lord that bought us? Where is our Saviour? We *have* no Saviour. We must save ourselves. Here is the conclusion of the whole matter, the final answer to the question. Man must look no longer to Churches, Bibles, nor Messiahs for salvation; but to his own stout heart, and strong right arm. Alas, man's very difficulty is the want of this stout heart, and this strong right arm. It is he himself that is lost, and to this very lost self you send him for salvation!

But enough. We have already shown the utter insufficiency of Mr. Parker's Christianity, to meet the wants of the sinner. We, as we have said, differ radically from him in our views of what Christianity is. He does not preach the same Gospel that we do. Consequently our views of the Church are es-

essentially different from his. We hold the Church *absolutely essential* to the salvation of the race and of individuals, and we contend that it has *supreme authority* in all that pertains to human life. These are, no doubt, strong positions, but we believe ourselves able to maintain them. In order, however, to do it, we must begin by stating as briefly as we can what we ourselves understand, not by *a* Christian Church, but *the* Christian Church.

1. What is the Christian Church? In one word, the Christian Church is not an assembly of men and women grouped around Jesus as great Model-man, but the real living body of our Lord. To make this plain, we refer to the doctrine of Life, already alluded to more than once in this discussion, brought out in the article on Leroux's *l'Humanité* in the last number of this Journal, and in our recent Letter to Dr. Channing on the Mediatorial Life of Jesus. Jesus, according to the New Testament, does not save the world, as great Model-man, as great Prophet and Teacher, nor as grand Expiatory Sacrifice, though he was all these; but by communicating, through fellowship, communion, his divine life to humanity. How he could do this is already explained. All dependent life is at once subjective and objective; that is, the product of the conjoint and simultaneous action of both subject and object. The name for this conjoint action is COMMUNION. Jesus, by virtue of the miraculous communion in him of Humanity with Divinity, lived a life at once human and divine. This human-divine Life is the Living Jesus, the Saviour, and saves us by becoming *our* life, our righteousness. Hence, we are said to be saved by Christ's righteousness, not by our own.

But the righteousness of Christ does not save us by being imputed to us, being accounted to us for our righteousness, as theologians have falsely contended, but by becoming truly, literally, really, not symbolically, our righteousness, so that we actually have that mind in us, which was in Christ Jesus. This is what is called, having the blood of the atonement personally applied. The righteousness of Christ is true righteousness. By possessing it, — not through our own works, but by the gift of God, — we of course possess true righteousness, and are blameless before God. Theologians, having learned that we are saved by Christ's righteousness, and not perceiving how it could become literally ours, have supposed it was ours only by way of imputation, God being pleased to

adjudge it ours, for and in consideration of the great merits of his Son. They may now see how it can be literally our righteousness, and abandon their old hypothesis of imputation, with which nobody was ever yet satisfied, and opposition to which has induced some mischievous errors.

The righteousness of Christ, which saves, is his Life, and this life is communicated to others by communion. Jesus was in the bosom of the Father, lived, in a miraculous communion with God, a life which was by its objectivity the life of God, and by its subjectivity the life of man; which yet was a single life, and as we have said, by virtue of the subjectivity of Jesus, a human life. All divine as it was, then, it could pass *naturally* into the life of those with whom he communed, or who communed with him. He was the direct object of communion to the disciples, and through them the indirect object of all who communed with them. Between him and the disciples, and those who had fellowship with the disciples, there must have been then a mutual *solidarity*, a one life flowing through them all.

Now the true Christian Church is composed of all those men and women, who are thus united into *one body* by the unity of the Life, termed by St. Paul "the unity of the Spirit." At first it consisted only of those who had personally communed with Jesus, that is, of his immediate disciples; and then of those who communed, or lived by communing with these; and now of all those between whom and Jesus, through the transmission of life from man to man and generation to generation, the Communion has been instituted and preserved, constituting them all one with each other, and one with Jesus, agreeably to his prayer: "Neither pray I for these (the disciples) alone; but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." \* And also according to the doctrine of Paul; "For as we have many members in one body; so we being many are *one body* in Christ, and *members one of another*." † "For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into *one body*, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free." ‡

No life ever dies. Virtue went out of Jesus through the communion of his disciples with him, never to be recalled. It

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\* John xvii. 21, 22.

† Romans xii. 4, 5.

‡ 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13.

is the Life that saves, the identical Life to which we give the name Jesus. This, when the man Jesus was on the earth, before "he went away," was incarnated in an individual body. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." But it, when the disciples saw their Master go up from them, did not ascend, but remained on the earth, embodied in these very disciples of Jesus, whom he treated not as servants, but as friends, on whom he had breathed, saying, "Receive my spirit." The Life, thus remaining when the personal Jesus departed to his Father, and as God with us, is the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete, Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, that was to lead us into all truth, and which is one with the Son, and one with the Father, but, as the Church has always taught, proceeding forth from the Father and the Son. This is what is termed in Theology "the Procession of the Holy Ghost." The Father through the Miraculous Conception takes Humanity into intimate union with himself, and begets the Son, through whom the Holy Ghost is shed abroad in the hearts of all them that believe, or through the Communion are united into one body.

The Holy Ghost, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, the Life, the indwelling and abiding Jesus, is one and the same. This was to be the life of every true believer. Hence Jesus says to his disciples, when commissioning them as apostles, "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and lo, *I am with you unto the end of the world.*" In this way, Christ Jesus really and literally lives in the life of all true Christians, as much as in the fleshly tabernacle in which he dwelt as Son of Mary, in the days of Peter, James, and John.

The Christian Church is composed of all those who, in any age or nation, by whatsoever name they may be called, live this life; in whom Christ "dwelleth," or is "formed the hope of glory," or who have "that mind in them which was also in Christ Jesus;" to whom Christ is "the power of God, and the wisdom of God;" to whom he is "made of God, wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption." In this view of the case, the Church cannot be a mere assembly or aggregation of individuals; for there is but one Lord, one Spirit that animates them all, and by the unity of the life of Jesus they are united, compacted, solidified into one firm and indissoluble body, according to the assertions of Paul, al-



ready quoted. It is a *one body* composed of many members, but all these are members one of another, and all members of Christ, and united to him as their one living head, from whom is derived all the life of the members. But, if there be only the one life, and all they who live it compose the Church or body of our Lord, it follows that there can be but **ONE Church**; and as this one Church must include all who are members of Christ's body, and as men and women become members everywhere by virtue of communion with the one and the same life, the Church must not only be one, but **CATHOLIC**. The modern notion, that there may be churches many and diverse, in any deep, significant sense of the term, is unwarranted; because it implies that the body of Christ may be cut up, or broken into fragments, and still the warm life-blood circulate uninterrupted throughout the parts. The Church, moreover, is not only one, and catholic, that is, we must not only assert the unity and universality of the Church, as the Roman Catholic Church has always done, but we must also assert its **INSPIRATION**, and therefore, what has always been called, the **SUPREMACY** of the Church. The Church is constituted by the indwelling of Christ the Lord, by living not a life *like* that of Jesus, but the identical life which was made flesh and dwelt among us. This Life is the Spirit of Truth, and just in proportion as it is lived, does it lead into all truth. Inspiration is, we have shown, always through the medium of a life. The Divine Life is in the Church. It is, therefore, inspired through the medium of this Life. Hence, through the Church we have a *continuous inspiration*, not original and immediate, but derivative and mediate, yet full and authoritative. This is the ground of the authority of the Church, and of the ability, and the right consequent upon its ability, to be the interpreter of the Scriptures, and to exercise authority over the soul, reason, conscience, religion, whatever pertains to human development and growth.

2. The relation of the Church to the salvation of the race, and of individuals, must now be obvious. We have already identified Christ and Christianity. There is no separation possible or conceivable even between Christ and Christianity. Christ saves by giving himself, by becoming "**THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS.**" But Christ without the Church would be to us no Christ at all. We cannot commune, we can have no intercourse, with pure spirit. It escapes us on all sides, forever eluding our mental grasp. We know it, commune

with it, only as embodied, incarnated. God outside of the universe is to us an abstraction, a mere nullity ; he is a *reality* to us only as realized, embodied in his works. Abstract creation, abstract the works of God, which are the media through which he reveals himself, and we could have no conception of him. So, when the personal Jesus ascended into heaven, he would have been no more to us, than if he had never been, had he not embodied himself in the Church. All life is derived from him through communion. But where do we meet him ? Where do we commune with him ? We commune with God in his works, especially in man, the direct object of man, and can commune with him nowhere else. Where do we commune with Jesus, but in *his* works, in the Church, which is his creation, his body ? We can approach him only where he is, and where he is only through a medium. He is in the Church, and to us nowhere else ; and the Church, as his body, becomes the medium through which we have access to him, through whom we have access to the Father.

In other words, and perhaps plainer ; the Life is the Saviour, and the Life is obtained only by personal communion with those who live it. These are the Church. It follows then that salvation is possible only on condition of communing with the Church. The life that saves, and the only life that saves, is in the Church ; and, therefore, the Church assumes nothing which it has not a right to assume, when it says that out of the pale of the Church there is no salvation. "I am," says Jesus, "the true vine. Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, and ye are the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit ; for without me ye can do nothing." Now Christ is in those, who through communion have received him, in whom he lives, is embodied. These, we say again, are the Church. We can receive him, then, only by communion with the Church, and can abide in him only by abiding in the Church. Out of the Church we are as the branches severed from the vine, in which is the life of the branches. Out of the Church, then, no salvation.

The same truth is taught by the parable which likens the kingdom of heaven to leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal till the whole was leavened. On what condition could the *whole* be leavened ? Simply on condition that it remained in one mass. Had the woman di-

vided it into two parts, put her leaven in one part, and placed it out of communication with the other, could the whole have been leavened? It is plain then if, as we have proved, that we are saved by living the life of Christ, and if we can live that life only by communion, that out of the Church there is no salvation, for out of the Church no access to the Life that saves. In order to partake of the Life, we must be joined as members to Christ's body.

Here is the profound significance of the Communion, of Excommunication, and of Sects and Schisms. The one steady aim of the Church, as we have said, has been to bring all men to the Communion; its greatest dread has always been of Sects and Schisms, and its severest penalty upon disorderly members, Excommunication. How profoundly true! Communion is the one thing desirable; for it is the medium of life; sects and schisms are fatal to the life, for they mutilate, cut up, or break into fragments the body of our Lord, and prevent the free circulation of the divine life through all its parts; and excommunication is a terrible penalty, for it cuts off the disorderly member from the Communion, and therefore from all chance of salvation. How true, then, is it, that Jesus gave unto the Church, and to Peter, as the representative of the Church, the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and that whatsoever it shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever it shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven! Call not this the false assumption of the Popish Church; it is literally true, and grows out of the very nature and design of the Christian Church. They, who are received into communion with those in whom Christ dwells, do receive of Christ, and by virtue of the Christ received their sins are remitted; and they, whom the Church cuts off from its communion, being debarred from all access to the life, must of necessity remain in the "bonds of iniquity and the gall of bitterness."

Is not the doctrine we here teach the true doctrine? Do we assert, in fact, aught which is not incorporated into the authentic creed of our own age? What is it that hinders the progress of Christian principles? Why does darkness still brood over so many lands, and the voice of man's injustice to man still ring in our ears and pierce our hearts? Is it not all owing to the want of communion? The human family have been broken up into fragments; and the free, mutual intercourse of its members with those who embody the Saviour has been hindered, interrupted by our divisions into

hostile nations ; by family pride, fostered by false political institutions, and the unequal, and therefore unjust, *repartition* of the fruits of industry. Reorganize the state, family, and property, so as to favor the universal communion of man with man, which is only what the age is struggling for under the name of liberty, national, political, civil, social, and the life will have free course and be glorified in the redemption and sanctification of all men. Just in proportion as we extend the Communion, do we become more truly Christian. Commerce and the missionary, literature and the arts, even war and conquest, are in the providence of God made media for extending the intercourse of man with man, and of all quarters of the globe with Christendom. Trade and politics, perhaps aided somewhat by philanthropy, have brought the whole world, to a partial extent, under the same system. The progress of the Russians and English in Asia, of the French in Africa, and the growth of America, compel Europe in settling her own domestic concerns to consult all quarters of the globe. By and by the whole world will be brought under the influence of Christian civilization ; and in each particular nation, national caste, family caste, property caste, the three forms in which Satan wars against the Communion, will be abolished ; and then will Christ no longer have any let or hindrance. Then will all things be subject to him, that God may be all and in all.

We hardly need add that by the Communion we do not mean the Eucharist, but that which the Eucharist symbolizes ; not the *symbolical* communion, but the *real* communion ; not feeding on God, eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Jesus, figuratively, as Protestants pretend, and with which they seem satisfied, but literally, really, actually, according to the very words of Jesus, " Except ye eat my flesh, and drink my blood, ye have no life in you." The real work of bringing men to the Communion is not that of bringing them to celebrate the feast of the Eucharist, but that of so organizing the state, family, and property, that all men may truly commune one with another, and so all men come to love one another, as Jesus hath loved us, and given his life for us.

3. The **AUTHORITY** of the Church will not detain us long. We have already stated its ground. The true Church, living the life of Jesus, as the body of our Lord, whose indwelling life is the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, is an **INSPIRED BODY**. Its life is Christianity, which we have shown is the

form in which the Ideal is revealed to us, and therefore is the authority to which we must submit; because the Ideal, in that it is the Ideal, is necessarily sovereign.

All limited beings are imperfect; all imperfection tends to generate disorder; all disorder is fatal to freedom, and therefore to growth; therefore to the life of the being concerned. The highest freedom, and therefore the highest good of any or all beings, is expressed in that one word, ORDER. Where there is disorder there is confusion, clashing, friction, no freedom; for the action of one is perpetually impeding the action of another. Hence no free and harmonious development and growth. Hence the necessity of order, which allows all to move on, each in its appointed sphere, without clashing with, or infringing upon, the action of another.

To maintain this order, government is necessary, and must needs be that which restrains the tendency we spoke of, and keeps each in its proper sphere. But by the very fact, that the tendency which renders government necessary, grows out of the nature of the beings it concerns, it follows that these beings cannot furnish the government; and therefore government must come from a source above them. For if it came from them, it would have the same imperfection, and the same tendency that they have, and therefore would need to be governed as much as they. Here is the absurdity of all *Individualism*, and of such theories as "self-government," and "government by consent of the governed," whereby government must very humbly crave of the murderer permission to choke him to death! Man can doubtless exercise a control over himself, but only indirectly, through cultivation; for he is never the direct object of his own activity, as he would be in case he could directly govern himself. So a people may doubtless govern itself without kings and nobles; but only indirectly through constitutions, state organization, by which a power that governs is created distinct from the people governed. For that which governs must of necessity be other than that which is governed. If it governs, it must also be supreme, and must restrain; on any other condition it is not government.

Now, the state must use force in case its decrees are resisted. But the employment of force to compel obedience, except in a very few cases, cannot be permitted, without paving the way for gross oppression. It must be restrained to the *material* interests of society and individuals. It must not

extend to spiritual matters, to men's feelings, sentiments, thoughts, opinions, beliefs. Yet these beliefs, opinions, thoughts, sentiments, feelings, are really the great matters. These constitute the man, and the outward actions, which you submit to the control of the State, are only the outward expression of these. To allow the utmost freedom to these, while you restrain the others, were to act, if we may borrow a simile from Milton, as absurdly as he who thought to keep out the crows by shutting his park gates.

Man needs instruction. But all instruction is, from the nature of the case, authoritative. All instruction should also be in relation to the end for which man was made, and should answer the question, "What is the chief end of man?" What is the destiny of man? But if there be nowhere a power that has authority to teach, and that has a full right to demand and to compel, by all moral and spiritual discipline, submission to its teachings, how shall we have any instructions at all? How shall we be able to preserve that order in the spiritual world, without which order in the material world is impossible?

Moreover, we deny that a man has the right to think and believe as he pleases. We deny any man's right to think or to propagate falsehood. He who, having aimed to propagate the truth, and done all in his circumstances he could do to ascertain the truth, will doubtless be pardoned for errors of doctrine, as Abraham was for attempting to offer up his son Isaac; for God is just, and never exacts impossibilities, unless they are voluntarily incurred. Furthermore, we deny the ability of the individual, regarded as a mere isolated individual, to decide for himself on the great and awful question, What is the END to which man must direct all his efforts? He will always decide this question according to his own life, be that life what it will; and therefore if his life be not in the right, be not the true Christian life, his decision will not be the just one.

We have proved over and over again, that we cannot come to the knowledge of the truth but through supernatural Inspiration. This Inspiration, which is through the life of Jesus, we have also proved is in the Church, and it is only by union with the Church that we receive it. He who is separated from the Church, we are speaking now of the true Catholic Church, is destitute of this inspiration, and therefore incapable of answering the question. We then become

able, as individuals, to know the truth only by becoming members of Christ's body.

Now, if we as individuals become able to judge by becoming members of Christ's body, how much more shall the whole body itself be able to judge? This life in each individual is mixed up with that which is local, personal, peculiar, but when it is taken as the life of the whole body, it is taken in its unity and catholicity, and therefore in the purest state in which mortals can obtain it. Hence the decision of the whole Church is always superior to that of the individual, and also the highest authority we have, or can have, in any case whatever.

We then hold that the one Catholic Church, as the body of our Lord, is the authoritative body, the governing body, having, by virtue of the indwelling Christ, the right to decide authoritatively in all matters touching human life, whatever. Inasmuch as we admit the authority of Christianity, so do we admit the authority of the Church, which is the living expression of Christianity. We say the Church has the right, the authority to teach, and to say authoritatively what is the end to which we should direct, socially and individually, all our labors, and to make our Christian character and fellowship depend on our following its prescriptions.

But do you not sacrifice in this the liberty of the individual? What do we mean by the liberty of the individual? The freedom to think and do as he pleases? That were license, not liberty. That he is not accountable for his belief, whatever it is, and that there is no standard to which he is intellectually bound to conform? We should once have answered this question in the affirmative, because we formerly, in our metaphysics, lost sight of the living synthesis of the human soul, and supposed that man was passive in all matters of faith. But we have learned that human nature is one nature, and that man is active in all his phenomena, and therefore his opinions are deeds for which he is as accountable, as for any other deeds. What then do we mean by individual freedom? That the individual shall be compelled neither morally nor physically to submit to an authority not approved by his own conscience? But conscience is uniform only in telling men to do right; as to the practical question, What is right? it varies with each individual. Adopt it as your rule, and you have all the disorder we have complained of; you run into absolute individualism, which is incompatible with all social order, and therefore with all good, whether social or individ-

ual. What then? We know individual freedom in no sense, in which it must not be subjected to the action of authority. The only definition of it we can give is, *Freedom to do whatever the sovereign authority commands or permits*. In the present case individual freedom is simply the right and the liberty to do whatever is authorized or permitted by Christianity, and practically, by the Church. We do not understand, in the spiritual region where we now are, anything of this inherent right to freedom about which men talk. We may say as the Jews did, that "we be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man;" but still we are free only as the Son makes us free, free in the freedom of the Spirit, of Christ, through the Truth. We know no step between this and absolute individualism.

But if the individual is subjected to the authority of the Church, and has no right to depart from its decisions, he has, from the nature of the case, the right to sit in judgment on the question, What is the real decision of the Church? and also on this other question, not less important, What is the meaning of Scripture according to this decision?

We may also say, for the quieting of those who have not learned that liberty can be enjoyed, only as the result of authority which ordains and secures it, that there is never tyranny in enforcing a man to do that which he feels is commanded by the highest authority. The highest authority, the sovereign, we have proved is Christianity, the Ideal, therefore, the Supreme Law of Christendom. The true Catholic Church can and will enjoin only its own Ideal. As this is Christianity, it follows that it neither can nor will enjoin only that which every man in Christendom acknowledges to be the law to which he is accountable. Tyranny on the part of the Church is out of the question. We might as well say that there is tyranny in demanding that a man submit only to the right. There is then no danger to be apprehended to liberty, by any who love truth and progress, though there may be danger to be apprehended by those who love license and anarchy, and who would rather "reign in hell than serve in heaven."

Moreover, we do not assume that the individual may *never* dissent from the Church. All truth is sacred and authoritative. He who has it has a right to entertain and promulgate it, whether it agree with the Church or not. But whoso puts forth doctrines in opposition to, or different from those of the Church, does it at his own peril, and can find his warrant for so doing only in the truth of his utterances. If he is willing to



run the hazard, he will take the responsibility, and speak. If it turn out to be a true word, he will be justified; if false, he will be under condemnation. The prophet is superior to the priest, but then he must be a prophet, — show that he speaks by divine commission, by revealing a life above the life of the Church, the which in Christendom, to say the least, can rarely happen.

The authentic creed of the Church of Christ is that which every man is bound, *in foro conscientiae*, to adopt and to follow, and the Church can never be oppressive in commanding obedience to that creed. This authentic creed is not in the Thirty-Nine Articles, nor in the Westminster Confession of Faith, nor in the formularies of any of the so-named Churches, whether Grecian, Roman, Anglican, or Protestant. And yet it is drawn up, and easily ascertainable. It is written on the very heart of this century, and inscribed on the very front of its literature and science. We read it in every social movement of the age, from the terrible French Revolution down to the Chartist outbreak for bread; and hear it in the clear and piercing tones of every young prophet of God, who rises up and demands a fuller manifestation of divine life, a more general effusion of the Holy Ghost, for the glory of God, and the progress of Humanity. We almost dare ourselves venture to give its formula. We gave it six years ago, in two words, UNION and PROGRESS, the mutual solidarity and continuous progress of the race. We give it now in the words of another, "Christian character consists in unremitting efforts to effect the continued amelioration, in the speediest manner possible, of the moral, intellectual, and physical condition of mankind, especially of the poorest and most numerous class;" or in other words still, SEEK TO BE SAVED FROM SIN, AND TO SECURE THE BLISS OF HEAVEN HEREAFTER, BY DOING THY BEST TO CREATE A HEAVEN FOR ALL MANKIND ON EARTH. This, let men say what they will, is in substance the genuine, the authentic creed of the Church of Christ in the nineteenth century, the only creed that men feel themselves bound to obey, that they have no right to call in question; and it is the only creed that has not ceased to make proselytes. The so-called Churches of Christ are the real, living body of our Lord, so far forth as they adopt this creed, enjoin it, and command obedience to it.

The Church of Christ has, by virtue of its being the Church of the Ideal, the right, and as an outward, visible organization, ought to have the right, to dictate the end here implied, and to declare the means by which we must attempt to real-

ize it ; and it has, and of right ought to have, the *power* to discipline all those who, whether in a private or public capacity, neglect it, fail to adopt measures which tend to promote it, or pretending to favor it, adopt such measures as they must needs see are hostile to it. There is for us no liberty, and no real advance, but on condition of our having such an authority. We need it. We need an authority back of us, that shall make the hard, stony-hearted man of the world tremble before his ill-gotten wealth, and feel that he must disgorge his hoards, and give himself and all he has up to the service of God and man, or have his part with devils and the damned ; — an authority which shall arrest the voluptuary, rolling sin as a sweet morsel under his tongue, and make him feel that he can enter into heaven only through the gates of Chastity and Self-denial ; — a power that shall overawe your selfish demagogue, your ambitious politician, seeking power but for his own aggrandizement, and before which he shall not dare propose other than just ends, or adopt other than just measures. The Church should subject to its severest discipline, or mark with the deepest brand of its utter condemnation, the false-hearted senator, or the base magistrate, who, under pretence of raising the wages of labor and benefiting the workingman, will recommend or support measures, which tax the poor for the rich, and which do necessarily make the poor poorer and the rich richer. No man should be suffered to wear the Christian character in the community, who does not use whatever power he may have been entrusted with, for the greatest good of the poorest and most numerous class of his brethren. There is more than one prominent politician and leader of the business world in this Commonwealth, as well as elsewhere, steeped in corruption, whose constant study is to make the government a mere instrument, by which to plunder the many for the benefit of the few, who nevertheless is fawned upon by a professedly Christian community, courted, praised even by men who call themselves ministers of Jesus ; No pulpit dares rebuke them ; none of our Churches dare subject them to their discipline, to exclude them from the communion, cut them off as gangrenous limbs from the body of our Lord. But there should be a Church clothed with a power over these sons of Satan, before which they should feel weak and helpless, and which, if need were, could grind its foot into their rebellious necks, as the Pope did his into the neck of Frederic Barbarossa. When the outward, visible organization comes to be the real expression of the true Catholic Church, we shall have a

Church that can and will exercise this power of disciplining its disorderly members, — its members who forget the rights and interests of humanity, — to the fullest extent, and with the most salutary effect.

Thus much we have ventured, in opposition to the Protestantism of the country, and the Individualism which we have inherited from our fathers, to say in favor of the unity, catholicity, necessity, and authority of the Church. We have not for twenty years labored, suffered, borne reproach and abuse from all quarters, in behalf of liberty, to desert her sacred standard now, and go over to the camp of our enemies. We fight under our old banner, all torn by its efforts to stream against the wind, as it may be. We belong to the grand army of Progress, of Universal Freedom to Universal Man, ready to do battle in words, and if necessary, in deeds, at any moment, and against every enemy; but we have learned what we did not always know or consider, that *Liberty must be organized or it is license, and ordained by authority, or it has no basis, no safeguard, no guaranty*. In the name, the sacred, the soul-stirring name of Liberty, in which name we feel we have some right to speak, we demand the rehabilitation of the Church. Humanity needs, and has a sacred right to an authoritative Church, that shall inspire a love of mankind, and command all men to labor for the upbuilding and extension of God's kingdom on the earth, — a one Catholic Church, clothed with supreme authority over all matters pertaining to human life, whether spiritual or material. 'This Church, in some sort, already exists in Christendom. The Roman Church, to a great extent, was it down to Leo the Tenth. Since then it has been the Church in the wilderness. None of the organisms now extant, though they contain it, as the grub contains the psyche, are it, and they must be all transformed before they can be the real body of our Lord.

This, we say in conclusion, is the day of the Second Advent. All signs indicate it, all voices proclaim it. Now the Son of Man returns, comes a second time; but not in a body as when born of the Virgin Mary. He comes now in the clouds of heaven, as the lightning flashing upon the world, and rendering its darkness visible. He comes a pure disembodied spirit, seeking a new body, for the old is dead and buried in the tomb of the past. The Church then is now not formed, but in a state of Formation; and our ministry, instead of being that of pastors and teachers, is that of Apostles and Martyrs. The House of the Lord, the Church, — from *Κύριος* and *Οἶκος*, — is not yet rebuilt, and there is no

publicly recognised altar at which we can minister. We are then thrown back on the Apostleship. As Apostles of the **WORD**, we must go forth, in meekness, in love, but bold in the Spirit, justified in the Faith, and mighty through Christ working within, to found the **CHURCH OF THE SECOND ADVENT**. We must go forth, and preach anew Christ crucified, to the Jews, the members and supporters of old organisms, a stumbling block, and to the Greeks, — the wise men of this world, supporters of naturalism, relying on their own resources, — foolishness ; but to them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God ; we must speak out from the fulness of the Spirit, under a sense of the awful responsibility we assume, and of our own insufficiency, in sorrow and heaviness of heart, yet not as cast down nor without hope ; and the immortal atoms of a new moral world will soon begin to gravitate around us, and then will be created the new heavens and the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. The new will gradually absorb or transform the old, and all things will be made new.

We have ventured to pronounce the words, **CHURCH OF THE SECOND ADVENT** ; we have used these words not in the low material sense in which they are used by the Millerites and Latter-day Saints, but in a high, deep, significant, spiritual sense, as indicating a new Epoch in the reign of Christ spiritually in humanity, and a new social organism for the redemption and progress of the race. Young men, men of the Future, behold then your work. This new Church will be founded ; the new House, the second Temple, far surpassing the glory of the first, must be erected, and it is yours to take part in its erection. Thank God, that you are freed from the terrible work which devolved on your fathers, and elder brothers, that of demolishing old institutions, and of living only amid the rubbish. It is yours to be the workmen in building the new Temple, a work in which you will be seconded by the prayers of all good men, by all that is true, beautiful, good, strong, immutable, and immortal on earth or in heaven. The Church universal and eternal will be erected. "The corner stone is laid ; the materials are prepared. Let then the workmen come forth with joy, and bid the Temple rise. Let them embody the true Idea of the **GOD-MAN**, and Christ will then have come a second time ; he will have come in power and great glory, and he will reign, and the whole earth will be glad."\*

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\* *New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church.* Boston : 1836. pp. 66.

But loth as we are to quit this subject, we must draw this article to a close. We have not said all that we wished, nor have we in all cases said what we have, as we would. We have written the larger part of this article under great physical debility, when we were hardly able to sit at our desk. We have been obliged to prepare it in great haste, or not at all, for the time when we must publish it, was not at our control. In the hurry of composition, it can hardly be possible that errors of detail and on minor points have not escaped us. For these we ask indulgence. For all that concerns the general argument, and the leading doctrines set forth, we ask only the most rigid criticism. Taken as a whole we regard it as the most important and the most complete of our theological publications. If read in connexion with the Essay on the Church of the Future, the Review of Charles Elwood, the paper on Leroux's *l'Humanité*, the Letter to Dr. Channing, and the article in the Democratic Review on Schmucker's Psychology, which will appear at the same time with this, it will give those, who wish to know our religious views, all the information they can really need, and will take away all excuse for misapprehending or misrepresenting us hereafter.

As it concerns the author of the work before us, all we have to say is, that we have criticised him freely, perhaps in some instances severely, yet, we trust, not in malice or wrath. We have meant to treat him throughout with the respect due not only from one man or one minister, but from one friend to another. We have had the pleasure of reckoning Mr. Parker among our most warmly cherished friends, almost from his entry into the ministry; and not willingly could we bring ourselves to feel that we are not so to consider him hereafter. We honor, love, and esteem, the man and whenever he shall write a work out from his own life and experience, we know we shall like it. This work is not a genuine production. It has sprung not from his own life and experience, but from his reading, and is that portion of his various reading which his own mind would not digest and assimilate. Deeper in the man is the true religious soul, the high and holy aspiration after truth and excellence. He belongs, notwithstanding the crude speculations of this book, to the great Christian family; and as a brother in Christ we have heretofore considered him, and as such we shall continue to consider him, till we find that his life exhibits no evidence of communion with Jesus.

EDITOR.

## ART. II. — END OF THE VOLUME.

IN announcing that with this Number the publication of the Boston Quarterly Review is discontinued, we offer no valedictory ; for we have no wish to take leave of our readers, nor expectation that they and we are about to part company. Five years' acquaintance ought not to be severed with a stroke of the pen. Most of our readers have had in some degree to share with us in the evil report we have borne, and all men are so made that they can never become wholly indifferent to those with whom they have suffered. The frank manner in which we have spoken, the honesty and truthfulness of our utterances to ourselves, have given our readers an opportunity of knowing us personally, at least so far as worth knowing. The five volumes of the Review now completed, the greater part of which we have ourselves written, must be taken very much in the light of a private Journal. We have spoken as we thought and felt at the time of writing, as unreservedly as if we had been writing in a private Diary, for no eye but our own. Happy is he who can so speak, with less to regret on review, or with less that must expose him to ridicule, censure, or misconstruction. In these volumes we have embodied five years of our life, — our thoughts, our likes and dislikes, our loves and our hates, our aspirations and hopes. They have their faults ; for what life is perfect ? but they have proceeded from a living soul, and a warm heart, and they have in them, let the world say what it will, something of vitality. Crude, ill-tempered, hasty, rash, impetuous, they may be at times ; but when criticism has done its work, when the mists of prejudice have been dissipated, and they stand forth for what

they really are, they will be seen to bear the marks of one, who to many faults joined at least the one virtue of being able, in good report and in evil, in weakness and in strength, in poverty and disgrace, to be true to the great Idea which has possessed him almost from the cradle — that of man's moral, intellectual, and physical amelioration, on earth.

These volumes mark an important epoch in the life of the Editor. Friendless and alone five years ago, he started this Journal; almost friendless and alone has he continued it to this time; and he parts with it not without a pang, like that with which one looks for the last time upon the face of a dear friend. Nevertheless he owes to this Review some years of a life, for the most part dark and full of trouble, of very high enjoyment, intellectual and moral. And if it has raised him up enemies, it has also brought him some warm-hearted friends, on whom he can count, and whose friendship is ample remuneration for any measure of abuse that has been or can be received. We were wrong in saying that we had continued the work almost without friends. It is not so. Every one who has continued to go with us, has become in some sort a personal friend, and the great body of the American people will one day be among the number of our friends; for we have a true American heart, and feel a fraternal relation with them all. Pardon this egotism, which the very wide abuse we have at times received in some degree renders excusable.

Nevertheless, we are not to part company with the readers of the Boston Quarterly. With this number will be sent to our subscribers the October number of the Democratic Review, in which our publication will hereafter be merged. An arrangement to this effect has been made with the proprietors of that Journal, very much to our satisfaction, and which promises to be much to our pecuniary advantage.

An arrangement is also made with the Editor of the Democratic Review, by which the Editor of this Journal is to be a regular contributor to its pages, and by which he is to be permitted to select his own topics of discussion, and to discuss them in his own way, as freely as if it were his own Journal. The much wider circulation of the Democratic Review, than has been attained by ours, makes this arrangement very desirable to us, because it gives us a much larger, — though not a better, — public to address, and nothing will be wanting to complete our happiness, if our old friends go with us. They must do so, for we should hardly know how to speak, if we did not feel that we were still speaking to those to whom our tones, all unmusical as they are, have become familiar, and not altogether unpleasant.

The Democratic Review is published at New York, by J. & H. G. Langley, 57 Chatham Street, monthly, at Five Dollars a year. Our own contributions to it will be almost as much as we usually contribute to the Quarterly, and the subscribers will obtain as much matter for five dollars, as we have furnished them for twelve or fifteen. The work is very neatly printed, and ably and judiciously edited by John L. O'Sullivan, Esq., who has proved himself a pleasing, able, and vigorous writer, an accomplished scholar, and a man of great moral purity, force, and elevation; liberal and catholic in his feelings; firm, decided, independent, uncompromising in his principles. American literature can boast few names that promise more than his. Five years' experience as Editor of the Democratic Review, and the brilliant success which has attended his labors, amply justify our estimation of his worth and ability. In addition to his own essays, the Democratic Review is enriched by contributions from the first lite



rary men in the country, such, for instance, as Alexander H. Everett, Bancroft, Cooper, Cass, Hawthorne, Bryant, Goodwin, &c.

The Democratic Review is the organ of the Democratic party, and has therefore of course a decided political character; but it must not be supposed from this, that it is entirely taken up with political discussions. It is a magazine, and devoted principally to general literature. In it, Bryant, Whittier, and others, publish their poetry, and in it we intend publishing our general system of philosophy and metaphysics, the Introduction to which appears in the number for October. It stands already at the head of the Monthly Magazines in this country, and it is the intention of its persevering and energetic Editor, that no pains shall be spared to make it in every way worthy of the party whose organ it is, of the rising literature of the country, and of the active, intense, yet catholic spirit of the age. If anything could make us not regret parting with our own Review, it is that we are to aid in a work so respectable, and be in some measure also united with a man, scholar, and politician, whom we so highly esteem as its accomplished and independent Editor.

With these remarks, we take our leave for the present of our readers, with the hope of meeting them again on the first of each month, in a company both they and we shall love.

O. A. BROWNSON.

J.W.











